on sense and the sensible-第7章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！




sense　provinces　（for　only　those　things　are　capable　of　mixture　whose



extremes　are　contraries；　and　no　one　compound　can　be　formed　from；



e。g。　White　and　Sharp；　except　indirectly；　i。e。　not　as　a　concord　is



formed　of　Sharp　and　Grave）；　there　follows　logically　the



impossibility　of　discerning　such　concurrent　stimuli　coinstantaneously。



For　we　must　suppose　that　the　stimuli；　when　equal；　tend　alike　to　efface



one　another；　since　no　one　＇form　of　stimulus＇　results　from　them；　while；



if　they　are　unequal；　the　stronger　alone　is　distinctly　perceptible。



　　Again；　the　soul　would　be　more　likely　to　perceive



coinstantaneously；　with　one　and　the　same　sensory　act；　two　things　in



the　same　sensory　province；　such　as　the　Grave　and　the　Sharp　in　sound；



for　the　sensory　stimulation　in　this　one　province　is　more　likely　to



be　unitemporal　than　that　involving　two　different　provinces；　as　Sight



and　Hearing。　But　it　is　impossible　to　perceive　two　objects



coinstantaneously　in　the　same　sensory　act　unless　they　have　been　mixed；



＇when；　however；　they　are　no　longer　two＇；　for　their　amalgamation



involves　their　becoming　one；　and　the　sensory　act　related　to　one　object



is　itself　one；　and　such　act；　when　one；　is；　of　course；



coinstantaneous　with　itself。　Hence；　when　things　are　mixed　we　of



necessity　perceive　them　coinstantaneously：　for　we　perceive　them　by　a



perception　actually　one。　For　an　object　numerically　one　means　that



which　is　perceived　by　a　perception　actually　one；　whereas　an　object



specifically　one　means　that　which　is　perceived　by　a　sensory　act



potentially　one　＇i。e。　by　an　energeia　of　the　same　sensuous　faculty＇。　If



then　the　actualized　perception　is　one；　it　will　declare　its　data　to



be　one　object；　they　must；　therefore；　have　been　mixed。　Accordingly；



when　they　have　not　been　mixed；　the　actualized　perceptions　which



perceive　them　will　be　two；　but　＇if　so；　their　perception　must　be



successive　not　coinstantaneous；　for＇　in　one　and　the　same　faculty　the



perception　actualized　at　any　single　moment　is　necessarily　one；　only



one　stimulation　or　exertion　of　a　single　faculty　being　possible　at　a



single　instant；　and　in　the　case　supposed　here　the　faculty　is　one。　It



follows；　therefore；　that　we　cannot　conceive　the　possibility　of



perceiving　two　distinct　objects　coinstantaneously　with　one　and　the



same　sense。



　　But　if　it　be　thus　impossible　to　perceive　coinstantaneously　two



objects　in　the　same　province　of　sense　if　they　are　really　two；



manifestly　it　is　still　less　conceivable　that　we　should　perceive



coinstantaneously　objects　in　two　different　sensory　provinces；　as　White



and　Sweet。　For　it　appears　that　when　the　Soul　predicates　numerical



unity　it　does　so　in　virtue　of　nothing　else　than　such　coinstantaneous



perception　＇of　one　object；　in　one　instant；　by　one　energeia＇：　while



it　predicates　specific　unity　in　virtue　of　＇the　unity　of＇　the



discriminating　faculty　of　sense　together　with　＇the　unity　of＇　the



mode　in　which　this　operates。　What　I　mean；　for　example；　is　this；　the



same　sense　no　doubt　discerns　White　and　Black；　＇which　are　hence



generically　one＇　though　specifically　different　from　one　another；　and



so；　too；　a　faculty　of　sense　self…identical；　but　different　from　the



former；　discerns　Sweet　and　Bitter；　but　while　both　these　faculties



differ　from　one　another　＇and　each　from　itself＇　in　their　modes　of



discerning　either　of　their　respective　contraries；　yet　in　perceiving



the　co…ordinates　in　each　province　they　proceed　in　manners　analogous　to



one　another；　for　instance；　as　Taste　perceives　Sweet；　so　Sight



