the critique of pure reason-第104章

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itself。　It　is　true　that　we　had　to　discuss　the　question　of　an

apparent　antithetic；　but　we　found　that　it　was　based　upon　a

misconception。　In　conformity　with　the　common　prejudice；　phenomena　were

regarded　as　things　in　themselves；　and　thus　an　absolute　completeness　in

their　synthesis　was　required　in　the　one　mode　or　in　the　other　（it　was

shown　to　be　impossible　in　both）；　a　demand　entirely　out　of　place　in

regard　to　phenomena。　There　was；　then；　no　real　self…contradiction　of

reason　in　the　propositions：　The　series　of　phenomena　given　in

themselves　has　an　absolutely　first　beginning；　and：　This　series　is

absolutely　and　in　itself　without　beginning。　The　two　propositions　are

perfectly　consistent　with　each　other；　because　phenomena　as　phenomena

are　in　themselves　nothing；　and　consequently　the　hypothesis　that　they

are　things　in　themselves　must　lead　to　self…contradictory　inferences。

　　But　there　are　cases　in　which　a　similar　misunderstanding　cannot　be

provided　against；　and　the　dispute　must　remain　unsettled。　Take；　for

example；　the　theistic　proposition：　There　is　a　Supreme　Being；　and　on

the　other　hand；　the　atheistic　counter…statement：　There　exists　no

Supreme　Being；　or；　in　psychology：　Everything　that　thinks　possesses　the

attribute　of　absolute　and　permanent　unity；　which　is　utterly

different　from　the　transitory　unity　of　material　phenomena；　and　the

counter…proposition：　The　soul　is　not　an　immaterial　unity；　and　its

nature　is　transitory；　like　that　of　phenomena。　The　objects　of　these

questions　contain　no　heterogeneous　or　contradictory　elements；　for　they

relate　to　things　in　themselves；　and　not　to　phenomena。　There　would

arise；　indeed；　a　real　contradiction；　if　reason　came　forward　with　a

statement　on　the　negative　side　of　these　questions　alone。　As　regards

the　criticism　to　which　the　grounds　of　proof　on　the　affirmative　side

must　be　subjected；　it　may　be　freely　admitted；　without　necessitating

the　surrender　of　the　affirmative　propositions；　which　have；　at　least；

the　interest　of　reason　in　their　favour…　an　advantage　which　the

opposite　party　cannot　lay　claim　to。

　　I　cannot　agree　with　the　opinion　of　several　admirable　thinkers…

Sulzer　among　the　rest…　that；　in　spite　of　the　weakness　of　the　arguments

hitherto　in　use；　we　may　hope；　one　day；　to　see　sufficient

demonstrations　of　the　two　cardinal　propositions　of　pure　reason…　the

existence　of　a　Supreme　Being；　and　the　immortality　of　the　soul。　I　am

certain；　on　the　contrary；　that　this　will　never　be　the　case。　For　on

what　ground　can　reason　base　such　synthetical　propositions；　which　do

not　relate　to　the　objects　of　experience　and　their　internal

possibility？　But　it　is　also　demonstratively　certain　that　no　one　will

ever　be　able　to　maintain　the　contrary　with　the　least　show　of

probability。　For；　as　he　can　attempt　such　a　proof　solely　upon　the　basis

of　pure　reason；　he　is　bound　to　prove　that　a　Supreme　Being；　and　a

thinking　subject　in　the　character　of　a　pure　intelligence；　are

impossible。　But　where　will　he　find　the　knowledge　which　can　enable

him　to　enounce　synthetical　judgements　in　regard　to　things　which

transcend　the　region　of　experience？　We　may；　therefore；　rest　assured

that　the　opposite　never　will　be　demonstrated。　We　need　not；　then；

have　recourse　to　scholastic　arguments；　we　may　always　admit　the　truth

of　those　propositions　which　are　consistent　with　the　speculative

interests　of　reason　in　the　sphere　of　experience；　and　form；　moreover；

the　only　means　of　uniting　the　speculative　with　the　practical　interest。

Our　opponent；　who　must　not　be　considered　here　as　a　critic　solely；　we

can　be　ready　to　meet　with　a　non　liquet　which　cannot　fail　to　disconcert

