the army of the cumberland-第35章

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nt's　notice。　　The　orders　to　withdraw　reached　Thomas　about　six　o'clock　P。M。；　and　the　movement　commenced　about　nine　P。M。

Brannan's　division　was　posted　at　six　P。M。　on　the　road　about　half　way　from　Rossville　to　Chattanooga；　covering　the　movement。　　Orders　were　sent　by　Thomas　for　each　division　commander　to　throw　out　a　strong　skirmish　line；　to　be　withdrawn　at　daylight；　concealing　the　movement　to　the　rear。　　This　line　was　to　be　supported　by　Baird's　division　and　Minty's　brigade　of　cavalry；　which　was　to　retire　after　the　skirmishers　were　withdrawn。　　During　the　night　the　movement　was　completed　without　the　loss　of　a　single　man；　and　at　seven　o'clock　on　the　morning　of　the　22d；　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland；　again　united；　was　in　position；　holding　the　coveted　prize；　still　strong　enough　to　prevent　the　enemy　from　attempting　further　to　dispute　our　possession　of　the　town。　　The　temporary　works　were　strengthened　from　day　to　day　until　all　apprehension　of　an　attack　from　the　enemy　on　the　front　was　at　an　end。

Taking　all　the　surroundings　into　consideration；　the　campaign　from　the　western　slopes　of　the　Cumberland　Mountains；　ending　in　the　battle　of　Chickamauga；　was　the　most　brilliant　one　of　the　war；　made　as　it　was；　in　the　face　of　the　strong　column　of　the　enemy；　whose　business　it　was　to　watch　every　movement；　and　as　far　as　possible　to　retard　and　cripple　the　advance。　　Rosecrans；　with　his　masterly　manevering；　in　every　instance　deceived　his　opponent　down　to　the　withdrawal　of　Bragg　from　Chattanooga。　　While　recognizing　the　genius　of　the　military　leader　who　could　plan　the　campaign　that　was　made　from　the　time　of　the　crossing　of　the　Cumberland　Mountains；　Bragg　regarded　the　obstacles　to　be　overcome　on　such　a　campaign　so　stupendous　that　he　was　incredulous　that　any　movement　south　of　the　Tennessee　was　contemplated　by　the　Federal　leader。　　Every　preparation　was　made　by　Bragg　to　meet　the　crossing　of　our　army　over　the　Tennessee　north　of　Chattanooga　on　the　advance　of　Crittenden；　he　threw　open　the　gateway　for　Rosecrans's　advance。　　When　the　full　scope　of　the　movement　dawned　upon　him；　Bragg　abandoned　Chattanooga　and　gathered　his　troops　wherever　he　could　reach　them　from　all　quarters　to　concentrate　for　the　destruction　of　our　army。　　Bragg　never　intended　his　withdrawal　from　Chattanooga　to　be　permanent；　all　the　indications　he　left　behind　him　pointed　that　way。　　None　of　the　bridges　were　destroyed　as　he　retired。　　All　storehouses；　hospitals；　and　other　buildings　used　by　his　army　were　left　standing；　and　Rosecrans's　mistake　was　in　construing　Bragg's　withdrawal　to　be　a　demoralized　retreat　and　in　ordering　his　army　to　pursue　before　this　was　definitely　determined。　　However；　all　advices　that　Rosecrans　had　were　to　the　effect　that　the　rebels　were　in　hasty　flight　and　would　not　stop　anywhere　north　of　Dalton；　and　that　their　probable　destination　was　Rome。　　This　information　was　sent　to　him　from　Washington；　and　Bragg　aided　in　confirming　this　belief　by　sending　numbers　of　his　soldiers　as　〃deserters〃　into　the　Federal　lines　with　the　same　report。

As　late　as　the　11th；　Halleck　telegraphed　Rosecrans　that　after　he　occupied　〃the　mountain　passes　to　the　west　of　Dalton〃　it　would　be　determined　what　his　future　movements　would　be；　and　on　the　13th；　Halleck　telegraphed　Rosecrans　that　if　Bragg　should　go　to　Alabama　he　must　not　be　allowed　to　re…enter　Middle　Tennessee。　　On　the　13th；　Foster；　at　Fortress　Monroe；　telegraphed　Halleck　that　trains　of　cars　had　been　running　day　and　night　southward　for　the　past　thirty…six　hours。　　On　the　following　day　Foster　sent　Halleck　another　despatch；　that　Longstreet's　corps　was　reported　going　south；　which　Meade　on　the　same　day　confirmed。　　Then　Halleck　sent　urgent　messages　to　Hurlbut　and　Burnside　to　move　to　Rosecrans's　support。　　But　it　was　too　late。　These　commands　were　many　days'　marches　away；　and　at　that　moment　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland　was　engaged　in　the　earlier　movements　of　the　life　and　death　struggle　it　was　peremptorily　ordered　by　Halleck　to　encounter　alone　with　its　old　enemy；　under　Bragg；　heavily　re…enforced；　while　large　numbers　of　Federal　troops　which　might　have　been　within　helping　distance；　had　orders　been　given　in　due　season；　as　asked　for　by　Rosecrans；　remained　inactive。