perceives　White；　and　as　the　latter　perceives　Black；　so　the　former



perceives　Bitter。



　　Again；　if　the　stimuli　of　sense　derived　from　Contraries　are



themselves　Contrary；　and　if　Contraries　cannot　be　conceived　as



subsisting　together　in　the　same　individual　subject；　and　if　Contraries；



e。g。　Sweet　and　Bitter；　come　under　one　and　the　same　sense…faculty；　we



must　conclude　that　it　is　impossible　to　discern　them　coinstantaneously。



It　is　likewise　clearly　impossible　so　to　discern　such　homogeneous



sensibles　as　are　not　＇indeed＇　Contrary；　＇but　are　yet　of　different



species＇。　For　these　are；　＇in　the　sphere　of　colour；　for　instance＇；



classed　some　with　White；　others　with　Black；　and　so　it　is；　likewise；　in



the　other　provinces　of　sense；　for　example；　of　savours；　some　are



classed　with　Sweet；　and　others　with　Bitter。　Nor　can　one　discern　the



components　in　compounds　coinstantaneously　（for　these　are　ratios　of



Contraries；　as　e。g。　the　Octave　or　the　Fifth）；　unless；　indeed；　on



condition　of　perceiving　them　as　one。　For　thus；　and　not　otherwise；



the　ratios　of　the　extreme　sounds　are　compounded　into　one　ratio：



since　we　should　have　together　the　ratio；　on　the　one　hand；　of　Many　to



Few　or　of　Odd　to　Even；　on　the　other；　that　of　Few　to　Many　or　of　Even　to



Odd　＇and　these；　to　be　perceived　together；　must　be　unified＇。



　　If；　then；　the　sensibles　denominated　co…ordinates　though　in　different



provinces　of　sense　（e。g。　I　call　Sweet　and　White　co…ordinates　though　in



different　provinces）　stand　yet　more　aloof；　and　differ　more；　from　one



another　than　do　any　sensibles　in　the　same　province；　while　Sweet



differs　from　White　even　more　than　Black　does　from　White；　it　is　still



less　conceivable　that　one　should　discern　them　＇viz。　sensibles　in



different　sensory　provinces　whether　co…ordinates　or　not＇



coinstantaneously　than　sensibles　which　are　in　the　same　province。



Therefore；　if　coinstantaneous　perception　of　the　latter　be



impossible；　that　of　the　former　is　a　fortiori　impossible。



　　Some　of　the　writers　who　treat　of　concords　assert　that　the　sounds



combined　in　these　do　not　reach　us　simultaneously；　but　only　appear　to



do　so；　their　real　successiveness　being　unnoticed　whenever　the　time



it　involves　is　＇so　small　as　to　be＇　imperceptible。　Is　this　true　or　not？



One　might　perhaps；　following　this　up；　go　so　far　as　to　say　that　even



the　current　opinion　that　one　sees　and　hears　coinstantaneously　is　due



merely　to　the　fact　that　the　intervals　of　time　＇between　the　really



successive　perceptions　of　sight　and　hearing＇　escape　observation。　But



this　can　scarcely　be　true；　nor　is　it　conceivable　that　any　portion　of



time　should　be　＇absolutely＇　imperceptible；　or　that　any　should　be



absolutely　unnoticeable；　the　truth　being　that　it　is　possible　to



perceive　every　instant　of　time。　＇This　is　so＇；　because；　if　it　is



inconceivable　that　a　person　should；　while　perceiving　himself　or



aught　else　in　a　continuous　time；　be　at　any　instant　unaware　of　his



own　existence；　while；　obviously；　the　assumption；　that　there　is　in



the　time…continuum　a　time　so　small　as　to　be　absolutely



imperceptible；　carries　the　implication　that　a　person　would；　during



such　time；　be　unaware　of　his　own　existence；　as　well　as　of　his　seeing



and　perceiving；　＇this　assumption　must　be　false＇。



　　Again；　if　there　is　any　magnitude；　whether　time　or　thing；



absolutely　imperceptible　owing　to　its　smallness；　it　follows　that　there



would　not　be　either　a　thing　which　one　perceives；　or　a　time　in　which



one　perceives　it；　unless　in　the　sense　that　in　some　part　of　the　given



time　he　sees　some　part　of　the　given　thing。　For　＇let　there　be　a　line



ab；　divided　into　two　parts　at　g；　and　let　this　line　represent　a　whole



