the six enneads-第109章

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he　Soul's　inability　to　bring　some　other　thing　to　being…　something　in　the　order　of　nature；　which；　else；　it　would…　but　producing　where　it　may。　In　the　matter　of　the　arts　and　crafts；　all　that　are　to　be　traced　to　the　needs　of　human　nature　are　laid　up　in　the　Absolute　Man。　　　　　And　before　the　particular　Soul　there　is　another　Soul；　a　universal；　and；　before　that；　an　Absolute…Soul；　which　is　the　Life　existing　in　the　Intellectual…Principle　before　Soul　came　to　be　and　therefore　rightly　called　＇as　the　Life　in　the　Divine＇　the　Absolute…Soul。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THE　SIXTH　ENNEAD。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　THE　KINDS　OF　BEING…　（1）。

　　　　1。　Philosophy　at　a　very　early　stage　investigated　the　number　and　character　of　the　Existents。　Various　theories　resulted：　some　declared　for　one　Existent；　others　for　a　finite　number；　others　again　for　an　infinite　number；　while　as　regards　the　nature　of　the　Existents…　one；　numerically　finite；　or　numerically　infinite…　there　was　a　similar　disagreement。　These　theories；　in　so　far　as　they　have　been　adequately　examined　by　later　workers；　may　be　passed　over　here；　our　attention　must　be　directed　upon　the　results　of　those　whose　examination　has　led　them　to　posit　on　their　awn　account　certain　well…defined　genera。　　　　　These　thinkers　rejected　pure　unity　on　the　ground　of　the　plurality　observed　even　in　the　Intellectual　world；　they　rejected　an　infinite　number　as　not　reconcilable　with　the　facts　and　as　defying　knowledge：　considering　the　foundations　of　being　to　be　〃genera〃　rather　than　elements　strictly　so　called；　they　concluded　for　a　finite　number。　Of　these　〃genera〃　some　found　ten；　others　less；　others　no　doubt　more。　　　　　But　here　again　there　is　a　divergence　of　views。　To　some　the　genera　are　first…principles；　to　others　they　indicate　only　a　generic　classification　of　the　Existents　themselves。　　　　　Let　us　begin　with　the　well…known　tenfold　division　of　the　Existents；　and　consider　whether　we　are　to　understand　ten　genera　ranged　under　the　common　name　of　Being；　or　ten　categories。　That　the　term　Being　has　not　the　same　sense　in　all　ten　is　rightly　maintained。　　　　　But　a　graver　problem　confronts　us　at　the　outset：　Are　the　ten　found　alike　in　the　Intellectual　and　in　the　Sensible　realms？　Or　are　all　found　in　the　Sensible　and　some　only　in　the　Intellectual？　All　in　the　Intellectual　and　some　in　the　Sensible　is　manifestly　impossible。　　　　　At　this　point　it　would　be　natural　to　investigate　which　of　the　ten　belong　to　both　spheres；　and　whether　the　Existents　of　the　Intellectual　are　to　be　ranged　under　one　and　the　same　genus　with　the　Existents　in　the　Sensible；　or　whether　the　term　〃Existence〃　＇or　Substance＇　is　equivocal　as　applied　to　both　realms。　If　the　equivocation　exists；　the　number　of　genera　will　be　increased：　if　there　is　no　equivocation；　it　is　strange　to　find　the　one　same　〃Existence〃　applying　to　the　primary　and　to　the　derivative　Existents　when　there　is　no　common　genus　embracing　both　primal　and　secondary。　　　　　These　thinkers　are　however　not　considering　the　Intellectual　realm　in　their　division；　which　was　not　intended　to　cover　all　the　Existents；　the　Supreme　they　overlooked。　　　　　2。　But　are　we　really　obliged　to　posit　the　existence　of　such　genera？　　　　　Take　Substance；　for　Substance　must　certainly　be　our　starting…point：　what　are　the　grounds　for　regarding　Substance　as　one　single　genus？　　　　　It　has　been　remarked　that　Substance　cannot　be　a　single　entity　common　to　both　the　Intellectual　and　the　Sensible　worlds。　We　may　add　that　such　community　would　entail　the　existence　of　something　prior　to　Intellectual　and　Sensible　Substances　alike；　something　distinct　from　both　as　predicated　of　both；　and　this　prior　would　be　neither　body　nor　unembodied；　for　it　were　one　or　the　other；　body　would　be　unembodied；　or　the　unembodied　would　be　the　body。　　　　　