memoirs of general william t. sherman-2-第24章

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outh　had　one　jot　or　tittle　of　provocation。　　I　myself　have　seen　in　Missouri；　Kentucky；　Tennessee；　and　Mississippi；　hundreds　and　thousands　of　women　and　children　fleeing　from　your　armies　and　desperadoes；　hungry　and　with　bleeding　feet。　　In　Memphis；　Vicksburg；　and　Mississippi；　we　fed　thousands　upon　thousands　of　the　families　of　rebel　soldiers　left　on　our　hands；　and　whom　we　could　not　see　starve。　　Now　that　war　comes　home　to　you；　you　feel　very　different。　　You　deprecate　its　horrors；　but　did　not　feel　them　when　you　sent　car…loads　of　soldiers　and　ammunition；　and　moulded　shells　and　shot；　to　carry　war　into　Kentucky　and　Tennessee；　to　desolate　the　homes　of　hundreds　and　thousands　of　good　people　who　only　asked　to　live　in　peace　at　their　old　homes；　and　under　the　Government　of　their　inheritance。　　But　these　comparisons　are　idle。　I　want　peace；　and　believe　it　can　only　be　reached　through　union　and　war；　and　I　will　ever　conduct　war　with　a　view　to　perfect　and　early　success。

But；　my　dear　sirs；　when　peace　does　come；　you　may　call　on　me　for　any　thing。　　Then　will　I　share　with　you　the　last　cracker；　and　watch　with　you　to　shield　your　homes　and　families　against　danger　from　every　quarter。

Now　you　must　go；　and　take　with　you　the　old　and　feeble；　feed　and　nurse　them；　and　build　for　them；　in　more　quiet　places；　proper　habitations　to　shield　them　against　the　weather　until　the　mad　passions　of　men　cool　down；　and　allow　the　Union　and　peace　once　more　to　settle　over　your　old　homes　at　Atlanta。　　Yours　in　haste；

W。　T。　SHERMAN；　Major…General　commanding。



HEADQUARTERS　MILITARY　DIVISION　OF　THE　MISSISSIPPI　IN　THE　FIELD；　ATLANTA；　GEORGIA；　September　14；　1864。

General　J。　B。　HOOD；　commanding　Army　of　the　Tennessee；　Confederate　Army。

GENERAL：　Yours　of　September　12th　is　received；　and　has　been　carefully　perused。　　I　agree　with　you　that　this　discussion　by　two　soldiers　is　out　of　place；　and　profitless；　but　you　must　admit　that　you　began　the　controversy　by　characterizing　an　official　act　of　mine　in　unfair　and　improper　terms。　　I　reiterate　my　former　answer；　and　to　the　only　new　matter　contained　in　your　rejoinder　add：　We　have　no　〃negro　allies〃　in　this　army；　not　a　single　negro　soldier　left　Chattanooga　with　this　army；　or　is　with　it　now。　　There　are　a　few　guarding　Chattanooga；　which　General　Steedman　sent　at　one　time　to　drive　Wheeler　out　of　Dalton。

I　was　not　bound　by　the　laws　of　war　to　give　notice　of　the　shelling　of　Atlanta；　a　〃fortified　town；　with　magazines；　arsenals；　founderies；　and　public　stores；〃　you　were　bound　to　take　notice。　　See　the　books。

This　is　the　conclusion　of　our　correspondence；　which　I　did　not　begin；　and　terminate　with　satisfaction。　　I　am；　with　respect；　your　obedient　servant；

