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the critique of pure reason-及42嫗

弌傍�� the critique of pure reason 忖方�� 耽匈3500忖

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!!!!隆堋響頼��紗秘慕禰厮宴和肝写偬堋響��




       objects in space。



                         PROOF



  I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time。 All

determination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something

permanent in perception。 But this permanent something cannot be

something in me�察�for the very reason that my existence in time is

itself determined by this permanent something。 It follows that the

perception of this permanent existence is possible only through a

thing without me and not through the mere representation of a thing

without me。 Consequently�察�the determination of my existence in time is

possible only through the existence of real things external to me。

Now�察�consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the

consciousness of the possibility of this determination in time。

Hence it follows that consciousness in time is necessarily connected

also with the existence of things without me�察�inasmuch as the

existence of these things is the condition of determination in time。

That is to say�察�the consciousness of my own existence is at the same

time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things

without me。

  Remark I。 The reader will observe�察�that in the foregoing proof the

game which idealism plays is retorted upon itself�察�and with more

justice。 It assumed that the only immediate experience is internal and

that from this we can only infer the existence of external things。

But�察�as always happens�察�when we reason from given effects to

determined causes�察�idealism bas reasoned with too much haste and

uncertainty�察�for it is quite possible that the cause of our

representations may lie in ourselves�察�and that we ascribe it falsely

to external things。 But our proof shows that external experience is

properly immediate��* that only by virtue of it´ not�察�indeed�察�the

consciousness of our own existence�察�but certainly the determination of

our existence in time�察�that is�察�internal experience´ is possible。 It

is true�察�that the representation ;I am�察─�which is the expression of

the consciousness which can accompany all my thoughts�察�is that which

immediately includes the existence of a subject。 But in this

representation we cannot find any knowledge of the subject�察�and

therefore also no empirical knowledge�察�that is�察�experience。 For

experience contains�察�in addition to the thought of something existing��

intuition�察�and in this case it must be internal intuition�察�that is��

time�察�in relation to which the subject must be determined。 But the

existence of external things is absolutely requisite for this purpose��

so that it follows that internal experience is itself possible only

mediately and through external experience。



  *The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things is��

in the preceding theorem�察�not presupposed�察�but proved�察�by the

possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not。 The

question as to the possibility of it would stand thus�此 �Have we an

internal sense�察�but no external sense�察�and is our belief in external

perception a mere delusion�拭─�But it is evident that�察�in order merely

to fancy to ourselves anything as external�察�that is�察�to present it

to the sense in intuition we must already possess an external sense��

and must thereby distinguish immediately the mere receptivity of an

external intuition from the spontaneity which characterizes every

act of imagination。 For merely to imagine also an external sense��

would annihilate the faculty of intuition itself which is to be

determined by the imagination。



  Remark II。 Now with this view all empirical use of our faculty of

cognition in the determination of time is in perfect accordance。 Its

truth is supported by the fact that it is possible to perceive a

determination of time only by means of a change in external

relations ��motion�� to the permanent in space ��for example�察�we become

aware of the sun's motion by observing the changes of his relation

to the objects of this earth��。 But this is not all。 We find that we

possess nothing permanent that can correspond and be submitted to

the conception of a substance as intuition�察�except matter。 This idea

of permanence is not itself derived from external experience�察�but is

an a priori necessary condition of all determination of time��

consequently also of the internal sense in reference to our own

existence�察�and that through the existence of external things。 In the

representation ;I�察─�the consciousness of myself is not an intuition��

but a merely intellectual representation produced by the spontaneous

activity of a thinking subject。 It follows�察�that this ;I; has not

any predicate of intuition�察�which�察�in its character of permanence��

could serve as correlate to the determination of time in the

internal sense´ in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate of

matter as an empirical intuition。

  Remark III。 From the fact that the existence of external things is a

necessary condition of the possibility of a determined consciousness

of ourselves�察�it does not follow that every intuitive representation

of external things involves the existence of these things�察�for their

representations may very well be the mere products of the

imagination ��in dreams as well as in madness���察�though�察�indeed�察�these

are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external

perceptions�察�which�察�as has been shown�察�are possible only through the