object　and　a　corresponding　whole　time。　Now；＇　if　one　sees　the　whole



line；　and　perceives　it　during　a　time　which　forms　one　and　the　same



continuum；　only　in　the　sense　that　he　does　so　in　some　portion　of　this



time；　let　us　suppose　the　part　gb；　representing　a　time　in　which　by



supposition　he　was　perceiving　nothing；　cut　off　from　the　whole。　Well；



then；　he　perceives　in　a　certain　part　＇viz。　in　the　remainder＇　of　the



time；　or　perceives　a　part　＇viz。　the　remainder＇　of　the　line；　after



the　fashion　in　which　one　sees　the　whole　earth　by　seeing　some　given



part　of　it；　or　walks　in　a　year　by　walking　in　some　given　part　of　the



year。　But　＇by　hypothesis＇　in　the　part　bg　he　perceives　nothing：



therefore；　in　fact；　he　is　said　to　perceive　the　whole　object　and　during



the　whole　time　simply　because　he　perceives　＇some　part　of　the　object＇



in　some　part　of　the　time　ab。　But　the　same　argument　holds　also　in　the



case　of　ag　＇the　remainder；　regarded　in　its　turn　as　a　whole＇；　for　it



will　be　found　＇on　this　theory　of　vacant　times　and　imperceptible



magnitudes＇　that　one　always　perceives　only　in　some　part　of　a　given



whole　time；　and　perceives　only　some　part　of　a　whole　magnitude；　and



that　it　is　impossible　to　perceive　any　＇really＇　whole　＇object　in　a



really　whole　time；　a　conclusion　which　is　absurd；　as　it　would　logically



annihilate　the　perception　of　both　Objects　and　Time＇。



　　Therefore　we　must　conclude　that　all　magnitudes　are　perceptible；



but　their　actual　dimensions　do　not　present　themselves　immediately　in



their　presentation　as　objects。　One　sees　the　sun；　or　a　four…cubit　rod



at　a　distance；　as　a　magnitude；　but　their　exact　dimensions　are　not



given　in　their　visual　presentation：　nay；　at　times　an　object　of　sight



appears　indivisible；　but　＇vision　like　other　special　senses；　is



fallible　respecting　'common　sensibles'；　e。g。　magnitude；　and＇　nothing



that　one　sees　is　really　indivisible。　The　reason　of　this　has　been



previously　explained。　It　is　clear　then；　from　the　above　arguments；　that



no　portion　of　time　is　imperceptible。



　　But　we　must　here　return　to　the　question　proposed　above　for



discussion；　whether　it　is　possible　or　impossible　to　perceive　several



objects　coinstantaneously；　by　'coinstantaneously'　I　mean　perceiving



the　several　objects　in　a　time　one　and　indivisible　relatively　to　one



another；　i。e。　indivisible　in　a　sense　consistent　with　its　being　all　a



continuum。



　　First；　then；　is　it　conceivable　that　one　should　perceive　the



different　things　coinstantaneously；　but　each　with　a　different　part



of　the　Soul？　Or　＇must　we　object＇　that；　in　the　first　place；　to　begin



with　the　objects　of　one　and　the　same　sense；　e。g。　Sight；　if　we　assume



it　＇the　Soul　qua　exercising　Sight＇　to　perceive　one　colour　with　one



part；　and　another　colour　with　a　different　part；　it　will　have　a



plurality　of　parts　the　same　in　species；　＇as　they　must　be；＇　since　the



objects　which　it　thus　perceives　fall　within　the　same　genus？



　　Should　any　one　＇to　illustrate　how　the　Soul　might　have　in　it　two



different　parts　specifically　identical；　each　directed　to　a　set　of



aistheta　the　same　in　genus　with　that　to　which　the　other　is　directed＇



urge　that；　as　there　are　two　eyes；　so　there　may　be　in　the　Soul



something　analogous；　＇the　reply　is＇　that　of　the　eyes；　doubtless；



some　one　organ　is　formed；　and　hence　their　actualization　in



perception　is　one；　but　if　this　is　so　in　the　Soul；　then；　in　so　far　as



what　is　formed　of　both　＇i。e。　of　any　two　specifically　identical　parts



as　assumed＇　is　one；　the　true　perceiving　subject　also　will　be　one；　＇and



the　contradictory　of　the　above　hypothesis　（of　different　parts　of



Soul　remaining　engaged