the critique of pure reason-第5章

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observation；　cognize　my　soul　as　a　thing　in　itself　and　consequently；

cannot　cognize　liberty　as　the　property　of　a　being　to　which　I　ascribe

effects　in　the　world　of　sense。　For；　to　do　so；　I　must　cognize　this

being　as　existing；　and　yet　not　in　time；　which…　since　I　cannot

support　my　conception　by　any　intuition…　is　impossible。　At　the　same

time；　while　I　cannot　cognize；　I　can　quite　well　think　freedom；　that

is　to　say；　my　representation　of　it　involves　at　least　no　contradiction；

if　we　bear　in　mind　the　critical　distinction　of　the　two　modes　of

representation　（the　sensible　and　the　intellectual）　and　the

consequent　limitation　of　the　conceptions　of　the　pure　understanding　and

of　the　principles　which　flow　from　them。　Suppose　now　that　morality

necessarily　presupposed　liberty；　in　the　strictest　sense；　as　a　property

of　our　will；　suppose　that　reason　contained　certain　practical；　original

principles　a　priori；　which　were　absolutely　impossible　without　this

presupposition；　and　suppose；　at　the　same　time；　that　speculative　reason

had　proved　that　liberty　was　incapable　of　being　thought　at　all。　It

would　then　follow　that　the　moral　presupposition　must　give　way　to　the

speculative　affirmation；　the　opposite　of　which　involves　an　obvious

contradiction；　and　that　liberty　and；　with　it；　morality　must　yield　to

the　mechanism　of　nature；　for　the　negation　of　morality　involves　no

contradiction；　except　on　the　presupposition　of　liberty。　Now　morality

does　not　require　the　speculative　cognition　of　liberty；　it　is　enough

that　I　can　think　it；　that　its　conception　involves　no　contradiction；

that　it　does　not　interfere　with　the　mechanism　of　nature。　But　even　this

requirement　we　could　not　satisfy；　if　we　had　not　learnt　the　twofold

sense　in　which　things　may　be　taken；　and　it　is　only　in　this　way　that

the　doctrine　of　morality　and　the　doctrine　of　nature　are　confined

within　their　proper　limits。　For　this　result；　then；　we　are　indebted

to　a　criticism　which　warns　us　of　our　unavoidable　ignorance　with　regard

to　things　in　themselves；　and　establishes　the　necessary　limitation　of

our　theoretical　cognition　to　mere　phenomena。



　　*In　order　to　cognize　an　object；　I　must　be　able　to　prove　its

possibility；　either　from　its　reality　as　attested　by　experience；　or　a

priori；　by　means　of　reason。　But　I　can　think　what　I　please；　provided

only　I　do　not　contradict　myself；　that　is；　provided　my　conception　is

a　possible　thought；　though　I　may　be　unable　to　answer　for　the　existence

of　a　corresponding　object　in　the　sum　of　possibilities。　But　something

more　is　required　before　I　can　attribute　to　such　a　conception　objective

validity；　that　is　real　possibility…　the　other　possibility　being　merely

logical。　We　are　not；　however；　confined　to　theoretical　sources　of

cognition　for　the　means　of　satisfying　this　additional　requirement；　but

may　derive　them　from　practical　sources。



　　The　positive　value　of　the　critical　principles　of　pure　reason　in

relation　to　the　conception　of　God　and　of　the　simple　nature　of　the

soul；　admits　of　a　similar　exemplification；　but　on　this　point　I　shall

not　dwell。　I　cannot　even　make　the　assumption…　as　the　practical

interests　of　morality　require…　of　God；　freedom；　and　immortality；　if

I　do　not　deprive　speculative　reason　of　its　pretensions　to　transcendent

insight。　For　to　arrive　at　these；　it　must　make　use　of　principles　which；

in　fact；　extend　only　to　the　objects　of　possible　experience；　and

which　cannot　be　applied　to　objects　beyond　this　sphere　without

converting　them　into　phenomena；　and　thus　rendering　the　practical

extension　of　pure　reason　impossible。　I　must；　therefore；　abolish

knowledge；　to　make　room　for　belief。　The　dogmatism　of　metaphysics；　that

is；　the　presumption　that　it　is　possible　to　advance　in　metaphysics

without　previous　criticism；　is　the　true　source　of　the　unbelief　（always

dogmatic）　which　militates　against　morality。

　　Thus；　while　it　may　be　no　very　difficult　task　to　bequeath　a　legacy　to

posterity；　in　the　shape　of　a　system　of　metaphysics　constructed　in

accordance　with　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　still　the　value　of　such　a

