the critique of pure reason-第47章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



applies　is　to　it　indifferent。　The　attempt　must　therefore　be　made

with　a　synthetical　and　so…called　transcendental　principle；　for

example：　〃Everything　that　exists；　exists　as　substance；〃　or；

〃Everything　that　is　contingent　exists　as　an　effect　of　some　other

thing；　viz。；　of　its　cause。〃　Now　I　ask；　whence　can　the　understanding

draw　these　synthetical　propositions；　when　the　conceptions　contained

therein　do　not　relate　to　possible　experience　but　to　things　in

themselves　（noumena）？　Where　is　to　be　found　the　third　term；　which　is

always　requisite　PURE　site　in　a　synthetical　proposition；　which　may

connect　in　the　same　proposition　conceptions　which　have　no　logical

（analytical）　connection　with　each　other？　The　proposition　never　will　be

demonstrated；　nay；　more；　the　possibility　of　any　such　pure　assertion

never　can　be　shown；　without　making　reference　to　the　empirical　use　of

the　understanding；　and　thus；　ipso　facto；　completely　renouncing　pure

and　non…sensuous　judgement。　Thus　the　conception　of　pure　and　merely

intelligible　objects　is　completely　void　of　all　principles　of　its

application；　because　we　cannot　imagine　any　mode　in　which　they　might　be

given；　and　the　problematical　thought　which　leaves　a　place　open　for

them　serves　only；　like　a　void　space；　to　limit　the　use　of　empirical

principles；　without　containing　at　the　same　time　any　other　object　of

cognition　beyond　their　sphere。

APPENDIX

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　APPENDIX。



　　　Of　the　Equivocal　Nature　or　Amphiboly　of　the　Conceptions　of

　　　　　Reflection　from　the　Confusion　of　the　Transcendental　with

　　　　　the　Empirical　use　of　the　Understanding。



　　Reflection　（reflexio）　is　not　occupied　about　objects　themselves；

for　the　purpose　of　directly　obtaining　conceptions　of　them；　but　is　that

state　of　the　mind　in　which　we　set　ourselves　to　discover　the　subjective

conditions　under　which　we　obtain　conceptions。　It　is　the

consciousness　of　the　relation　of　given　representations　to　the

different　sources　or　faculties　of　cognition；　by　which　alone　their

relation　to　each　other　can　be　rightly　determined。　The　first　question

which　occurs　in　considering　our　representations　is　to　what　faculty

of　cognition　do　they　belong？　To　the　understanding　or　to　the　senses？

Many　judgements　are　admitted　to　be　true　from　mere　habit　or

inclination；　but；　because　reflection　neither　precedes　nor　follows；

it　is　held　to　be　a　judgement　that　has　its　origin　in　the　understanding。

All　judgements　do　not　require　examination；　that　is；　investigation　into

the　grounds　of　their　truth。　For；　when　they　are　immediately　certain

（for　example：　〃Between　two　points　there　can　be　only　one　straight

line〃）；　no　better　or　less　mediate　test　of　their　truth　can　be　found

than　that　which　they　themselves　contain　and　express。　But　all

judgement；　nay；　all　comparisons　require　reflection；　that　is；　a

distinction　of　the　faculty　of　cognition　to　which　the　given　conceptions

belong。　The　act　whereby　I　compare　my　representations　with　the

faculty　of　cognition　which　originates　them；　and　whereby　I

distinguish　whether　they　are　compared　with　each　other　as　belonging

to　the　pure　understanding　or　to　sensuous　intuition；　I　term

transcendental　reflection。　Now；　the　relations　in　which　conceptions　can

stand　to　each　other　are　those　of　identity　and　difference；　agreement

and　opposition；　of　the　internal　and　external；　finally；　of　the

determinable　and　the　determining　（matter　and　form）。　The　proper

determination　of　these　relations　rests　on　the　question；　to　what

faculty　of　cognition　they　subjectively　belong；　whether　to

sensibility　or　understanding？　For；　on　the　manner　in　which　we　solve

