the six enneads-第111章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


o　the　Reason…Principles；　and　at　the　same　time　maintain　that　relations　are　Reason…Principles　and　participate　in　Ideal…Forms；　we　are　bound　to　seek　their　causes　in　that　higher　sphere。　Doubleness；　it　is　clear；　is　the　cause　of　a　thing　being　double；　and　from　it　is　derived　halfness。　　　　　Some　correlatives　owe　their　designations　to　the　same　Form；　others　to　opposite　Forms；　it　is　thus　that　two　objects　are　simultaneously　double　and　half　of　each　other；　and　one　great　and　the　other　small。　It　may　happen　that　both　correlatives　exist　in　one　object…likeness　and　unlikeness；　and；　in　general；　identity　and　difference；　so　that　the　same　thing　will　be　at　once　like　and　unlike；　identical　and　different。　　　　　The　question　arises　here　whether　sharing　in　the　same　Form　could　make　one　man　depraved　and　another　more　depraved。　In　the　case　of　total　depravity；　clearly　the　two　are　made　equal　by　the　absence　of　a　Form。　Where　there　is　a　difference　of　degree；　the　one　has　participated　in　a　Form　which　has　failed　to　predominate；　the　other　in　a　Form　which　has　failed　still　more：　or；　if　we　choose　the　negative　aspect；　we　may　think　of　them　both　as　failing　to　participate　in　a　Form　which　naturally　belonged　to　them。　　　　　Sensation　may　be　regarded　as　a　Form　of　double　origin　＇determined　both　by　the　sense…organ　and　by　the　sensible　object＇；　and　similarly　with　knowledge。　　　　　Habit　is　an　Act　directed　upon　something　had　＇some　experience　produced　by　habit＇　and　binding　it　as　it　were　with　the　subject　having　＇experiencing＇；　as　the　Act　of　production　binds　producer　and　product。　　　　　Measurement　is　an　Act　of　the　measurer　upon　the　measured　object：　it　too　is　therefore　a　kind　of　Reason…Principle。　　　　　Now　if　the　condition　of　being　related　is　regarded　as　a　Form　having　a　generic　unity；　Relation　must　be　allowed　to　be　a　single　genus　owing　its　reality　to　a　Reason…Principle　involved　in　all　instances。　If　however　the　Reason…Principles　＇governing　the　correlatives＇　stand　opposed　and　have　the　differences　to　which　we　have　referred；　there　may　perhaps　not　be　a　single　genus；　but　this　will　not　prevent　all　relatives　being　expressed　in　terms　of　a　certain　likeness　and　falling　under　a　single　category。　　　　　But　even　if　the　cases　of　which　we　have　spoken　can　be　subsumed　under　a　single　head；　it　is　nevertheless　impossible　to　include　in　a　single　genus　all　that　goes　with　them　in　the　one　common　category：　for　the　category　includes　negations　and　derivatives…　not　only；　for　example；　double　but　also　its　negative；　the　resultant　doubleness　and　the　act　of　doubling。　But　we　cannot　include　in　one　genus　both　the　thing　and　its　negative…　double　and　not…double；　relative　and　not…relative…　any　more　than　in　dealing　with　the　genus　animal　we　can　insert　in　it　the　nonanimal。　Moreover；　doubleness　and　doubling　have　only　the　relation　to　double　that　whiteness　has　to　white；　they　cannot　be　classed　as　identical　with　it。　　　　　10。　As　regards　Quality；　the　source　of　what　we　call　a　〃quale；〃　we　must　in　the　first　place　consider　what　nature　it　possesses　in　accordance　with　which　it　produces　the　〃qualia；〃　and　whether；　remaining　one　and　the　same　in　virtue　of　that　common　ground；　it　has　also　differences　whereby　it　produces　the　variety　of　species。　If　there　is　no　common　ground　and　the　term　Quality　involves　many　connotations；　there　cannot　be　a　single　genus　of　Quality。　　　　　What　then　will　be　the　common　ground　in　habit；　disposition；　passive　quality；　figure；　shape？　In　light；　thick　and　lean？　　　　　If　we　hold　this　common　ground　to　be　a　power　adapting　itself　to　the　forms　of　habits；　dispositions　and　physical　capacities；　a　power　which　gives　the　possessor　whatever　capacities　he　has；　we　have　no　plausible　explanation　of　incapacities。　Besides；　how　are　figure　and　the　shape　of　a　given　thing　to　be　regarded　as　a　power？　　　　　