the critique of pure reason-第26章

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distinguished　from　the　merely　intellectual　synthesis；　which　is

produced　by　the　understanding　alone；　without　the　aid　of　imagination。

Now；　in　so　far　as　imagination　is　spontaneity；　I　sometimes　call　it　also

the　productive　imagination；　and　distinguish　it　from　the

reproductive；　the　synthesis　of　which　is　subject　entirely　to

empirical　laws；　those　of　association；　namely；　and　which；　therefore；

contributes　nothing　to　the　explanation　of　the　possibility　of　a

priori　cognition；　and　for　this　reason　belongs　not　to　transcendental

philosophy；　but　to　psychology。



　　We　have　now　arrived　at　the　proper　place　for　explaining　the　paradox

which　must　have　struck　every　one　in　our　exposition　of　the　internal

sense　（SS　6）；　namely…　how　this　sense　represents　us　to　our　own

consciousness；　only　as　we　appear　to　ourselves；　not　as　we　are　in

ourselves；　because；　to　wit；　we　intuite　ourselves　only　as　we　are

inwardly　affected。　Now　this　appears　to　be　contradictory；　inasmuch　as

we　thus　stand　in　a　passive　relation　to　ourselves；　and　therefore　in　the

systems　of　psychology；　the　internal　sense　is　commonly　held　to　be　one

with　the　faculty　of　apperception；　while　we；　on　the　contrary；　carefully

distinguish　them。

　　That　which　determines　the　internal　sense　is　the　understanding；　and

its　original　power　of　conjoining　the　manifold　of　intuition；　that　is；

of　bringing　this　under　an　apperception　（upon　which　rests　the

possibility　of　the　understanding　itself）。　Now；　as　the　human

understanding　is　not　in　itself　a　faculty　of　intuition；　and　is　unable

to　exercise　such　a　power；　in　order　to　conjoin；　as　it　were；　the

manifold　of　its　own　intuition；　the　synthesis　of　understanding　is；

considered　per　se；　nothing　but　the　unity　of　action；　of　which；　as　such；

it　is　self…conscious；　even　apart　from　sensibility；　by　which；　moreover；

it　is　able　to　determine　our　internal　sense　in　respect　of　the

manifold　which　may　be　presented　to　it　according　to　the　form　of

sensuous　intuition。　Thus；　under　the　name　of　a　transcendental　synthesis

of　imagination；　the　understanding　exercises　an　activity　upon　the

passive　subject；　whose　faculty　it　is；　and　so　we　are　right　in　saying

that　the　internal　sense　is　affected　thereby。　Apperception　and　its

synthetical　unity　are　by　no　means　one　and　the　same　with　the　internal

sense。　The　former；　as　the　source　of　all　our　synthetical　conjunction；

applies；　under　the　name　of　the　categories；　to　the　manifold　of

intuition　in　general；　prior　to　all　sensuous　intuition　of　objects。

The　internal　sense；　on　the　contrary；　contains　merely　the　form　of

intuition；　but　without　any　synthetical　conjunction　of　the　manifold

therein；　and　consequently　does　not　contain　any　determined　intuition；

which　is　possible　only　through　consciousness　of　the　determination　of

the　manifold　by　the　transcendental　act　of　the　imagination　（synthetical

influence　of　the　understanding　on　the　internal　sense）；　which　I　have

named　figurative　synthesis。

　　This　we　can　indeed　always　perceive　in　ourselves。　We　cannot

cogitate　a　geometrical　line　without　drawing　it　in　thought；　nor　a

circle　without　describing　it；　nor　represent　the　three　dimensions　of

space　without　drawing　three　lines　from　the　same　point　perpendicular　to

one　another。　We　cannot　even　cogitate　time；　unless；　in　drawing　a

straight　line　（which　is　to　serve　as　the　external　figurative

representation　of　time）；　we　fix　our　attention　on　the　act　of　the

synthesis　of　the　manifold；　whereby　we　determine　successively　the

internal　sense；　and　thus　attend　also　to　the　succession　of　this

determination。　Motion　as　an　act　of　the　subject　（not　as　a　determination

of　an　object）；*　consequently　the　synthesis　of　the　manifold　in　space；

