the critique of pure reason-第65章

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are　obliged　to　give　some　account　of　our　conception；　which　in　this　case

cannot　proceed　from　the　whole　to　the　determined　quantity　of　the　parts；

but　must　demonstrate　the　possibility　of　a　whole　by　means　of　a

successive　synthesis　of　the　parts。　But　as　this　synthesis　must

constitute　a　series　that　cannot　be　completed；　it　is　impossible　for

us　to　cogitate　prior　to　it；　and　consequently　not　by　means　of　it；　a

totality。　For　the　conception　of　totality　itself　is　in　the　present　case

the　representation　of　a　completed　synthesis　of　the　parts；　and　this

completion；　and　consequently　its　conception；　is　impossible。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　THE　ANTITHESIS。



　　The　proof　in　favour　of　the　infinity　of　the　cosmical　succession　and

the　cosmical　content　is　based　upon　the　consideration　that；　in　the

opposite　case；　a　void　time　and　a　void　space　must　constitute　the　limits

of　the　world。　Now　I　am　not　unaware；　that　there　are　some　ways　of

escaping　this　conclusion。　It　may；　for　example；　be　alleged；　that　a

limit　to　the　world；　as　regards　both　space　and　time；　is　quite　possible；

without　at　the　same　time　holding　the　existence　of　an　absolute　time

before　the　beginning　of　the　world；　or　an　absolute　space　extending

beyond　the　actual　world…　which　is　impossible。　I　am　quite　well

satisfied　with　the　latter　part　of　this　opinion　of　the　philosophers

of　the　Leibnitzian　school。　Space　is　merely　the　form　of　external

intuition；　but　not　a　real　object　which　can　itself　be　externally

intuited；　it　is　not　a　correlate　of　phenomena；　it　is　the　form　of

phenomena　itself。　Space；　therefore；　cannot　be　regarded　as　absolutely

and　in　itself　something　determinative　of　the　existence　of　things；

because　it　is　not　itself　an　object；　but　only　the　form　of　possible

objects。　Consequently；　things；　as　phenomena；　determine　space；　that

is　to　say；　they　render　it　possible　that；　of　all　the　possible

predicates　of　space　（size　and　relation）；　certain　may　belong　to

reality。　But　we　cannot　affirm　the　converse；　that　space；　as　something

self…subsistent；　can　determine　real　things　in　regard　to　size　or　shape；

for　it　is　in　itself　not　a　real　thing。　Space　（filled　or　void）*　may

therefore　be　limited　by　phenomena；　but　phenomena　cannot　be　limited

by　an　empty　space　without　them。　This　is　true　of　time　also。　All　this

being　granted；　it　is　nevertheless　indisputable；　that　we　must　assume

these　two　nonentities；　void　space　without　and　void　time　before　the

world；　if　we　assume　the　existence　of　cosmical　limits；　relatively　to

space　or　time。



　　*It　is　evident　that　what　is　meant　here　is；　that　empty　space；　in　so

far　as　it　is　limited　by　phenomena…　space；　that　is；　within　the　world…

does　not　at　least　contradict　transcendental　principles；　and　may

therefore；　as　regards　them；　be　admitted；　although　its　possibility

cannot　on　that　account　be　affirmed。



　　For；　as　regards　the　subterfuge　adopted　by　those　who　endeavour　to

evade　the　consequence…　that；　if　the　world　is　limited　as　to　space　and

time；　the　infinite　void　must　determine　the　existence　of　actual