W。　T。　SHERMAN；　Major…General　commanding。


HEADQUARTERS　OF　THE　ARMY　WASHINGTON；　September　28；　1864；

Major…General　SHERMAN；　Atlanta；　Georgia。

GENERAL：　Your　communications　of　the　20th　in　regard　to　the　removal　of　families　from　Atlanta；　and　the　exchange　of　prisoners；　and　also　the　official　report　of　your　campaign；　are　just　received。　　I　have　not　had　time　as　yet　to　examine　your　report。　　The　course　which　you　have　pursued　in　removing　rebel　families　from　Atlanta；　and　in　the　exchange　of　prisoners；　is　fully　approved　by　the　War　Department。　Not　only　are　you　justified　by　the　laws　and　usages　of　war　in　removing　these　people；　but　I　think　it　was　your　duty　to　your　own　army　to　do　so。　　Moreover；　I　am　fully　of　opinion　that　the　nature　of　your　position；　the　character　of　the　war；　the　conduct　of　the　enemy　（and　especially　of　non…combatants　and　women　of　the　territory　which　we　have　heretofore　conquered　and　occupied）；　will　justify　you　in　gathering　up　all　the　forage　and　provisions　which　your　army　may　require；　both　for　a　siege　of　Atlanta　and　for　your　supply　in　your　march　farther　into　the　enemy's　country。　　Let　the　disloyal　families　of　the　country；　thus　stripped；　go　to　their　husbands；　fathers；　and　natural　protectors；　in　the　rebel　ranks；　we　have　tried　three　years　of　conciliation　and　kindness　without　any　reciprocation；　on　the　contrary；　those　thus　treated　have　acted　as　spies　and　guerrillas　in　our　rear　and　within　our　lines。　　The　safety　of　our　armies；　and　a　proper　regard　for　the　lives　of　our　soldiers；　require　that　we　apply　to　our　inexorable　foes　the　severe　rules　of　war。　　We　certainly　are　not　required　to　treat　the　so…called　non…combatant　rebels　better　than　they　themselves　treat　each　other。　　Even　herein　Virginia；　within　fifty　miles　of　Washington；　they　strip　their　own　families　of　provisions；　leaving　them；　as　our　army　advances；　to　be　fed　by　us；　or　to　starve　within　our　lines。　　We　have　fed　this　class　of　people　long　enough。　　Let　them　go　with　their　husbands　and　fathers　in　the　rebel　ranks；　and　if　they　won't　go；　we　must　send　them　to　their　friends　and　natural　protectors。　　I　would　destroy　every　mill　and　factory　within　reach　which　I　did　not　want　for　my　own　use。　　This　the　rebels　have　done；　not　only　in　Maryland　and　Pennsylvania；　but　also　in　Virginia　and　other　rebel　States；　when　compelled　to　fall　back　before　our　armies。　　In　many　sections　of　the　country　they　have　not　left　a　mill　to　grind　grain　for　their　own　suffering　families；　lest　we　might　use　them　to　supply　our　armies。　　We　most　do　the　same。

I　have　endeavored　to　impress　these　views　upon　our　commanders　for　the　last　two　years。　　You　are　almost　the　only　one　who　has　properly　applied　them。　　I　do　not　approve　of　General　Hunter's　course　in　burning　private　homes　or　uselessly　destroying　private　property。　That　is　barbarous。　　But　I　approve　of　taking　or　destroying　whatever　may　serve　as　supplies　to　us　or　to　the　enemy's　army。

Very　respectfully；　your　obedient　servant；

H。　W。　HALLECK；　Major…General；　Chief　of　Staff


In　order　to　effect　the　exchange　of　prisoners；　to　facilitate　the　exodus　of　the　people　of　Atlanta；　and　to　keep　open　communication　with　the　South；　we　established　a　neutral　camp；　at　and　about　the　railroad…station　next　south　of　Atlanta；　known　as　〃Rough　and　Ready；〃　to　which　point　I　dispatched　Lieutenant…Colonel　Willard　Warner；　of　my　staff；　with　a　guard　of　one　hundred　men；　and　General　Hood　sent　Colonel　Clare；　of　his　staff；　with　a　similar　guard；　these　officers　and　men　harmonized　perfectly；　and　parted　good　friends　when　their　work　was　done。　　In　the　mean　time　I　also　had　reconnoitred　the　entire　rebel　lines　about　Atlanta；　which　were　well　built；　but　were　entirely　too　extensive　to　be　held　by　a　single　corps　or　division　of　troops；　so　I　instructed　Colonel　Poe；　United　States　Engineers；　on　my　staff；　to　lay　off　an　inner　and　shorter　line；　susceptible　of　defense　by　a　smaller　garrison。

By　the　middle　of　September　all　these　matters　were　in　progress；　the　reports　of　the　past　campaign　were　written　up　and　dispatched　to　Washington；　and　our　thoughts　began　to　turn　toward　the　future。　Admiral　Farragut　had　boldly　and　successfully　run　the　forts　at　the　entrance　to　Mobile　Bay；　which　resulted　in　the　capture　of　Fort　Morgan；　so　that　General　Canby　was　enabled　to　begin　his　regular　operations　against　Mobile　City；　with　a　view　to　open　the　Alabama　River　to　navigation。　　My　first　thoughts　were　to　concert　operations　with　him；　either　by　way　of　Montgomery；　Alabama；　or　by　the　Appalachicula；　but　so　long　a　line；　to　be　used　as　a　base　for　further　operations　eastward；　was　not　advisable；　and　I　concluded　to　await　the　initiative　of　the　enemy；　supposing　that　he　would　be　forced　to　resort　to　some　desperate　campaign　by　the　clamor　raised　at　the　South　on　account　of　the　great　loss　to　them　of　the　city　of　Atlanta。

