darwin and modern science-第116章

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　is　pleasant　to　me　as　a　speculatist；　though　odious　to　me　as　a　systematist。〃　　（〃Life　and　Letters〃；　Vol。　II。　page　37。）　　He　could　indeed　be　angry　with　variations　even　as　an　evolutionist；　but　then　only　because　he　could　not　explain　them；　not　because　he　could　not　classify　them。　　〃If；　as　I　must　think；　external　conditions　produce　little　DIRECT　effect；　what　the　devil　determines　each　particular　variation？〃　　（Ibid。　page　232。）　　What　Darwin　experienced　in　his　particular　domain　holds　good　of　all　knowledge。　　All　knowledge　is　systematic；　in　so　far　as　it　strives　to　put　phenomena　in　quite　definite　relations；　one　to　another。　　But　the　systematisation　can　never　be　complete。　　And　here　Darwin　has　contributed　much　to　widen　the　world　for　us。　　He　has　shown　us　forces　and　tendencies　in　nature　which　make　absolute　systems　impossible；　at　the　same　time　that　they　give　us　new　objects　and　problems。　　There　is　still　a　place　for　what　Lessing　called　〃the　unceasing　striving　after　truth；〃　while　〃absolute　truth〃　（in　the　sense　of　a　closed　system）　is　unattainable　so　long　as　life　and　experience　are　going　on。

There　is　here　a　special　remark　to　be　made。　　As　we　have　seen　above；　recent　research　has　shown　that　natural　selection　or　struggle　for　life　is　no　explanation　of　variations。　　Hugo　de　Vries　distinguishes　between　partial　and　embryonal　variations；　or　between　variations　and　mutations；　only　the　last…　named　being　heritable；　and　therefore　of　importance　for　the　origin　of　new　species。　　But　the　existence　of　variations　is　not　only　of　interest　for　the　problem　of　the　origin　of　species；　it　has　also　a　more　general　interest。　　An　individual　does　not　lose　its　importance　for　knowledge；　because　its　qualities　are　not　heritable。　　On　the　contrary；　in　higher　beings　at　least；　individual　peculiarities　will　become　more　and　more　independent　objects　of　interest。　　Knowledge　takes　account　of　the　biographies　not　only　of　species；　but　also　of　individuals：　　it　seeks　to　find　the　law　of　development　of　the　single　individual。　　（The　new　science　of　Ecology　occupies　an　intermediate　position　between　the　biography　of　species　and　the　biography　of　individuals。　Compare　〃Congress　of　Arts　and　Science〃；　St　Louis；　Vol。　V。　1906　（the　Reports　of　Drude　and　Robinson）　and　the　work　of　my　colleague　E。　Warming。）　　As　Leibniz　said　long　ago；　individuality　consists　in　the　law　of　the　changes　of　a　being。　　〃La　loi　du　changement　fait　l'individualite　de　chaque　substance。〃　　Here　is　a　world　which　is　almost　new　for　science；　which　till　now　has　mainly　occupied　itself　with　general　laws　and　forms。　　But　these　are　ultimately　only　means　to　understand　the　individual　phenomena；　in　whose　nature　and　history　a　manifold　of　laws　and　forms　always　cooperate。　　The　importance　of　this　remark　will　appear　in　the　sequel。

V。

To　many　people　the　Darwinian　theory　of　natural　selection　or　struggle　for　existence　seemed　to　change　the　whole　conception　of　life；　and　particularly　all　the　conditions　on　which　the　validity　of　ethical　ideas　depends。　　If　only　that　has　persistence　which　can　be　adapted　to　a　given　condition；　what　will　then　be　the　fate　of　our　ideals；　of　our　standards　of　good　and　evil？　　Blind　force　seems　to　reign；　and　the　only　thing　that　counts　seems　to　be　the　most　heedless　use　of　power。　　Darwinism；　it　was　said；　has　proclaimed　brutality。　　No　other　difference　seems　permanent　save　that　between　the　sound；　powerful　and　happy　on　the　one　side；　the　sick；　feeble　and　unhappy　on　the　other；　and　every　attempt　to　alleviate　this　difference　seems　to　lead　to　general　enervation。　　Some　of　those　who　interpreted　Darwinism　in　this　manner　felt　an　aesthetic　delight　in　contemplating　the　heedlessness　and　energy　of　the　great　struggle　for　existence　and　anticipated　the　realisation　of　a　higher　human　type　as　the　outcome　of　it：　　so　Nietzsche　and　his　followers。　　Others　recognising　the　same　consequences　in　Darwinism　regarded　these　as　one　of　the　strongest　objections　against　it；　so　Duhring　and　Kropotkin　（in　his　earlier　works）。