him；　while　we　cannot　deny　his　right　to　a　similar　retort；　as　we　have　on

our　side　the　advantage　of　the　support　of　the　subjective　maxim　of

reason；　and　can　therefore　look　upon　all　his　sophistical　arguments　with

calm　indifference。

　　From　this　point　of　view；　there　is　properly　no　antithetic　of　pure

reason。　For　the　only　arena　for　such　a　struggle　would　be　upon　the　field

of　pure　theology　and　psychology；　but　on　this　ground　there　can　appear

no　combatant　whom　we　need　to　fear。　Ridicule　and　boasting　can　be　his

only　weapons；　and　these　may　be　laughed　at；　as　mere　child's　play。

This　consideration　restores　to　Reason　her　courage；　for　what　source

of　confidence　could　be　found；　if　she；　whose　vocation　it　is　to

destroy　error；　were　at　variance　with　herself　and　without　any

reasonable　hope　of　ever　reaching　a　state　of　permanent　repose？

　　Everything　in　nature　is　good　for　some　purpose。　Even　poisons　are

serviceable；　they　destroy　the　evil　effects　of　other　poisons

generated　in　our　system；　and　must　always　find　a　place　in　every

complete　pharmacopoeia。　The　objections　raised　against　the　fallacies

and　sophistries　of　speculative　reason；　are　objections　given　by　the

nature　of　this　reason　itself；　and　must　therefore　have　a　destination

and　purpose　which　can　only　be　for　the　good　of　humanity。　For　what

purpose　has　Providence　raised　many　objects；　in　which　we　have　the

deepest　interest；　so　far　above　us；　that　we　vainly　try　to　cognize

them　with　certainty；　and　our　powers　of　mental　vision　are　rather

excited　than　satisfied　by　the　glimpses　we　may　chance　to　seize？　It　is

very　doubtful　whether　it　is　for　our　benefit　to　advance　bold

affirmations　regarding　subjects　involved　in　such　obscurity；　perhaps　it

would　even　be　detrimental　to　our　best　interests。　But　it　is　undoubtedly

always　beneficial　to　leave　the　investigating；　as　well　as　the

critical　reason；　in　perfect　freedom；　and　permit　it　to　take　charge　of

its　own　interests；　which　are　advanced　as　much　by　its　limitation；　as　by

its　extension　of　its　views；　and　which　always　suffer　by　the

interference　of　foreign　powers　forcing　it；　against　its　natural

tendencies；　to　bend　to　certain　preconceived　designs。

　　Allow　your　opponent　to　say　what　he　thinks　reasonable；　and　combat　him

only　with　the　weapons　of　reason。　Have　no　anxiety　for　the　practical

interests　of　humanity…　these　are　never　imperilled　in　a　purely

speculative　dispute。　Such　a　dispute　serves　merely　to　disclose　the

antinomy　of　reason；　which；　as　it　has　its　source　in　the　nature　of

reason；　ought　to　be　thoroughly　investigated。　Reason　is　benefited　by

the　examination　of　a　subject　on　both　sides；　and　its　judgements　are

corrected　by　being　limited。　It　is　not　the　matter　that　may　give

occasion　to　dispute；　but　the　manner。　For　it　is　perfectly　permissible

to　employ；　in　the　presence　of　reason；　the　language　of　a　firmly

rooted　faith；　even　after　we　have　been　obliged　to　renounce　all

pretensions　to　knowledge。

　　If　we　were　to　ask　the　dispassionate　David　Hume…　a　philosopher

endowed；　in　a　degree　that　few　are；　with　a　well…balanced　judgement：

What　motive　induced　you　to　spend　so　much　labour　and　thought　in

undermining　the　consoling　and　beneficial　persuasion　that　reason　is

capable　of　assuring　us　of　the　existence；　and　presenting　us　with　a

determinate　conception　of　a　Supreme　Being？…　his　answer　would　be：

Nothing　but　the　desire　of　teaching　reason　to　know　its　own　powers

better；　and；　at　the　same　time；　a　dislike　of　the　procedure　by　which

that　faculty　was　compelled　to　support　foregone　conclusions；　and

prevented　from　confessing　the　internal　weaknesses　which　it　cannot

but　feel　when　it　enters　upon　a　rigid　self…examination。　If；　on　the

other　hand；　we　were　to　ask　Priestley…　a　philosopher　who　had　no　taste

