the critique of pure reason-第16章

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　　It　is；　moreover；　not　necessary　that　we　should　limit　the　mode　of

intuition　in　space　and　time　to　the　sensuous　faculty　of　man。　It　may

well　be　that　all　finite　thinking　beings　must　necessarily　in　this

respect　agree　with　man　（though　as　to　this　we　cannot　decide）；　but

sensibility　does　not　on　account　of　this　universality　cease　to　be

sensibility；　for　this　very　reason；　that　it　is　a　deduced　（intuitus

derivativus）；　and　not　an　original　（intuitus　originarius）；　consequently

not　an　intellectual　intuition；　and　this　intuition；　as　such；　for

reasons　above　mentioned；　seems　to　belong　solely　to　the　Supreme

Being；　but　never　to　a　being　dependent；　quoad　its　existence；　as　well　as

its　intuition　（which　its　existence　determines　and　limits　relatively　to

given　objects）。　This　latter　remark；　however；　must　be　taken　only　as

an　illustration；　and　not　as　any　proof　of　the　truth　of　our

aesthetical　theory。



　　　　SS　10　Conclusion　of　the　Transcendental　Aesthetic。



　　We　have　now　completely　before　us　one　part　of　the　solution　of　the

grand　general　problem　of　transcendental　philosophy；　namely；　the

question：　〃How　are　synthetical　propositions　a　priori　possible？〃　That

is　to　say；　we　have　shown　that　we　are　in　possession　of　pure　a　priori

intuitions；　namely；　space　and　time；　in　which　we　find；　when　in　a

judgement　a　priori　we　pass　out　beyond　the　given　conception；

something　which　is　not　discoverable　in　that　conception；　but　is

certainly　found　a　priori　in　the　intuition　which　corresponds　to　the

conception；　and　can　be　united　synthetically　with　it。　But　the

judgements　which　these　pure　intuitions　enable　us　to　make；　never

reach　farther　than　to　objects　of　the　senses；　and　are　valid　only　for

objects　of　possible　experience。

INTRO

　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　PART。　TRANSCENDENTAL　LOGIC。



　　　　　　　INTRODUCTION。　Idea　of　a　Transcendental　Logic。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　Of　Logic　in　General。