This　interpretation　of　Darwinism　was　frequent　in　the　interval　between　the　two　main　works　of　Darwin〃The　Origin　of　Species〃　and　〃The　Descent　of　Man〃。　　But　even　during　this　interval　it　was　evident　to　an　attentive　reader　that　Darwin　himself　did　not　found　his　standard　of　good　and　evil　on　the　features　of　the　life　of　nature　he　had　emphasised　so　strongly。　　He　did　not　justify　the　ways　along　which　nature　reached　its　ends；　he　only　pointed　them　out。　　The　〃real〃　was　not　to　him；　as　to　Hegel；　one　with　the　〃rational。〃　　Darwin　has；　indeed；　by　his　whole　conception　of　nature；　rendered　a　great　service　to　ethics　in　making　the　difference　between　the　life　of　nature　and　the　ethical　life　appear　in　so　strong　a　light。　　The　ethical　problem　could　now　be　stated　in　a　sharper　form　than　before。　　But　this　was　not　the　first　time　that　the　idea　of　the　struggle　for　life　was　put　in　relation　to　the　ethical　problem。　　In　the　seventeenth　century　Thomas　Hobbes　gave　the　first　impulse　to　the　whole　modern　discussion　of　ethical　principles　in　his　theory　of　bellum　omnium　contra　omnes。　　Men；　he　taught；　are　in　the　state　of　nature　enemies　one　of　another；　and　they　live　either　in　fright　or　in　the　glory　of　power。　　But　it　was　not　the　opinion　of　Hobbes　that　this　made　ethics　impossible。　　On　the　contrary；　he　found　a　standard　for　virtue　and　vice　in　the　fact　that　some　qualities　and　actions　have　a　tendency　to　bring　us　out　of　the　state　of　war　and　to　secure　peace；　while　other　qualities　have　a　contrary　tendency。　　In　the　eighteenth　century　even　Immanuel　Kant's　ideal　ethics　hadso　far　as　can　be　seena　similar　origin。　　Shortly　before　the　foundation　of　his　definitive　ethics；　Kant　wrote　his　〃Idee　zu　einer　allgemeinen　Weltgeschichte〃　（1784）；　wherein　a　way　which　reminds　us　of　Hobbes；　and　is　prophetic　of　Darwinhe　describes　the　forward…driving　power　of　struggle　in　the　human　world。　　It　is　here　as　with　the　struggle　of　the　trees　for　light　and　air；　through　which　they　compete　with　one　another　in　height。　　Anxiety　about　war　can　only　be　allayed　by　an　ordinance　which　gives　everyone　his　full　liberty　under　acknowledgment　of　the　equal　liberty　of　others。　　And　such　ordinance　and　acknowledgment　are　also　attributes　of　the　content　of　the　moral　law；　as　Kant　proclaimed　it　in　the　year　after　the　publication　of　his　essay　（1785）　　（Cf。　my　〃History　of　Modern　Philosophy〃　（English　translation　London；　1900）；　I。　pages　76…79。）　　Kant　really　came　to　his　ethics　by　the　way　of　evolution；　though　he　afterwards　disavowed　it。　　Similarly　the　same　line　of　thought　may　be　traced　in　Hegel　though　it　has　been　disguised　in　the　form　of　speculative　dialectics。　　（〃Herrschaft　und　Knechtschaft〃；　〃Phanomenologie　des　Geistes〃；　IV。　A。；　Leiden；　1907。）　　And　in　Schopenhauer's　theory　of　the　blind　will　to　live　and　its　abrogation　by　the　ethical　feeling；　which　is　founded　on　universal　sympathy；　we　have　a　more　individualistic　form　of　the　same　idea。

It　was；　then；　not　entirely　a　foreign　point　of　view　which　Darwin　introduced　into　ethical　thought；　even　if　we　take　no　account　of　the　poetical　character　of　the　word　〃struggle〃　and　of　the　more　direct　adaptation；　through　the　use　and　non…use　of　power；　which　Darwin　also　emphasised。　　In　〃The　Descent　of　Man〃　he　has　devoted　a　special　chapter　（〃The　Descent　of　Man〃；　Vol。　I。　Ch。　iii。）　to　a　discussion　of　the　origin　of　the　ethical　consciousness。　　The　characteristic　expression　of　this　consciousness　he　found；　just　as　Kant　did；　in　the　idea　of　〃ought〃；　it　was　the　origin　of　this　new　idea　which　should　be　explained。　　His　hypothesis　was　that　the　ethical　〃ought〃　has　its　origin　in　the　social　and　parental　instincts；　which；　as　well　as　other　instincts　（e。g。　the　instinct　of　self…preservation）；　lie　deeper　than　pleasure　and　pain。　　In　many　species；　not　least　in　the　human　species；　these　instincts　are　fostered　by　natural　selection；　and　when　the　powers　of　memory　and　comparison　are　developed；　so　that　single　acts　can　be　valued　according　to　the　claims　of　the　deep　social　instinct；　then　consciousness　of　duty　and　remorse　are　possible。　　Blind　instinct　has　developed　to　conscious　ethical　will。

