the critique of pure reason-第38章

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does　this　by　applying　the　order　of　time　to　phenomena；　and　their

existence。　In　other　words；　it　assigns　to　each　phenomenon；　as　a

consequence；　a　place　in　relation　to　preceding　phenomena；　determined

a　priori　in　time；　without　which　it　could　not　harmonize　with　time

itself；　which　determines　a　place　a　priori　to　all　its　parts。　This

determination　of　place　cannot　be　derived　from　the　relation　of

phenomena　to　absolute　time　（for　it　is　not　an　object　of　perception）；

but；　on　the　contrary；　phenomena　must　reciprocally　determine　the　places

in　time　of　one　another；　and　render　these　necessary　in　the　order　of

time。　In　other　words；　whatever　follows　or　happens；　must　follow　in

conformity　with　a　universal　rule　upon　that　which　was　contained　in

the　foregoing　state。　Hence　arises　a　series　of　phenomena；　which；　by

means　of　the　understanding；　produces　and　renders　necessary　exactly　the

same　order　and　continuous　connection　in　the　series　of　our　possible

perceptions；　as　is　found　a　priori　in　the　form　of　internal　intuition

（time）；　in　which　all　our　perceptions　must　have　place。

　　That　something　happens；　then；　is　a　perception　which　belongs　to　a

possible　experience；　which　becomes　real　only　because　I　look　upon　the

phenomenon　as　determined　in　regard　to　its　place　in　time；

consequently　as　an　object；　which　can　always　be　found　by　means　of　a

rule　in　the　connected　series　of　my　perceptions。　But　this　rule　of　the

determination　of　a　thing　according　to　succession　in　time　is　as

follows：　〃In　what　precedes　may　be　found　the　condition；　under　which

an　event　always　（that　is；　necessarily）　follows。〃　From　all　this　it　is

obvious　that　the　principle　of　cause　and　effect　is　the　principle　of

possible　experience；　that　is；　of　objective　cognition　of　phenomena；

in　regard　to　their　relations　in　the　succession　of　time。

　　The　proof　of　this　fundamental　proposition　rests　entirely　on　the

following　momenta　of　argument。　To　all　empirical　cognition　belongs

the　synthesis　of　the　manifold　by　the　imagination；　a　synthesis　which　is

always　successive；　that　is；　in　which　the　representations　therein

always　follow　one　another。　But　the　order　of　succession　in

imagination　is　not　determined；　and　the　series　of　successive

representations　may　be　taken　retrogressively　as　well　as　progressively。

But　if　this　synthesis　is　a　synthesis　of　apprehension　（of　the

manifold　of　a　given　phenomenon）；then　the　order　is　determined　in　the

object；　or　to　speak　more　accurately；　there　is　therein　an　order　of

successive　synthesis　which　determines　an　object；　and　according　to

which　something　necessarily　precedes；　and　when　this　is　posited；

something　else　necessarily　follows。　If；　then；　my　perception　is　to

contain　the　cognition　of　an　event；　that　is；　of　something　which

really　happens；　it　must　be　an　empirical　judgement；　wherein　we　think

that　the　succession　is　determined；　that　is；　it　presupposes　another

phenomenon；　upon　which　this　event　follows　necessarily；　or　in

conformity　with　a　rule。　If；　on　the　contrary；　when　I　posited　the

antecedent；　the　event　did　not　necessarily　follow；　I　should　be

obliged　to　consider　it　merely　as　a　subjective　play　of　my

imagination；　and　if　in　this　I　represented　to　myself　anything　as

objective；　I　must　look　upon　it　as　a　mere　dream。　Thus；　the　relation

of　phenomena　（as　possible　perceptions）；　according　to　which　that

which　happens　is；　as　to　its　existence；　necessarily　determined　in

time　by　something　which　antecedes；　in　conformity　with　a　rule…　in　other

words；　the　relation　of　cause　and　effect…　is　the　condition　of　the

objective　validity　of　our　empirical　judgements　in　regard　to　the

sequence　of　perceptions；　consequently　of　their　empirical　truth；　and

