the science of right-第3章

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of　being　bound　by　others　to　anything　more　than　that　to　which　he　may

also　reciprocally　bind　them。　It　is；　consequently；　the　inborn　quality

of　every　man　in　virtue　of　which　he　ought　to　be　his　own　master　by　right

（sui　juris）。　There　is；　also；　the　natural　quality　of　justness

attributable　to　a　man　as　naturally　of　unimpeachable　right　（justi）；

because　be　has　done　no　wrong　to　any　one　prior　to　his　own　juridical

actions。　And；　further；　there　is　also　the　innate　right　of　common　action

on　the　part　of　every　man；　so　that　he　may　do　towards　others　what　does

not　infringe　their　rights　or　take　away　anything　that　is　theirs

unless　they　are　willing　to　appropriate　it；　such　merely　to

communicate　thought；　to　narrate　anything；　or　to　promise　something

whether　truly　and　honestly；　or　untruly　and　dishonestly　（veriloquim　aut

falsiloquim）；　for　it　rests　entirely　upon　these　others　whether　they

will　believe　or　trust　in　it　or　not。*　　But　all　these　rights　or　titles

are　already　included　in　the　principle　of　innate　freedom；　and　are　not

really　distinguished　from　it；　even　as　dividing　members　under　a

higher　species　of　right。



　　*It　is　customary　to　designate　every　untruth　that　is　spoken

intentionally　as　such；　although　it　may　be　in　a　frivolous　manner　a　lie；

or　falsehood　（mendacium）；　because　it　may　do　harm；　at　least　in　so　far

as　any　one　who　repeats　it　in　good　faith　may　be　made　a　laughing…stock

of　to　others　on　account　of　his　easy　credulity。　But　in　the　juridical

sense；　only　that　untruth　is　called　a　lie　which　immediately　infringes

the　right　of　another；　such　as　a　false　allegation　of　a　contract

having　been　concluded；　when　the　allegation　is　put　forward　in　order

to　deprive　some　one　of　what　is　his　（falsiloquim　dolosum）。　This

distinction　of　conceptions　so　closely　allied　is　not　without

foundation；　because　on　the　occasion　of　a　simple　statement　of　one's

thoughts；　it　is　always　free　for　another　to　take　them　as　he　may；　and

yet　the　resulting　repute；　that　such　a　one　is　a　man　whose　word　cannot

be　trusted；　comes　so　close　to　the　opprobrium　of　directly　calling　him　a

liar；　that　the　boundary…line　separating　what；　in　such　a　case；

belongs　to　jurisprudence；　and　what　is　special　to　ethics；　can　hardly　be

otherwise　drawn。



　　The　reason　why　such　a　division　into　separate　rights　has　been

introduced　into　the　system　of　natural　right；　viewed　as　including　all

that　is　innate；　was　not　without　a　purpose。　Its　object　was　to　enable

proof　to　be　more　readily　put　forward　in　case　of　any　controversy

arising　about　an　acquired　right；　and　questions　emerging　either　with

reference　to　a　fact　that　might　be　in　doubt；　or；　if　that　were

established；　in　reference　to　a　right　under　dispute。　For　the　party

repudiating　an　obligation；　and　on　whom　the　burden　of　proof　（onus

probandi）　might　be　incumbent；　could　thus　methodically　refer　to　his

innate　right　of　freedom　as　specified　under　various　relations　in

detail；　and　could　therefore　found　upon　them　equally　as　different

titles　of　right。

　　In　the　relation　of　innate　right；　and　consequently　of　the　internal

mine　and　thine；　there　is　therefore　not　rights；　but　only　one　right。

And；　accordingly；　this　highest　division　of　rights　into　innate　and

acquired；　which　evidently　consists　of　two　members　extremely　unequal　in

their　contents　is　properly　placed　in　the　introduction；　and　the

subdivisions　of　the　science　of　right　may　be　referred　in　detail　to

the　external　mine　and　thine。



　　　　　　　　　C。　Methodical　Division　of　the　Science　of　Right。



　　The　highest　division　of　the　system　of　natural　right　should　not　be…

as　it　is　frequently　put…　into　〃natural　right〃　and　〃social　right；〃

but　into　natural　right　and　civil　right。　The　first　constitutes

private　right；　the　second；　public　right。　For　it　is　not　the　〃social

state〃　but　the　〃civil　state〃　that　is　opposed　to　the　〃state　of　nature〃；

for　in　the　〃state　of　nature〃　there　may　well　be　society　of　some　kind；

but　there　is　no　〃civil〃　society；　as　an　institution　securing　the　mine

and　thine　by　public　laws。　It　is　thus　that　right；　viewed　under

reference　to　the　state　of　nature；　is　specially　called　private　right。

The　whole　of　the　principles　of　right　will　therefore　fall　to　be

expounded　under　the　two　subdivisions　of　private　right　and　public

right。

CH1

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART。　PRIVATE　RIGHT。

　　The　System　of　those　Laws　Which　Require　No　External　Promulgation。

　　CHAPTER　I。　Of　the　Mode　of　Having　Anything　External　as　One's　Own。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1。　The　Meaning　of　〃Mine〃　in　Right

