the critique of pure reason-第98章

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general　laws；　with　the　hope　of　discovering；　sooner　or　later；　the

teleological　connection　also。　Thus；　and　thus　only；　can　the　principle

of　final　unity　aid　in　the　extension　of　the　employment　of　reason　in　the

sphere　of　experience；　without　being　in　any　case　detrimental　to　its

interests。



　　*This　was　the　term　applied　by　the　old　dialecticians　to　a　sophistical

argument；　which　ran　thus：　If　it　is　your　fate　to　die　of　this　disease；

you　will　die；　whether　you　employ　a　physician　or　not。　Cicero　says

that　this　mode　of　reasoning　has　received　this　appellation；　because；　if

followed；　it　puts　an　end　to　the　employment　of　reason　in　the　affairs　of

life。　For　a　similar　reason；　I　have　applied　this　designation　to　the

sophistical　argument　of　pure　reason。



　　The　second　error　which　arises　from　the　misconception　of　the

principle　of　systematic　unity　is　that　of　perverted　reason　（perversa

ratio；　usteron　roteron　rationis）。　The　idea　of　systematic　unity　is

available　as　a　regulative　principle　in　the　connection　of　phenomena

according　to　general　natural　laws；　and；　how　far　soever　we　have　to

travel　upon　the　path　of　experience　to　discover　some　fact　or　event；

this　idea　requires　us　to　believe　that　we　have　approached　all　the

more　nearly　to　the　completion　of　its　use　in　the　sphere　of　nature；

although　that　completion　can　never　be　attained。　But　this　error

reverses　the　procedure　of　reason。　We　begin　by　hypostatizing　the

principle　of　systematic　unity；　and　by　giving　an　anthropomorphic

determination　to　the　conception　of　a　Supreme　Intelligence；　and　then

proceed　forcibly　to　impose　aims　upon　nature。　Thus　not　only　does

teleology；　which　ought　to　aid　in　the　completion　of　unity　in　accordance

with　general　laws；　operate　to　the　destruction　of　its　influence；　but　it

hinders　reason　from　attaining　its　proper　aim；　that　is；　the　proof；　upon

natural　grounds；　of　the　existence　of　a　supreme　intelligent　cause。　For；

if　we　cannot　presuppose　supreme　finality　in　nature　a　priori；　that

is；　as　essentially　belonging　to　nature；　how　can　we　be　directed　to

endeavour　to　discover　this　unity　and；　rising　gradually　through　its

different　degrees；　to　approach　the　supreme　perfection　of　an　author

of　all…　a　perfection　which　is　absolutely　necessary；　and　therefore

cognizable　a　priori？　The　regulative　principle　directs　us　to　presuppose

systematic　unity　absolutely　and；　consequently；　as　following　from　the

essential　nature　of　things…　but　only　as　a　unity　of　nature；　not

merely　cognized　empirically；　but　presupposed　a　priori；　although　only

in　an　indeterminate　manner。　But　if　I　insist　on　basing　nature　upon

the　foundation　of　a　supreme　ordaining　Being；　the　unity　of　nature　is　in

effect　lost。　For；　in　this　case；　it　is　quite　foreign　and　unessential　to

the　nature　of　things；　and　cannot　be　cognized　from　the　general　laws

of　nature。　And　thus　arises　a　vicious　circular　argument；　what　ought

to　have　been　proved　having　been　presupposed。

　　To　take　the　regulative　principle　of　systematic　unity　in　nature　for　a

constitutive　principle；　and　to　hypostatize　and　make　a　cause　out　of

that　which　is　properly　the　ideal　ground　of　the　consistent　and

harmonious　exercise　of　reason；　involves　reason　in　inextricable

embarrassments。　The　investigation　of　nature　pursues　its　own　path　under

the　guidance　of　the　chain　of　natural　causes；　in　accordance　with　the

general　laws　of　nature；　and　ever　follows　the　light　of　the　idea　of　an

author　of　the　universe…　not　for　the　purpose　of　deducing　the

finality；　which　it　constantly　pursues；　from　this　Supreme　Being；　but　to

attain　to　the　cognition　of　his　existence　from　the　finality　which　it

