the critique of pure reason-第58章

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as　it　stands　in　the　table…　but　begin　at　the　category　of　substance；

by　which　at　the　a　thing　a　thing　is　represented　and　proceeds

backwards　through　the　series。　The　topic　of　the　rational　doctrine　of

the　soul；　from　which　everything　else　it　may　contain　must　be　deduced；

is　accordingly　as　follows：



　　　　　　　　　　　　1　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2

　　The　Soul　is　SUBSTANCE　　　　　　　As　regards　its　quality

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　it　is　SIMPLE



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3

　　　　　　　　　　As　regards　the　different

　　　　　　　　　　times　in　which　it　exists；

　　　　　　　　　　it　is　numerically　identical；

　　　　　　　　　　that　is　UNITY；　not　Plurality。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　4

　　It　is　in　relation　to　possible　objects　in　space*



　　*The　reader；　who　may　not　so　easily　perceive　the　psychological

sense　of　these　expressions；　taken　here　in　their　transcendental

abstraction；　and　cannot　guess　why　the　latter　attribute　of　the　soul

belongs　to　the　category　of　existence；　will　find　the　expressions

sufficiently　explained　and　justified　in　the　sequel。　I　have；

moreover；　to　apologize　for　the　Latin　terms　which　have　been

employed；instead　of　their　German　synonyms；　contrary　to　the　rules　of

correct　writing。　But　I　judged　it　better　to　sacrifice　elegance　to

perspicuity。



　　From　these　elements　originate　all　the　conceptions　of　pure

psychology；　by　combination　alone；　without　the　aid　of　any　other

principle。　This　substance；　merely　as　an　object　of　the　internal

sense；　gives　the　conception　of　Immateriality；　as　simple　substance；

that　of　Incorruptibility；　its　identity；　as　intellectual　substance；

gives　the　conception　of　Personality；　all　these　three　together；

Spirituality。　Its　relation　to　objects　in　space　gives　us　the　conception

of　connection　（commercium）　with　bodies。　Thus　it　represents　thinking

substance　as　the　principle　of　life　in　matter；　that　is；　as　a　soul

（anima）；　and　as　the　ground　of　Animality；　and　this；　limited　and

determined　by　the　conception　of　spirituality；　gives　us　that　of

Immortality。

　　Now　to　these　conceptions　relate　four　paralogisms　of　a　transcendental

psychology；　which　is　falsely　held　to　be　a　science　of　pure　reason。

touching　the　nature　of　our　thinking　being。　We　can；　however；　lay　at　the

foundation　of　this　science　nothing　but　the　simple　and　in　itself

perfectly　contentless　representation　〃I　which　cannot　even　be　called

a　conception；　but　merely　a　consciousness　which　accompanies　all

conceptions。　By　this　〃I；〃　or　〃He；〃　or　〃It；〃　who　or　which　thinks；

nothing　more　is　represented　than　a　transcendental　subject　of　thought　=

x；　which　is　cognized　only　by　means　of　the　thoughts　that　are　its

predicates；　and　of　which；　apart　from　these；　we　cannot　form　the　least

conception。　Hence　in　a　perpetual　circle；　inasmuch　as　we　must　always

employ　it；　in　order　to　frame　any　judgement　respecting　it。　And　this

inconvenience　we　find　it　impossible　to　rid　ourselves　of；　because

consciousness　in　itself　is　not　so　much　a　representation　distinguishing

a　particular　object；　as　a　form　of　representation　in　general；　in　so　far

as　it　may　be　termed　cognition；　for　in　and　by　cognition　alone　do　I

think　anything。

　　It　must；　however；　appear　extraordinary　at　first　sight　that　the

condition　under　which　I　think；　and　which　is　consequently　a　property　of

my　subject；　should　be　held　to　be　likewise　valid　for　every　existence

which　thinks；　and　that　we　can　presume　to　base　upon　a　seemingly

empirical　proposition　a　judgement　which　is　apodeictic　and　universal；

to　wit；　that　everything　which　thinks　is　constituted　as　the　voice　of　my

consciousness　declares　it　to　be；　that　is；　as　a　self…conscious　being。

