the six enneads-第128章

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e　will　certainly　be　locomotion　at　first；　but　it　will　be　succeeded　by　something　different；　just　as　in　growth　locomotion　is　found　at　the　outset；　though　later　it　is　supplanted　by　quantitative　motion。　The　present　case　is　similar：　locomotion　leads　the　way；　but　integration　or　disintegration　does　not　inevitably　follow；　integration　takes　place　only　when　the　impinging　elements　become　intertwined；　disintegration　only　when　they　are　rent　asunder　by　the　contact。　　　　　On　the　other　hand；　it　often　happens　that　locomotion　follows　disintegration；　or　else　occurs　simultaneously；　though　the　experience　of　the　disintegrated　is　not　conceived　in　terms　of　locomotion：　so　too　in　integration　a　distinct　experience；　a　distinct　unification；　accompanies　the　locomotion　and　remains　separate　from　it。　　　　　Are　we　then　to　posit　a　new　species　for　these　two　motions；　adding　to　them；　perhaps；　alteration？　A　thing　is　altered　by　becoming　dense…　in　other　words；　by　integration；　it　is　altered　again　by　being　rarefied…　that　is；　by　disintegration。　When　wine　and　water　are　mixed；　something　is　produced　different　from　either　of　the　pre…existing　elements：　thus；　integration　takes　place；　resulting　in　alteration。　　　　　But　perhaps　we　should　recall　a　previous　distinction；　and　while　holding　that　integrations　and　disintegrations　precede　alterations；　should　maintain　that　alterations　are　nonetheless　distinct　from　either；　that；　further；　not　every　alteration　is　of　this　type　＇presupposing；　that　is　to　say；　integration　or　disintegration＇；　and；　in　particular；　rarefication　and　condensation　are　not　identical　with　disintegration　and　integration；　nor　in　any　sense　derived　from　them：　to　suppose　that　they　were　would　involve　the　admission　of　a　vacuum。　　　　　Again；　can　we　use　integration　and　disintegration　to　explain　blackness　and　whiteness？　But　to　doubt　the　independent　existence　of　these　qualities　means　that；　beginning　with　colours；　we　may　end　by　annihilating　almost　all　qualities；　or　rather　all　without　exception；　for　if　we　identify　every　alteration；　or　qualitative　change；　with　integration　and　disintegration；　we　allow　nothing　whatever　to　come　into　existence；　the　same　elements　persist；　nearer　or　farther　apart。　　　　　Finally；　how　is　it　possible　to　class　learning　and　being　taught　as　integrations？　　　　　26。　We　may　now　take　the　various　specific　types　of　Motion；　such　as　locomotion；　and　once　again　enquire　for　each　one　whether　it　is　not　to　be　divided　on　the　basis　of　direction；　up；　down；　straight；　circular…　a　question　already　raised；　whether　the　organic　motion　should　be　distinguished　from　the　inorganic…　they　are　clearly　not　alike；　whether；　again；　organic　motions　should　be　subdivided　into　walking；　swimming　and　flight。　　　　　Perhaps　we　should　also　distinguish；　in　each　species；　natural　from　unnatural　motions：　this　distinction　would　however　imply　that　motions　have　differences　which　are　not　external。　It　may　indeed　be　the　case　that　motions　create　these　differences　and　cannot　exist　without　them；　but　Nature　may　be　supposed　to　be　the　ultimate　source　of　motions　and　differences　alike。　　　　　Motions　may　also　be　classed　as　natural；　artificial　and　purposive：　〃natural〃　embracing　growth　and　decay；　〃artificial〃　architecture　and　shipbuilding；　〃purposive〃　enquiry；　learning；　government；　and；　in　general；　all　speech　and　action。　　　　　Again；　with　regard　to　growth；　alteration　and　birth；　the　division　may　proceed　from　the　natural　and　unnatural；　or；　speaking　generally；　from　the　characters　of　the　moved　objects。　　　　　27。　What　view　are　we　to　take　of　that　which　is　opposed　to　Motion；　whether　it　be　Stability　or　Rest？　Are　we　to　consider　it　as　a　distinct　genus；　or　to　refer　it　to　one　of　the　genera　already　established？　We　should；　no　doubt；　be　well　advised　to　assign　Stability　to　the　Intellectual；　and　to　look　in　the　lower　sphere　for　Rest　alone。　　　　　