　　Our　knowledge　springs　from　two　main　sources　in　the　mind；　first　of

which　is　the　faculty　or　power　of　receiving　representations

（receptivity　for　impressions）；　the　second　is　the　power　of　cognizing　by

means　of　these　representations　（spontaneity　in　the　production　of

conceptions）。　Through　the　first　an　object　is　given　to　us；　through

the　second；　it　is；　in　relation　to　the　representation　（which　is　a

mere　determination　of　the　mind）；　thought。　Intuition　and　conceptions

constitute；　therefore；　the　elements　of　all　our　knowledge；　so　that

neither　conceptions　without　an　intuition　in　some　way　corresponding

to　them；　nor　intuition　without　conceptions；　can　afford　us　a　cognition。

Both　are　either　pure　or　empirical。　They　are。　empirical；　when　sensation

（which　presupposes　the　actual　presence　of　the　object）　is　contained

in　them；　and　pure；　when　no　sensation　is　mixed　with　the　representation。

Sensations　we　may　call　the　matter　of　sensuous　cognition。　Pure

intuition　consequently　contains　merely　the　form　under　which

something　is　intuited；　and　pure　conception　only　the　form　of　the

thought　of　an　object。　Only　pure　intuitions　and　pure　conceptions　are

possible　a　priori；　the　empirical　only　a　posteriori。

　　We　apply　the　term　sensibility　to　the　receptivity　of　the　mind　for

impressions；　in　so　far　as　it　is　in　some　way　affected；　and；　on　the

other　hand；　we　call　the　faculty　of　spontaneously　producing

representations；　or　the　spontaneity　of　cognition；　understanding。　Our

nature　is　so　constituted　that　intuition　with　us　never　can　be　other

than　sensuous；　that　is；　it　contains　only　the　mode　in　which　we　are

affected　by　objects。　On　the　other　hand；　the　faculty　of　thinking　the

object　of　sensuous　intuition　is　the　understanding。　Neither　of　these

faculties　has　a　preference　over　the　other。　Without　the　sensuous

faculty　no　object　would　be　given　to　us；　and　without　the

understanding　no　object　would　be　thought。　Thoughts　without　content　are

void；　intuitions　without　conceptions；　blind。　Hence　it　is　as

necessary　for　the　mind　to　make　its　conceptions　sensuous　（that　is；　to

join　to　them　the　object　in　intuition）；　as　to　make　its　intuitions

intelligible　（that　is；　to　bring　them　under　conceptions）。　Neither　of

these　faculties　can　exchange　its　proper　function。　Understanding　cannot

intuite；　and　the　sensuous　faculty　cannot　think。　in　no　other　way　than

from　the　united　operation　of　both；　can　knowledge　arise。　But　no　one

ought；　on　this　account；　to　overlook　the　difference　of　the　elements

contributed　by　each；　we　have　rather　great　reason　carefully　to　separate

and　distinguish　them。　We　therefore　distinguish　the　science　of　the　laws

of　sensibility；　that　is；　aesthetic；　from　the　science　of　the　laws　of

the　understanding；　that　is；　logic。

　　Now；　logic　in　its　turn　may　be　considered　as　twofold…　namely；　as

logic　of　the　general；　or　of　the　particular　use　of　the　understanding。

The　first　contains　the　absolutely　necessary　laws　of　thought；　without

which　no　use　whatsoever　of　the　understanding　is　possible；　and　gives

laws　therefore　to　the　understanding；　without　regard　to　the

difference　of　objects　on　which　it　may　be　employed。　The　logic　of　the

particular　use　of　the　understanding　contains　the　laws　of　correct

thinking　upon　a　particular　class　of　objects。　The　former　may　be

called　elemental　logic…　the　latter；　the　organon　of　this　or　that

particular　science。　The　latter　is　for　the　most　part　employed　in　the

schools；　as　a　propaedeutic　to　the　sciences；　although；　indeed；

according　to　the　course　of　human　reason；　it　is　the　last　thing　we

arrive　at；　when　the　science　has　been　already　matured；　and　needs　only

the　finishing　touches　towards　its　correction　and　completion；　for　our

knowledge　of　the　objects　of　our　attempted　science　must　be　tolerably

extensive　and　complete　before　we　can　indicate　the　laws　by　which　a

science　of　these　objects　can　be　established。

　　General　logic　is　again　either　pure　or　applied。　In　the　former；　we

abstract　all　the　empirical　conditions　under　which　the　understanding　is

exercised；　for　example；　the　influence　of　the　senses；　the　play　of　the

fantasy　or　imagination；　the　laws　of　the　memory；　the　force　of　habit；　of

inclination；　etc。；　consequently　also；　the　sources　of　prejudice…　in　a

word；　we　abstract　all　causes　from　which　particular　cognitions　arise；

because　these　causes　regard　the　understanding　under　certain

circumstances　of　its　application；　and；　to　the　knowledge　of　them

experience　is　required。　Pure　general　logic　has　to　do；　therefore；

merely　with　pure　a　priori　principles；　and　is　a　canon　of

understanding　and　reason；　but　only　in　respect　of　the　formal　part　of