bequest　is　not　to　be　depreciated。　It　will　render　an　important

service　to　reason；　by　substituting　the　certainty　of　scientific

method　for　that　random　groping　after　results　without　the　guidance　of

principles；　which　has　hitherto　characterized　the　pursuit　of

metaphysical　studies。　It　will　render　an　important　service　to　the

inquiring　mind　of　youth；　by　leading　the　student　to　apply　his　powers　to

the　cultivation　of。　genuine　science；　instead　of　wasting　them；　as　at

present；　on　speculations　which　can　never　lead　to　any　result；　or　on　the

idle　attempt　to　invent　new　ideas　and　opinions。　But；　above　all；　it　will

confer　an　inestimable　benefit　on　morality　and　religion；　by　showing

that　all　the　objections　urged　against　them　may　be　silenced　for　ever　by

the　Socratic　method；　that　is　to　say；　by　proving　the　ignorance　of　the

objector。　For；　as　the　world　has　never　been；　and；　no　doubt；　never

will　be　without　a　system　of　metaphysics　of　one　kind　or　another；　it

is　the　highest　and　weightiest　concern　of　philosophy　to　render　it

powerless　for　harm；　by　closing　up　the　sources　of　error。

　　This　important　change　in　the　field　of　the　sciences；　this　loss　of　its

fancied　possessions；　to　which　speculative　reason　must　submit；　does　not

prove　in　any　way　detrimental　to　the　general　interests　of　humanity。　The

advantages　which　the　world　has　derived　from　the　teachings　of　pure

reason　are　not　at　all　impaired。　The　loss　falls；　in　its　whole　extent；

on　the　monopoly　of　the　schools；　but　does　not　in　the　slightest　degree

touch　the　interests　of　mankind。　I　appeal　to　the　most　obstinate

dogmatist；　whether　the　proof　of　the　continued　existence　of　the　soul

after　death；　derived　from　the　simplicity　of　its　substance；　of　the

freedom　of　the　will　in　opposition　to　the　general　mechanism　of

nature；　drawn　from　the　subtle　but　impotent　distinction　of　subjective

and　objective　practical　necessity；　or　of　the　existence　of　God；　deduced

from　the　conception　of　an　ens　realissimum…　the　contingency　of　the

changeable；　and　the　necessity　of　a　prime　mover；　has　ever　been　able

to　pass　beyond　the　limits　of　the　schools；　to　penetrate　the　public

mind；　or　to　exercise　the　slightest　influence　on　its　convictions。　It

must　be　admitted　that　this　has　not　been　the　case　and　that；　owing　to

the　unfitness　of　the　common　understanding　for　such　subtle

speculations；　it　can　never　be　expected　to　take　place。　On　the　contrary；

it　is　plain　that　the　hope　of　a　future　life　arises　from　the　feeling；

which　exists　in　the　breast　of　every　man；　that　the　temporal　is

inadequate　to　meet　and　satisfy　the　demands　of　his　nature。　In　like

manner；　it　cannot　be　doubted　that　the　clear　exhibition　of　duties　in

opposition　to　all　the　claims　of　inclination；　gives　rise　to　the

consciousness　of　freedom；　and　that　the　glorious　order；　beauty；　and

providential　care；　everywhere　displayed　in　nature；　give　rise　to　the

belief　in　a　wise　and　great　Author　of　the　Universe。　Such　is　the　genesis

of　these　general　convictions　of　mankind；　so　far　as　they　depend　on

rational　grounds；　and　this　public　property　not　only　remains

undisturbed；　but　is　even　raised　to　greater　importance；　by　the　doctrine

that　the　schools　have　no　right　to　arrogate　to　themselves　a　more

profound　insight　into　a　matter　of　general　human　concernment　than

that　to　which　the　great　mass　of　men；　ever　held　by　us　in　the　highest

estimation；　can　without　difficulty　attain；　and　that　the　schools

should；　therefore；　confine　themselves　to　the　elaboration　of　these

universally　comprehensible　and；　from　a　moral　point　of　view；　amply