First；　then；　we　have　to　discover　the　precise　nature　of　this　Rest。　If　it　presents　itself　as　identical　with　Stability；　we　have　no　right　to　expect　to　find　it　in　the　sphere　where　nothing　is　stable　and　the　apparently　stable　has　merely　a　less　strenuous　motion。　　　　　Suppose　the　contrary：　we　decide　that　Rest　is　different　from　Stability　inasmuch　as　Stability　belongs　to　the　utterly　immobile；　Rest　to　the　stationary　which；　though　of　a　nature　to　move；　does　not　move。　Now；　if　Rest　means　coming　to　rest；　it　must　be　regarded　as　a　motion　which　has　not　yet　ceased　but　still　continues；　but　if　we　suppose　it　to　be　incompatible　with　Motion；　we　have　first　to　ask　whether　there　is　in　the　Sensible　world　anything　without　motion。　　　　　Yet　nothing　can　experience　every　type　of　motion；　certain　motions　must　be　ruled　out　in　order　that　we　may　speak　of　the　moving　object　as　existing：　may　we　not；　then；　say　of　that　which　has　no　locomotion　and　is　at　rest　as　far　as　pertains　to　that　specific　type　of　motion；　simply　that　it　does　not　move？　　　　　Rest；　accordingly；　is　the　negation　of　Motion：　in　other　words；　it　has　no　generic　status。　It　is　in　fact　related　only　to　one　type　of　motion；　namely；　locomotion；　it　is　therefore　the　negation　of　this　motion　that　is　meant。　　　　　But；　it　may　be　asked；　why　not　regard　Motion　as　the　negation　of　Stability？　We　reply　that　Motion　does　not　appear　alone；　it　is　accompanied　by　a　force　which　actualizes　its　object；　forcing　it　on；　as　it　were；　giving　it　a　thousand　forms　and　destroying　them　all：　Rest；　on　the　contrary；　comports　nothing　but　the　object　itself；　and　signifies　merely　that　the　object　has　no　motion。　　　　　Why；　then；　did　we　not　in　discussing　the　Intellectual　realm　assert　that　Stability　was　the　negation　of　Motion？　Because　it　is　not　indeed　possible　to　consider　Stability　as　an　annulling　of　Motion；　for　when　Motion　ceases　Stability　does　not　exist；　but　requires　for　its　own　existence　the　simultaneous　existence　of　Motion；　and　what　is　of　a　nature　to　move　is　not　stationary　because　Stability　of　that　realm　is　motionless；　but　because　Stability　has　taken　hold　of　it；　in　so　far　as　it　has　Motion；　it　will　never　cease　to　move：　thus；　it　is　stationary　under　the　influence　of　Stability；　and　moves　under　the　influence　of　Motion。　In　the　lower　realm；　too；　a　thing　moves　in　virtue　of　Motion；　but　its　Rest　is　caused　by　a　deficiency；　it　has　been　deprived　of　its　due　motion。　　　　　What　we　have　to　observe　is　the　essential　character　of　this　Sensible　counterpart　of　Stability。　　　　　Consider　sickness　and　health。　The　convalescent　moves　in　the　sense　that　he　passes　from　sickness　to　health。　What　species　of　rest　are　we　to　oppose　to　this　convalescence？　If　we　oppose　the　condition　from　which　he　departs；　that　condition　is　sickness；　not　Stability；　if　that　into　which　he　passes；　it　is　health；　again　not　the　same　as　Stability。　　　　　It　may　be　declared　that　health　or　sickness　is　indeed　some　form　of　Stability：　we　are　to　suppose；　then；　that　Stability　is　the　genus　of　which　health　and　sickness　are　species；　which　is　absurd。　　　　　Stability　may；　again；　be　regarded　as　an　attribute　of　health：　according　to　this　view；　health　will　not　be　health　before　possessing　Stability。　　　　　These　questions　may　however　be　left　to　the　judgement　of　the　individual。　　　　　28。　We　have　already　indicated　that　Activity　and　Passivity　are　to　be　regarded　as　motions；　and　that　it　is　possible　to　distinguish　absolute　motions；　actions；　passions。　　　　　As　for　the　remaining　so…called　genera；　we　have　shown　that　they　are　reducible　to　those　which　we　have　posited。　　　　　With　regard　to　the　relative；　we　have　maintained　that　Relation　belongs　to　one　object　as　compared　with　another；　that　the　two　objects　coexist　simultaneously；　and　that　Relation　is　found　wherever　a　substance　is　in　such　a　condition　as　to　produce　it；　not　that　the　substance　is　a　relative；　except　in　so　far　as　it　constitutes　part　of　a　whole…　a　hand；　for　example；　or　head　or　cause　or　principle　or　element。　　　　　We　may　also　adopt　the　ancient　division　of　relatives　into　creative　principles；　measures；　excesses　and　deficiencies；　and　those　which　in　general　separate　objects　on　the　basis　of　similarities　and　differences。　　　　　Our　investigation　into　the　kinds　of　Being　is　now　complete。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FOURTH　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　THE　INTEGRAL　OMNIPRESENCE　OF　THE　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　AUTHENTIC　EXISTENT　（1）。

