the six enneads-第124章

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　prior　to　the　individual：　but　what　is　prior　by　nature　is　prior　unconditionally。　How　then　can　the　Form　take　a　lower　rank？　The　individual；　it　is　true；　is　prior　in　the　sense　of　being　more　readily　accessible　to　our　cognisance；　this　fact；　however；　entails　no　objective　difference。　　　　　Moreover；　such　a　difference；　if　established；　would　be　incompatible　with　a　single　Reason…Principle　of　Substance；　First　and　Second　Substance　could　not　have　the　same　Principle；　nor　be　brought　under　a　single　genus。　　　　　10。　Another　method　of　division　is　possible：　substances　may　be　classed　as　hot…dry；　dry…cold；　cold…moist；　or　however　we　choose　to　make　the　coupling。　We　may　then　proceed　to　the　combination　and　blending　of　these　couples；　either　halting　at　that　point　and　going　no　further　than　the　compound；　or　else　subdividing　by　habitation…　on　the　earth；　in　the　earth…　or　by　form　and　by　the　differences　exhibited　by　living　beings；　not　qua　living；　but　in　their　bodies　viewed　as　instruments　of　life。　　　　　Differentiation　by　form　or　shape　is　no　more　out　of　place　than　a　division　based　on　qualities…　heat；　cold　and　the　like。　If　it　be　objected　that　qualities　go　to　make　bodies　what　they　are；　then；　we　reply；　so　do　blendings；　colours；　shapes。　Since　our　discussion　is　concerned　with　Sensible　Substance；　it　is　not　strange　that　it　should　turn　upon　distinctions　related　to　sense…perception：　this　Substance　is　not　Being　pure　and　simple；　but　the　Sensible　Being　which　we　call　the　Universe。　　　　　We　have　remarked　that　its　apparent　subsistence　is　in　fact　an　assemblage　of　Sensibles；　their　existence　guaranteed　to　us　by　sense…perception。　But　since　their　combination　is　unlimited；　our　division　must　be　guided　by　the　Form…Ideas　of　living　beings；　as　for　example　the　Form…Idea　of　Man　implanted　in　Body；　the　particular　Form　acts　as　a　qualification　of　Body；　but　there　is　nothing　unreasonable　in　using　qualities　as　a　basis　of　division。　　　　　We　may　be　told　that　we　have　distinguished　between　simple　and　composite　bodies；　even　ranking　them　as　opposites。　But　our　distinction；　we　reply；　was　between　material　and　organic　bodies　and　raised　no　question　of　the　composite。　In　fact；　there　exists　no　means　of　opposing　the　composite　to　the　simple；　it　is　necessary　to　determine　the　simples　in　the　first　stage　of　division；　and　then；　combining　them　on　the　basis　of　a　distinct　underlying　principle；　to　differentiate　the　composites　in　virtue　of　their　places　and　shapes；　distinguishing　for　example　the　heavenly　from　the　earthly。　　　　　These　observations　will　suffice　for　the　Being　＇Substance＇；　or　rather　the　Becoming；　which　obtains　in　the　Sensible　realm。　　　　　11。　Passing　to　Quantity　and　the　quantum；　we　have　to　consider　the　view　which　identifies　them　with　number　and　magnitude　on　the　ground　that　everything　quantitative　is　numbered　among　Sensible　things　or　rated　by　the　extension　of　its　substrate：　we　are　here；　of　course；　discussing　not　Quantity　in　isolation；　but　that　which　causes　a　piece　of　wood　to　be　three　yards　long　and　gives　the　five　in　〃five　horses；〃　　　　　Now　we　have　often　maintained　that　number　and　magnitude　are　to　be　regarded　as　the　only　true　quantities；　and　that　Space　and　Time　have　no　right　to　be　conceived　as　quantitative：　Time　as　the　measure　of　Motion　should　be　assigned　to　Relation；　while　Space；　being　that　which　circumscribes　Body；　is　also　a　relative　and　falls　under　the　same　category；　though　continuous；　it　is；　like　Motion；　not　included　in　Quantity。　　　　　On　the　other　hand；　why　do　we　not　find　in　the　category　of　Quantity　〃great〃　and　〃small〃？　It　is　some　kind　of　Quantity　which　gives　greatness　to　the　great；　greatness　is　not　a　relative；　though　greater　and　smaller　are　relatives；　since　these；　like　doubleness；　imply　an　external　correlative。　　　　　What　is　it；　then；　which　makes　a　mountain　small　and　a　grain　of　millet　large？　