therefore　of　experience。　The　principle　of　the　relation　of　causality　in

the　succession　of　phenomena　is　therefore　valid　for　all　objects　of

experience；　because　it　is　itself　the　ground　of　the　possibility　of

experience。

　　Here；　however；　a　difficulty　arises；　which　must　be　resolved。　The

principle　of　the　connection　of　causality　among　phenomena　is　limited　in

our　formula　to　the　succession　thereof；　although　in　practice　we　find

that　the　principle　applies　also　when　the　phenomena　exist　together　in

the　same　time；　and　that　cause　and　effect　may　be　simultaneous。　For

example；　there　is　heat　in　a　room；　which　does　not　exist　in　the　open

air。　I　look　about　for　the　cause；　and　find　it　to　be　the　fire；　Now　the

fire　as　the　cause　is　simultaneous　with　its　effect；　the　heat　of　the

room。　In　this　case；　then；　there　is　no　succession　as　regards　time；

between　cause　and　effect；　but　they　are　simultaneous；　and　still　the　law

holds　good。　The　greater　part　of　operating　causes　in　nature　are

simultaneous　with　their　effects；　and　the　succession　in　time　of　the

latter　is　produced　only　because　the　cause　cannot　achieve　the　total

of　its　effect　in　one　moment。　But　at　the　moment　when　the　effect　first

arises；　it　is　always　simultaneous　with　the　causality　of　its　cause；

because；　if　the　cause　had　but　a　moment　before　ceased　to　be；　the　effect

could　not　have　arisen。　Here　it　must　be　specially　remembered　that　we

must　consider　the　order　of　time　and　not　the　lapse　thereof。　The

relation　remains；　even　though　no　time　has　elapsed。　The　time　between

the　causality　of　the　cause　and　its　immediate　effect　may　entirely

vanish；　and　the　cause　and　effect　be　thus　simultaneous；　but　the

relation　of　the　one　to　the　other　remains　always　determinable　according

to　time。　If；　for　example；　I　consider　a　leaden　ball；　which　lies　upon

a　cushion　and　makes　a　hollow　in　it；　as　a　cause；　then　it　is

simultaneous　with　the　effect。　But　I　distinguish　the　two　through　the

relation　of　time　of　the　dynamical　connection　of　both。　For　if　I　lay　the

ball　upon　the　cushion；　then　the　hollow　follows　upon　the　before

smooth　surface；　but　supposing　the　cushion　has；　from　some　cause　or

another；　a　hollow；　there　does　not　thereupon　follow　a　leaden　ball。

　　Thus；　the　law　of　succession　of　time　is　in　all　instances　the　only

empirical　criterion　of　effect　in　relation　to　the　causality　of　the

antecedent　cause。　The　glass　is　the　cause　of　the　rising　of　the　water

above　its　horizontal　surface；　although　the　two　phenomena　are

contemporaneous。　For；　as　soon　as　I　draw　some　water　with　the　glass　from

a　larger　vessel；　an　effect　follows　thereupon；　namely；　the　change　of

the　horizontal　state　which　the　water　had　in　the　large　vessel　into　a

concave；　which　it　assumes　in　the　glass。

　　This　conception　of　causality　leads　us　to　the　conception　of　action；

that　of　action；　to　the　conception　of　force；　and　through　it；　to　the

conception　of　substance。　As　I　do　not　wish　this　critical　essay；　the

sole　purpose　of　which　is　to　treat　of　the　sources　of　our　synthetical

cognition　a　priori；　to　be　crowded　with　analyses　which　merely

explain；　but　do　not　enlarge　the　sphere　of　our　conceptions；　I　reserve

the　detailed　explanation　of　the　above　conceptions　for　a　future

system　of　pure　reason。　Such　an　analysis；　indeed；　executed　with　great

particularity；　may　already　be　found　in　well…known　works　on　this

subject。　But　I　cannot　at　present　refrain　from　making　a　few　remarks

on　the　empirical　criterion　of　a　substance；　in　so　far　as　it　seems　to　be

more　evident　and　more　easily　recognized　through　the　conception　of

action　than　through　that　of　the　permanence　of　a　phenomenon。

　　Where　action　（consequently　activity　and　force）　exists；　substance

