criminal psychology-第56章

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。　Much　may　be　learned　from　such　people　by　use　of　this　specialty　of　theirs；　while　oversight　thereof　may　render　them　hopeless　as　witnesses。　How　far　this　goes　with　some　peopleas　a　rule　people　with　a　sense　of　location　are　the　more　intelligentI　saw　some　time　ago　when　the　Germanist　Bernhardt　Seuffert　told　me　that　when　he　did　not　know　how　anything　is　spelled　he　imagined　its　appearance；　and　when　that　did　not　help　he　wrote　both　the　forms　between　which　he　was　vacillating　and　then　knew　which　one　was　the　correct　one。　When　I　asked　him　whether　the　chirographic　image　appeared　printed　or　written　and　in　what　type；　he　replied　significantly　enough；　‘‘As　my　writing…teacher　wrote　it。''　He　definitely　localized　the　image　on　his　writing　book　of　many　years　ago　and　read　it　off　in　his　mind。　Such　specialties　must　be　remembered　in　examining　witnesses。

In　conclusion；　there　is　a　word　to　say　concerning　Cattell's＇1＇　investigations　of　the　time　required　for　apprehension。　The　better　a　man　knows　the　language　the　more　rapidly　can　he　repeat　and　read　its　words。　It　is　for　this　reason　that　we　believe　that　foreigners　speak　more　rapidly　than　we。　Cattell　finds　this　so　indubitable；　that　he　wants　to　use　speed　as　a　test　in　the　examinations　in　foreign　languages。


＇1＇　J。　M。　Cattell：　ber　die　Zeit　der　Erkennung　u。　Benemlung　von　Schrift　etc。　（in　Wundt's：　Philosophischen　Studien　II；　1883）。


The　time　used　in　order　to　identify　a　single　letter　is　a　quarter　of　a　second；　the　time　to　pronounce　it　one…tenth　of　a　second。　Colors　and　pictures　require　noticeably　more；　not　because　they　are　not　recognized；　but　because　it　is　necessary　to　think　what　the　right　name　is。　We　are　much　more　accustomed　to　reading　words。

These　observations　might　be　carried　a　step　further。　The　more　definitely　an　event　to　be　described　is　conceived；　the　clearer　the　deduction　and　the　more　certain　the　memory　of　it；　the　more　rapidly　may　it　be　reproduced。　It　follows　that；　setting　aside　individual　idiosyncrasies；　the　rapidity　of　speech　of　a　witness　will　be　of　importance　when　we　want　to　know　how　much　he　has　thought　on　a　question　and　is　certain　what　he　is　going　to　say。　It　is　conceivable　that　a　person　who　is　trying　to　remember　the　event　accurately　will　speak　slowly　and　stutteringly；　or　at　least　with　hesitation　at　the　moment。　The　same　will　occur　if　he　tries　to　conceive　of　various　　possibilities；　to　eliminate　some；　and　to　avoid　contradiction　and　improbability。　If；　however；　the　witness　is　convinced　and　believes　truly　what　he　is　telling；　so　that　he　may　go　over　it　in　his　mind　easily　and　without　interruption；　he　will　tell　his　story　as　quickly　as　he　can。　This　may　indeed　be　observed　in　public　speakers；　even　judges；　prosecutors；　and　defense；　if　anyone　of　them　is　not　clear　with　regard　to　the　case　he　represents；　or　not　convinced　of　its　correctness；　he　will　speak　slowly；　if　the　situation　is　reversed　he　will　speak　rapidly。　Court　and　other　public　stenographers　confirm　this　observation。


Topic　3。　IMAGINATION。　Section　45。

The　things　witnesses　tell　us　have　formerly　existed　in　their　imaginations；　and　the　_*how_　of　this　existence　determines　in　a　large　degree　the　_quale_　of　what　they　offer　us。　Hence；　the　nature　of　imagination　must　be　of　interest　to　us；　and　the　more　so；　as　we　need　not　concern　ourselves　with　the　relation　between　being　and　imagination。　It　may　be　that　things　may　exist　in　forms　quite　different　from　those　in　which　we　know　them；　perhaps　even　in　unknowable　forms。　The　idealist；　according　to　some　authorities；　has　set　this　possibility　aside　and　given　a　scientific　reply　to　those　who　raised　it。