　　　　1。　How　are　we　to　explain　the　omnipresence　of　the　soul？　Does　it　depend　upon　the　definite　magnitude　of　the　material　universe　coupled　with　some　native　tendency　in　soul　to　distribute　itself　over　material　mass；　or　is　it　a　characteristic　of　soul　apart　from　body？　　　　　In　the　latter　case；　soul　will　not　appear　just　where　body　may　bring　it；　body　will　meet　soul　awaiting　it　everywhere；　wheresoever　body　finds　place；　there　soul　lay　before　ever　body　was；　the　entire　material　mass　of　the　universe　has　been　set　into　an　existent　soul。　　　　　But　if　soul　spread　thus　wide　before　material　extension　existed；　then　as　covering　all　space　it　would　seem　to　be　of　itself　a　thing　of　magnitude；　and　in　what　mode　could　it　exist　in　the　All　before　the　All　was　in　being；　before　there　was　any　All？　And　who　can　accept　a　soul　described　as　partless　and　massless　and　yet；　for　all　that　absence　of　extension；　extending　over　a　universe？　We　may　perhaps　be　told　that；　though　extended　over　the　corporeal；　it　does　not　itself　become　so：　but　thus　to　give　it　magnitude　as　an　accidental　attribute　leaves　the　problem　still　unsolved：　precisely　the　same　question　must　in　all　reason　arise：　How　can　the　soul　take　magnitude　even　in　the　move　of　accident？　　　　　We　cannot　think　of　soul　being　diffused　as　a　quality　is；　say　sweetness　or　colour；　for　while　these　are　actual　states　of　the　masses　affected　so　that　they　show　that　quality　at　every　point；　none　of　them　has　an　independent　existence；　they　are　attributes　of　body　and　known　only　as　in　body；　such　quality　is　necessarily　of　a　definite　extension。　Further；　the　colour　at　any　point　is　independent　of　that　at　any　other；　no　doubt　the　Form；　White；　is　the　same　all　over；　but　there　is　not　arithmetical　identity；　in　soul　there　is；　it　is　one　soul　in　foot　and　in　hand；　as　the　facts　of　perception　show。　And　yet　in　the　case　of　qualities　the　one　is　observably　distributed　part　for　part；　in　the　soul　the　identity　is　undistributed；　what　we　sometimes　call　distribution　is　simply　omnipresence。　　　　　Obviously；　we　must　take　hold　of　the　question　from　the　very　beginning　in　the　hope　of　finding　some　clear　and　convincing　theory　as　to　how　soul；　immaterial　and　without　magnitude；　can　be　thus　broad…spread；　whether　before　material　masses　exist　or　as　enveloping　them。　Of　course；　should　it　appear　that　this　omnipresence　may　occur　apart　from　material　things；　there　is　no　difficulty　in　accepting　its　occurrence　within　the　material。　　　　　2。　Side　by　side　exist　the　Authentic　All　and　its　counterpart；　the　visible　universe。　The　Authentic　is　contained　in　nothing；　since　nothing　existed　before　it；　of　necessity　anything　coming　after　it　must；　as　a　first　condition　of　existence；　be　contained　by　this　All；　especially　since　it　depends　upon　the　Authentic　and　without　that　could　have　neither　stability　nor　movement。　　　　　We　may　be　reminded　that　the　universe　cannot　be　contained　in　the　Authentic　as　in　a　place；　where　place　would　mean　the　boundaries　of　some　surrounding　extension　considered　as　an　envelope；　or　some　space　formerly　a　part　of　the　Void　and　still　remaining　unoccupied　even　after　the　emergence　of　the　universe；　that　it　can　only　support　itself；　as　it　were；　upon　the　Authentic　and　rest　in　the　embrace　of　its　omnipresence；　but　this　objection　is　merely　verbal　and　will　disappear　if　our　meaning　is　grasped；　we　mention　it　f