It　was　not　until　McCook　had　received　and　partly　executed　his　orders　to　occupy　Alpine　that　the　actual　facts　as　to　Bragg's　movements　were　developed；　and　that　he　was　concentrated　at　La　Fayette；　there　waiting　for　reinforcements；　but　strong　enough　without　them　to　crush　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland　in　detail。　　Rosecrans；　when　aware　of　Bragg's　movements；　grasped　the　situation　at　once。　　Bending　every　energy　to　the　concentration　of　his　army　before　Bragg　should　strike；　on　the　12th　he　issued　orders　for　McCook's　immediate　return；　and　despatched　the　same　in　all　haste　by　courier。　　Hearing　nothing　definite　from　McCook；　on　the　next　day　Rosecrans　repeated　his　orders　and　duplicated　them　in　the　afternoon　of　that　day。　　Still　learning　nothing　positive　as　to　McCook's　movements；　on　the　14th　repeated　orders　were　sent　to　him　urging　him　to　consummate　his　rearward　movement　with　all　possible　haste。　　After　a　sleepless　night；　Rosecrans　on　the　15th　left　Chattanooga　for　the　front；　to　hasten；　if　possible；　McCook's　movements。　　After　another　sleepless　night；　information　was　had　from　McCook　as　to　the　position　of　his　command；　and　on　the　17th　the　concentration　of　the　army　was　effected　in　McLemore's　Cove；　five　days　after　McCook's　first　orders　were　dated。

The　delay　attending　McCook's　movements　was　almost　fatal　to　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland。　　Had　Bragg　received　his　promised　reinforcements　at　the　date　he　expected　them；　our　army　would　in　all　probability　have　been　completely　annihilated　in　detail。　　McCook　claims　that　his　delay　was　only　incident　to　the　route　he　was　compelled　to　take　to　join　Thomas。　　This　took　him　back　over　Lookout　Mountain；　to　Valley　Head；　then　down　that　valley；　crossing　the　mountain　again　at　Cooper's　Gap；　and　then　up　and　down　Missionary　Ridge　into　McLemore's　Cove；　a　long；　difficult　road；　nearly　all　of　it　over　rough　mountains。　　This　route；　McCook　from　the　information　received；　regarded　as　the　better　one　to　take；　as　between　it　and　the　one　on　which　he　was　ordered　to　move；　which　was　a　road　on　the　mountain　into　the　head　of　McLemore's　Cove；　through　Dougherty's　Gap。

The　battle　for　Chattanooga　would　never　have　been　fought　at　Chickamauga　had　not　the　safety　of　McCook's　corps　demanded　it。　　Could　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland　have　been　withdrawn　in　safety　to　Chattanooga　and　there　concentrated　behind　earthworks；　as　it　was　later；　while　Bragg　doubtless　would　have　made　his　attack　there；　yet　the　surroundings　would　have　been　far　more　favorable　for　our　army；　especially　as　the　troops　afterward　sent　might　have　reached　Rosecrans　in　time　to　have　defeated　Bragg；　as　he　was　later　at　the　battle　of　Missionary　Ridge。　But　the　reinforcements　that　were　hurried　from　all　points　AFTER　the　disaster；　by　the　officials　at　Washington　were　not　to　benefit　Rosecrans。