for　transcendental　speculation；　but　was　entirely　devoted　to　the

principles　of　empiricism…　what　his　motives　were　for　overturning

those　two　main　pillars　of　religion…　the　doctrines　of　the　freedom　of

the　will　and　the　immortality　of　the　soul　（in　his　view　the　hope　of　a

future　life　is　but　the　expectation　of　the　miracle　of　resurrection）…

this　philosopher；　himself　a　zealous　and　pious　teacher　of　religion；

could　give　no　other　answer　than　this：　I　acted　in　the　interest　of

reason；　which　always　suffers；　when　certain　objects　are　explained　and

judged　by　a　reference　to　other　supposed　laws　than　those　of　material

nature…　the　only　laws　which　we　know　in　a　determinate　manner。　It

would　be　unfair　to　decry　the　latter　philosopher；　who　endeavoured　to

harmonize　his　paradoxical　opinions　with　the　interests　of　religion；　and

to　undervalue　an　honest　and　reflecting　man；　because　he　finds　himself

at　a　loss　the　moment　he　has　left　the　field　of　natural　science。　The

same　grace　must　be　accorded　to　Hume；　a　man　not　less　well…disposed；　and

quite　as　blameless　in　his　moral　character；　and　who　pushed　his　abstract

speculations　to　an　extreme　length；　because；　as　he　rightly　believed；

the　object　of　them　lies　entirely　beyond　the　bounds　of　natural　science；

and　within　the　sphere　of　pure　ideas。

　　What　is　to　be　done　to　provide　against　the　danger　which　seems　in

the　present　case　to　menace　the　best　interests　of　humanity？　The

course　to　be　pursued　in　reference　to　this　subject　is　a　perfectly　plain

and　natural　one。　Let　each　thinker　pursue　his　own　path；　if　he　shows

talent；　if　be　gives　evidence　of　profound　thought；　in　one　word；　if　he

shows　that　he　possesses　the　power　of　reasoning…　reason　is　always　the

gainer。　If　you　have　recourse　to　other　means；　if　you　attempt　to

coerce　reason；　if　you　raise　the　cry　of　treason　to　humanity；　if　you

excite　the　feelings　of　the　crowd；　which　can　neither　understand　nor

sympathize　with　such　subtle　speculations…　you　will　only　make

yourselves　ridiculous。　For　the　question　does　not　concern　the　advantage

or　disadvantage　which　we　are　expected　to　reap　from　such　inquiries；　the

question　is　merely　how　far　reason　can　advance　in　the　field　of

speculation；　apart　from　all　kinds　of　interest；　and　whether　we　may

depend　upon　the　exertions　of　speculative　reason；　or　must　renounce

all　reliance　on　it。　Instead　of　joining　the　combatants；　it　is　your　part

to　be　a　tranquil　spectator　of　the　struggle…　a　laborious　struggle　for

the　parties　engaged；　but　attended；　in　its　progress　as　well　as　in　its

result；　with　the　most　advantageous　consequences　for　the　interests　of

thought　and　knowledge。　It　is　absurd　to　expect　to　be　enlightened　by

Reason；　and　at　the　same　time　to　prescribe　to　her　what　side　of　the

question　she　must　adopt。　Moreover；　reason　is　sufficiently　held　in

check　by　its　own　power；　the　limits　imposed　on　it　by　its　own　nature　are

sufficient；　it　is　unnecessary　for　you　to　place　over　it　additional

guards；　as　if　its　power　were　dangerous　to　the　constitution　of　the

intellectual　state。　In　the　dialectic　of　reason　there　is　no　victory

gained　which　need　in　the　least　disturb　your　tranquility。

　　The　strife　of　dialectic　is　a　necessity　of　reason；　and　we　cannot

but　wish　that　it　had　been　conducted　long　ere　this　with　that　perfect

freedom　which　ought　to　be　its　essential　condition。　In　this　case；　we

should　have　had　at　an　earlier　period　a　matured　and　profound　criticism；

which　must　have　put　an　end　to　all　dialectical　disputes；　by　exposing

the　illusions　and　prejudices　in　which　they　originated。

　　There　is　in　human　nature　an　unworthy　propensity…　a　propensity　which；

like　everything　that　springs　from　nature；　must　in　its　final　purpose　be

conducive　to　the　good　of　humanity…　to　conce