the critique of pure reason-第117章

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of　our　actions…　which　are　deduced　from　principles　entirely　a　priori。

Hence　the　metaphysic　of　ethics　is　the　only　pure　moral　philosophy；　as

it　is　not　based　upon　anthropological　or　other　empirical

considerations。　The　metaphysic　of　speculative　reason　is　what　is

commonly　called　metaphysic　in　the　more　limited　sense。　But　as　pure

moral　philosophy　properly　forms　a　part　of　this　system　of　cognition；　we

must　allow　it　to　retain　the　name　of　metaphysic；　although　it　is　not

requisite　that　we　should　insist　on　so　terming　it　in　our　present

discussion。

　　It　is　of　the　highest　importance　to　separate　those　cognitions　which

differ　from　others　both　in　kind　and　in　origin；　and　to　take　great

care　that　they　are　not　confounded　with　those　with　which　they　are

generally　found　connected。　What　the　chemist　does　in　the　analysis　of

substances；　what　the　mathematician　in　pure　mathematics；　is；　in　a　still

higher　degree；　the　duty　of　the　philosopher；　that　the　value　of　each

different　kind　of　cognition；　and　the　part　it　takes　in　the　operations

of　the　mind；　may　be　clearly　defined。　Human　reason　has　never　wanted　a

metaphysic　of　some　kind；　since　it　attained　the　power　of　thought；　or

rather　of　reflection；　but　it　has　never　been　able　to　keep　this　sphere

of　thought　and　cognition　pure　from　all　admixture　of　foreign

elements。　The　idea　of　a　science　of　this　kind　is　as　old　as

speculation　itself；　and　what　mind　does　not　speculate…　either　in　the

scholastic　or　in　the　popular　fashion？　At　the　same　time；　it　must　be

admitted　that　even　thinkers　by　profession　have　been　unable　clearly

to　explain　the　distinction　between　the　two　elements　of　our

cognition…　the　one　completely　a　priori；　the　other　a　posteriori；　and

hence　the　proper　definition　of　a　peculiar　kind　of　cognition；　and

with　it　the　just　idea　of　a　science　which　has　so　long　and　so　deeply

engaged　the　attention　of　the　human　mind；　has　never　been　established。

When　it　was　said：　〃Metaphysic　is　the　science　of　the　first　principles

of　human　cognition；〃　this　definition　did　not　signalize　a　peculiarity

in　kind；　but　only　a　difference　in　degree；　these　first　principles

were　thus　declared　to　be　more　general　than　others；　but　no　criterion　of

distinction　from　empirical　principles　was　given。　Of　these　some　are

more　general；　and　therefore　higher；　than　others；　and…　as　we　cannot

distinguish　what　is　completely　a　priori　from　that　which　is　known　to　be

a　posteriori…　where　shall　we　draw　the　line　which　is　to　separate　the

higher　and　so…called　first　principles；　from　the　lower　and

subordinate　principles　of　cognition？　What　would　be　said　if　we　were

asked　to　be　satisfied　with　a　division　of　the　epochs　of　the　world

into　the　earlier　centuries　and　those　following　them？　〃Does　the

fifth；　or　the　tenth　century　belong　to　the　earlier　centuries？〃　it　would

be　asked。　In　the　same　way　I　ask：　Does　the　conception　of　extension

belong　to　metaphysics？　You　answer；　〃Yes。〃　Well；　that　of　body　too？

〃Yes。〃　And　that　of　a　fluid　body？　You　stop；　you　are　unprepared　to　admit

this；　for　if　you　do；　everything　will　belong　to　metaphysics。　From

this　it　is　evident　that　the　mere　degree　of　subordination…　of　the

particular　to　the　general…　cannot　determine　the　limits　of　a　science；

and　that；　in　the　present　case；　we　must　expect　to　find　a　difference

in　the　conceptions　of　metaphysics　both　in　kind　and　in　origin。　The

fundamental　idea　of　metaphysics　was　obscured　on　another　side　by　the

fact　that　this　kind　of　a　priori　cognition　showed　a　certain

similarity　in　character　with　the　science　of　mathematics。　Both　have　the

property　in　common　of　possessing　an　a　priori　origin；　but；　in　the

