memoirs of general william t. sherman-2-第30章
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ture course； which was to leave Hood to be encountered by General Thomas； while I should carry into full effect the long…contemplated project of marching for the sea…coast； and thence to operate toward Richmond。 But it was all…important to me and to our cause that General Thomas should have an ample force； equal to any and every emergency。
He then had at Nashville about eight or ten thousand new troops； and as many more civil employs of the Quartermaster's Department； which were not suited far the field； but would be most useful in manning the excellent forts that already covered Nashville。 At Chattanooga； he had General Steedman's division； about five thousand men； besides garrisons for Chattanooga； Bridgeport； and Stevenson； at Murfreesboro' he also had General Rousseau's division； which was full five thousand strong； independent of the necessary garrisons for the railroad。 At Decatur and Huntsville； Alabama； was the infantry division of General R。 S。 Granger； estimated at four thousand； and near Florence； Alabama。； watching the crossings of the Tennessee； were General Edward Hatch's division of cavalry； four thousand； General Croxton's brigade； twenty…five hundred； and Colonel Capron's brigade； twelve hundred； besides which； General J。 H。 Wilson had collected in Nashville about ten thousand dismounted cavalry； for which he was rapidly collecting the necessary horses for a remount。 All these aggregated about forty…five thousand men。 General A。 J。 Smith at that time was in Missouri； with the two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps which had been diverted to that quarter to assist General Rosecrans in driving the rebel General Price out of Missouri。 This object had been accomplished； and these troops； numbering from eight to ten thousand； had been ordered to Nashville。 To these I proposed at first to add only the Fourth Corps （General Stanley）； fifteen thousand； and that corps was ordered from Gaylesville~to march to Chattanooga； and thence report for orders to General Thomas； but subsequently； on the 30th of October； at Rome； Georgia； learning from General Thomas that the new troops promised by General Grant were coming forward very； slowly； I concluded to further reenforce him by General Schofield's corps （Twenty…third）； twelve thousand； which corps accordingly marched for Resaca； and there took the cars for Chattanooga。 I then knew that General Thomas would have an ample force with which to encounter General Hood anywhere in the open field； besides garrisons to secure the railroad to his rear and as far forward as Chattanooga。 And； moreover； I was more than convinced that he would have ample time for preparation； for； on that very day； General R。 S。 Granger had telegraphed me from Decatur； Alabama：
I omitted to mention another reason why Hood will go to Tusomnbia before crossing the Tennessee River。 He was evidently out of supplies。 His men were all grumbling； the first thing the prisoners asked for was something to eat。 Hood could not get any thing if he should cross this side of Rogersville。
I knew that the country about Decatur and Tuscumbia； Alabama； was bare of provisions； and inferred that General Hood would have to draw his supplies； not only of food； but of stores； clothing； and ammunition； from Mobile； Montgomery； and Selma； Alabama； by the railroad around by Meridian and Corinth； Mississippi； which we had most effectually disabled the previous winter。
General Hood did not make a serious attack on Decatur； but hung around it from October 26th to the 30th； when he drew off and marched for a point on the south side of the Tennessee River； opposite Florence； where he was compelled to remain nearly a month； to collect the necessary supplies for his contemplated invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky。
The Fourth Corps （Stanley） had already reached Chattanooga； and had been transported by rail to Pulaski； Tennessee； and General Thomas ordered General Schofield； with the Twenty…third Corps； to Columbia； Tennessee； a place intermediate between Hood （then on the Tennessee River； opposite Florence） and Forrest； opposite Johnsonville。
On the 31st of October General Croxton； of the cavalry； reported that the enemy had crossed the Tennessee River four miles above Florence； and that he had endeavored to stop him； but without success。 Still； I was convinced that Hood's army was in no condition to march for Nashville； and that a good deal of further delay might reasonably be counted on。 I also rested with much confidence on the fact that the Tennessee River below Muscle Shoals was strongly patrolled by gunboats； and that the reach of the river above Muscle Shoals； from Decatur as high up as our railroad at Bridgeport； was also guarded by gunboats； so that Hood； to cross over； would be compelled to select a point inaccessible to these gunboats。 He actually did choose such a place； at the old railroad…piers； four miles above Florence； Alabama； which is below Muscle Shoals and above Colbert Shoals。
On the 31st of October Forrest made his appearance on the Tennessee River opposite Johnsonville （whence a new railroad led to Nashville）； and with his cavalry and field pieces actually crippled and captured two gunboats with five of our transports； a feat of arms which； I confess； excited my admiration。
There is no doubt that the month of October closed to us looking decidedly squally； but； somehow； I was sustained in the belief that in a very few days the tide would turn。