Surely；　in　the　first　place；　〃small〃　is　equivalent　to　〃smaller。〃　It　is　admitted　that　the　term　is　applied　only　to　things　of　the　same　kind；　and　from　this　admission　we　may　infer　that　the　mountain　is　〃smaller〃　rather　than　〃small；〃　and　that　the　grain　of　millet　is　not　large　in　any　absolute　sense　but　large　for　a　grain　of　millet。　In　other　words；　since　the　comparison　is　between　things　of　the　same　kind；　the　natural　predicate　would　be　a　comparative。　　　　　Again；　why　is　not　beauty　classed　as　a　relative？　Beauty；　unlike　greatness；　we　regard　as　absolute　and　as　a　quality；　〃more　beautiful〃　is　the　relative。　Yet　even　the　term　〃beautiful〃　may　be　attached　to　something　which　in　a　given　relation　may　appear　ugly：　the　beauty　of　man；　for　example；　is　ugliness　when　compared　with　that　of　the　gods；　〃the　most　beautiful　of　monkeys；〃　we　may　quote；　〃is　ugly　in　comparison　with　any　other　type。〃　Nonetheless；　a　thing　is　beautiful　in　itself；　as　related　to　something　else　it　is　either　more　or　less　beautiful。　　　　　Similarly；　an　object　is　great　in　itself；　and　its　greatness　is　due；　not　to　any　external；　but　to　its　own　participation　in　the　Absolute　Great。　　　　　Are　we　actually　to　eliminate　the　beautiful　on　the　pretext　that　there　is　a　more　beautiful？　No　more　then　must　we　eliminate　the　great　because　of　the　greater：　the　greater　can　obviously　have　no　existence　whatever　apart　from　the　great；　just　as　the　more　beautiful　can　have　no　existence　without　the　beautiful。　　　　　12。　It　follows　that　we　must　allow　contrariety　to　Quantity：　whenever　we　speak　of　great　and　small；　our　notions　acknowledge　this　contrariety　by　evolving　opposite　images；　as　also　when　we　refer　to　many　and　few；　indeed；　〃few〃　and　〃many〃　call　for　similar　treatment　to　〃small〃　and　〃great。〃　　　　　〃Many；〃　predicated　of　the　inhabitants　of　a　house；　does　duty　for　〃more〃：　〃few〃　people　are　said　to　be　in　the　theatre　instead　of　〃less。〃　　　　　〃Many；〃　again；　necessarily　involves　a　large　numerical　plurality。　This　plurality　can　scarcely　be　a　relative；　it　is　simply　an　expansion　of　number；　its　contrary　being　a　contraction。　　　　　The　same　applies　to　the　continuous　＇magnitude＇；　the　notion　of　which　entails　prolongation　to　a　distant　point。　　　　　Quantity；　then；　appears　whenever　there　is　a　progression　from　the　unit　or　the　point：　if　either　progression　comes　to　a　rapid　halt；　we　have　respectively　〃few〃　and　〃small〃；　if　it　goes　forward　and　does　not　quickly　cease；　〃many〃　and　〃great。〃　　　　　What；　we　may　be　asked；　is　the　limit　of　this　progression？　What；　we　retort；　is　the　limit　of　beauty；　or　of　heat？　Whatever　limit　you　impose；　there　is　always　a　〃hotter〃；　yet　〃hotter〃　is　accounted　a　relative；　〃hot〃　a　pure　quality。　　　　　In　sum；　just　as　there　is　a　Reason…Principle　of　Beauty；　so　there　must　be　a　Reason…Principle　of　greatness；　participation　in　which　makes　a　thing　great；　as　the　Principle　of　beauty　makes　it　beautiful。　　　　　To　judge　from　these　instances；　there　is　contrariety　in　Quantity。　Place　we　may　neglect　as　not　strictly　coming　under　the　category　of　Quantity；　if　it　were　admitted；　〃above〃　could　only　be　a　contrary　if　there　were　something　in　the　universe　which　was　〃below〃：　as　referring　to　the　partial；　the　terms　〃above〃　and　〃below〃　are　used　in　a　purely　relative　sense；　and　must　go　with　〃right〃　and　〃left〃　into　the　category　of　Relation。　　　　　Syllable　and　discourse　are　only　indirectly　quantities　or　substrates　of　Quantity；　it　is　voice　that　is　quantitative：　but　voice　is　a　kind　of　Motion；　it　must　accordingly　in　any　case　＇quantity　or　no　quantity＇　be　referred　to　Motion；　as　must　activity　also。　　　　　13。　It　has　been　remarked　that　the　continuous　is　effectually　distinguished　from　the　discrete　by　their　possessing　the　one　a　common；　the　other　a　separate；　limit。　　　　　