the six enneads-第120章

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Stability：　neither　Stability　nor　Motion　is　a　mere　modification　of　Being。　Similarly；　Identity　and　Difference　are　not　later　additions：　Being　did　not　grow　into　plurality；　its　very　unity　was　a　plurality；　but　plurality　implies　Difference；　and　unity…in…plurality　involves　Identity。　　　　　Substance　＇Real　Being＇　requires　no　more　than　these　five　constituents；　but　when　we　have　to　turn　to　the　lower　sphere；　we　find　other　principles　giving　rise　no　longer　to　Substance　（as　such）　but　to　quantitative　Substance　and　qualitative：　these　other　principles　may　be　regarded　as　genera　but　not　primary　genera。　　　　　16。　As　for　Relation；　manifestly　an　offshoot；　how　can　it　be　included　among　primaries？　Relation　is　of　thing　ranged　against　thing；　it　is　not　self…pivoted；　but　looks　outward。　　　　　Place　and　Date　are　still　more　remote　from　Being。　Place　denotes　the　presence　of　one　entity　within　another；　so　that　it　involves　a　duality；　but　a　genus　must　be　a　unity；　not　a　composite。　Besides；　Place　does　not　exist　in　the　higher　sphere；　and　the　present　discussion　is　concerned　with　the　realm　of　True　Being。　　　　　Whether　time　is　There；　remains　to　be　considered。　Apparently　it　has　less　claim　than　even　Place。　If　it　is　a　measurement；　and　that　a　measurement　of　Motion；　we　have　two　entities；　the　whole　is　a　composite　and　posterior　to　Motion；　therefore　it　is　not　on　an　equal　footing　with　Motion　in　our　classification。　　　　　Action　and　Passivity　presuppose　Motion；　if；　then；　they　exist　in　the　higher　sphere；　they　each　involve　a　duality；　neither　is　a　simplex。　　　　　Possession　is　a　duality；　while　Situation；　as　signifying　one　thing　situated　in　another；　is　a　threefold　conception。　　　　　17。　Why　are　not　beauty；　goodness　and　the　virtues；　together　with　knowledge　and　intelligence；　included　among　the　primary　genera？　　　　　If　by　goodness　we　mean　The　First…　what　we　call　the　Principle　of　Goodness；　the　Principle　of　which　we　can　predicate　nothing；　giving　it　this　name　only　because　we　have　no　other　means　of　indicating　it…　then　goodness；　clearly；　can　be　the　genus　of　nothing：　this　principle　is　not　affirmed　of　other　things；　if　it　were；　each　of　these　would　be　Goodness　itself。　The　truth　is　that　it　is　prior　to　Substance；　not　contained　in　it。　If；　on　the　contrary；　we　mean　goodness　as　a　quality；　no　quality　can　be　ranked　among　the　primaries。　　　　　Does　this　imply　that　the　nature　of　Being　is　not　good？　Not　good；　to　begin　with；　in　the　sense　in　which　The　First　is　good；　but　in　another　sense　of　the　word：　moreover；　Being　does　not　possess　its　goodness　as　a　quality　but　as　a　constituent。　　　　　But　the　other　genera　too；　we　said；　are　constituents　of　Being；　and　are　regarded　as　genera　because　each　is　a　common　property　found　in　many　things。　If　then　goodness　is　similarly　observed　in　every　part　of　Substance　or　Being；　or　in　most　parts；　why　is　goodness　not　a　genus；　and　a　primary　genus？　Because　it　is　not　found　identical　in　all　the　parts　of　Being；　but　appears　in　degrees；　first；　second　and　subsequent；　whether　it　be　because　one　part　is　derived　from　another…　posterior　from　prior…　or　because　all　are　posterior　to　the　transcendent　Unity；　different　parts　of　Being　participating　in　it　in　diverse　degrees　corresponding　to　their　characteristic　natures。　　　　　If　however　we　must　make　goodness　a　genus　as　well　＇as　a　transcendent　source＇；　it　will　be　a　posterior　genus；　for　goodness　is　posterior　to　Substance　and　posterior　to　what　constitutes　the　generic　notion　of　Being；　however　unfailingly　it　be　found　associated　with　Being；　but　the　Primaries；　we　decided；　belong　to　Being　as　such；　and　go　to　form　Substance。　　　　　This　indeed　is　why　we　posit　that　which　transcends　Being；　since　Being　and　Substance　cannot　but　be　a　plurality；　necessarily　comprising　the　genera　enumerated　and　therefore　forming　a　one…and…many。　　　　　