On the 1st of November I telegraphed very fully to General Grant； at City Point； who must have been disturbed by the wild rumors that filled the country； and on the 2d of November received （at Rome） this dispatch：
CITY POINT； November 1； 18646 P。M。
Major…General SHERMAN：
Do you not think it advisable； now that Hood has gone so far north； to entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign？ With Hood's army destroyed； you can go where you please with impunity。 I believed and still believe； if you had started south while Hood was in the neighborhood of you； he would have been forced to go after you。 Now that he is far away he might look upon the chase as useless； and he will go in one direction while you are pushing in the other。 If you can see a chance of destroying Hood's army； attend to that first； and make your other move secondary。
U。 S。 GRANT； Lieutenant…General。
My answer is dated
ROME； GEORGIA； November 2； 1864。 Lieutenant…General U。 S。 GRANT； City Point； Virginia：
Your dispatch is received。 If I could hope to overhaul Hood； I would turn against him with my whole force； then he would retreat to the south west； drawing me as a decoy away from Georgia； which is his chief object。 If he ventures north of the Tennessee River； I may turn in that direction； and endeavor to get below him on his line of retreat； but thus far he has not gone above the Tennessee River。 General Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent his reaching any country in which we have an interest； and he has orders； if Hood turns to follow me； to push for Selma； Alabama。 No single army can catch Hood； and I am convinced the best results will follow from our defeating Jeff。 Davis's cherished plea of making me leave Georgia by manoeuvring。 Thus far I have confined my efforts to thwart this plan； and have reduced baggage so that I can pick up and start in any direction； but I regard the pursuit of Hood as useless。 Still； if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee； I will hold Decatur； and be prepared to move in that direction； but； unless I let go of Atlanta； my force will not be equal to his。
W。 T。 SHERMAN； Major…General。
By this date； under the intelligent and energetic action of Colonel W。 W。 Wright； and with the labor of fifteen hundred men； the railroad break of fifteen miles about Dalton was repaired so far as to admit of the passage of cars； and I transferred my headquarters to Kingston as more central； and from that place； on the same day （November 2d）； again telegraphed to General Grant：
KINGSTON； GEORGIA； November 2； 1884。 Lieutenant…General U。 S。 GRANT； City Point； Virginia： If I turn back； the whole effect of my campaign will be loSt。 By my movements I have thrown Beauregard （Hood） well to the west； and Thomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until the reenforcements from Missouri reach him。 We have now ample supplies at Chattannooga and Atlanta； and can stand a month's interruption to our communications。 I do not believe the Confederate army can reach our railroad…lines except by cavalry…raids； and Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate them。 I am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow my contemplated movement through Georgia。 W。 T。 SHERMAN； Major…General。
That name day I received； in answer to the Rome dispatch； the following：
CITY POINT； VIRGINIA； November 2；186411。30 a。m。
Major…General SHERMAN：
Your dispatch of 9 A。M。 yesterday is just received。 I dispatched you the same date； advising that Hood's army； now that it had worked so far north； ought to be looked upon now as the 〃object。〃 With the force； however； that you have left with General Thomas； he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him。
I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood； without giving up all we have gained in territory。 I say； then； go on as you propose。
U。 S。 GRANT； Lieutenant…General；
This was the first time that General Grant ordered the 〃march to the sea；〃 and； although many of his warm friends and admirers insist that he was the author and projector of that march； and that I simply executed his plans； General Grant has never； in my opinion； thought so or said so。 The truth is fully given in an original letter of President Lincoln； which I received at Savannah； Georgia； and have at this instant before me； every word of which is in his own familiar handwriting。 It is dated…
WASHINGTON； December 26； 1864。
When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast； I was anxious； if not fearful； but； feeling that you were the better judge； and remembering 〃nothing risked； nothing gained；〃 I did not interfere。 Now； the undertaking being a success； the honor is all yours； for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce； and； taking the work of General Thomas into account； as it should be taken； it is indeed a great success。 Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages； but； in showing to the world that your army could be divided； putting the stronger part to an important new service； and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole； Hood's army； it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light。 But what next？ I suppose it will be safer if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide。
A。 LINCOLN
Of course； this judgment； made after the event； was extremely flattering and was all I ever expected； a recognition of the truth and of its importance。 I have often been asked； by well…meaning friends； when the thought of that march first entered my mind。 I knew that an army which had penetrated Georgia as far as Atlanta could not turn back。 It must go ahead； but when； how； and where； depended on many considerations。 As soon as Hood had shifted across from Lovejoy