General　Thomas　occupied　a　house　on　Marietta　Streets　which　had　a　veranda　with　high　pillars。　　We　were　sitting　there　one　evening；　talking　about　things　generally；　when　General　Thomas　asked　leave　to　send　his　trains　back　to　Chattanooga；　for　the　convenience　and　economy　of　forage。　　I　inquired　of　him　if　he　supposed　we　would　be　allowed　much　rest　at　Atlanta；　and　he　said　he　thought　we　would；　or　that　at　all　events　it　would　not　be　prudent　for　us　to　go　much　farther　into　Georgia　because　of　our　already　long　line　of　communication；　viz。；　three　hundred　miles　from　Nashville。　　This　was　true；　but　there　we　were；　and　we　could　not　afford　to　remain　on　the　defensive；　simply　holding　Atlanta　and　fighting　for　the　safety　of　its　railroad。　　I　insisted　on　his　retaining　all　trains；　and　on　keeping　all　his　divisions　ready　to　move　at　a　moment's　warning。　　All　the　army；　officers　and　men；　seemed　to　relax　more　or　less；　and　sink　into　a　condition　of　idleness。　　General　Schofield　was　permitted　to　go　to　Knoxville；　to　look　after　matters　in　his　Department　of　the　Ohio；　and　Generals　Blair　and　Logan　went　home　to　look　after　politics。　　Many　of　the　regiments　were　entitled　to；　and　claimed；　their　discharge；　by　reason　of　the　expiration　of　their　term　of　service；　so　that　with　victory　and　success　came　also　many　causes　of　disintegration。

The　rebel　General　Wheeler　was　still　in　Middle　Tennessee；　threatening　our　railroads；　and　rumors　came　that　Forrest　was　on　his　way　from　Mississippi　to　the　same　theatre；　for　the　avowed　purpose　of　breaking　up　our　railroads　and　compelling　us　to　fall　back　from　our　conqueSt。　To　prepare　for　this；　or　any　other　emergency；　I　ordered　Newton's　division　of　the　Fourth　Corps　back　to　Chattanooga；　and　Corse's　division　of　the　Seventeenth　Corps　to　Rome；　and　instructed　General　Rousseau　at　Nashville；　Granger　at　Decatur；　and　Steadman　at　Chattanooga；　to　adopt　the　most　active　measures　to　protect　and　insure　the　safety　of　our　roads。

Hood　still　remained　about　Lovejoy's　Station；　and；　up　to　the　15th　of　September；　had　given　no　signs　of　his　future　plans；　so　that　with　this　date　I　close　the　campaign　of　Atlanta；　with　the　following　review　of　our　relative　losses　during　the　months　of　August　and　September；　with　a　summary　of　those　for　the　whole　campaign；　beginning　May　6　and　ending　September　15；　1864。　　The　losses　for　August　and　September　are　added　together；　so　as　to　include　those　about　Jonesboro：


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Killed　and　Missing　　　　Wounded　　　　Total　　　　　　　　　Grand　Aggregate。。。。。　1；408　　　　　　　　　　　　　3；731　　　　5；139



Hood's　losses；　as　reported　for　the　same　period；　page　577；　Johnston's　〃Narrative：〃

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Killed　　　　　　　　　　　　　Wounded　　　　　Total　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　482　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3；223　　　　　　3；705

To　which　should　be　added：

　　　　　　　Prisoners　captured　by　us：。。。。。。。。。。。。　3；738

　　　　　　　Giving　his　total　loss　。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。　7；44


On　recapitulating　the　entire　losses　of　each　army　during　the　entire　campaign；　from　May　to　September；　inclusive；　we　have；　in　the　Union　army；　as　per　table　appended：

Killed　。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。　　4；423　Wounded　。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。　22；822　Missing。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。　　4；442　　　　　　　　Aggregate　Loss　。。。。。。。。。　31；627


In　the　Southern　army；　according　to　the　reports　of　Surgeon　Foard　（pp。　　576；　577；　Johnston's　〃Narrative　〃）

　　　　　　　　Total　killed　。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。　　3；044　　　　　　　　　Total　killed　and　wounded。。。。。　21；996　　　　　　　　　Prisoners　captured　by　us　。。。。　12；983

　　　　　　　　Aggregate　loss　to　the　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Southern　Army　。。。。。。。。。。　34；979


The　foregoing　figures　are　official；　and　are　very　nearly　correct。　　I　see　no　room　for　error　save　in　the　cavalry；　which　was　very　much　scattered；　and　whose　reports　are　much　less　reliable　than　of　the　infantry　and　artillery；　but　as　Surgeon　Foard's　tables　do　not　embrace　Wheeler's；　Jackson's；　and　Martin's　divisions　of　cavalry；　I　infer　that　the　comparison；　as　to　cavalry　losses；　is　a　〃stand…off。〃

I　have　no　doubt　that　the　S