The　cause　of　this　belief　is　to　be　found　in　the　fact　that　we

necessarily　attribute　to　things　a　priori　all　the　properties　which

constitute　conditions　under　which　alone　we　can　cogitate　them。　Now　I

cannot　obtain　the　least　representation　of　a　thinking　being　by　means　of

external　experience；　but　solely　through　self…consciousness。　Such

objects　are　consequently　nothing　more　than　the　transference　of　this

consciousness　of　mine　to　other　things　which　can　only　thus　be

represented　as　thinking　beings。　The　proposition；　〃I　think；〃　is；　in　the

present　case；　understood　in　a　problematical　sense；　not　in　so　far　as　it

contains　a　perception　of　an　existence　（like　the　Cartesian　〃Cogito；

ergo　sum〃）；*　but　in　regard　to　its　mere　possibility…　for　the　purpose　of

discovering　what　properties　may　be　inferred　from　so　simple　a

proposition　and　predicated　of　the　subject　of　it。



　　*＇〃I　think；　therefore　I　am。〃＇



　　If　at　the　foundation　of　our　pure　rational　cognition　of　thinking

beings　there　lay　more　than　the　mere　Cogito…　if　we　could　likewise

call　in　aid　observations　on　the　play　of　our　thoughts；　and　the　thence

derived　natural　laws　of　the　thinking　self；　there　would　arise　an

empirical　psychology　which　would　be　a　kind　of　physiology　of　the

internal　sense　and　might　possibly　be　capable　of　explaining　the

phenomena　of　that　sense。　But　it　could　never　be　available　for

discovering　those　properties　which　do　not　belong　to　possible

experience　（such　as　the　quality　of　simplicity）；　nor　could　it　make

any　apodeictic　enunciation　on　the　nature　of　thinking　beings：　it

would　therefore　not　be　a　rational　psychology。

　　Now；　as　the　proposition　〃I　think〃　（in　the　problematical　sense）

contains　the　form　of　every　judgement　in　general　and　is　the　constant

accompaniment　of　all　the　categories；　it　is　manifest　that　conclusions

are　drawn　from　it　only　by　a　transcendental　employment　of　the

understanding。　This　use　of　the　understanding　excludes　all　empirical

elements；　and　we　cannot；　as　has　been　shown　above；　have　any

favourable　conception　beforehand　of　its　procedure。　We　shall

therefore　follow　with　a　critical　eye　this　proposition　through　all

the　predicaments　of　pure　psychology；　but　we　shall；　for　brevity's　sake；

allow　this　examination　to　proceed　in　an　uninterrupted　connection。

　　Before　entering　on　this　task；　however；　the　following　general

remark　may　help　to　quicken　our　attention　to　this　mode　of　argument。

It　is　not　merely　through　my　thinking　that　I　cognize　an　object；　but

only　through　my　determining　a　given　intuition　in　relation　to　the　unity

of　consciousness　in　which　all　thinking　consists。　It　follows　that　I

cognize　myself；　not　through　my　being　conscious　of　myself　as

thinking；　but　only　when　I　am　conscious　of　the　intuition　of　myself　as

determined　in　relation　to　the　function　of　thought。　All　the　modi　of

self…consciousness　in　thought　are　hence　not　conceptions　of　objects

（conceptions　of　the　understanding…　categories）；　they　are　mere

logical　functions；　which　do　not　present　to　thought　an　object　to　be

cognized；　and　cannot　therefore　present　my　Self　as　an　object。　Not　the

consciousness　of　the　determining；　but　only　that　of　the　determinable

self；　that　is；　of　my　internal　intuition　（in　so　far　as　the　manifold

contained　in　it　can　be　connected　conformably　with　the　general

condition　of　the　unity　of　apperception　in　thought）；　is　the　object。

　　1。　In　all　judgements　I　am　the　determining　subject　of　that　relation

which　constitutes　a　judgement。　But　that　the　I　which　thinks；　must　be

considered　as　in　thought　always　a　subject；　and　as　a　thing　which　cannot

be　a　predicate　to　thought；　is　an　apodeictic　and　identical　proposition。

But　this　proposition　does　not　signify　that　I；　as　an　object；　am；　for