reality of external objects。 The sole aim of our remarks has�察�however��

been to prove that internal experience in general is possible only

through external experience in general。 Whether this or that

supposed experience be purely imaginary must be discovered from its

particular determinations and by comparing these with the criteria

of all real experience。



  Finally�察�as regards the third postulate�察�it applies to material

necessity in existence�察�and not to merely formal and logical necessity

in the connection of conceptions。 Now as we cannot cognize

completely a priori the existence of any object of sense�察�though we

can do so comparatively a priori�察�that is�察�relatively to some other

previously given existence´ a cognition�察�however�察�which can only be of

such an existence as must be contained in the complex of experience��

of which the previously given perception is a part´ the necessity of

existence can never be cognized from conceptions�察�but always�察�on the

contrary�察�from its connection with that which is an object of

perception。 But the only existence cognized�察�under the condition of

other given phenomena�察�as necessary�察�is the existence of effects

from given causes in conformity with the laws of causality。 It is

consequently not the necessity of the existence of things ��as

substances���察�but the necessity of the state of things that we cognize��

and that not immediately�察�but by means of the existence of other

states given in perception�察�according to empirical laws of

causality。 Hence it follows that the criterion of necessity is to be

found only in the law of possible experience´ that everything which

happens is determined a priori in the phenomenon by its cause。 Thus we

cognize only the necessity of effects in nature�察�the causes of which

are given us。 Moreover�察�the criterion of necessity in existence

possesses no application beyond the field of possible experience��

and even in this it is not valid of the existence of things as

substances�察�because these can never be considered as empirical

effects�察�or as something that happens and has a beginning。

Necessity�察�therefore�察�regards only the relations of phenomena

according to the dynamical law of causality�察�and the possibility

grounded thereon�察�of reasoning from some given existence ��of a

cause�� a priori to another existence ��of an effect��。 ;Everything

that happens is hypothetically necessary�察─�is a principle which

subjects the changes that take place in the world to a law�察�that is��

to a rule of necessary existence�察�without which nature herself could

not possibly exist。 Hence the proposition�察 �Nothing happens by blind

chance ��in mundo non datur casus���察─�is an a priori law of nature。

The case is the same with the proposition�察 �Necessity in nature is not

blind�察─�that is�察�it is conditioned�察�consequently intelligible

necessity ��non datur fatum��。 Both laws subject the play of change to

;a nature of things ��as phenomena���察─�or�察�which is the same thing�察�to

the unity of the understanding�察�and through the understanding alone

can changes belong to an experience�察�as the synthetical unity of

phenomena。 Both belong to the class of dynamical principles。 The

former is properly a consequence of the principle of causality´ one of

the analogies of experience。 The latter belongs to the principles of

modality�察�which to the determination of causality adds the

conception of necessity�察�which is itself�察�however�察�subject to a rule

of the understanding。 The principle of continuity forbids any leap

in the series of phenomena regarded as changes ��in mundo non datur

saltus���察�and likewise�察�in the complex of all empirical intuitions in

space�察�any break or hiatus between two phenomena ��non datur hiatus��´

for we can so express the principle�察�that experience can admit nothing

which proves the existence of a vacuum�察�or which even admits it as a

part of an empirical synthesis。 For�察�as regards a vacuum or void��

which we may cogitate as out and beyond the field of possible

experience ��the world���察�such a question cannot come before the

tribunal of mere understanding�察�which decides only upon questions that

concern the employment of given phenomena for the construction of

empirical cognition。 It is rather a problem for ideal reason�察�which

passes beyond the sphere of a possible experience and aims at

forming a judgement of that which surrounds and circumscribes it��

and the proper place for the consideration of it is the transcendental

dialectic。 These four propositions�察 �In mundo non datur hiatus�察�non

datur saltus�察�non datur casus�察�non datur fatum�察─�as well as all

principles of transcendental origin�察�we could very easily exhibit in

their proper order�察�that is�察�in conformity with the order of the

categories�察�and assign to each its proper place。 But the already

practised reader will do this for himself�察�or discover the clue to

such an arrangement。 But the combined result of all is simply this�察�to

admit into the empirical synthesis nothing which might cause a break

in or be foreign to the understanding and the continuous connection of

all phenomena�察�that is�察�the unity of the conceptions of the

understanding。 For in the understanding alone is the unity of

experience�察�in which all perceptions must have their assigned place��

possible。

  Whether the field of possibility be greater than that of reality��

and whether the field of the latter be itself greater than that of

necessity�察�are interesting enough questions�察�and quite capable of

synthetic solution�察�questions�察�however�察�which come under the

jurisdiction of reason alone。 For they

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