things　in　regard　to　their　dimensions…　it　arises　solely　from　the　fact

that　instead　of　a　sensuous　world；　an　intelligible　world…　of　which

nothing　is　known…　is　cogitated；　instead　of　a　real　beginning　（an

existence；　which　is　preceded　by　a　period　in　which　nothing　exists）；

an　existence　which　presupposes　no　other　condition　than　that　of　time；

and；　instead　of　limits　of　extension；　boundaries　of　the　universe。　But

the　question　relates　to　the　mundus　phaenomenon；　and　its　quantity；

and　in　this　case　we　cannot　make　abstraction　of　the　conditions　of

sensibility；　without　doing　away　with　the　essential　reality　of　this

world　itself。　The　world　of　sense；　if　it　is　limited；　must　necessarily

lie　in　the　infinite　void。　If　this；　and　with　it　space　as　the　a　priori

condition　of　the　possibility　of　phenomena；　is　left　out　of　view；　the

whole　world　of　sense　disappears。　In　our　problem　is　this　alone

considered　as　given。　The　mundus　intelligibilis　is　nothing　but　the

general　conception　of　a　world；　in　which　abstraction　has　been　made　of

all　conditions　of　intuition；　and　in　relation　to　which　no　synthetical

proposition…　either　affirmative　or　negative…　is　possible。





　　　　　　　　　SECOND　CONFLICT　OF　TRANSCENDENTAL　IDEAS。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THESIS。



　　Every　composite　substance　in　the　world　consists　of　simple　parts；　and

there　exists　nothing　that　is　not　either　itself　simple；　or　composed

of　simple　parts。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PROOF。



　　For；　grant　that　composite　substances　do　not　consist　of　simple　parts；

in　this　case；　if　all　combination　or　composition　were　annihilated　in

thought；　no　composite　part；　and　（as；　by　the　supposition；　there　do

not　exist　simple　parts）　no　simple　part　would　exist。　Consequently；　no

substance；　consequently；　nothing　would　exist。　Either；　then；　it　is

impossible　to　annihilate　composition　in　thought；　or；　after　such

annihilation；　there　must　remain　something　that　subsists　without

composition；　that　is；　something　that　is　simple。　But　in　the　former　case

the　composite　could　not　itself　consist　of　substances；　because　with

substances　composition　is　merely　a　contingent　relation；　apart　from

which　they　must　still　exist　as　self…subsistent　beings。　Now；　as　this

case　contradicts　the　supposition；　the　second　must　contain　the　truth…

that　the　substantial　composite　in　the　world　consists　of　simple　parts。

　　It　follows；　as　an　immediate　inference；　that　the　things　in　the

world　are　all；　without　exception；　simple　beings…　that　composition　is

merely　an　external　condition　pertaining　to　them…　and　that；　although　we

never　can　separate　and　isolate　the　elementary　substances　from　the

state　of　composition；　reason　must　cogitate　these　as　the　primary

subjects　of　all　composition；　and　consequently；　as　prior　thereto…　and

as　simple　substances。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ANTITHESIS。



　　No　composite　thing　in　the　world　consists　of　simple　parts；　and

there　does　not　exist　in　the　world　any　simple　substance。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PROOF。