While　the　battle　of　the　19th　was　severe　at　times；　and　some　slight　advantages　were　gained　by　the　enemy；　still　nothing　had　been　accomplished　to　mark　that　day's　fighting　as　a　great；　distinctive　battle。　　The　delay　on　the　part　of　Negley　in　reporting　as　ordered；　to　Thomas　on　the　left；　placed　that　position　in　extreme　peril；　had　Polk　made　his　attack　as　ordered　at　day…dawn　on　the　20th。　　Fortunately；　Polk　slept　outside　of　his　lines　that　nightnot　as　he　was　accustomed　toand　was　not　awakened　as　early　as　he　would　have　been　had　he　remained　in　camp。　　For　this　reason　the　attack；　was　not　made　until　after　Beatty's　brigade　had　reached　Baird's　left。　　While　this　was　too　weak　to　successfully　resist　the　attack；　still　with　this　command　rallied　after　it　was　driven　back　and　aided　by　the　troops　sent　to　its　support；　Thomas　was　able　to　repulse　Breckinridge's　first　charge　of　the　morning。　　The　delay　from　six　o'clock　until　after　nine　was　of　great　service　to　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland。　　Negley's　delay　in　reporting　at　an　early　hour　with　his　entire　division　was　owing　to　Wood's　failure　to　relieve　him。　　Sheridan　had　at　an　earlier　hour　been　ordered　to　Negley's　position　on　his　front；　but　Thomas　representing　the　urgency　of　the　movement；　Crittenden　was　ordered　to　send　Wood；　who　was　only　a　short　distance　from　Negley。　　Wood；　on　receiving　his　orders　to　relieve　Negley；　simply　moved　forward　and　occupied　the　position　that　had　been　vacated　by　Negley's　reserve　brigade；　already　started　for　Thomas's　left。　　On　Rosecrans's　return　from　the　extreme　right；　he　found　that　Negley　had　not　yet　reported　to　Thomas；　although　more　than　an　hour　had　elapsed　since　he　was　so　ordered　and　then　discovered　that　Wood　had　failed　to　relieve　him　on　the　front。　Repeating　his　orders　in　such　plain　English　that　there　could　be　no　further　misapprehension　of　them；　Rosecrans　moved　Wood's　division　into　position；　relieved　Negley　at　once；　and　started　him　in　all　haste　to　Thomas。　　Negley　did　not　reach　the　left　until　after　ten　o'clock。　Rosecrans；　impatient　at　the　delay　that　occurred　in　the　execution　of　his　order；　expressed　himself　very　forcibly　to　Wood；　much　to　the　dissatisfaction　of　the　latter。　　After　seeing　Negley　was　at　last　en　route　to　Thomas；　Rosecrans　then　went　to　the　right　and　was　watching　the　movements　of　the　troops　when　the　word　reached　him　of　the　supposed　gap　to　the　right　of　Reynolds；　on　the　left　of　Wood。　　Rosecrans's　plan　of　battle　being　to　keep　his　line　well　closed　up　on　the　left；　he　directed　an　aid　to　send　Wood　an　order　to　close　up　on　Reynolds；　which　he　did　as　follows。


Headquarters　of　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland。

Brigadier…General　Wood；　Commanding　Division：

The　General　Commanding　directs　that　you　close　up　on　Reynolds　as　fast　as　possible；　and　support　him；

Respectfully；　etc。；

FRANK　S。　BOND；　Major　and　Aid…de…Camp。


This　order　was　written　by　an　officer　who　had　no　military　experience　prior　to　the　war；　and；　as　the　order　shows　on　its　face；　embraced　much　more　than　the　General　Commanding　intended　it　should。　　The　orderly　who　carried　this　order　to　Wood　reported　on　his　return　that　〃General　Wood　on　receipt　of　the　order　remarked　that　he　'was　glad　the　order　was　in　writing；　as　it　was　a　good　thing　to　have　for　future　reference。'　That　he　carefully　took　out　his　note…book；　safely　deposited　the　order　in　it；　and　then　proceeded　to　execute　it。〃　　Wood's　official　report　contains　the　order　written　out　in　full。　　He　says　that　it　was　eleven　o'clock　when　it　reached　him。　　〃General　McCook　was　with　me　when　I　received　it。　　I　informed　him　that　I　would　immediately　carry　it　into　execution；　and　suggested　to　him　that　he　should　close　up　his　command　rapidly　on　my　right；　to　prevent　the　occurrence　of　a　gap　in　the　line。　　He　said　he　would　do　so；　and　immediately　rode　away。〃

McCook　says；　in　reference　to　the　movement　of　Sheridan　to　the　aid　of　Thomas；　which　he　had　just　ordered；　〃Simultaneously　with　this　movement；　and　much　to　my　surprise；　Wood's　division　left　the　position　it　had　in　line　of　battle　on　Davis's　left；　marching　by　the　left　flank；　leaving　a　wide　gap　in　the　line。〃　　Wood　also　says　in　his　official　report　that　when　he　started　to　execute　the　order　he　met　Thomas；　and　told　him　of　his　order。　　He　says；　〃I　exhibited　my　order　to　him；　and　asked　him　whether　he　would　take　the　responsibility　of　changing　it。　　He　replied　he　would；　and　I　then　informed　him　that　I　would　move　my　command　to　the　support　of　General　Baird。〃　　The　first　mention　Thomas　makes　in