lect02-第4章

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Continental　community　to　the　unofficial　commentaries　of　the　most






learned　writers　of　textbooks。　We　obtain　our　law；　and　adjust　it　to






the　needs　of　each　successive　generation；　either　through






legislative　enactment　or　through　the　decisions　of　our　judges　on






isolated　groups　of　facts　established　by　the　most　laborious






methods。　But；　as　I　have　already　stated；　the　opinion　to　which　I






incline　is；　that　no　part　of　the　Brehon　law　had　its　origin　in






legislation。　The　author　of　innovation　and　improvement　was　the






learned　Brehon；　and　the　Brehon　appears　to　have　invented　at






pleasure　the　facts　which　he　used　as　the　framework　for　his　legal






doctrine。　His　invention　was　necessarily　limited　by　his






experience；　and　hence　the　cases　suggested　in　the　law…tracts






possess　great　interest；　as　throwing　light　on　the　society　amid






which　they　were　composed；　but　these　cases　seem　to　be　purely






hypothetical；　and　only　intended　to　illustrate　the　rule　which






happens　to　be　under　discussion。






　　　　In　the　volume　of　my　own　to　which　I　referred　a　few　moments　ago






I　said　of　the　early　Roman　law　that　'great　influence　must　have






been　exercised　（over　it）　by　the　want　of　any　distinct　check　on　the






suggestion　or　invention　of　possible　questions。　When　the　data　can






be　multiplied　at　pleasure；　the　facilities　for　evolving　a　general






rule　are　immensely　increased。　As　the　law　is　administered　among






ourselves　（in　England）　the　judge　cannot　travel　out　of　the　sets　of






facts　exhibited　before　him　or　before　his　predecessors。






Accordingly；　each　group　of　circumstances　which　is　adjudicated






upon　receives；　to　employ　a　Gallicism；　a　sort　of　consecration。　It






acquires　certain　qualities　which　distinguish　it　from　every　other






case；　genuine　or　hypothetical。'　I　do　not　think　it　can　be　doubted






that　this　English　practice　of　never　declaring　a　legal　rule






authoritatively　until　a　state　of　facts　arises　to　which　it　can　be






fitted；　is　the　secret　of　the　apparent　backwardness　and　barrenness






of　English　law　at　particular　epochs；　as　contrasted　with　the






richness　and　reasonableness　of　other　systems　which　it　more　than






rivals　in　its　present　condition。　It　is　true；　as　I　said　before；






even　of　the　Brehon　law；　that　it　does　not　wholly　disappoint　the






patriotic　expectations　entertained　of　it。　When　they　are






disencumbered　of　archaic　phrase　and　form；　there　are　some　things






remarkably　modern　in　it。　I　quite　agree　with　one　of　the　Editors






that；　in　the　ancient　Irish　Law　of　Civil　Wrong；　there　is　a






singularly　close　approach　to　modern　doctrines　on　the　subject　of






Contributory　Negligence；　and　I　have　found　it　possible　to　extract






from　the　quaint　texts　of　the　Book　of　Aicill　some　extremely






sensible　rulings　on　the　difficult　subject　of　the　Measure　of






Damages；　for　which　it　would　be　vain　to　study　the　writings　of　Lord






Coke；　though　these　last　are　relatively　of　much　later　date。　But






the　Brehon　law　pays　heavily　for　this　apparent　anticipation　of　the






modern　legal　spirit。　It　must　be　confessed　that　most　of　it　has　a






strong　air　of　fancifulness　and　unreality。　It　seems　as　if　the






Brehon　lawyer；　after　forming　（let　us　say）　a　conception　of　a






particular　kind　of　injury；　set　himself；　as　a　sort　of　mental






exercise；　to　devise　all　the　varieties　of　circumstance　under　which






the　wrong　could　be　committed；　and　then　to　determine　the　way　in






which　some　traditional　principle　of　redress　could　be　applied　to






the　cases　supposed。　This　indulgence　of　his　imagination　drew　him






frequently　into　triviality　or　silliness；　and　led　to　an






extraordinary　multiplication　of　legal　detail。　Four　pages　of　the






Book　of　Aicill　（a　very　large　proportion　of　an　ancient　body　of






law）　are　concerned　with　injuries　received　from　dogs　in






dog…fights；　and　they　set　forth　in　the　most　elaborate　way　the






modification　of　the　governing　rule　required　in　the　case　of　the






owners　　in　the　case　of　the　spectators　　in　the　case　of　the






'impartial　interposer'　　in　the　case　of　the　'half…interposer；'