myself；　a　self…subsistent　being　or　substance。　This　latter　statement…

an　ambitious　one…　requires　to　be　supported　by　data　which　are　not　to　be

discovered　in　thought；　and　are　perhaps　（in　so　far　as　I　consider　the

thinking　self　merely　as　such）　not　to　be　discovered　in　the　thinking

self　at　all。

　　2。　That　the　I　or　Ego　of　apperception；　and　consequently　in　all

thought；　is　singular　or　simple；　an；3　cannot　be　resolved　into　a

plurality　of　subjects；　and　therefore　indicates　a　logically　simple

subject…　this　is　self…evident　from　the　very　conception　of　an　Ego；

and　is　consequently　an　analytical　proposition。　But　this　is　not

tantamount　to　declaring　that　the　thinking　Ego　is　a　simple　substance…

for　this　would　be　a　synthetical　proposition。　The　conception　of

substance　always　relates　to　intuitions；　which　with　me　cannot　be

other　than　sensuous；　and　which　consequently　lie　completely　out　of

the　sphere　of　the　understanding　and　its　thought：　but　to　this　sphere

belongs　the　affirmation　that　the　Ego　is　simple　in　thought。　It　would

indeed　be　surprising；　if　the　conception　of　〃substance；〃　which　in　other

cases　requires　so　much　labour　to　distinguish　from　the　other　elements

presented　by　intuition…　so　much　trouble；　too；　to　discover　whether　it

can　be　simple　（as　in　the　case　of　the　parts　of　matter）…　should　be

presented　immediately　to　me；　as　if　by　revelation；　in　the　poorest

mental　representation　of　all。

　　3。　The　proposition　of　the　identity　of　my　Self　amidst　all　the

manifold　representations　of　which　I　am　conscious；　is　likewise　a

proposition　lying　in　the　conceptions　themselves；　and　is　consequently

analytical。　But　this　identity　of　the　subject；　of　which　I　am

conscious　in　all　its　representations；　does　not　relate　to　or　concern

the　intuition　of　the　subject；　by　which　it　is　given　as　an　object。

This　proposition　cannot　therefore　enounce　the　identity　of　the

person；　by　which　is　understood　the　consciousness　of　the　identity　of

its　own　substance　as　a　thinking　being　in　all　change　and　variation　of

circumstances。　To　prove　this；　we　should　require　not　a　mere　analysis　of

the　proposition；　but　synthetical　judgements　based　upon　a　given

intuition。

　　4。　I　distinguish　my　own　existence；　as　that　of　a　thinking　being；　from

that　of　other　things　external　to　me…　among　which　my　body　also　is

reckoned。　This　is　also　an　analytical　proposition；　for　other　things　are

exactly　those　which　I　think　as　different　or　distinguished　from　myself。

But　whether　this　consciousness　of　myself　is　possible　without　things

external　to　me；　and　whether　therefore　I　can　exist　merely　as　a　thinking

being　（without　being　man）…　cannot　be　known　or　inferred　from　this

proposition。

　　Thus　we　have　gained　nothing　as　regards　the　cognition　of　myself　as

object；　by　the　analysis　of　the　consciousness　of　my　Self　in　thought。

The　logical　exposition　of　thought　in　general　is　mistaken　for　a

metaphysical　determination　of　the　object。

　　Our　Critique　would　be　an　investigation　utterly　superfluous；　if　there

existed　a　possibility　of　proving　a　priori；　that　all　thinking　beings

are　in　themselves　simple　substances；　as　such；　therefore；　possess　the

inseparable　attribute　of　personality；　and　are　conscious　of　their

existence　apart　from　and　unconnected　with　matter。　For　we　should　thus

have　taken　a　step　beyond　the　world　of　sense；　and　have　penetrated

into　the　sphere　of　noumena；　and　in　this　case　the　right　could　not　be

denied　us　of　extending　our　knowledge　in　this　sphere；　of　establishing

ourselves；　and；　under　a　favouring　star；　appropriating　to　ourselves

possessions　in　it。　For　the　proposition：　〃Every　thinking　being；　as

such；　is　simple　substance；〃　is　an　a　priori　synthetical　proposition；

because　in　the　first　place　it　goes　beyond　the　conception　which　is

the　subject　of　it；　and　ad