seeks　in　the　existence　of　the　phenomena　of　nature；　and；　if　possible；

in　that　of　all　things　to　cognize　this　being；　consequently；　as

absolutely　necessary。　Whether　this　latter　purpose　succeed　or　not；

the　idea　is　and　must　always　be　a　true　one；　and　its　employment；　when

merely　regulative；　must　always　be　accompanied　by　truthful　and

beneficial　results。

　　Complete　unity；　in　conformity　with　aims；　constitutes　absolute

perfection。　But　if　we　do　not　find　this　unity　in　the　nature　of　the

things　which　go　to　constitute　the　world　of　experience；　that　is；　of

objective　cognition；　consequently　in　the　universal　and　necessary

laws　of　nature；　how　can　we　infer　from　this　unity　the　idea　of　the

supreme　and　absolutely　necessary　perfection　of　a　primal　being；　which

is　the　origin　of　all　causality？　The　greatest　systematic　unity；　and

consequently　teleological　unity；　constitutes　the　very　foundation　of

the　possibility　of　the　most　extended　employment　of　human　reason。　The

idea　of　unity　is　therefore　essentially　and　indissolubly　connected　with

the　nature　of　our　reason。　This　idea　is　a　legislative　one；　and　hence　it

is　very　natural　that　we　should　assume　the　existence　of　a　legislative

reason　corresponding　to　it；　from　which　the　systematic　unity　of　nature…

the　object　of　the　operations　of　reason…　must　be　derived。

　　In　the　course　of　our　discussion　of　the　antinomies；　we　stated　that　it

is　always　possible　to　answer　all　the　questions　which　pure　reason　may

raise；　and　that　the　plea　of　the　limited　nature　of　our　cognition；　which

is　unavoidable　and　proper　in　many　questions　regarding　natural

phenomena；　cannot　in　this　case　be　admitted；　because　the　questions

raised　do　not　relate　to　the　nature　of　things；　but　are　necessarily

originated　by　the　nature　of　reason　itself；　and　relate　to　its　own

internal　constitution。　We　can　now　establish　this　assertion；　which　at

first　sight　appeared　so　rash；　in　relation　to　the　two　questions　in

which　reason　takes　the　greatest　interest；　and　thus　complete　our

discussion　of　the　dialectic　of　pure　reason。

　　If；　then；　the　question　is　asked；　in　relation　to　transcendental

theology；*　first；　whether　there　is　anything　distinct　from　the　world；

which　contains　the　ground　of　cosmical　order　and　connection　according

to　general　laws？　The　answer　is：　Certainly。　For　the　world　is　a　sum　of

phenomena；　there　must；　therefore；　be　some　transcendental　basis　of

these　phenomena；　that　is；　a　basis　cogitable　by　the　pure

understanding　alone。　If；　secondly；　the　question　is　asked　whether

this　being　is　substance；　whether　it　is　of　the　greatest　reality；

whether　it　is　necessary；　and　so　forth？　I　answer　that　this　question

is　utterly　without　meaning。　For　all　the　categories　which　aid　me　in

forming　a　conception　of　an　object　cannot　be　employed　except　in　the

world　of　sense；　and　are　without　meaning　when　not　applied　to　objects　of

actual　or　possible　experience。　Out　of　this　sphere；　they　are　not

properly　conceptions；　but　the　mere　marks　or　indices　of　conceptions；

which　we　may　admit；　although　they　cannot；　without　the　help　of

experience；　help　us　to　understand　any　subject　or　thing。　If；　thirdly；

the　question　is　whether　we　may　not　cogitate　this　being；　which　is

distinct　from　the　world；　in　analogy　with　the　objects　of　experience？

The　answer　is：　Undoubtedly；　but　only　as　an　ideal；　and　not　as　a　real

object。　That　is；　we　must　cogitate　it　only　as　an　unknown　substratum

of　the　systematic　unity；　order；　and　finality　of　the　world…　a　unity

which　reason　must　employ　as　the　regulative　principle　of　its

investigation　of　nature。　Nay；　more；　we　may　admit　into　the　idea　certain

anthropomorphic　elements；　which　are　promotive　of　the　interests　of　this

regulative　principle。　For　it　is　no　more　than　an　idea；　which　does　not