So　far　as　we　lawyers　are　concerned；　the　‘‘scientific　reply''　does　not　matter。　We　are　interested　in　the　reliability　of　the　imagination　and　in　its　identification　with　what　we　assume　to　exist　and　to　occur。　Some　writers　hold　that　sensory　objects　are　in　sense…perception　both　external　and　internal；　external　with　regard　to　each　other；　and　internal　with　regard　to　consciousness。　Attention　is　called　to　the　fact　that　the　distinction　between　image　and　object　constitutes　no　part　of　the　act　of　perception。　But　those　who　remark　this　fact　assume　that　the　act　does　contain　an　image。　According　to　St。　Augustine　the　image　serves　as　the　knowledge　of　the　object；　according　to　Erdmann　the　object　is　the　image　objectified。

Of　great　importance　is　the　substitutional　adequacy　of　images。　E。　g。；　I　imagine　my　absent　dog；　Bismarck's　dog；　whom　I　know　only　pictorially；　and　finally；　the　dog　of　Alcibiades；　whose　appearance　is　known　only　by　the　fact　that　he　was　pretty　and　that　his　master　had　cut　off　his　tail。　In　this　case；　the　representative　value　of　these　images　will　be　definite；　for　everybody　knows　that　I　can　imagine　my　own　dog　very　correctly；　that　the　image　of　Bismarck's　beast　will　also　be　comparatively　good　inasmuch　as　this　animal　has　been　fre…　　quently　pictured　and　described；　while　the　image　of　Alcibiades'　dog　will　want　much　in　the　way　of　reliabilityalthough　I　have　imagined　this　historic　animal　quite　vividly　since　boyhood。　When；　therefore；　I　speak　of　any　one　of　these　three　animals　everybody　will　be　able　properly　to　value　the　correctness　of　my　images　because　he　knows　their　conditions。　When　we　speak　with　a　witness；　however；　we　rarely　know　the　conditions　under　which　he　has　obtained　his　images；　and　we　learn　them　only　from　him。　Now　it　happens　that　the　description　offered　by　the　witness　adds　another　image；　i。　e。；　our　own　image　of　the　matter；　and　this；　and　that　of　the　witness；　have　to　be　placed　in　specific　relation　to　each　other。　Out　of　the　individual　images　of　all　concerned　an　image　should　be　provided　which　implies　the　image　of　the　represented　event。　Images　can　be　compared　only　with　images；　or　images　are　only　pictures　of　images。＇1＇


＇1＇　Cf。　Windelband：　‘‘Prludien。''


The　difficulty　of　this　transmutation　lies　fundamentally　in　the　nature　of　representation。　Representation　can　never　be　identical　with　its　object。　Helmholtz　has　made　this　most　clear：　‘‘Our　visions　and　representations　are　effects；　objects　seen　and　represented　have　worked　on　our　nervous　system　and　on　our　consciousness。　The　nature　of　each　effect　depends　necessarily　upon　the　nature　of　its　cause；　and　the　nature　of　the　individual　upon　whom　the　cause　was　at　work。　To　demand　an　image　which　should　absolutely　reproduce　its　object　and　therefore　be　absolutely　true；　would　be　to　demand　an　effect　which　should　be　absolutely　independent　of　the　nature　of　that　object　on　which　the　effect　is　caused。　And　this　is　an　obvious　contradiction。''

What　the　difference　between　image　and　object　consists　of；　whether　it　is　merely　formal　or　material；　how　much　it　matters；　has　not　yet　been　scientifically　proved　and　may　never　be　so。　We　have　to　assume　only　that　the　validity　of　this　distinction　is　universally　known；　and　that　everybody　possesses　an　innate　corrective　with　which　he　assigns　proper　place　to　image　and　object；　i。　e。；　he　knows　approximately　the　distinction　between　them。　The　difficulty　lies　in　the　fact　that　not　all　people　possess　an　identical　standard；　and　that　upon　the　creation　of　the　latter　practically　all　human　qualities　exert　an　influence。　This　variety　in　standards；　again；　is　double…edged。　On　the　one　side　it　depends　on　the　essence　of　image　and　of　object；　on　the　other　it　depends　on　the　alteration　which　the　image　undergoes　even　during　perception　as　well　as　during　all　the　ensuing　time。　Everybody　knows　this　distinction。　Whoever　has　seen　anything　under　certain　circumstances；　or　during　a　certain　period　of　his　life；　may　frequently　　produce　an　image　of　it　varying　in　individual　characteristics；　but　in　its　general　character　constant。　If　he　sees　it　later　under　different　conditions；　at　a　different　age；　when　memory　and　imaginative　disposition　have　exercised　their　alterative　influence；　image　and　object　fail　to　correspond　in　various　directions。　The　matter　is　still　worse　with　regard　to　images　of　things　and　events　that　have　never　been　seen。　I　can　imagine　the　siege　of　Troy；　a　dragon；　the　polar　night　and　Alexander　the　Great；　but　how　different　will　the　image　be　from　the　object！