This　conclusion　must　not　however　prevent　our　seeking　in　the　actual　substance　of　the　Sensible　world　an　element　held　in　common　by　Matter；　by　Form　and　by　their　Composite；　all　of　which　are　designated　as　substances；　though　it　is　not　maintained　that　they　are　Substance　in　an　equal　degree；　Form　is　usually　held　to　be　Substance　in　a　higher　degree　than　Matter；　and　rightly　so；　in　spite　of　those　who　would　have　Matter　to　be　the　more　truly　real。　　　　　There　is　further　the　distinction　drawn　between　what　are　known　as　First　and　Second　Substances。　But　what　is　their　common　basis；　seeing　that　the　First　are　the　source　from　which　the　Second　derive　their　right　to　be　called　substances？　　　　　But；　in　sum；　it　is　impossible　to　define　Substance：　determine　its　property；　and　still　you　have　not　attained　to　its　essence。　Even　the　definition；　〃That　which；　numerically　one　and　the　same；　is　receptive　of　contraries；〃　will　hardly　be　applicable　to　all　substances　alike。　　　　　3。　But　perhaps　we　should　rather　speak　of　some　single　category；　embracing　Intellectual　Substance；　Matter；　Form；　and　the　Composite　of　Matter　and　Form。　One　might　refer　to　the　family　of　the　Heraclids　as　a　unity　in　the　sense；　not　of　a　common　element　in　all　its　members；　but　of　a　common　origin：　similarly；　Intellectual　Substance　would　be　Substance　in　the　first　degree；　the　others　being　substances　by　derivation　and　in　a　lower　degree。　　　　　But　what　is　the　objection　to　including　everything　in　a　single　category；　all　else　of　which　existence　is　predicated　being　derived　from　that　one　thing；　Existence　or　Substance？　Because；　granted　that　things　be　no　more　than　modifications　of　Substance；　there　is　a　distinct　grading　of　substances　themselves。　Moreover；　the　single　category　does　not　put　us　in　a　position　to　build　on　Substance；　or　to　grasp　it　in　its　very　truth　as　the　plausible　source　of　the　other　substances。　　　　　Supposing　we　grant　that　all　things　known　as　substances　are　homogeneous　as　possessing　something　denied　to　the　other　genera；　what　precisely　is　this　something；　this　individuality；　this　subject　which　is　never　a　predicate；　this　thing　not　present　in　any　thing　as　in　a　subject；　this　thing　which　does　not　owe　its　essential　character　to　any　other　thing；　as　a　quality　takes　character　from　a　body　and　a　quantity　from　a　substance；　as　time　is　related　to　motion　and　motion　to　the　moved？　　　　　The　Second　Substance　is；　it　is　true；　a　predicate。　But　predication　in　this　case　signifies　a　different　relation　from　that　just　considered；　it　reveals　the　genus　inherent　in　the　subject　and　the　subject's　essential　character；　whereas　whiteness　is　predicated　of　a　thing　in　the　sense　of　being　present　in　the　thing。　　　　　The　properties　adduced　may　indeed　be　allowed　to　distinguish　Substance　from　the　other　Existents。　They　afford　a　means　of　grouping　substances　together　and　calling　them　by　a　common　name。　They　do　not　however　establish　the　unity　of　a　genus；　and　they　do　not　bring　to　light　the　concept　and　the　nature　of　Substance。　　　　　These　considerations　are　sufficient　for　our　purpose：　let　us　now　proceed　to　investigate　the　nature　of　Quantity。　　　　　4。　We　are　told　that　number　is　Quantity　in　the　primary　sense；　number　together　with　all　continuous　magnitude；　space　and　time：　these　are　the　standards　to　which　all　else　that　is　considered　as　Quantity　is　referred；　including　motion　which　is　Quantity　because　its　time　is　quantitative…　though　perhaps；　conversely；　the　time　takes　its　continuity　from　the　motion。　　　　　If　it　is　maintained　that　the　continuous　is　a　Quantity　by　the　fact　of　its　continuity；　then　the　discrete　will　not　be　a　Quantity。　If；　on　the　contrary；　the　continuous　possesses　Quantity　as　an　accident；　what　is　there　common　to　both　continuous　and　discrete　to　make　them　quantities？　　　　　