The　same　principle　gives　rise　to　the　numerical　distinction　between　odd　and　even；　and　it　holds　good　that　if　there　are　differentiae　found　in　both　contraries；　they　are　either　to　be　abandoned　to　the　objects　numbered；　or　else　to　be　considered　as　differentiae　of　the　abstract　numbers；　and　not　of　the　numbers　manifested　in　the　sensible　objects。　If　the　numbers　are　logically　separable　from　the　objects；　that　is　no　reason　why　we　should　not　think　of　them　as　sharing　the　same　differentiae。　　　　　But　how　are　we　to　differentiate　the　continuous；　comprising　as　it　does　line；　surface　and　solid？　The　line　may　be　rated　as　of　one　dimension；　the　surface　as　of　two　dimensions；　the　solid　as　of　three；　if　we　are　only　making　a　calculation　and　do　not　suppose　that　we　are　dividing　the　continuous　into　its　species；　for　it　is　an　invariable　rule　that　numbers；　thus　grouped　as　prior　and　posterior；　cannot　be　brought　into　a　common　genus；　there　is　no　common　basis　in　first；　second　and　third　dimensions。　Yet　there　is　a　sense　in　which　they　would　appear　to　be　equal…　namely；　as　pure　measures　of　Quantity：　of　higher　and　lower　dimensions；　they　are　not　however　more　or　less　quantitative。　　　　　Numbers　have　similarly　a　common　property　in　their　being　numbers　all；　and　the　truth　may　well　be；　not　that　One　creates　two；　and　two　creates　three；　but　that　all　have　a　common　source。　　　　　Suppose；　however；　that　they　are　not　derived　from　any　source　whatever；　but　merely　exist；　we　at　any　rate　conceive　them　as　being　derived；　and　so　may　be　assumed　to　regard　the　smaller　as　taking　priority　over　the　greater：　yet；　even　so；　by　the　mere　fact　of　their　being　numbers　they　are　reducible　to　a　single　type。　　　　　What　applies　to　numbers　is　equally　true　of　magnitudes；　though　here　we　have　to　distinguish　between　line；　surface　and　solid…　the　last　also　referred　to　as　〃body〃…　in　the　ground　that；　while　all　are　magnitudes；　they　differ　specifically。　　　　　It　remains　to　enquire　whether　these　species　are　themselves　to　be　divided：　the　line　into　straight；　circular；　spiral；　the　surface　into　rectilinear　and　circular　figures；　the　solid　into　the　various　solid　figures…　sphere　and　polyhedra：　whether　these　last　should　be　subdivided；　as　by　the　geometers；　into　those　contained　by　triangular　and　quadrilateral　planes：　and　whether　a　further　division　of　the　latter　should　be　performed。　　　　　14。　How　are　we　to　classify　the　straight　line？　Shall　we　deny　that　it　is　a　magnitude？　　　　　The　suggestion　may　be　made　that　it　is　a　qualified　magnitude。　May　we　not；　then；　consider　straightness　as　a　differentia　of　〃line〃？　We　at　any　rate　draw　on　Quality　for　differentiae　of　Substance。　　　　　The　straight　line　is；　thus；　a　quantity　plus　a　differentia；　but　it　is　not　on　that　account　a　composite　made　up　of　straightness　and　line：　if　it　be　a　composite；　the　composite　possesses　a　differentiae　of　its　own。　　　　　But　＇if　the　line　is　a　quantity＇　why　is　not　the　product　of　three　lines　included　in　Quantity？　The　answer　is　that　a　triangle　consists　not　merely　of　three　lines　but　of　three　lines　in　a　particular　disposition；　a　quadrilateral　of　four　lines　in　a　particular　disposition：　even　the　straight　line　involves　disposition　as　well　as　quantity。　　　　　Holding　that　the　straight　line　is　not　mere　quantity；　we　should　naturally　proceed　to　assert　that　the　line　as　limited　is　not　mere　quantity；　but　for　the　fact　that　the　limit　of　a　line　is　a　point；　which　is　in　the　same　category；　Quantity。　Similarly；　the　limited　surface　will　be　a　quantity；　since　lines；　which　have　a　far　better　right　than　itself　to　this　category；　constitute　its　limits。　With　the　introduction　of　the　limited　surface…　rectangle；　hexagon；　polygon…　into　the　category　of　Quantity；　this　category　will　be　brought　to　include　every　figure　whatsoever。　　　　　If　however　by　classing　the　triangle　and　the　rectangle　as　qualia　we　propose　to　bring　figures　under　Quality；　we　are　not　thereby　precluded　from　assigning　the　same　object　to　more　categories　than　one：　in　so　far　as　it　is　a　magnitude…　a　magnitude　of　such