if　we　make　abstraction　of　space　and　attend　merely　to　the　act　by

which　we　determine　the　internal　sense　according　to　its　form；　is　that

which　produces　the　conception　of　succession。　The　understanding；

therefore；　does　by　no　means　find　in　the　internal　sense　any　such

synthesis　of　the　manifold；　but　produces　it；　in　that　it　affects　this

sense。　At　the　same　time；　how　〃I　who　think〃　is　distinct　from　the　〃I〃

which　intuites　itself　（other　modes　of　intuition　being　cogitable　as

at　least　possible）；　and　yet　one　and　the　same　with　this　latter　as　the

same　subject；　how；　therefore；　I　am　able　to　say：　〃I；　as　an　intelligence

and　thinking　subject；　cognize　myself　as　an　object　thought；　so　far　as　I

am；　moreover；　given　to　myself　in　intuition…　only；　like　other

phenomena；　not　as　I　am　in　myself；　and　as　considered　by　the

understanding；　but　merely　as　I　appear〃…　is　a　question　that　has　in　it

neither　more　nor　less　difficulty　than　the　question…　〃How　can　I　be　an

object　to　myself？〃　or　this…　〃How　I　can　be　an　object　of　my　own

intuition　and　internal　perceptions？〃　But　that　such　must　be　the　fact；

if　we　admit　that　space　is　merely　a　pure　form　of　the　phenomena　of

external　sense；　can　be　clearly　proved　by　the　consideration　that　we

cannot　represent　time；　which　is　not　an　object　of　external　intuition；

in　any　other　way　than　under　the　image　of　a　line；　which　we　draw　in

thought；　a　mode　of　representation　without　which　we　could　not　cognize

the　unity　of　its　dimension；　and　also　that　we　are　necessitated　to

take　our　determination　of　periods　of　time；　or　of　points　of　time；　for

all　our　internal　perceptions　from　the　changes　which　we　perceive　in

outward　things。　It　follows　that　we　must　arrange　the　determinations

of　the　internal　sense；　as　phenomena　in　time；　exactly　in　the　same

manner　as　we　arrange　those　of　the　external　senses　in　space。　And

consequently；　if　we　grant；　respecting　this　latter；　that　by　means　of

them　we　know　objects　only　in　so　far　as　we　are　affected　externally；

we　must　also　confess；　with　regard　to　the　internal　sense；　that　by　means

of　it　we　intuite　ourselves　only　as　we　are　internally　affected　by

ourselves；　in　other　words；　as　regards　internal　intuition；　we　cognize

our　own　subject　only　as　phenomenon；　and　not　as　it　is　in　itself。*＇2＇



　　*Motion　of　an　object　in　space　does　not　belong　to　a　pure　science；

consequently　not　to　geometry；　because；　that　a　thing　is　movable

cannot　be　known　a　priori；　but　only　from　experience。　But　motion；

considered　as　the　description　of　a　space；　is　a　pure　act　of　the

successive　synthesis　of　the　manifold　in　external　intuition　by　means　of

productive　imagination；　and　belongs　not　only　to　geometry；　but　even

to　transcendental　philosophy。

　　*＇2＇　I　do　not　see　why　so　much　difficulty　should　be　found　in

admitting　that　our　internal　sense　is　affected　by　ourselves。　Every

act　of　attention　exemplifies　it。　In　such　an　act　the　understanding

determines　the　internal　sense　by　the　synthetical　conjunction　which

it　cogitates；　conformably　to　the　internal　intuition　which

corresponds　to　the　manifold　in　the　synthesis　of　the　understanding。　How

much　the　mind　is　usually　affected　thereby　every　one　will　be　able　to

perceive　in　himself。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　21



　　On　the　other　hand；　in　the　transcendental　synthesis　of　the　manifold

content　of　representations；　consequently　in　the　synthetical　unity　of

apperception；　I　am　conscious　of　myself；　not　as　I　appear　to　myself；　nor

as　I　am　in　myself；　but　only　that　〃I　am。〃　This　representation　is　a

thought；　not　an　intuition。　Now；　as　in　order　to　cognize　ourselves；　in

addition　to　the　act　of　thinking；　which　subjects　the　manifold　of

every　possible　intuition　to　the　unity　of　apperception；　there　is