Suppose　we　concede　that　numbers　are　quantities：　we　are　merely　allowing　them　the　name　of　quantity；　the　principle　which　gives　them　this　name　remains　obscure。　　　　　On　the　other　hand；　line　and　surface　and　body　are　not　called　quantities；　they　are　called　magnitudes：　they　become　known　as　quantities　only　when　they　are　rated　by　number…two　yards；　three　yards。　Even　the　natural　body　becomes　a　quantity　when　measured；　as　does　the　space　which　it　occupies；　but　this　is　quantity　accidental；　not　quantity　essential；　what　we　seek　to　grasp　is　not　accidental　quantity　but　Quantity　independent　and　essential；　Quantity…Absolute。　Three　oxen　is　not　a　quantity；　it　is　their　number；　the　three；　that　is　Quantity；　for　in　three　oxen　we　are　dealing　with　two　categories。　So　too　with　a　line　of　a　stated　length；　a　surface　of　a　given　area；　the　area　will　be　a　quantity　but　not　the　surface；　which　only　comes　under　that　category　when　it　constitutes　a　definite　geometric　figure。　　　　　Are　we　then　to　consider　numbers；　and　numbers　only；　as　constituting　the　category　of　Quantity？　If　we　mean　numbers　in　themselves；　they　are　substances；　for　the　very　good　reason　that　they　exist　independently。　If　we　mean　numbers　displayed　in　the　objects　participant　in　number；　the　numbers　which　give　the　count　of　the　objects…　ten　horses　or　ten　oxen；　and　not　ten　units…　then　we　have　a　paradoxical　result：　first；　the　numbers　in　themselves；　it　would　appear；　are　substances　but　the　numbers　in　objects　are　not；　and　secondly；　the　numbers　inhere　in　the　objects　as　measures　＇of　extension　or　weight＇；　yet　as　standing　outside　the　objects　they　have　no　measuring　power；　as　do　rulers　and　scales。　If　however　their　existence　is　independent；　and　they　do　not　inhere　in　the　objects；　but　are　simply　called　in　for　the　purpose　of　measurement；　the　objects　will　be　quantities　only　to　the　extent　of　participating　in　Quantity。　　　　　So　with　the　numbers　themselves：　how　can　they　constitute　the　category　of　Quantity？　They　are　measures；　but　how　do　measures　come　to　be　quantities　or　Quantity？　Doubtless　in　that；　existing　as　they　do　among　the　Existents　and　not　being　adapted　to　any　of　the　other　categories；　they　find　their　place　under　the　influence　of　verbal　suggestion　and　so　are　referred　to　the　so…called　category　of　Quantity。　We　see　the　unit　mark　off　one　measurement　and　then　proceed　to　another；　and　number　thus　reveals　the　amount　of　a　thing；　and　the　mind　measures　by　availing　itself　of　the　total　figure。　　　　　It　follows　that　in　measuring　it　is　not　measuring　essence；　it　pronounces　its　〃one〃　or　〃two；〃　whatever　the　character　of　the　objects；　even　summing　contraries。　It　does　not　take　count　of　condition…　hot；　handsome；　it　simply　notes　how　many。　　　　　Number　then；　whether　regarded　in　itself　or　in　the　participant　objects；　belongs　to　the　category　of　Quantity；　but　the　participant　objects　do　not。　〃Three　yards　long〃　does　not　fall　under　the　category　of　Quantity；　but　only　the　three。　　　　　Why　then　are　magnitudes　classed　as　quantities？　Not　because　they　are　so　in　the　strict　sense；　but　because　they　approximate　to　Quantity；　and　because　objects　in　which　magnitudes　inhere　are　themselves　designated　as　quantities。　We　call　a　thing　great　or　small　from　its　participation　in　a　high　number　or　a　low。　True；　greatness　and　smallness　are　not　claimed　to　be　quantities；　but　relations：　but　it　is　by　their　apparent　possession　of　quantity　that　they　are　thought　of　as　relations。　All　this；　however；　needs　more　careful　examination。　　　　　In　sum；　we　hold　that　there　is　no　single　genus　of　Quantity。　Only　number　is　Quantity；　the　rest　＇magnitudes；　space；　time；　motion＇　quantities　only　in　a　secondary　degree。　We　have　therefore　not　strictly　one　genus；　but　one　category　grouping　the　approximate　with　the　primary　and　the　secondary。　　　　　We　have　however　to　enquire　in　what　sense　the　abstract　numbers　are　substances。　Can　it　be　that　they　are　also　in　a　manner　quantitative？　Into　whatever　category　they　fall；　the　other