one；　our　knowledge　is　based　upon　conceptions；　in　the　other；　on　the

construction　of　conceptions。　Thus　a　decided　dissimilarity　between

philosophical　and　mathematical　cognition　comes　out…　a　dissimilarity

which　was　always　felt；　but　which　could　not　be　made　distinct　for　want

of　an　insight　into　the　criteria　of　the　difference。　And　thus　it

happened　that；　as　philosophers　themselves　failed　in　the　proper

development　of　the　idea　of　their　science；　the　elaboration　of　the

science　could　not　proceed　with　a　definite　aim；　or　under　trustworthy

guidance。　Thus；　too；　philosophers；　ignorant　of　the　path　they　ought

to　pursue　and　always　disputing　with　each　other　regarding　the

discoveries　which　each　asserted　he　had　made；　brought　their　science

into　disrepute　with　the　rest　of　the　world；　and　finally；　even　among

themselves。

　　All　pure　a　priori　cognition　forms；　therefore；　in　view　of　the

peculiar　faculty　which　originates　it；　a　peculiar　and　distinct　unity；

and　metaphysic　is　the　term　applied　to　the　philosophy　which　attempts　to

represent　that　cognition　in　this　systematic　unity。　The　speculative

part　of　metaphysic；　which　has　especially　appropriated　this

appellation…　that　which　we　have　called　the　metaphysic　of　nature…　and

which　considers　everything；　as　it　is　（not　as　it　ought　to　be）；　by　means

of　a　priori　conceptions；　is　divided　in　the　following　manner。

　　Metaphysic；　in　the　more　limited　acceptation　of　the　term；　consists　of

two　parts…　transcendental　philosophy　and　the　physiology　of　pure

reason。　The　former　presents　the　system　of　all　the　conceptions　and

principles　belonging　to　the　understanding　and　the　reason；　and　which

relate　to　objects　in　general；　but　not　to　any　particular　given

objects　（Ontologia）；　the　latter　has　nature　for　its　subject…matter；

that　is；　the　sum　of　given　objects…　whether　given　to　the　senses；　or；　if

we　will；　to　some　other　kind　of　intuition…　and　is　accordingly

physiology；　although　only　rationalis。　But　the　use　of　the　faculty　of

reason　in　this　rational　mode　of　regarding　nature　is　either　physical　or

hyperphysical；　or；　more　properly　speaking；　immanent　or　transcendent。

The　former　relates　to　nature；　in　so　far　as　our　knowledge　regarding

it　may　be　applied　in　experience　（in　concreto）；　the　latter　to　that

connection　of　the　objects　of　experience；　which　transcends　all

experience。　Transcendent　physiology　has；　again；　an　internal　and　an

external　connection　with　its　object；　both；　however；　transcending

possible　experience；　the　former　is　the　physiology　of　nature　as　a

whole；　or　transcendental　cognition　of　the　world；　the　latter　of　the

connection　of　the　whole　of　nature　with　a　being　above　nature；　or

transcendental　cognition　of　God。

　　Immanent　physiology；　on　the　contrary；　considers　nature　as　the　sum　of

all　sensuous　objects；　consequently；　as　it　is　presented　to　us…　but

still　according　to　a　priori　conditions；　for　it　is　under　these　alone

that　nature　can　be　presented　to　our　minds　at　all。　The　objects　of

immanent　physiology　are　of　two　kinds：　1。　Those　of　the　external　senses；

or　corporeal　nature；　2。　The　object　of　the　internal　sense；　the　soul；

or；　in　accordance　with　our　fundamental　conceptions　of　it；　thinking

nature。　The　metaphysics　of　corporeal　nature　is　called　physics；　but；　as

it　must　contain　only　the　principles　of　an　a　priori　cognition　of

nature；　we　must　term　it　rational　physics。　The　metaphysics　of

thinking　nature　is　called　psychology；　and　for　the　same　reason　is　to　be

regarded　as　merely　the　rational　cognition　of　the　soul。

　　Thus　the　whole　system　of　metaphysics　consists　of　four　principal

parts：　1。　Ontology；　2。　Rational　Physiology；　3。　Rational　cosmology；　and

4。　Rational　theology。　The　second　part…　that　of　the　rational　doctrine

of　nature…　may　be　subdivided　into　two；　physica　rationalis*　and