satisfactory　proofs。　The　change；　therefore；　affects　only　the

arrogant　pretensions　of　the　schools；　which　would　gladly　retain；　in

their　own　exclusive　possession；　the　key　to　the　truths　which　they

impart　to　the　public。



　　　　　　　　　　Quod　mecum　nescit；　solus　vult　scire　videri。



At　the　same　time　it　does　not　deprive　the　speculative　philosopher　of

his　just　title　to　be　the　sole　depositor　of　a　science　which　benefits

the　public　without　its　knowledge…　I　mean；　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason。

This　can　never　become　popular　and；　indeed；　has　no　occasion　to　be　so；

for　finespun　arguments　in　favour　of　useful　truths　make　just　as

little　impression　on　the　public　mind　as　the　equally　subtle

objections　brought　against　these　truths。　On　the　other　hand；　since　both

inevitably　force　themselves　on　every　man　who　rises　to　the　height　of

speculation；　it　becomes　the　manifest　duty　of　the　schools　to　enter　upon

a　thorough　investigation　of　the　rights　of　speculative　reason　and；

thus；　to　prevent　the　scandal　which　metaphysical　controversies　are

sure；　sooner　or　later；　to　cause　even　to　the　masses。　It　is　only　by

criticism　that　metaphysicians　（and；　as　such；　theologians　too）　can　be

saved　from　these　controversies　and　from　the　consequent　perversion　of

their　doctrines。　Criticism　alone　can　strike　a　blow　at　the　root　of

materialism；　fatalism；　atheism；　free…thinking；　fanaticism；　and

superstition；　which　are　universally　injurious…　as　well　as　of

idealism　and　scepticism；　which　are　dangerous　to　the　schools；　but　can

scarcely　pass　over　to　the　public。　If　governments　think　proper　to

interfere　with　the　affairs　of　the　learned；　it　would　be　more　consistent

with　a　wise　regard　for　the　interests　of　science；　as　well　as　for

those　of　society；　to　favour　a　criticism　of　this　kind；　by　which　alone

the　labours　of　reason　can　be　established　on　a　firm　basis；　than　to

support　the　ridiculous　despotism　of　the　schools；　which　raise　a　loud

cry　of　danger　to　the　public　over　the　destruction　of　cobwebs；　of

which　the　public　has　never　taken　any　notice；　and　the　loss　of　which；

therefore；　it　can　never　feel。

　　This　critical　science　is　not　opposed　to　the　dogmatic　procedure　of

reason　in　pure　cognition；　for　pure　cognition　must　always　be

dogmatic；　that　is；　must　rest　on　strict　demonstration　from　sure

principles　a　priori…　but　to　dogmatism；　that　is；　to　the　presumption

that　it　is　possible　to　make　any　progress　with　a　pure　cognition；

derived　from　（philosophical）　conceptions；　according　to　the

principles　which　reason　has　long　been　in　the　habit　of　employing…

without　first　inquiring　in　what　way　and　by　what　right　reason　has

come　into　the　possession　of　these　principles。　Dogmatism　is　thus　the

dogmatic　procedure　of　pure　reason　without　previous　criticism　of　its

own　powers；　and　in　opposing　this　procedure；　we　must　not　be　supposed　to

lend　any　countenance　to　that　loquacious　shallowness　which　arrogates　to

itself　the　name　of　popularity；　nor　yet　to　scepticism；　which　makes

short　work　with　the　whole　science　of　metaphysics。　On　the　contrary；　our

criticism　is　the　necessary　preparation　for　a　thoroughly　scientific

system　of　metaphysics　which　must　perform　its　task　entirely　a　priori；

to　the　complete　satisfaction　of　speculative　reason；　and　must；

therefore；　be　treated；　not　popularly；　but　scholastically。　In

carrying　out　the　plan　which　the　Critique　prescribes；　that　is；　in　the

future　system　of　metaphysics；　we　must　have　recourse　to　the　strict

method　of　the　celebrated　Wolf；　the　greatest　o