As　already　stated；　Darwin；　as　a　moral　philosopher　belongs　to　the　school　that　was　founded　by　Shaftesbury；　and　was　afterwards　represented　by　Hutcheson；　Hume；　Adam　Smith；　Comte　and　Spencer。　　His　merit　is；　first；　that　he　has　given　this　tendency　of　thought　a　biological　foundation；　and　that　he　has　stamped　on　it　a　doughty　character　in　showing　that　ethical　ideas　and　sentiments；　rightly　conceived；　are　forces　which　are　at　work　in　the　struggle　for　life。

There　are　still　many　questions　to　solve。　　Not　only　does　the　ethical　development　within　the　human　species　contain　features　still　unexplained　（The　works　of　Westermarck　and　Hobhouse　throw　new　light　on　many　of　these　features。）；　but　we　are　confronted　by　the　great　problem　whether　after　all　a　genetic　historical　theory　can　be　of　decisive　importance　here。　　To　every　consequent　ethical　consciousness　there　is　a　standard　of　value；　a　primordial　value　which　determines　the　single　ethical　judgments　as　their　last　presupposition；　and　the　〃rightness〃　of　this　basis；　the　〃value〃　of　this　value　can　as　little　be　discussed　as　the　〃rationality〃　of　our　logical　principles。　　There　is　here　revealed　a　possibility　of　ethical　scepticism　which　evolutionistic　ethics　（as　well　as　intuitive　or　rationalistic　ethics）　has　overlooked。　　No　demonstration　can　show　that　the　results　of　the　ethical　development　are　definitive　and　universal。　　We　meet　here　again　with　the　important　opposition　of　systematisation　and　evolution。　　There　will；　I　think；　always　be　an　open　question　here；　though　comparative　ethics；　of　which　we　have　so　far　only　the　first　attempts；　can　do　much　to　throw　light　on　it。

It　would　carry　us　too　far　to　discuss　all　the　philosophical　works　on　ethics；　which　have　been　influenced　directly　or　indirectly　by　evolutionism。　　I　may；　however；　here　refer　to　the　book　of　C。M。　Williams；　〃A　Review　of　the　Systems　of　Ethics　founded　on　the　Theory　of　Evolution〃　（New　York　and　London；　1893。）；　in　which；　besides　Darwin；　the　following　authors　are　reviewed：　　Wallace；　Haeckel；　Spencer；　Fiske；　Rolph；　Barratt；　Stephen；　Carneri；　Hoffding；　Gizycki；　Alexander；　Ree。　　As　works　which　criticise　evolutionistic　ethics　from　an　intuitive　point　of　view　and　in　an　instructive　way；　may　be　cited：　　Guyau　〃La　morale　anglaise　contemporaine〃　（Paris；　1879。）；　and　Sorley；　〃Ethics　of　Naturalism〃。　　I　will　only　mention　some　interesting　contributions　to　ethical　discussion　which　can　be　found　in　Darwinism　besides　the　idea　of　struggle　for　life。

The　attention　which　Darwin　has　directed　to　variations　has　opened　our　eyes　to　the　differences　in　human　nature　as　well　as　in　nature　generally。　　There　is　here　a　fact　of　great　importance　for　ethical　thought；　no　matter　from　what　ultimate　premiss　it　starts。　　Only　from　a　very　abstract　point　of　view　can　different　individuals　be　treated　in　the　same　manner。　　The　most　eminent　ethical　thinkers；　men　such　as　Jeremy　Bentham　and　Immanuel　Kant；　who　discussed　ethical　questions　from　very　opposite　standpoints；　agreed　in　regarding　all　men　as　equal　in　respect　of　ethical　endowment。　　In　regard　to　Bentham；　Leslie　Stephen　remarks：　　〃He　is　determined　to　be　thoroughly　empirical；　to　take　men　as　he　found　them。　　But　his　utilitarianism　supposed　that　men's　views　of　happiness　and　utility　were　uniform　and　clear；　and　that　all　that　was　wanted　was　to　show　them　the　means　by　which　their　ends　could　be　reached。〃　　（〃English　literature　and　society　in　the　eighteenth　century〃；　London；