criminal psychology-第34章

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We　must　never　forget　that　every　rule　is　shattered　whenever　any　single　element　of　the　situation　is　unknown；　and　that　happens　very　easily　and　frequently。　Suppose　that　I　did　not　have　full　knowledge　of　the　nature　of　water；　and　walked　on　terra　firma　to　the　edge　of　some　quiet；　calm　pool。　When　now　I　presume：　water　has　a　body；　it　has　a　definite　density；　it　has　consistency；　weight；　etc。；　I　will　also　presume　that　I　may　go　on　walking　over　its　surface　just　as　over　the　surface　of　the　earth；and　that；　simply　because　I　am　ignorant　of　its　fluidity　and　its　specific　gravity。　Liebman＇1＇　summarizes　the　situation　as　follows。　The　causal　nexus；　the　existential　and　objective　relation　between　lightning　and　thunder；　the　firing　of　powder　and　the　explosion；　are　altogether　different　from　the　logical　nexus；　i。　e。　the　mere　conceptual　connection　between　antecedent　and　consequent　in　deduction。　This　constitutes　the　well　known　kernel　of　Humian　skepticism。　We　must　keep　in　mind　clearly　that　we　never　can　know　with　certainty　whether　we　are　in　possession　of　all　the　determining　factors　of　a　phenomenon；　and　hence　we　must　adhere　to　the　only　unexceptionable　rule：　_Be　careful　about　making　rules　that　admit　of　no　exceptions_。　There　is　still　another　objection　to　discuss；　i。　e。　the　mathematical　exception　to　Humian　skepticism。　It　might　be　held　that　inasmuch　as　the　science　of　justice　is　closely　related　in　many　ways　to　mathematics；　it　may　permit　of　propositions　a　priori。　Leibnitz　already　had　said；　‘‘The　mathematicians　count　with　numbers；　the　lawyers　with　ideas；fundamentally　both　do　the　same　thing。''　If　the　relationship　were　really　so　close；　general　skepticism　about　phenomenal　sciences　could　not　be　applied　to　the　legal　disciplines。　But　we　nowadays　deal　not　with　concepts　merely；　and　in　spite　of　all　obstruction；　Leibnitz's　time　has　passed　and　the　realities　of　our　profession；　indeed　its　most　important　object；　the　human　being　itself；　constitute　an　integrating　part　of　our　studies。　And　the　question　may　be　still　further　raised　whether　mathematics　is　really　so　exempt　from　skepticism。　The　work　of　Gauss；　Lobatschewski；　Bolyai；　Lambert；　would　make　the　answer　negative。

＇1＇　Liebman　Zur　Analysis　der　Wirklichkeit。　Strassburg　1888。



Let　us；　for　once；　consider　what　significance　mathematical　postulates　have。　When　Pythagoras　discovered　his　proposition　in　such　a　way　that　he　first　drew　a　right…angled　triangle　and　then　built　a　square　on　each　of　the　sides；　and　finally　measured　the　area　of　each　and　compared　them；　he　must　at　first　have　got　the　notion　that　that　also　might　be　merely　accidental。　If　he　had　made　the　construction　10　or　100　times　with　various　triangles　and　these　had　resulted　always　identically；　only　then　might　he　have　been　justified　in　saying　that　he　had　apparently　discovered　a　theorem。　But　then　his　process　was　just　as　thoroughly　experiential　as　that　of　a　scientist　who　says　that　a　bird　has　never　yet　been　observed　to　give　birth　to　living　young；　and　that　hence　all　birds　lay　eggs。

But　Pythagoras　did　not　proceed　in　this　experiential　manner　in　the　discovery　of　his　theorem。　He　constructed　and　he　counted；　and　when　he　did　that　he　acted　on　postulates：　‘‘If　this　is　a　right…angled　triangle　and　if　that　be　a　square；　so；''and　this　is　just　what　is　done　in　every　science。　The　general　propositions　are；　‘‘If　the　relations　remain　the　same　as　formerly　the　moon　must　rise　to…morrow　at　such　and　such　a　time。''　‘‘If　this　step　in　a　deduction　is　not　false；　if　it　is　well　grounded　at　this　point；　if　it　really　refers　to　x；　it　follows。。。。　''　In　his　procedures　the　criminalist　does　exactly　the　same　thing。　What　he　must　be　skeptical　about　is　the　postulates　from　which　he　starts。