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Meum　Juris）。



　　Anything　is　〃Mine〃　by　right；　or　is　rightfully　mine；　when　I　am　so

connected　with　it；　that　if　any　other　person　should　make　use　of　it

without　my　consent；　he　would　do　me　a　lesion　or　injury。　The

subjective　condition　of　the　use　of　anything　is　possession　of　it。

　　An　external　thing；　however　as　such　could　only　be　mine；　if　I　may

assume　it　to　be　possible　that　I　can　be　wronged　by　the　use　which

another　might　make　of　it　when　it　is　not　actually　in　my　possession。

Hence　it　would　be　a　contradiction　to　have　anything　external　as　one's

own；　were　not　the　conception　of　possession　capable　of　two　different

meanings；　as　sensible　possession　that　is　perceivable　by　the　senses；

and　rational　possession　that　is　perceivable　only　by　the　intellect。

By　the　former　is　to　be　understood　a　physical　possession；　and　by　the

latter；　a　purely　juridical　possession　of　the　same　object。

　　The　description　of　an　object　as　〃external　to　me〃　may　signify

either　that　it　is　merely　〃different　and　distinct　from　me　as　a

subject；〃　or　that　it　is　also　〃a　thing　placed　outside　of　me；　and　to

be　found　elsewhere　in　space　or　time。〃　Taken　in　the　first　sense；　the

term　possession　signifies　rational　possession；　and；　in　the　second

sense；　it　must　mean　empirical　possession。　A　rational　or　intelligible

possession；　if　such　be　possible；　is　possession　viewed　apart　from

physical　holding　or　detention　（detentio）。



　　　　　　　　　2。　Juridical　Postulate　of　the　Practical　Reason。



　　It　is　possible　to　have　any　external　object　of　my　will　as　mine。　In

other　words；　a　maxim　to　this　effect…　were　it　to　become　law…　that　any

object　on　which　the　will　can　be　exerted　must　remain　objectively　in

itself　without　an　owner；　as　res　nullius；　is　contrary　to　the

principle　of　right。

　　For　an　object　of　any　act　of　my　will；　is　something　that　it　would　be

physically　within　my　power　to　use。　Now；　suppose　there　were　things　that

by　right　should　absolutely　not　be　in　our　power；　or；　in　other　words；

that　it　would　be　wrong　or　inconsistent　with　the　freedom　of　all；

according　to　universal　law；　to　make　use　of　them。　On　this

supposition；　freedom　would　so　far　be　depriving　itself　of　the　use　of

its　voluntary　activity；　in　thus　putting　useable　objects　out　of　all

possibility　of　use。　In　practical　relations；　this　would　be　to

annihilate　them；　by　making　them　res　nullius；　notwithstanding　the

fact　act　acts　of　will　in　relation　to　such　things　would　formally

harmonize；　in　the　actual　use　of　them；　with　the　external　freedom　of　all

according　to　universal　laws。　Now　the　pure　practical　reason　lays　down

only　formal　laws　as　principles　to　regulate　the　exercise　of　the　will；

and　therefore　abstracts　from　the　matter　of　the　act　of　will；　as　regards

the　other　qualities　of　the　object；　which　is　considered　only　in　so

far　as　it　is　an　object　of　the　activity　of　the　will。　Hence　the

practical　reason　cannot　contain；　in　reference　to　such　an　object；　an

absolute　prohibition　of　its　use；　because　this　would　involve　a

contradiction　of　external　freedom　with　itself。　An　object　of　my　free

will；　however；　is　one　which　I　have　the　physical　capability　of　making

some　use　of　at　will；　since　its　use　stands　in　my　power　（in　potentia）。

This　is　to　be　distinguished　from　having　the　object　brought　under　my

disposal　（in　postestatem　meam　reductum）；　which　supposes　not　a