i。　e。　the　man　who　tries　to　separate　the　dogs　with　a　bias　in






favour　of　one　of　them　　in　the　case　of　an　accidental　looker…on






　in　the　case　of　a　youth　under　age；　and　in　the　case　of　an　idiot。






The　same　law…tract　deals　also　with　the　curious　subjects　of






injuries　from　a　cat　stealing　in　a　kitchen；　from　women　using　their






distaffs　in　a　woman…battle；　and　from　bees；　a　distinction　being






drawn　between　the　case　in　which　the　sting　draws　blood　and　the






case　in　which　it　does　not。　Numberless　other　instances　could　be






given；　but　I　repeat　that　all　this　is　mixed　up　with　much　that　even






now　has　juridical　interest；　and　with　much　which　in　that　state　of






society　had　probably　the　greatest　practical　importance。






　　　　It　is　not；　perhaps；　as　often　noticed　as　it　should　be　by






English　writers　on　law　that　the　method　of　enunciating　legal






principles　with　which　our　Courts　of　Justice　have　familiarised　us






is　absolutely　peculiar　to　England　and　to　communities　under　the






direct　influence　of　English　practice。　In　all　Western　societies；






Legislation；　which　is　the　direct　issue　of　the　commands　of　the






sovereign　state；　tends　more　and　more　to　become　the　exclusive






source　of　law；　but　still　in　all　Continental　countries　other






authorities　of　various　kinds　are　occasionally　referred　to；　among






which　are　the　texts　of　the　Roman　Corpus　Juris；　commentaries　on






Codes　and　other　bodies　of　written　law；　the　unofficial　writings　of






famous　lawyers；　and　other　branches　of　the　vast　literature　of　law






holding　at　most　a　secondary　place　in　the　estimation　of　the






English　Judges　and　Bar。　Nowhere；　however；　is　anything　like　the






same　dignity　as　with　us　attributed　to　a　decided　'case；'　and　I






have　found　it　difficult　to　make　foreign　lawyers　understand　why






their　English　brethren　should　bow　so　implicitly　to　what　Frenchmen






term　the　'jurisprudence'　of　a　particular　tribunal。　From　one　point






of　view　English　law　has　doubtless　suffered　through　this






reluctance　to　invent　or　imagine　facts　aS　the　groundwork　of　rules；






and　it　will　continue　to　bear　the　marks　of　the　injury　until






legislative　re…arrangement　and　re…statement　fully　disclose　the






stores　of　common　sense　which　are　at　present　concealed　by　its






defects　of　language　and　form。　On　the　other　hand；　these　habits　of






the　English　Courts　seem　to　be　closely　connected　with　one　of　the






most　honourable　characteristics　of　the　English　system；　its






extreme　carefulness　about　facts。　Nowhere　else　in　the　world　is






there　the　same　respect　for　a　fact；　unless　the　respect　be　of






English　origin。　The　feeling　is　not　shared　by　our　European






contemporaries；　and　was　not　shared　by　our　remote　ancestors。　It






has　been　said　　and　the　remark　seems　to　me　a　very　just　one　






that　in　early　times　questions　of　fact　are　regarded　as　the






simplest　of　all　questions。　Such　tests　of　truth　as　Ordeal　and






Compurgation　satisfy　men's　minds　completely　and　easily；　and　the






only　difficulty　recognised　is　the　discovery　of　the　legal






tradition　and　its　application　to　the　results　of　the　test。　Up　to　a






certain　point　no　doubt　our　own　mechanism　for　the　determination　of






a　fact　is　also　a　mere　artifice。　We　take　as　our　criterion　of　truth






the　unanimous　opinion　of　twelve　men　on　statements　made　before






them。　But　then　the　mode　of　convincing；　or　attempting　to　convince；






them　is　exactly　that　which　would　have　to　be　followed　if　it　were






sought　to　obtain　a　decision　upon　evidence　from　the　very　highest






human　intelligence。　The　old　procedure　was　sometimes　wholly






senseless；　sometimes　only　distantly　rational；　the　modern　English






procedure　is　at　most　imperfect；　and　some　of　its　imperfection






arises　from　the　very　constitution　of　human　nature　and　human






society。　I　quite　concur；　therefore；　in　the　ordinary　professional






opinion　that　its　view　of　facts　and　its　modes　of　ascertaining　them






are　the　great　glory　of　English　law。　I　am　afraid；　however；　that






facts　must　always　be　the　despair　of　the　law　reformer。　Bentham






seems　to　me　from　several　expressions　to　have　supposed　that　if　the






English　Law　of　Evidence　were　re…constructed　on　his　principles






questions　of　fact　would　cease　to　present　any　serious　difficulty。






Almost　every　one　of　his　suggestions　has　been　adopted　by　the






Legislature；　and　yet　enquiries　into　facts　become　more　protracted






and　complex　than　ever。　The　truth　is　that　the　facts　of　human






nature；　with　which　Courts　of　Justice　have　chiefly　to　deal；　are






far　obscurer　and　more　intricately　involved　than　the　facts　of






physical　nature；　and　the　difficulty　of　ascertaining　them　with






precision　constantly　increases　in　our　age；　through　the　progress






of　invention　and　enterprise；　through　the　ever…growing






miscellaneousness　of　all　modern　communities；　and　through　the　ever






quickening　play　of　modern　social　movements。　Possibly　we　may　see






English　law　take　the　form　which　Bentham　hoped　for　and　laboured






for；　every　successive　year　brings　us　in　some　slight　degree　nearer






to　this　achievement；　and　consequently；　little　as　we　may　agree　in






his　opinion　that　all　questions　of　law　are　the　effect　of　some






judicial　delusion　or　legal　abuse；　we　may　reasonably　expect　them






to　become　less　frequent　and　easier　of　solution。　But　neither　facts






nor　the　modes　of　ascertaining　them　tend　in　the　least　to　simplify






themselves；　and　in　no　conceivable　state　of　society　will　Courts　of






Justice　enjoy　perpetual　vacation。






　　　　I　have　been　at　some　pains　to　explain　what　sort　of　authority






the　Irish　Brehon　law　did　not；　in　my　opinion；　possess。　The　'law　of






nature'　had　lost　all　supernatural　sanction；　except　so　far　as　it






coincided　with　the　'law　of　the　letter。'　It　had　not　yet　acquired；






or　had　very　imperfectly　acquired；　that　binding　power　which　law






obtains　when　the　State　exerts　the　public　force　through　Courts　of






Justice　to