Section　26。　（d）　The　Empirical　Method　in　the　Study　of　Cases。


Properly　to　bound　our　discussion　of　Humian　skepticism；　a　few　words　have　to　be　said　concerning　the　empirical　method　of　the　sciences。　We　will　call　those　laws　purely　empirical　which；　in　the　study　of　nature；　yield　regularities　that　are　demonstrated　by　observation　and　experiment；　but　upon　which　little　or　no　reliance　is　placed　with　regard　to　cases　which　differ　considerably　from　the　observed。　The　latter　is　done　because　no　reason　is　seen　for　the　existence　of　such　laws。　The　empirical　rule　is；　therefore；　no　final　law；　but　is　capable　of　explaining；　especially　when　true；　e。　g。；　the　succession　of　a　certain　condition　of　weather　from　certain　meteorological　signs；　the　improvement　of　species　through　crossing；　the　fact　that　some　alloys　are　harder　than　their　components；　and　so　on。　Or；　to　choose　examples　from　our　own　field；　jurisprudence　may　assert　as　empirical　law　that　a　murderer　is　a　criminal　who　has　gone　unpunished　for　his　earlier　crimes；　that　all　gamblers　show　such　significant　resemblances；　that　the　criminal　who　has　soiled　his　hands　with　blood　in　some　violent　　crime　was　accustomed　to　wipe　them　on　the　underside　of　a　table；　that　the　slyest　person　generally　perpetrates　some　gross　stupidity　after　committing　a　serious　crime；　and　so　renders　discovery　simpler；　that　lust　and　cruelty　have　a　certain　relation；　that　superstition　plays　a　great　rle　in　crime；　etc。

It　is　of　exceeding　importance　to　establish　such　purely　empiric　laws　in　our　science；　which　has　done　little　with　such　matters　because；　owing　to　scanty　research　into　most　of　them；　we　need　these　laws。　We　know　approximately　that　this　and　that　have　come　to　light　so　and　so　often；　but　we　have　not　reduced　to　order　and　studied　systematically　the　cases　before　us；　and　we　dare　not　call　this　knowledge　natural　law　because　we　have　subjected　it　to　no　inductive　procedure。　‘‘The　reference　of　any　fact　discovered　by　experience　to　general　laws　or　rules　we　call　induction。　It　embraces　both　observation　and　deduction。''　Again；　it　may　be　defined　as　‘‘the　generalization　or　universalization　of　our　experiences；　and　inference　that　a　phenomenon　occurring　x　times　will　invariably　occur　when　the　essential　circumstances　remain　identical。　The　earliest　investigators　started　with　the　simplest　inductions；that　fire　burns；　that　water　flows　downward；so　that　new；　simple　truths　were　continually　discovered。　This　is　the　type　of　scientific　induction　and　it　requires　further；　the　addition　of　certainty　and　accuracy。''＇1＇

The　foregoing　might　have　been　written　expressly　for　us　lawyers；　but　we　have　to　bear　in　mind　that　we　have　not　proceeded　in　our　own　generalizations　beyond　‘‘fire　burns；　water　flows　downward。''　And　such　propositions　we　have　only　derived　from　other　disciplines。　Those　derived　from　our　own　are　very　few　indeed；　and　to　get　more　we　have　very　far　to　go。　Moreover；　the　laws　of　experience　are　in　no　way　so　certain　as　they　are　supposed　to　be；　even　when　mathematically　conceived。　The　empirical　law　is　established　that　the　sum　of　the　three　angles　of　a　triangle　is　equal　to　two　right　angles。　And　yet　nobody；　ever　since　the　science　of　surveying　has　been　invented；　has　succeeded　in　discovering　180　degrees　in　any　triangle。　Now　then；　when　even　such　things；　supposed　ever　since　our　youth　to　be　valid；　are　not　at　all　true；　or　true　theoretically　only；　how　much　more　careful　must　we　be　in　making　inferences　from　much　less　certain　rules；　even　though　we　have　succeeded　in　using　them　before　in　many　analogous　cases？　The　activity　of　a　criminalist　is　of　far　too　short　duration　to　permit　him　to　experience　any　more　than　a　very　small　portion　of　the　possibilities　of　life；　and　suggestions　from　foreign　sources　are　very