also　must　exist；　and　in　it　alone　must　be　sought　the　seat　of　that

fruitful　source　of　phenomena。　Very　well。　But　if　we　are　called　upon

to　explain　what　we　mean　by　substance；　and　wish　to　avoid　the　vice　of

reasoning　in　a　circle；　the　answer　is　by　no　means　so　easy。　How　shall　we

conclude　immediately　from　the　action　to　the　permanence　of　that　which

acts；　this　being　nevertheless　an　essential　and　peculiar　criterion　of

substance　（phenomenon）？　But　after　what　has　been　said　above；　the

solution　of　this　question　becomes　easy　enough；　although　by　the

common　mode　of　procedure…　merely　analysing　our　conceptions…　it　would

be　quite　impossible。　The　conception　of　action　indicates　the　relation

of　the　subject　of　causality　to　the　effect。　Now　because　all　effect

consists　in　that　which　happens；　therefore　in　the　changeable；　the

last　subject　thereof　is　the　permanent；　as　the　substratum　of　all　that

changes；　that　is；　substance。　For　according　to　the　principle　of

causality；　actions　are　always　the　first　ground　of　all　change　in

phenomena　and；　consequently；　cannot　be　a　property　of　a　subject　which

itself　changes；　because　if　this　were　the　case；　other　actions　and

another　subject　would　be　necessary　to　determine　this　change。　From

all　this　it　results　that　action　alone；　as　an　empirical　criterion；　is　a

sufficient　proof　of　the　presence　of　substantiality；　without　any

necessity　on　my　part　of　endeavouring　to　discover　the　permanence　of

substance　by　a　comparison。　Besides；　by　this　mode　of　induction　we　could

not　attain　to　the　completeness　which　the　magnitude　and　strict

universality　of　the　conception　requires。　For　that　the　primary

subject　of　the　causality　of　all　arising　and　passing　away；　all　origin

and　extinction；　cannot　itself　（in　the　sphere　of　phenomena）　arise　and

pass　away；　is　a　sound　and　safe　conclusion；　a　conclusion　which　leads　us

to　the　conception　of　empirical　necessity　and　permanence　in

existence；　and　consequently　to　the　conception　of　a　substance　as

phenomenon。

　　When　something　happens；　the　mere　fact　of　the　occurrence；　without

regard　to　that　which　occurs；　is　an　object　requiring　investigation。　The

transition　from　the　non…being　of　a　state　into　the　existence　of　it；

supposing　that　this　state　contains　no　quality　which　previously　existed

in　the　phenomenon；　is　a　fact　of　itself　demanding　inquiry。　Such　an

event；　as　has　been　shown　in　No。　A；　does　not　concern　substance　（for

substance　does　not　thus　originate）；　but　its　condition　or　state。　It

is　therefore　only　change；　and　not　origin　from　nothing。　If　this

origin　be　regarded　as　the　effect　of　a　foreign　cause；　it　is　termed

creation；　which　cannot　be　admitted　as　an　event　among　phenomena；

because　the　very　possibility　of　it　would　annihilate　the　unity　of

experience。　If；　however；　I　regard　all　things　not　as　phenomena；　but

as　things　in　themselves　and　objects　of　understanding　alone；　they；

although　substances；　may　be　considered　as　dependent；　in　respect　of

their　existence；　on　a　foreign　cause。　But　this　would　require　a　very

different　meaning　in　the　words；　a　meaning　which　could　not　apply　to

phenomena　as　objects　of　possible　experience。

　　How　a　thing　can　be　changed；　how　it　is　possible　that　upon　one　state

existing　in　one　point　of　time；　an　opposite　state　should　follow　in

another　point　of　time…　of　this　we　have　not　the　smallest　conception　a

priori。　There　is　requisite　for　this　the　knowledge　of　real　powers；

which　can　only　be　given　empirically；　for　example；　knowledge　of

moving　forces；　or；　in　other　words；　of　certain　successive　phenomena　（as

movements）　which　indicate　the　presence　of　such　forces。　But　the　form　of

every　change；　the　condition　under　which　alone　it　can　take　place　as　the

coming　into　existence　of　another　state　（be　the　content　of　the

change；　that　is；　t