capability　merely；　but　also　a　particular　act　of　the　free…will。　But

in　order　to　consider　something　merely　as　an　object　of　my　will　as　such；

it　is　sufficient　to　be　conscious　that　I　have　it　in　my　power。　It　is

therefore　an　assumption　a　priori　of　the　practical　reason　to　regard　and

treat　every　object　within　the　range　of　my　free　exercise　of　will　as

objectively　a　possible　mine　or　thine。

　　This　postulate　may　be　called　〃a　permissive　law〃　of　the　practical

reason；　as　giving　us　a　special　title　which　we　could　not　evolve　out

of　the　mere　conceptions　of　right　generally。　And　this　title　constitutes

the　right　to　impose　upon　all　others　an　obligation；　not　otherwise

laid　upon　them；　to　abstain　from　the　use　of　certain　objects　of　our　free

choice；　because　we　have　already　taken　them　into　our　possession。　Reason

wills　that　this　shall　be　recognised　as　a　valid　principle；　and　it

does　so　as　practical　reason；　and　it　is　enabled　by　means　of　this

postulate　a　priori　to　enlarge　its　range　of　activity　in　practice。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3。　Possession　and　Ownership。



　　Any　one　who　would　assert　the　right　to　a　thing　as　his　must　be　in

possession　of　it　as　an　object。　Were　he　not　its　actual　possessor　or

owner；　he　could　not　be　wronged　or　injured　by　the　use　which　another

might　make　of　it　without　his　consent。　For；　should　anything　external　to

him；　and　in　no　way　connected　with　him　by　right；　affect　this　object；　it

could　not　affect　himself　as　a　subject；　nor　do　him　any　wrong；　unless　he

stood　in　a　relation　of　ownership　to　it。



　　　　　　　　　　　4。　Exposition　of　the　Conception　of　the。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　External　Mine　and　Thine。



　　There　can　only　be　three　external　objects　of　my　will　in　the

activity　of　choice：

　　（1）　A　corporeal　thing　external　to　me；

　　（2）　The　free…will　of　another　in　the　performance　of　a　particular

act　（praestatio）；

　　（3）　The　state　of　another　in　relation　to　myself。

　　These　correspond　to　the　categories　of　substance；　causality；　and

reciprocity；　and　they　form　the　practical　relations　between　me　and

external　objects；　according　to　the　laws　of　freedom。



　　A。　I　can　only　call　a　corporeal　thing　or　an　object　in　space　〃mine；〃

when；　even　although　not　in　physical　possession　of　it；　I　am　able　to

assert　that　I　am　in　possession　of　it　in　another　real　nonphysical

sense。　Thus；　I　am　not　entitled　to　call　an　apple　mine　merely　because

I　hold　it　in　my　hand　or　possess　it　physically；　but　only　when　I　am

entitled　to　say；　〃I　possess　it；　although　I　have　laid　it　out　of　my

hand；　and　wherever　it　may　lie。〃　In　like　manner；　I　am　not　entitled　to

say　of　the　ground；　on　which　I　may　have　laid　myself　down；　that

therefore　it　is　mine；　but　only　when　I　can　rightly　assert　that　it　still

remains　in　my　possession；　although　I　may　have　left　the　spot。　For　any

one　who；　in　the　former　appearances　of　empirical　possession；　might

wrench　the　apple　out　of　my　hand；　or　drag　me　away　from　my

resting…place；　would；　indeed；　injure　me　in　respect　of　the　inner　〃mine〃

of　freedom；　but　not　in　respect　of　the　external　〃mine；〃　unless　I

could　assert　that　I　was　in　the　possession　of　the　object；　even　when　not

actually　holding　it　physically。　And　if　I　could　not　do　this；　neither

could　I　call　the　apple　or　the　spot　mine。

　　B。　I　cannot　call　the　perform