Moreover；　at　this；　Being　will　have　no　power　qua　Being　but　only　when　Quality　has　been　added　to　it；　and　the　activities　of　those　substances　which　are　activities　in　the　highest　degree；　will　be　traceable　to　Quality；　although　they　are　autonomous　and　owe　their　essential　character　to　powers　wholly　their　own！　　　　　Perhaps；　however；　qualities　are　conditioned　by　powers　which　are　posterior　to　the　substances　as　such　＇and　so　do　not　interfere　with　their　essential　activities＇。　Boxing；　for　example；　is　not　a　power　of　man　qua　man；　reasoning　is：　therefore　reasoning；　on　this　hypothesis；　is　not　quality　but　a　natural　possession　of　the　mature　human　being；　it　therefore　is　called　a　quality　only　by　analogy。　Thus；　Quality　is　a　power　which　adds　the　property　of　being　qualia　to　substances　already　existent。　　　　　The　differences　distinguishing　substances　from　each　other　are　called　qualities　only　by　analogy；　they　are；　more　strictly；　Acts　and　Reason…Principles；　or　parts　of　Reason…Principles；　and　though　they　may　appear　merely　to　qualify　the　substance；　they　in　fact　indicate　its　essence。　　　　　Qualities　in　the　true　sense…　those；　that　is；　which　determine　qualia…　being　in　accordance　with　our　definition　powers；　will　in　virtue　of　this　common　ground　be　a　kind　of　Reason…Principle；　they　will　also　be　in　a　sense　Forms；　that　is；　excellences　and　imperfections　whether　of　soul　or　of　body。　　　　　But　how　can　they　all　be　powers？　Beauty　or　health　of　soul　or　body；　very　well：　but　surely　not　ugliness；　disease；　weakness；　incapacity。　In　a　word；　is　powerlessness　a　power？　　　　　It　may　be　urged　that　these　are　qualities　in　so　far　as　qualia　are　also　named　after　them：　but　may　not　the　qualia　be　so　called　by　analogy；　and　not　in　the　strict　sense　of　the　single　principle？　Not　only　may　the　term　be　understood　in　the　four　ways　＇of　Aristotle＇；　but　each　of　the　four　may　have　at　least　a　twofold　significance。　　　　　In　the　first　place；　Quality　is　not　merely　a　question　of　action　and　passion；　involving　a　simple　distinction　between　the　potentially　active　＇quality＇　and　the　passive：　health；　disposition　and　habit；　disease；　strength　and　weakness　are　also　classed　as　qualities。　It　follows　that　the　common　ground　is　not　power；　but　something　we　have　still　to　seek。　　　　　Again；　not　all　qualities　can　be　regarded　as　Reason…Principles：　chronic　disease　cannot　be　a　Reason…Principle。　Perhaps；　however；　we　must　speak　in　such　cases　of　privations；　restricting　the　term　〃Quantities〃　to　Ideal…Forms　and　powers。　Thus　we　shall　have；　not　a　single　genus；　but　reference　only　to　the　unity　of　a　category。　Knowledge　will　be　regarded　as　a　Form　and　a　power；　ignorance　as　a　privation　and　powerlessness。　　　　　On　the　other　hand；　powerlessness　and　disease　are　a　kind　of　Form；　disease　and　vice　have　many　powers　though　looking　to　evil。　　　　　But　how　can　a　mere　failure　be　a　power？　Doubtless　the　truth　is　that　every　quality　performs　its　own　function　independently　of　a　standard；　for　in　no　case　could　it　produce　an　effect　outside　of　its　power。　　　　　Even　beauty　would　seem　to　have　a　power　of　its　own。　Does　this　apply　to　triangularity？　　　　　Perhaps；　after　all；　it　is　not　a　power　we　must　consider；　but　a　disposition。　Thus；　qualities　will　be　determined　by　the　forms　and　characteristics　of　the　object　qualified：　their　common　element；　then；　will　be　Form　and　ideal　type；　imposed　upon　Substance　and　posterior　to　it。　　　　　But　then；　how　do　we　account　for　the　powers？　We　may　doubtless　remark　that　even　the　natural　boxer　is　so　by　being　constituted　in　a　particular　way；　similarly；　with　the　man　unable　to　box：　to　generalize；　the　quality　is　a　characteristic　non…essential。　Whatever　is　seen　to　apply　alike　to　Being　and　to　non…Being；　as　do　heat　and　whiteness　and　colours　generally；　is　either　different　from　Being…　is；　for　example；　an　Act　of　Being…　or　else　is　some　secondary　of　Being；　derived　from　it；　contained　in　it；　its　image　and　likeness。　　　　　