This　is　especially　obvious　when　we　have　perceived　something　which　did　not　appear　to　us　altogether　correct。　We　improve　the　thing；　i。　e。；　we　study　how　it　might　have　been　better；　and　we　remember　it　as　improved；　then　the　more　frequently　this　object　as　imagined　recurs；　the　more　fixed　its　form　becomes；　but　not　its　actual　form；　only　its　altered　form。　We　see　this　with　especial　clearness　in　the　case　of　drawings　that　in　some　way　displease　us。　Suppose　I　do　not　like　the　red　dress　of　a　woman　in　some　picture　and　I　prefer　brown。　If　later　I　recall　the　picture　the　image　will　become　progressively　browner　and　browner；　and　finally　I　see　the　picture　as　brown；　and　when　I　meet　the　real　object　I　wonder　about　the　red　dress。＇1＇


＇1＇　H。　Gross：　Korregierte　Vorstellungen。　In　H。　Gross's　Archiv　X；　109。


We　get　this　situation　in　miniature　each　time　we　hear　of　a　crime；　however　barren　the　news　may　be；no　more　than　a　telegraphic　word。　The　event　must　naturally　have　some　degree　of　importance；　because；　if　I　hear　merely　that　a　silver　watch　has　been　stolen；　I　do　not　try　to　imagine　that　situation。　If；　however；　I　hear　that　near　a　hostelry　in　X；　a　peasant　was　robbed　by　two　traveling　apprentices　I　immediately　get　an　image　which　contains　not　only　the　unknown　region；　but　also　the　event　of　the　robbery；　and　even　perhaps　the　faces　of　those　concerned。　It　does　not　much　matter　that　this　image　is　completely　false　in　practically　every　detail；　because　in　the　greater　number　of　cases　it　is　corrected。　The　real　danger　lies　in　the　fact　that　this　correction　is　frequently　so　bad　and　often　fails　altogether　and　that；　in　consequence；　the　first　image　again　breaks　through　and　remains　the　most　vigorous。＇2＇　The　vigor　is　the　greater　because　we　always　attach　such　imagination　to　something　actual　or　approximately　real；　and　inasmuch　as　the　latter　thing　is　either　really　seen；　or　at　least　energetically　imagined；　the　first　image　acquires　renewed　power　of　coming　up。　According　to　Lipps；　‘‘Reproductive　images　　presuppose　dispositions。　Dispositions　ensue　upon　perceptions　that　they　imply；　still　there　are　reproductive　images　and　imagined　wholes　which　imply　no　preceding　perceptions。　This　contradiction　is　solved　when　dispositions　are　contained　in　other　things　at　the　same　time。　A　finite　number　of　dispositions　may　in　this　way　be　also　infinite。。。。　Dispositions　are　transformed　power　itself；　power　transformed　in　such　a　way　as　to　be　able　to　respond　actively　to　inner　stimulations。''


＇2＇　C。　de　Lagrave：　L'Autosuggestion　Naturelle。　Rev。　d'Hypnot。　1889；　XIV；　257。


The　process　is　similar　in　the　reproduction　of　images　during　speech。　The　fact　that　this　reproduction　is　not　direct　but　depends　on　the　sequence　of　images；　leads　to　the　garrulity　of　children；　old　men；　and　uneducated　people；　who　try　to　present　the　whole　complex　of　relations　belonging　to　any　given　image。　But　such　total　recall　drives　the　judge　to　despair；　not　only　because　he　loses　time；　but　because　of　the　danger　of　having　the　attention　turned　from　important　to　unimportant　things。　The　same　thing　is　perceived　in　judicial　documents　which　often　reveal　the　fact　that　the　dictator　permitted　himself　to　be　led　astray　by　unskilful　witnesses；　or　that　he　had　himself　been　responsible　for　abstruse；　indirect　memories。　The　real　thinker　will　almost　always　be　chary　of　words；　because　he　retains；　fr