this　question　depends　the　manner　in　which　we　must　cogitate　these

relations。

　　Before　constructing　any　objective　judgement；　we　compare　the

conceptions　that　are　to　be　placed　in　the　judgement；　and　observe

whether　there　exists　identity　（of　many　representations　in　one

conception）；　if　a　general　judgement　is　to　be　constructed；　or

difference；　if　a　particular；　whether　there　is　agreement　when

affirmative；　and　opposition　when　negative　judgements　are　to　be

constructed；　and　so　on。　For　this　reason　we　ought　to　call　these

conceptions；　conceptions　of　comparison　（conceptus　comparationis）。

But　as；　when　the　question　is　not　as　to　the　logical　form；　but　as　to　the

content　of　conceptions；　that　is　to　say；　whether　the　things

themselves　are　identical　or　different；　in　agreement　or　opposition；　and

so　on；　the　things　can　have　a　twofold　relation　to　our　faculty　of

cognition；　to　wit；　a　relation　either　to　sensibility　or　to　the

understanding；　and　as　on　this　relation　depends　their　relation　to

each　other；　transcendental　reflection；　that　is；　the　relation　of

given　representations　to　one　or　the　other　faculty　of　cognition；　can

alone　determine　this　latter　relation。　Thus　we　shall　not　be　able　to

discover　whether　the　things　are　identical　or　different；　in　agreement

or　opposition；　etc。；　from　the　mere　conception　of　the　things　by　means

of　comparison　（comparatio）；　but　only　by　distinguishing　the　mode　of

cognition　to　which　they　belong；　in　other　words；　by　means　of

transcendental　reflection。　We　may；　therefore；　with　justice　say；　that

logical　reflection　is　mere　comparison；　for　in　it　no　account　is　taken

of　the　faculty　of　cognition　to　which　the　given　conceptions　belong；　and

they　are　consequently；　as　far　as　regards　their　origin；　to　be　treated

as　homogeneous；　while　transcendental　reflection　（which　applies　to

the　objects　themselves）　contains　the　ground　of　the　possibility　of

objective　comparison　of　representations　with　each　other；　and　is

therefore　very　different　from　the　former；　because　the　faculties　of

cognition　to　which　they　belong　are　not　even　the　same。　Transcendental

reflection　is　a　duty　which　no　one　can　neglect　who　wishes　to

establish　an　a　priori　judgement　upon　things。　We　shall　now　proceed　to

fulfil　this　duty；　and　thereby　throw　not　a　little　light　on　the　question

as　to　the　determination　of　the　proper　business　of　the　understanding。

　　1。　Identity　and　Difference。　When　an　object　is　presented　to　us

several　times；　but　always　with　the　same　internal　determinations

（qualitas　et　quantitas）；　it；　if　an　object　of　pure　understanding；　is

always　the　same；　not　several　things；　but　only　one　thing　（numerica

identitas）；　but　if　a　phenomenon；　we　do　not　concern　ourselves　with

comparing　the　conception　of　the　thing　with　the　conception　of　some

other；　but；　although　they　may　be　in　this　respect　perfectly　the　same；

the　difference　of　place　at　the　same　time　is　a　sufficient　ground　for

asserting　the　numerical　difference　of　these　objects　（of　sense）。

Thus；　in　the　case　of　two　drops　of　water；　we　may　make　complete

abstraction　of　all　internal　difference　（quality　and　quantity）；　and；

the　fact　that　they　are　intuited　at　the　same　time　in　different

places；　is　sufficient　to　justify　us　in　holding　them　to　be

numerically　different。　Leibnitz　regarded　phenomena　as　things　in

themselves；　consequently　as　intelligibilia；　that　is；　objects　of　pure

understanding　（although；　on　account　of　the　confused　nature　of　their

representations；　he　gave　them　the　name　of　phenomena）；　and　in　this　case

his　principle　of　the　indiscernible　（principium　identatis

indiscernibilium）　is　not　to　be　impugned。　But；　as　phenomena　are　objects

of　sensibility；　and；　as　the　understanding；　in　respect　of　them；　must　be