＇1＇　ttingen：　Die　Moralstatistik。　Erlangen　1882。

　rare。　The　situation　is　different　in　other　disciplines。　‘‘Our　experience；''　says　James　Sully；''＇1＇　enables　us　to　express　a　number　of　additional　convictions。　We　can　predict　political　changes　and　scientific　developments；　and　can　conceive　of　the　geographical　conditions　at　the　north　pole。''　Other　disciplines　are　justified　to　assert　such　additional　propositions；　but　is　ours？　A　man　may　have　dealt　for　years　with　thieves　and　swindlers；　but　is　he　justified　in　deducing　from　the　inductions　made　in　his　experience；　the　situation　of　the　first　murderer　he　deals　with？　Is　he　right　in　translating　things　learned　by　dealing　with　educated　people　to　cases　where　only　peasants　appear？　In　all　these　cases　what　is　needed　in　making　deductions　is　great　caution　and　continual　reminder　to　be　very　careful；　for　our　work　here　still　lacks　the　proper　material。　In　addition　we　have　to　bear　in　mind　that　induction　is　intimately　related　to　analogy。　According　to　Lipps＇2＇　the　ground　of　one　is　the　ground　of　the　other；　they　both　rest　on　the　same　foundation。　‘‘If　I　am　still　in　doubt　whether　the　fact　on　which　a　moment　ago　I　depended　as　the　sufficient　condition　for　a　judgment　may　still　be　so　regarded；　the　induction　is　uncertain。　It　is　unjustified　when　I　take　for　sufficiently　valid　something　that　as　a　matter　of　fact　ought　not　to　be　so　taken。''　If　we　bear　in　mind　how　much　we　are　warned　against　the　use　of　analogy；　how　it　is　expressly　excluded　in　the　application　of　certain　criminal　laws；　and　how　dangerous　the　use　of　every　analogy　is；　we　must　be　convinced　that　the　use　for　our　cases　of　both　induction　and　analogy；　is　always　menace。　We　have　at　the　same　time　to　bear　in　mind　how　much　use　we　actually　make　of　both；　even　our　general　rulese。　g。；　concerning　false　testimony；bias；　reversibility；　special　inclinations；　etc。　and　our　doctrines　concerning　the　composition　and　indirection　of　testimony；　even　our　rules　concerning　the　value　of　witnesses　and　confessions；　all　these　depend　upon　induction　and　analogy。　We　pass　by　their　use　in　every　trial　from　case　to　case。　A　means　so　frequently　and　universally　used　must；　however；　be　altogether　reliable；　or　be　handled　with　the　greatest　care。　As　it　is　not　the　first　it　must　be　handled　in　the　second　way。

We　have　yet　to　indicate　the　various　ways　in　which　induction　may　be　used。　Fick　has　already　called　attention　to　the　astounding　question　concluding　Mill's　system　of　logic：　Why；　in　many　cases；　is　a　single　example　sufficient　to　complete　induction；　while　in　other　　cases　myriads　of　unanimous　instances　admitting　of　no　single　known　or　suspected　exception；　make　only　a　small　step　toward　the　establishment　of　a　generally　valid　judgment？


＇1＇　James　Sully：　‘‘Die　Illusionen''　in　Vol。　62　of　the　Internation。　Wissensohft　Bibliothek。　Leipzig　1884。

＇2＇　Th。　Lipps：　Grundtatssehen　des　Seelenlebens。　Bonn　1883。


This　question　is　of　enormous　significance　in　criminal　cases　because　it　is　not　easy　to　determine　in　any　particular　trial　whether　we　have　to　deal　with　a　situation　of　the　first　sort　where　a　single　example　is　evidential；　or　a　situation　of　the　second　sort　where　a　great　many　examples　fail　to　be　evidential。　On　this　difficulty　great　mistakes　depend；　particularly　mistakes　of　substitution　of　the　first　for　the　second。　We　are　satisfied　in　such　cases　with　a　few　examples　and　suppose　ourselves　to　have　proved　the　case　although　nothing　whatever　has　been　established。

We　must　see　first　of　all　if　it　is　of　any　use　to　refer　the　difficulty　of　the　matter　to　the　form　in　which　the　question　is　put；　and　to　say：　The　difficulty　results　from　the　question　itself。　If　it　be　asked；　‘‘Are　any　of　the　thousand　marbles　in　the　bag　white　marbles？''　the　question　is　determined　by　the　first　handful；　if　the　latter　brings　to　light　a　single　white　marble。　If；　however；　the　problem　is　phrased　so：　Does　the　bag　contain　white　marbles　_*only_？　then；　although　999　marbles　might　already　have　been　drawn　from　the　receptacle；　it