their　use；　be　the　content　what　it　may；　empirical　or　transcendental。

General　logic　is　called　applied；　when　it　is　directed　to　the　laws　of

the　use　of　the　understanding；　under　the　subjective　empirical

conditions　which　psychology　teaches　us。　It　has　therefore　empirical

principles；　although；　at　the　same　time；　it　is　in　so　far　general；

that　it　applies　to　the　exercise　of　the　understanding；　without　regard

to　the　difference　of　objects。　On　this　account；　moreover；　it　is　neither

a　canon　of　the　understanding　in　general；　nor　an　organon　of　a

particular　science；　but　merely　a　cathartic　of　the　human　understanding。

　　In　general　logic；　therefore；　that　part　which　constitutes　pure

logic　must　be　carefully　distinguished　from　that　which　constitutes

applied　（though　still　general）　logic。　The　former　alone　is　properly

science；　although　short　and　dry；　as　the　methodical　exposition　of　an

elemental　doctrine　of　the　understanding　ought　to　be。　In　this；

therefore；　logicians　must　always　bear　in　mind　two　rules：

　　1。　As　general　logic；　it　makes　abstraction　of　all　content　of　the

cognition　of　the　understanding；　and　of　the　difference　of　objects；

and　has　to　do　with　nothing　but　the　mere　form　of　thought。

　　2。　As　pure　logic；　it　has　no　empirical　principles；　and　consequently

draws　nothing　（contrary　to　the　common　persuasion）　from　psychology；

which　therefore　has　no　influence　on　the　canon　of　the　understanding。　It

is　a　demonstrated　doctrine；　and　everything　in　it　must　be　certain

completely　a　priori。

　　What　I　called　applied　logic　（contrary　to　the　common　acceptation　of

this　term；　according　to　which　it　should　contain　certain　exercises

for　the　scholar；　for　which　pure　logic　gives　the　rules）；　is　a

representation　of　the　understanding；　and　of　the　rules　of　its　necessary

employment　in　concreto；　that　is　to　say；　under　the　accidental

conditions　of　the　subject；　which　may　either　hinder　or　promote　this

employment；　and　which　are　all　given　only　empirically。　Thus　applied

logic　treats　of　attention；　its　impediments　and　consequences；　of　the

origin　of　error；　of　the　state　of　doubt；　hesitation；　conviction；

etc。；　and　to　it　is　related　pure　general　logic　in　the　same　way　that

pure　morality；　which　contains　only　the　necessary　moral　laws　of　a

free　will；　is　related　to　practical　ethics；　which　considers　these

laws　under　all　the　impediments　of　feelings；　inclinations；　and　passions

to　which　men　are　more　or　less　subjected；　and　which　never　can　furnish

us　with　a　true　and　demonstrated　science；　because　it；　as　well　as

applied　logic；　requires　empirical　and　psychological　principles。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　Of　Transcendental　Logic。



　　General　logic；　as　we　have　seen；　makes　abstraction　of　all　content

of　cognition；　that　is；　of　all　relation　of　cognition　to　its　object；　and

regards　only　the　logical　form　in　the　relation　of　cognitions　to　each

other；　that　is；　the　form　of　thought　in　general。　But　as　we　have　both

pure　and　empirical　intuitions　（as　transcendental　aesthetic　proves）；　in

like　manner　a　distinction　might　be　drawn　between　pure　and　empirical

thought　（of　objects）。　In　this　case；　there　would　exist　a　kind　of　logic；

in　which　we　should　not　make　abstraction　of　all　content　of　cognition；

for　or　logic　which　should　comprise　merely　the　laws　of　pure　thought　（of

an　object）；　would　of　course　exclude　all　those　cognitions　which　were　of

empirical　content。　This　kind　of　logic　would　also　examine　the　origin　of

our　cognitions　of　objects；　so　far　as　that　origin　cannot　be　ascribed　to

the　objects　themselves；　while；　on　the　contrary；　general　logic　has

nothing　to　do　with　the　origin　of　our　cognitions；　but　contemplates

our　representations；　be　they　given　primitively　a　priori　in

ourselves；　or　be　they　only　of　empirical　origin；　solely　according　to

the　laws　which　the　understanding　observes　in　employing　them　in　the

process　of　thought；　in　relation　to　each　other。　Consequently；　general

logic　treats　of　the　form　of　the　understanding　only；　which　can　be

applied　to　representations；　from　whatever　source　they　may　have　arisen。

　　And　here　I　shall　make　a　remark；　which　the　reader　must　bear　well　in

mind　in　the　course　of　the　following　considerations；　to　wit；　that　not

every　cognition　a　priori；　but　only　those　through　which　we　cognize　that

and　how　certain　representations　（intuitions　or　conceptions）　are

applied　or　are　possible　only　a　priori；　that　is　to　say；　the　a　priori

possibility　of　cognition　and　the　a　priori　use　of　it　are

transcendental。　Therefore　neither　is　space；　nor　any　a　priori

geometrical　determination　of　space；　a　transcendental　Representation；

but　only　the　knowledge