It　is　true　that　we　do　not　hesitate　to　speak　of　the　goodness　inherent　in　Being〃　when　we　are　thinking　of　that　Act　by　which　Being　tends；　of　its　nature；　towards　the　One：　thus；　we　affirm　goodness　of　it　in　the　sense　that　it　is　thereby　moulded　into　the　likeness　of　The　Good。　But　if　this　〃goodness　inherent　in　Being〃　is　an　Act　directed　toward　The　Good；　it　is　the　life　of　Being：　but　this　life　is　Motion；　and　Motion　is　already　one　of　the　genera。　　　　　18。　To　pass　to　the　consideration　of　beauty：　　　　　If　by　beauty　we　mean　the　primary　Beauty；　the　same　or　similar　arguments　will　apply　here　as　to　goodness：　and　if　the　beauty　in　the　Ideal…Form　is；　as　it　were；　an　effulgence　＇from　that　primary　Beauty＇；　we　may　observe　that　it　is　not　identical　in　all　participants　and　that　an　effulgence　is　necessarily　a　posterior。　　　　　If　we　mean　the　beauty　which　identifies　itself　with　Substance；　this　has　been　covered　in　our　treatment　of　Substance。　　　　　If；　again；　we　mean　beauty　in　relation　to　ourselves　as　spectators　in　whom　it　produces　a　certain　experience；　this　Act　＇of　production＇　is　Motion…　and　none　the　less　Motion　by　being　directed　towards　Absolute　Beauty。　　　　　Knowledge　again；　is　Motion　originating　in　the　self；　it　is　the　observation　of　Being…　an　Act；　not　a　State：　hence　it　too　falls　under　Motion；　or　perhaps　more　suitably　under　Stability；　or　even　under　both；　if　under　both；　knowledge　must　be　thought　of　as　a　complex；　and　if　a　complex；　is　posterior。　　　　　Intelligence；　since　it　connotes　intelligent　Being　and　comprises　the　total　of　existence；　cannot　be　one　of　the　genera：　the　true　Intelligence　＇or　Intellect＇　is　Being　taken　with　all　its　concomitants　＇with　the　other　four　genera＇；　it　is　actually　the　sum　of　all　the　Existents：　Being　on　the　contrary；　stripped　of　its　concomitants；　may　be　counted　as　a　genus　and　held　to　an　element　in　Intelligence。　　　　　Justice　and　self…control　＇sophrosyne＇；　and　virtue　in　general…　these　are　all　various　Acts　of　Intelligence：　they　are　consequently　not　primary　genera；　they　are　posterior　to　a　genus；　that　is　to　say；　they　are　species。　　　　　19。　Having　established　our　four　primary　genera；　it　remains　for　us　to　enquire　whether　each　of　them　of　itself　alone　produces　species。　And　especially；　can　Being　be　divided　independently；　that　is　without　drawing　upon　the　other　genera？　Surely　not：　the　differentiae　must　come　from　outside　the　genus　differentiated：　they　must　be　differentiae　of　Being　proper；　but　cannot　be　identical　with　it。　　　　　Where　then　is　it　to　find　them？　Obviously　not　in　non…beings。　If　then　in　beings；　and　the　three　genera　are　all　that　is　left；　clearly　it　must　find　them　in　these；　by　conjunction　and　couplement　with　these；　which　will　come　into　existence　simultaneously　with　itself。　　　　　But　if　all　come　into　existence　simultaneously；　what　else　is　produced　but　that　amalgam　of　all　Existents　which　we　have　just　considered　＇Intellect＇？　How　can　other　things　exist　over　and　above　this　all…including　amalgam？　And　if　all　the　constituents　of　this　amalgam　are　genera；　how　do　they　produce　species？　How　does　Motion　produce　species　of　Motion？　Similarly　with　Stability　and　the　other　genera。　　　　　A　word　of　warning　must　here　be　given　against　sinking　the　various　genera　in　their　species；　and　also　against　reducing　the　genus　to　a　mere　predicate；　something　merely　seen　in　the　species。　The　genus　must　exist　at　once　in　itself　and　in　its　species；　it　blends；　but　it　must　also　be　pure；　in　contributing　along　with　other　genera　to　form　Substance；　it　must　not　destroy　itself。　There　are　problems　here　that　demand　investigation。　　　　　But　since　we　identified　the　amalgam　of　the　Existents　＇or　primary　genera＇　with　the　particular　intellect；　Intellect　as　such　being　found　identical　with　Being　or　Substance；　and　therefore　prior　to　all　the　Existents；　which　may　be　regarded　as　its　species　or　members；　we　may　infer　that　the　intellect；　considered　as　completely　unfolded；　is　a　subsequent。　　　　　