　　Let　it　be　supposed　that　a　composite　thing　（as　substance）　consists　of

simple　parts。　Inasmuch　as　all　external　relation；　consequently　all

composition　of　substances；　is　possible　only　in　space；　the　space；

occupied　by　that　which　is　composite；　must　consist　of　the　same　number

of　parts　as　is　contained　in　the　composite。　But　space　does　not

consist　of　simple　parts；　but　of　spaces。　Therefore；　every　part　of　the

composite　must　occupy　a　space。　But　the　absolutely　primary　parts　of

what　is　composite　are　simple。　It　follows　that　what　is　simple

occupies　a　space。　Now；　as　everything　real　that　occupies　a　space；

contains　a　manifold　the　parts　of　which　are　external　to　each　other；　and

is　consequently　composite…　and　a　real　composite；　not　of　accidents　（for

these　cannot　exist　external　to　each　other　apart　from　substance）；　but

of　substances…　it　follows　that　the　simple　must　be　a　substantial

composite；　which　is　self…contradictory。

　　The　second　proposition　of　the　antithesis…　that　there　exists　in　the

world　nothing　that　is　simple…　is　here　equivalent　to　the　following：　The

existence　of　the　absolutely　simple　cannot　be　demonstrated　from　any

experience　or　perception　either　external　or　internal；　and　the

absolutely　simple　is　a　mere　idea；　the　objective　reality　of　which

cannot　be　demonstrated　in　any　possible　experience；　it　is　consequently；

in　the　exposition　of　phenomena；　without　application　and　object。　For；

let　us　take　for　granted　that　an　object　may　be　found　in　experience

for　this　transcendental　idea；　the　empirical　intuition　of　such　an

object　must　then　be　recognized　to　contain　absolutely　no　manifold

with　its　parts　external　to　each　other；　and　connected　into　unity。

Now；　as　we　cannot　reason　from　the　non…consciousness　of　such　a　manifold

to　the　impossibility　of　its　existence　in　the　intuition　of　an　object；

and　as　the　proof　of　this　impossibility　is　necessary　for　the

establishment　and　proof　of　absolute　simplicity；　it　follows　that　this

simplicity　cannot　be　inferred　from　any　perception　whatever。　As；

therefore；　an　absolutely　simple　object　cannot　be　given　in　any

experience；　and　the　world　of　sense　must　be　considered　as　the　sum　total

of　all　possible　experiences：　nothing　simple　exists　in　the　world。

　　This　second　proposition　in　the　antithesis　has　a　more　extended　aim

than　the　first。　The　first　merely　banishes　the　simple　from　the

intuition　of　the　composite；　while　the　second　drives　it　entirely　out　of

nature。　Hence　we　were　unable　to　demonstrate　it　from　the　conception

of　a　given　object　of　external　intuition　（of　the　composite）；　but　we

were　obliged　to　prove　it　from　the　relation　of　a　given　object　to　a

possible　experience　in　general。





　　　　　　　　　　　　OBSERVATIONS　ON　THE　SECOND　ANTINOMY。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THESIS。



　　When　I　speak　of　a　whole；　which　necessarily　consists　of　simple　parts；

I　understand　thereby　only　a　substantial　whole；　as　the　true

composite；　that　is　to　say；　I　understand　that　contingent　unity　of　the

manifold　which　is　given　as　perfectly　isolated　（at　least　in　thought）；

placed　in　reciprocal　connection；　and　thus　constituted　a　unity。　Space

ought　not　to　be　called　a　compositum　but　a　totum；　for　its　parts　are

possible　in　the　whole；　and　not　the　whole　by　means　of　the　parts。　It

might　perhaps　be　called　a　compositum　ideale；　but　not　a　compositum

reale。　But　this　is　of　no　importance。　As　space　is　not　a　composite　of

substances　（and　not　even　of　real　accidents）；　if　I　abstract　all

composition　therein…　nothing；　not　even　a　point；　remains；　for　a　point

is　possible　only　as　the　limit　of　a　space…　consequently　of　a　composite。

Space　and　time；　therefore；　do　not　consist　of　simple　parts。　That

which　belongs　only　to　the　condition　or　state　of　a　substance；　even

although　it　possesses　a　quantity　（motion　or　change；　for　example）；

likewise　does　not　consist　of　simple　parts。　That　is　to　say；　a　certain

degree　of　change　does　not　originate　from　the　addition　of　many　simple

changes。　Our　inference　of　the　simple　from　the　composite　is　valid

only　of　self…subsisting　things。　But　the　accidents　of　a　state　are　not

self…subsistent。　The　proof；　then；　for　the　necessity　of　the　simple；

as　the　component　part　of　all　that　is　substantial　and　composite；　may

prove　a　failure；　and　the　whole　case　of　this　thesis　be　lost；　if　we

carry　the　proposition　too　far；　and　wish　to　make　it　valid　of　everything

that　is　composite　without　distinction…　as　indeed　has　really　now　and

then　happened。　Besides；　I　am　here　speaking　only　of　the　simple；　in　so

far　as　it　is　necessarily　given　in　the　composite…　the　latter　being

capable　of　solution　into　the　former　as　its　component　parts。　The　proper

signification　of　the　word　monas　（as　employed　by　Leibnitz）　ought　to

relate　to　the　simple；　given　immediately　as　simple　substance　（for

example；　in　consciousness）；　and　not　as　an　element　of　the　composite。　As

an　clement；　the　term　atomus　would　be　more　appropriate。　And　as　I　wish

to　prove　the　existence　of　simple　substances；　only　in　relation　to；

and　as　the　elements　of；　the　composite；　I　might　term　the　antithesis

of　the　second　Antino