the army of the cumberland-第21章

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e　enemy　had　fled。　　Collecting　his　cavalry　he　moved　to　the　fords　of　Stone's　River；　in　readiness　to　cross；　and　on　the　5th；　preceding　Thomas；　they　entered　Murfreesboro。　　Zahm's　command　went　out　on　the　Shelbyville　pike　six　miles；　meeting　with　no　opposition。　　Stanley　with　the　rest　of　his　cavalry　marched　down　the　Manchester　pike；　encountering　the　enemy's　cavalry　strongly　posted　at　Lytle's　Creek　in　heavy　force。　　Fighting　here　until　sundown；　the　rebels　were　driven　from　one　cedar…brake　to　another　until　Spear's　brigade　came　up；　when　they　were　driven　from　their　last　stand　in　disorder。　　The　cavalry　returned　and　camped　at　Lytle's　Creek　to　recuperate；　after　nine　days　of　active　campaigning。　　During　this　time　the　saddles　were　only　taken　off　the　horses　to　groom　them；　and　were　immediately　replaced。

Bragg　in　his　retreat　left　in　his　hospitals　all　his　wounded　in　Murfreesboro。　　By　this　some　2；500　prisoners　fell　into　our　hands　to　be　cared　for。

Thus；　after　seven　days'　battle；　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland　rested　in　Murfreesboro　having　achieved　the　object　of　the　winter　campaign。　The　final　battle　for　Kentucky　had　been　fought　by　Bragg　and　lost。　Nashville；　too；　was　now　beyond　his　hopes；　and　for　the　great　victory　of　the　31st；　which　he　claimed；　Bragg　had　but　little　to　show。

In　the　heavy　skirmishing　prior　to　the　31st；　success　attended　every　movement　of　the　Federal　army。　　The　heavy　fighting　of　the　early　part　of　the　31st　was　all　in　Bragg's　favor　up　to　the　time　his　advance　was　checked　by　our　centre　and　the　new　line　on　the　right。　　From　that　time　to　the　occupation　of　Murfreesboro　every　movement　resulted　in　favor　of　the　army　under　Rosecrans；　and　the　retreat　of　Bragg　after　the　defeat　of　Breckinridge　gave　the　halo　of　victory　to　our　army　as　the　result　of　the　campaign。　　In　his　retreat　Bragg　admitted　that　he　had　gained　nothing　but　a　victory　barren　of　results；　at　the　cost　of　him　of　10；125　killed；　wounded；　and　missing；　9；000　of　whom　were　killed　and　wounded；　over　twenty　per　cent　of　his　command。　　Bragg's　field　return　of　December　10；　1862；　shows　an　effective　total　of　51；036；　composed　of　39；304　infantry；　10；070　cavalry；　and　1；662　artillery。　By　reason　of　Morgan　and　Forrest　being　absent　on　their　raids；　Bragg's　cavalry　was　reduced　to　5；638。　　This　gave　an　effective　force　of　46；604；　which　was　the　strength　of　the　army　with　which　Bragg　fought　the　battle。

Rosecrans's　force　on　the　battle…field　was：　　Infantry；　37；977；　artillery；　2；223；　cavalry；　3；200；　total；　43；400。　　His　loss　was：　killed；　1；553；　wounded；　7；245。　　The　enemy　captured　about　2；800　men。　Making　his　total　loss　about　twenty…five　per　cent。　of　his　force　in　action。　　Rosecrans　lost　twenty…eight　pieces　of　artillery　and　a　large　portion　of　his　wagon　train。　　Bragg　lost　three　pieces　of　artillery。