But　if　Quality　is　determined　by　formation　and　characteristic　and　Reason…Principle；　how　explain　the　various　cases　of　powerlessness　and　deformity？　Doubtless　we　must　think　of　Principles　imperfectly　present；　as　in　the　case　of　deformity。　And　disease…　how　does　that　imply　a　Reason…Principle？　Here；　no　doubt；　we　must　think　of　a　principle　disturbed；　the　Principle　of　health。　　　　　But　it　is　not　necessary　that　all　qualities　involve　a　Reason…Principle；　it　suffices　that　over　and　above　the　various　kinds　of　disposition　there　exist　a　common　element　distinct　from　Substance；　and　it　is　what　comes　after　the　substance　that　constitutes　Quality　in　an　object。　　　　　But　triangularity　is　a　quality　of　that　in　which　it　is　present；　it　is　however　no　longer　triangularity　as　such；　but　the　triangularity　present　in　that　definite　object　and　modified　in　proportion　to　its　success　in　shaping　that　object。　　　　　11。　But　if　these　considerations　are　sound；　why　has　Quality　more　than　one　species？　What　is　the　ground　for　distinguishing　between　habit　and　disposition；　seeing　that　no　differentia　of　Quality　is　involved　in　permanence　and　non…permanence？　A　disposition　of　any　kind　is　sufficient　to　constitute　a　quality；　permanence　is　a　mere　external　addition。　It　might　however　be　urged　that　dispositions　are　but　incomplete　〃forms〃…　if　the　term　may　pass…　habits　being　complete　ones。　But　incomplete；　they　are　not　qualities；　if　already　qualities；　the　permanence　is　an　external　addition。　　　　　How　do　physical　powers　form　a　distinct　species？　If　they　are　classed　as　qualities　in　virtue　of　being　powers；　power；　we　have　seen；　is　not　a　necessary　concomitant　of　qualities。　If；　however；　we　hold　that　the　natural　boxer　owes　his　quality　to　a　particular　disposition；　power　is　something　added　and　does　not　contribute　to　the　quality；　since　power　is　found　in　habits　also。　　　　　Another　point：　why　is　natural　ability　to　be　distinguished　from　that　acquired　by　learning？　Surely；　if　both　are　qualities；　they　cannot　be　differentiae　of　Quality：　gained　by　practice　or　given　in　nature；　it　is　the　same　ability；　the　differentia　will　be　external　to　Quality；　it　cannot　be　deduced　from　the　Ideal　Form　of　boxing。　Whether　some　qualities　as　distinguished　from　others　are　derived　from　experience　is　immaterial；　the　source　of　the　quality　makes　no　difference…　none；　I　mean；　pointing　to　variations　and　differences　of　Quality。　　　　　A　further　question　would　seem　to　be　involved：　If　certain　qualities　are　derived　from　experience　but　here　is　a　discrepancy　in　the　manner　and　source　of　the　experience；　how　are　they　to　be　included　in　the　same　species？　And　again；　if　some　create　the　experience；　others　are　created　by　it；　the　term　Quality　as　applied　to　both　classes　will　be　equivocal。　　　　　And　what　part　is　played　by　the　individual　form？　If　it　constitutes　the　individual's　specific　character；　it　is　not　a　quality；　if；　however；　it　is　what　makes　an　object　beautiful　or　ugly　after　the　specific　form　has　been　determined；　then　it　involves　a　Reason…Principle。　　　　　Rough　and　smooth；　tenuous　and　dense　may　rightly　be　classed　as　qualities。　It　is　true　that　they　are　not　determined　by　distances　and　approximations；　or　in　general　by　even　or　uneven　dispositions；　of　parts；　though；　were　they　so　determined；　they　might　well　even　then　be　qualities。　　　　　Knowledge　of　the　meaning　of　〃light〃　and　〃heavy〃　will　reveal　their　place　in　the　classification。　An　ambiguity　will　however　be　latent　in　the　term　〃light；〃　unless　it　be　determined　by　comparative　weight：　it　would　then　implicate　leanness　and　fineness；　and　involve　another　species　distinct　from　the　four　＇of　Aristotle＇。　　　　　12。　If　then　we　do　not　propose　to　divide　Quality　in　this　＇fourfold＇　manner；　what　basis　of　division　have　we？　　　　　We　must　examine　whether　qualities　may　not　prove　to　be　divisible　on　the　principle　that　some　belong　to　the　body　and　others　to　the　soul。