Our　treatment　of　this　problem　may　serve　to　promote　our　investigation；　we　will　take　it　as　a　kind　of　example；　and　with　it　embark　upon　our　enquiry。　　　　　20。　We　may　thus　distinguish　two　phases　of　Intellect；　in　one　of　which　it　may　be　taken　as　having　no　contact　whatever　with　particulars　and　no　Act　upon　anything；　thus　it　is　kept　apart　from　being　a　particular　intellect。　In　the　same　way　science　is　prior　to　any　of　its　constituent　species；　and　the　specific　science　is　prior　to　any　of　its　component　parts：　being　none　of　its　particulars；　it　is　the　potentiality　of　all；　each　particular；　on　the　other　hand；　is　actually　itself；　but　potentially　the　sum　of　all　the　particulars：　and　as　with　the　specific　science；　so　with　science　as　a　whole。　The　specific　sciences　lie　in　potentiality　in　science　the　total；　even　in　their　specific　character　they　are　potentially　the　whole；　they　have　the　whole　predicated　of　them　and　not　merely　a　part　of　the　whole。　At　the　same　time；　science　must　exist　as　a　thing　in　itself；　unharmed　by　its　divisions。　　　　　So　with　Intellect。　Intellect　as　a　whole　must　be　thought　of　as　prior　to　the　intellects　actualized　as　individuals；　but　when　we　come　to　the　particular　intellects；　we　find　that　what　subsists　in　the　particulars　must　be　maintained　from　the　totality。　The　Intellect　subsisting　in　the　totality　is　a　provider　for　the　particular　intellects；　is　the　potentiality　of　them：　it　involves　them　as　members　of　its　universality；　while　they　in　turn　involve　the　universal　Intellect　in　their　particularity；　just　as　the　particular　science　involves　science　the　total。　　　　　The　great　Intellect；　we　maintain；　exists　in　itself　and　the　particular　intellects　in　themselves；　yet　the　particulars　are　embraced　in　the　whole；　and　the　whole　in　the　particulars。　The　particular　intellects　exist　by　themselves　and　in　another；　the　universal　by　itself　and　in　those。　All　the　particulars　exist　potentially　in　that　self…existent　universal；　which　actually　is　the　totality；　potentially　each　isolated　member：　on　the　other　hand；　each　particular　is　actually　what　it　is　＇its　individual　self＇；　potentially　the　totality。　In　so　far　as　what　is　predicated　of　them　is　their　essence；　they　are　actually　what　is　predicated　of　them；　but　where　the　predicate　is　a　genus；　they　are　that　only　potentially。　On　the　other　hand；　the　universal　in　so　far　as　it　is　a　genus　is　the　potentiality　of　all　its　subordinate　species；　though　none　of　them　in　actuality；　all　are　latent　in　it；　but　because　its　essential　nature　exists　in　actuality　before　the　existence　of　the　species；　it　does　not　submit　to　be　itself　particularized。　If　then　the　particulars　are　to　exist　in　actuality…　to　exist；　for　example；　as　species…　the　cause　must　lie　in　the　Act　radiating　from　the　universal。　　　　　21。　How　then　does　the　universal　Intellect　produce　the　particulars　while；　in　virtue　of　its　Reason…Principle；　remaining　a　unity？　In　other　words；　how　do　the　various　grades　of　Being；　as　we　call　them；　arise　from　the　four　primaries？　Here　is　this　great；　this　infinite　Intellect；　not　given　to　idle　utterance　but　to　sheer　intellection；　all…embracing；　integral；　no　part；　no　individual：　how；　we　ask；　can　it　possibly　be　the　source　of　all　this　plurality？　　　　　Number　at　all　events　it　possesses　in　the　objects　of　its　contemplation：　it　is　thus　one　and　many；　and　the　many　are　powers；　wonderful　powers；　not　weak　but；　being　pure；　supremely　great　and；　so　to　speak；　full　to　overflowing　powers　in　very　truth；　knowing　no　limit；　so　that　they　are　infinite；　infinity；　Magnitude…Absolute。　　　　　As　we　survey　this　Magnitude　with　the　beauty　of　Being　within　it　and　the　glory　and　light　around　it；　all　contained　in　Intellect；　we　see；　simultaneously；　Quality　already　in　bloom；　and　along　with　the　continuity　of　its　Act　we　catch　a　glimpse　of　Magnitude　at　Rest。　Then；　with　one；　two　and　three　in　Intellect；　Magn