employed　empirically　and　not　purely　or　transcendentally；　plurality　and

numerical　difference　are　given　by　space　itself　as　the　condition　of

external　phenomena。　For　one　part　of　space；　although　it　may　be

perfectly　similar　and　equal　to　another　part；　is　still　without　it；

and　for　this　reason　alone　is　different　from　the　latter；　which　is　added

to　it　in　order　to　make　up　a　greater　space。　It　follows　that　this　must

hold　good　of　all　things　that　are　in　the　different　parts　of　space　at

the　same　time；　however　similar　and　equal　one　may　be　to　another。

　　2。　Agreement　and　Opposition。　When　reality　is　represented　by　the　pure

understanding　（realitas　noumenon）；　opposition　between　realities　is

incogitable…　such　a　relation；　that　is；　that　when　these　realities　are

connected　in　one　subject；　they　annihilate　the　effects　of　each　other

and　may　be　represented　in　the　formula　3　…　3　=　0。　On　the　other　hand；

the　real　in　a　phenomenon　（realitas　phaenomenon）　may　very　well　be　in

mutual　opposition；　and；　when　united　in　the　same　subject；　the　one　may

completely　or　in　part　annihilate　the　effect　or　consequence　of　the

other；　as　in　the　case　of　two　moving　forces　in　the　same　straight　line

drawing　or　impelling　a　point　in　opposite　directions；　or　in　the　case　of

a　pleasure　counterbalancing　a　certain　amount　of　pain。

　　3。　The　Internal　and　External。　In　an　object　of　the　pure

understanding；　only　that　is　internal　which　has　no　relation　（as　regards

its　existence）　to　anything　different　from　itself。　On　the　other　hand；

the　internal　determinations　of　a　substantia　phaenomenon　in　space　are

nothing　but　relations；　and　it　is　itself　nothing　more　than　a　complex　of

mere　relations。　Substance　in　space　we　are　cognizant　of　only　through

forces　operative　in　it；　either　drawing　others　towards　itself

（attraction）；　or　preventing　others　from　forcing　into　itself　（repulsion

and　impenetrability）。　We　know　no　other　properties　that　make　up　the

conception　of　substance　phenomenal　in　space；　and　which　we　term　matter。

On　the　other　hand；　as　an　object　of　the　pure　understanding；　every

substance　must　have　internal　determination　and　forces。　But　what

other　internal　attributes　of　such　an　object　can　I　think　than　those

which　my　internal　sense　presents　to　me？　That；　to　wit；　which　in

either　itself　thought；　or　something　analogous　to　it。　Hence　Leibnitz；

who　looked　upon　things　as　noumena；　after　denying　them　everything

like　external　relation；　and　therefore　also　composition　or　combination；

declared　that　all　substances；　even　the　component　parts　of　matter；　were

simple　substances　with　powers　of　representation；　in　one　word；　monads。

　　4。　Matter　and　Form。　These　two　conceptions　lie　at　the　foundation　of

all　other　reflection；　so　inseparably　are　they　connected　with　every

mode　of　exercising　the　understanding。　The　former　denotes　the

determinable　in　general；　the　second　its　determination；　both　in　a

transcendental　sense；　abstraction　being　made　of　every　difference　in

that　which　is　given；　and　of　the　mode　in　which　it　is　determined。

Logicians　formerly　termed　the　universal；　matter；　the　specific

difference　of　this　or　that　part　of　the　universal；　form。　In　a　judgement

one　may　call　the　given　conceptions　logical　matter　（for　the　judgement）；

the　relation　of　these　to　each　other　（by　means　of　the　copula）；　the　form

of　the　judgement。　In　an　object；　the　composite　parts　thereof

（essentialia）　are　the　matter；　the　mode　in　which　they　are　connected

in　the　object；　the　form。　In　respect　to　things　in　general；　unlimited

reality　was　regarded　as　the　matter　of　all　possibility；　the

limitation　thereof　（negation）　as　the　form；　by　which　one　thing　is

distinguished　from　another　according　to　transcendental　conceptions。

The　understanding　demands　that　something　be　given　（at　least　in　the

conceptio