necessary　a　determinate　mode　of　intuition；　whereby　this　manifold　is

given；　although　my　own　existence　is　certainly　not　mere　phenomenon

（much　less　mere　illusion）；　the　determination　of　my　existence*　Can　only

take　place　conformably　to　the　form　of　the　internal　sense；　according　to

the　particular　mode　in　which　the　manifold　which　I　conjoin　is　given

in　internal　intuition；　and　I　have　therefore　no　knowledge　of　myself

as　I　am；　but　merely　as　I　appear　to　myself。　The　consciousness　of　self

is　thus　very　far　from　a　knowledge　of　self；　in　which　I　do　not　use　the

categories；　whereby　I　cogitate　an　object；　by　means　of　the

conjunction　of　the　manifold　in　one　apperception。　In　the　same　way　as

I　require；　for　the　sake　of　the　cognition　of　an　object　distinct　from

myself；　not　only　the　thought　of　an　object　in　general　（in　the

category）；　but　also　an　intuition　by　which　to　determine　that　general

conception；　in　the　same　way　do　I　require；　in　order　to　the　cognition　of

myself；　not　only　the　consciousness　of　myself　or　the　thought　that　I

think　myself；　but　in　addition　an　intuition　of　the　manifold　in

myself；　by　which　to　determine　this　thought。　It　is　true　that　I　exist　as

an　intelligence　which　is　conscious　only　of　its　faculty　of

conjunction　or　synthesis；　but　subjected　in　relation　to　the　manifold

which　this　intelligence　has　to　conjoin　to　a　limitative　conjunction

called　the　internal　sense。　My　intelligence　（that　is；　I）　can　render

that　conjunction　or　synthesis　perceptible　only　according　to　the

relations　of　time；　which　are　quite　beyond　the　proper　sphere　of　the

conceptions　of　the　understanding　and　consequently　cognize　itself　in

respect　to　an　intuition　（which　cannot　possibly　be　intellectual；　nor

given　by　the　understanding）；　only　as　it　appears　to　itself；　and　not

as　it　would　cognize　itself；　if　its　intuition　were　intellectual。



　　*The　〃I　think〃　expresses　the　act　of　determining　my　own　existence。　My

existence　is　thus　already　given　by　the　act　of　consciousness；　but　the

mode　in　which　I　must　determine　my　existence；　that　is；　the　mode　in

which　I　must　place　the　manifold　belonging　to　my　existence；　is　not

thereby　given。　For　this　purpose　intuition　of　self　is　required；　and

this　intuition　possesses　a　form　given　a　priori；　namely；　time；　which　is

sensuous；　and　belongs　to　our　receptivity　of　the　determinable。　Now；

as　I　do　not　possess　another　intuition　of　self　which　gives　the

determining　in　me　（of　the　spontaneity　of　which　I　am　conscious）；

prior　to　the　act　of　determination；　in　the　same　manner　as　time　gives

the　determinable；　it　is　clear　that　I　am　unable　to　determine　my　own

existence　as　that　of　a　spontaneous　being；　but　I　am　only　able　to

represent　to　myself　the　spontaneity　of　my　thought；　that　is；　of　my

determination；　and　my　existence　remains　ever　determinable　in　a

purely　sensuous　manner；　that　is　to　say；　like　the　existence　of　a

phenomenon。　But　it　is　because　of　this　spontaneity　that　I　call　myself

an　intelligence。



　　　　　　Transcendental　Deduction　of　the　universally　possible

　　　　　　　　employment　in　experience　of　the　Pure　Conceptions

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　Understanding。　SS　22



　　In　the　metaphysical　deduction；　the　a　priori　origin　of　categories　was

proved　by　their　complete　accordance　with　the　general　logical　of

thought；　in　the　transcendental　deduction　was　exhibited　the　possibility

of　the　categories　as　a　priori　cognitions　of　objects　of　an　intuition　in

general　（SS　16　and　17）。At　present　we　are　about　to　explain　the

possibility　of　cognizing；　a　priori；　by　means　of　the　categories；　all

objects　which　can　possibly　be　presented　to　our　senses；　not；　indeed；

according　to　the　form　of　their　intuition；　but　according　to　the　laws　of

their　conjunction　or　synthesis；　and　thus；　a