Why　did　Rosecrans's　plan　of　battle　miscarry　so　fatally　and　Bragg's　come　so　near　absolute　success？　　The　fault　was　not　the　plan　as　conceived　by　the　former。　　The　near　success　of　the　latter　proved　a　vindication　of　that。　　The　originator　of　the　plan　was　not　at　fault　personally；　for　at　no　time　during　the　battle　did　he　falter　or　prove　unequal　to　his　command。　　When　called　on　to　give　up　his　plan　of　the　offensive　and　assume　the　defensive　to　save　his　army；　the　wonderful　power　of　Rosecrans　as　a　general　over　troops　was　never　displayed　to　a　greater　advantage。　　With　the　blood　from　a　slight　wound　on　his　cheek；　in　a　light　blue　army　overcoat；　through　the　mud　and　rain　of　the　battle…field；　he　rode　along　the　line　inspiring　his　troops　with　the　confidence　he　felt　as　to　the　final　result。　　To　Rosecrans　there　was　but　one　outcome　to　the　battle　at　Stone's　River；　and　that　was　victory。　　When　some　of　his　general　officers　advised　retreat　to　Nashville；　not　for　an　instant　did　he　falter　in　his　determination　to　〃fight　or　die　right　here。〃　　The　demoralization　of　one　of　his　division　commanders　was　so　great；　that　on　Thursday　afternoon；　when　the　rebels　were　massing　on　Rosecrans's　right；　this　general；　commanding　a　division；　announced　to　his　brigade　commanders　that　in　the　event　of　the　anticipated　assault　resulting　disastrously；　he　proposed　to　take　his　division　and　cut　his　way　through　to　Nashville。　　To　his　troopsthe　greater　part　of　whom　had　never　seen　Rosecrans　under　the　enemy's　firewhen　on　the　return　from　the　cedars；　they　formed　anew　in　front　of　the　Nashville　pikeseeing　the　Commanding　General　of　the　army　riding　fearlessly　on　the　extreme　front；　in　the　heat　of　battle；　cool　and　collected；　giving　orders　and　encouraging　his　menhis　mere　presence　was　an　inspiration。　　His　personal　bravery　was　never　more　fully　shown　than　when　he　rode　down　to　the　〃Round　Forest〃　with　his　staff；　under　fire；　at　the　time　Garesche　was　killed　by　a　shell　that　only　missed　the　chief　by　a　few　inches。　　In　this　ride　Rosecrans　had　three　mounted　orderlies　shot　dead　while　following　him。　　When　the　entire　extent　of　McCook's　disaster　in　its　crushing　force　was　revealed　to　him；　he　felt　the　full　burden　of　his　responsibility；　and　rising　to　the　demands　of　the　hour　he　was　superb。　　Dashing　from　one　point　to　another；　quick　to　discern　danger　and　ready　to　meet　it；　shrinking　from　no　personal　exposure；　dispatching　his　staff　on　the　gallop；　hurrying　troops　into　position；　massing　the　artillery　and　forming　his　new　lines　on　grounds　of　his　own　choosing；　confident　of　ultimate　success；　and　showing　his　troops　that　he　had　all　confidence　in　them；　it　was　worth　months　of　ordinary　life…time　to　have　been　with　Rosecrans　when　by　his　own　unconquered　spirit　he　plucked　victory　from　defeat　and　glory　from　disaster。

But　if　the　plan　was　not　at　fault；　what　was？　　Rosecrans　started　from　Nashville　for　an　offensive　campaign；　and　before　his　plan　of　battle　had　met　the　test；　he　was　compelled　to　abandon　it；　and　assume　the　defensive。　　Where　was　the　fault　and　who　was　to　blame？　　The　fault　was　McCook's　defective　line；　and　in　part　Rosecrans　was　responsible　for　it。　　He　ought　never　to　have　trusted　the　formation　of　a　line　of　battle　so　important　to　the　safety　of　his　whole　army　to　McCook　alone；　and　he　certainly　knew　this。　　Rosecrans　gave　his　personal　attention　to　the　left；　but　he　should　at　least　have　ordered　the　change　his　quick　eye　had　detected　as　necessary　in　McCook's　line；　and　not　trusted　to　chance　and　McCook's　ability　to　withstand　the　attack　with　his　faulty　line。　　No　one　who　saw　him　at　Stone's　River　the　31st　of　December　will　say　aught　against　the　personal　bravery　and　courage　of　McCook　under　fire。　　All　that　he　could　do　to　aid　in　repairing　the　great　disaster　of　that　day　he　did　to　the　best　of　his　ability。　　He　stayed　with　Davis's　division　under　fire　as　long　as　it　held　together；　and　then　gave　personal　directions　to　Sheridan's　troops；　in　the　gallant　fight　they　made　against　overwhelming　odds。　As　Rosecrans　himself　says　in　his　official　report　of　McCook；　〃a　tried；　faithful；　and　loyal　soldier；　who　bravely　breasted　the　battle　at　Shiloh　and　Perryville；　and　as　bravely　on　the　bloody　field　of　Stone's　River。〃　　But　there　is　something　more　than　mere　physical　bravery　required　in　a　general　officer　in　command　of　as　large　a　body　of　troops　as　a　corps　d'armee。　　As　an　instructor　at　West　Point；　McCook　maintained　a　high　rank。　　As　a　brigade　and　division　commander　under　Buell；　there　was　none　his　superior　in　the　care　and　attention　he　gave　his　troops　on　the　march；　in　camp；　or　on　the　drill…ground。　His　division　at　Shiloh　as　it　marched　to　the　front　on　the　second　day　did　him　full　credit；　and　in　his　handling　of　it　on　that　field　he　did　credit　to　it　and　to　himself。　　What　McCook　lacked　was　the　ability　to　handle　large　bodies　of　troops　independently　of　a　superior　officer　to　give　him　commands。　　This　was　his　experience　at　Perryville；　and　it　was　repeated　at　Stone's　River。　　With　the　known　results　of　Perryville；　McCook　ought　never　to　have　been　placed　in　command　of　the　〃right　wing。〃　　Rosecrans　at　Stone's　River；　of　necessity　was　on　the　left；　and　being　there　he　should　have　had　a　general　in　command　of　the　right　with　greater　military　capacity　than　McCook。　　Rosecrans's　confidence　was　so　slight　in　his　commander　of　the　left　that　he　felt　his　own　presence　was　needed　there　in　the　movement　of　the　troops　in　that　part　of　the　plan　of　battle。