psychologia　rationalis。



　　*It　must　not　be　supposed　that　I　mean　by　this　appellation　what　is

generally　called　physica　general　is；　and　which　is　rather　mathematics

than　a　philosophy　of　nature。　For　the　metaphysic　of　nature　is

completely　different　from　mathematics；　nor　is　it　so　rich　in　results；

although　it　is　of　great　importance　as　a　critical　test　of　the

application　of　pure　understanding…cognition　to　nature。　For　want　of　its

guidance；　even　mathematicians；　adopting　certain　common　notions…

which　are；　in　fact；　metaphysical…　have　unconsciously　crowded　their

theories　of　nature　with　hypotheses；　the　fallacy　of　which　becomes

evident　upon　the　application　of　the　principles　of　this　metaphysic；

without　detriment；　however；　to　the　employment　of　mathematics　in　this

sphere　of　cognition。



　　The　fundamental　idea　of　a　philosophy　of　pure　reason　of　necessity

dictates　this　division；　it　is；　therefore；　architectonical…　in

accordance　with　the　highest　aims　of　reason；　and　not　merely

technical；　or　according　to　certain　accidentally…observed

similarities　existing　between　the　different　parts　of　the　whole

science。　For　this　reason；　also；　is　the　division　immutable　and　of

legislative　authority。　But　the　reader　may　observe　in　it　a　few　points

to　which　he　ought　to　demur；　and　which　may　weaken　his　conviction　of　its

truth　and　legitimacy。

　　In　the　first　place；　how　can　I　desire　an　a　priori　cognition　or

metaphysic　of　objects；　in　so　far　as　they　are　given　a　posteriori？　and

how　is　it　possible　to　cognize　the　nature　of　things　according　to　a

priori　principles；　and　to　attain　to　a　rational　physiology？　The

answer　is　this。　We　take　from　experience　nothing　more　than　is　requisite

to　present　us　with　an　object　（in　general）　of　the　external　or　of　the

internal　sense；　in　the　former　case；　by　the　mere　conception　of　matter

（impenetrable　and　inanimate　extension）；　in　the　latter；　by　the

conception　of　a　thinking　being…　given　in　the　internal　empirical

representation；　I　think。　As　to　the　rest；　we　must　not　employ　in　our

metaphysic　of　these　objects　any　empirical　principles　（which　add　to　the

content　of　our　conceptions　by　means　of　experience）；　for　the　purpose　of

forming　by　their　help　any　judgements　respecting　these　objects。

　　Secondly；　what　place　shall　we　assign　to　empirical　psychology；

which　has　always　been　considered　a　part　of　metaphysics；　and　from　which

in　our　time　such　important　philosophical　results　have　been　expected；

after　the　hope　of　constructing　an　a　priori　system　of　knowledge　had

been　abandoned？　I　answer：　It　must　be　placed　by　the　side　of　empirical

physics　or　physics　proper；　that　is；　must　be　regarded　as　forming　a　part

of　applied　philosophy；　the　a　priori　principles　of　which　are

contained　in　pure　philosophy；　which　is　therefore　connected；　although

it　must　not　be　confounded；　with　psychology。　Empirical　psychology

must　therefore　be　banished　from　the　sphere　of　metaphysics；　and　is

indeed　excluded　by　the　very　idea　of　that　science。　In　conformity；

however；　with　scholastic　usage；　we　must　permit　it　to　occupy　a　place　in

metaphysics…　but　only　as　an　appendix　to　it。　We　adopt　this　course

from　motives　of　economy；　as　psychology　is　not　as　yet　full　enough　to

occupy　our　attention　as　an　independent　study；　while　it　is；　at　the　same

time；　of　too　great　importance　to　be　entirely　excluded　or　placed

where　it　has　still　less　affinity　than　it　has　with　the　subject　of

metaphysics。　It　is　a　stranger　who　has　been　long　a　guest；　and　we　make

it　welcome　to　stay；　until　it　can　take　up　a　more　suitable　abode　in　a

complete　system　of　anthropology…　the　pendant　to　empirical　physics。

　　The　above　is　the　general　idea　of　metaphysics；　which；　as　more　was

expected　from　it　than　could　be　look