relate　directly　to　a　being　distinct　from　the　world；　but　to　the

regulative　principle　of　the　systematic　unity　of　the　world；　by　means；

however；　of　a　schema　of　this　unity…　the　schema　of　a　Supreme

Intelligence；　who　is　the　wisely…designing　author　of　the　universe。　What

this　basis　of　cosmical　unity　may　be　in　itself；　we　know　not…　we

cannot　discover　from　the　idea；　we　merely　know　how　we　ought　to　employ

the　idea　of　this　unity；　in　relation　to　the　systematic　operation　of

reason　in　the　sphere　of　experience。



　　*After　what　has　been　said　of　the　psychological　idea　of　the　ego　and

its　proper　employment　as　a　regulative　principle　of　the　operations　of

reason；　I　need　not　enter　into　details　regarding　the　transcendental

illusion　by　which　the　systematic　unity　of　all　the　various　phenomena　of

the　internal　sense　is　hypostatized。　The　procedure　is　in　this　case　very

similar　to　that　which　has　been　discussed　in　our　remarks　on　the

theological　ideal。



　　But；　it　will　be　asked　again；　can　we　on　these　grounds；　admit　the

existence　of　a　wise　and　omnipotent　author　of　the　world？　Without　doubt；

and　not　only　so；　but　we　must　assume　the　existence　of　such　a　being。　But

do　we　thus　extend　the　limits　of　our　knowledge　beyond　the　field　of

possible　experience？　By　no　means。　For　we　have　merely　presupposed　a

something；　of　which　we　have　no　conception；　which　we　do　not　know　as

it　is　in　itself；　but；　in　relation　to　the　systematic　disposition　of　the

universe；　which　we　must　presuppose　in　all　our　observation　of　nature；

we　have　cogitated　this　unknown　being　in　analogy　with　an　intelligent

existence　（an　empirical　conception）；　that　is　to　say；　we　have　endowed

it　with　those　attributes；　which；　judging　from　the　nature　of　our　own

reason；　may　contain　the　ground　of　such　a　systematic　unity。　This　idea

is　therefore　valid　only　relatively　to　the　employment　in　experience

of　our　reason。　But　if　we　attribute　to　it　absolute　and　objective

validity；　we　overlook　the　fact　that　it　is　merely　an　ideal　being　that

we　cogitate；　and；　by　setting　out　from　a　basis　which　is　not

determinable　by　considerations　drawn　from　experience；　we　place

ourselves　in　a　position　which　incapacitates　us　from　applying　this

principle　to　the　empirical　employment　of　reason。

　　But；　it　will　be　asked　further；　can　I　make　any　use　of　this　conception

and　hypothesis　in　my　investigations　into　the　world　and　nature？　Yes；

for　this　very　purpose　was　the　idea　established　by　reason　as　a

fundamental　basis。　But　may　I　regard　certain　arrangements；　which　seemed

to　have　been　made　in　conformity　with　some　fixed　aim；　as　the

arrangements　of　design；　and　look　upon　them　as　proceeding　from　the

divine　will；　with　the　intervention；　however；　of　certain　other

particular　arrangements　disposed　to　that　end？　Yes；　you　may　do　so；

but　at　the　same　time　you　must　regard　it　as　indifferent；　whether　it

is　asserted　that　divine　wisdom　has　disposed　all　things　in　conformity

with　his　highest　aims；　or　that　the　idea　of　supreme　wisdom　is　a

regulative　principle　in　the　investigation　of　nature；　and　at　the　same

time　a　principle　of　the　systematic　unity　of　nature　according　to

general　laws；　even　in　those　cases　where　we　are　unable　to　discover　that

unity。　In　other　words；　it　must　be　perfectly　indifferent　to　you　whether

you　say；　when　you　have　discovered　this　unity：　God　has　wisely　willed　it

so；　or：　Nature　has　wisely　arranged　this。　For　it　was　nothing　but　the

systematic　unity；　which　reason　requires　as　a　basis　for　the

investigation　of　nature；　that　justified　you　in　accepting　the　idea　of　a

supreme　intelligence　as　a　schema　for　a　regulative　principle；　and；

the　farther　you　advance　in　the　discovery　of　design　and　finality；　the

more　certain　the　validity　of　your　idea。　But；　as　the　whole　aim　of

t