Rosecrans　in　his　report　repeatedly　speaks　of　〃the　faulty　line　of　McCook's　formation　on　the　right。〃　　But　he　knew　this　on　the　30th；　and　told　McCook　that　it　was　improperly　placed。　　McCook　did　not　think　so。　　Rosecrans　told　him　that　it　faced　too　much　to　the　east　and　not　enough　to　the　south；　that　it　was　too　weak　and　long；　and　was　liable　to　be　flanked。　　Knowing　all　this　and　knowing　McCook's　pride　of　opinion；　for　McCook　told　him　he　〃did　not　see　how　he　could　make　a　better　line；〃　or　a　〃better　disposition　of　my　troops；〃　it　was　the　plain　duty　of　Rosecrans　to　reform　the　line；　to　conform　to　what　it　should　be　in　his　judgment。　　The　order　to　McCook　to　build　camp　fires　for　a　mile　beyond　his　right　was　another　factor　that　brought　about　the　combination　that　broke　the　line　on　the　right。　Rosecrans　was　correct　in　his　conception　of　this；　in　order　to　mislead　Bragg　and　cause　him　to　strengthen　his　left　at　the　expense　of　his　right。　　Had　Bragg　awaited　Rosecrans's　attack；　this　building　of　fires　was　correctif　it　took　troops　away　from　the　right　to　reinforce　the　left；　but　this　it　did　not　do。　　Bragg　moved　McCown　and　Cleburne's　divisions　from　his　right　to　his　left　on　Tuesday；　but　after　this　Bragg　brought　none　of　his　forces　across　the　river　until　Wednesday　afternoon。　　The　building　of　the　fires　caused　Bragg　to　prolong　his　lines；　lengthening　them　to　the　extent　that　before　Hardee　struck　Kirk's　and　Willich's　brigades；　he　thought　our　line　extended　a　division　front　to　their　right。　　Finding　this　not　to　be　the　case；　he　whirled　his　left　with　all　the　force　of　double　numbers　on　to　the　right　of　McCook。　　The　rebels　then　swinging　around　found　themselves　in　the　rear　of　Johnson's　division　before　they　struck　any　troops　on　their　front。　　Of　course　it　is　mere　guess…work　to　say　just　what　the　outcome　might　have　been　　of　any　other　formation　of　the　line；　but　it　is　safe　to　say　that　had　the　left　instead　of　the　centre　of　Hardee　struck　the　right　of　McCook；　there　would　have　been　a　better　chance　for　the　troops　on　the　extreme　right　of　his　line　to　have　shown　the　spirit　that　was　in　them；　before　they　were　overpowered　by　mere　superiority　of　numbers。

Then　there　were　some　minor　mistakes　that　aided　in　a　great　degree　the　bringing　about　of　that　mishap　which　imperiled　the　safety　of　the　entire　army。　　Even　granting　that　Johnson　was　not　in　any　way　responsible　for　the　position　occupied　by　his　troops　on　the　front　line　of　battle；　still　it　is　hard　to　find　any　excuse　or　even　explanation　for　a　general　officer　in　command　of　a　division　who；　knowing　the　enemy　were　in　force　on　his　front；　and　intending　to　attack　his　command　at　daylight　the　next　morning；　would　place　his　headquarters　a　mile　and　a　half　in　the　rear。　　This　too；　when　he　knew　that　the　post　of　honor　and　responsibility　for　the　safety　of　the　entire　army　had　been　committed　to　his　keeping。　　What　then　shall　be　said　for　him　when　it　appears　by　the　report　of　the　commanding　officer　of　his　reserve　brigade　that　when　it　returned　from　the　support　of　a　cavalry　reconnoissance；　the　general　commanding　the　division　ordered　this　brigade；　on　the　eve　of　the　battle；　to　take　position　in　the　woods；　〃near　the　headquarters　of　the　division；〃　instead　of　in　supporting　distance　of　the　front　line？　　He　could　not　have　thought　that　the　division　headquarters　needed　th