utilitarianism-第7章

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other　objects　than　those　which；　by　a　supposed　mysterious　law；　are　found　in　our　present　experience　to　excite　it。　Its　binding　force；　however；　consists　in　the　existence　of　a　mass　of　feeling　which　must　be　broken　through　in　order　to　do　what　violates　our　standard　of　right；　and　which；　if　we　do　nevertheless　violate　that　standard；　will　probably　have　to　be　encountered　afterwards　in　the　form　of　remorse。　Whatever　theory　we　have　of　the　nature　or　origin　of　conscience；　this　is　what　essentially　constitutes　it。　　　The　ultimate　sanction；　therefore；　of　all　morality　（external　motives　apart）　being　a　subjective　feeling　in　our　own　minds；　I　see　nothing　embarrassing　to　those　whose　standard　is　utility；　in　the　question；　what　is　the　sanction　of　that　particular　standard？　We　may　answer；　the　same　as　of　all　other　moral　standards…　the　conscientious　feelings　of　mankind。　Undoubtedly　this　sanction　has　no　binding　efficacy　on　those　who　do　not　possess　the　feelings　it　appeals　to；　but　neither　will　these　persons　be　more　obedient　to　any　other　moral　principle　than　to　the　utilitarian　one。　On　them　morality　of　any　kind　has　no　hold　but　through　the　external　sanctions。　Meanwhile　the　feelings　exist；　a　fact　in　human　nature；　the　reality　of　which；　and　the　great　power　with　which　they　are　capable　of　acting　on　those　in　whom　they　have　been　duly　cultivated；　are　proved　by　experience。　No　reason　has　ever　been　shown　why　they　may　not　be　cultivated　to　as　great　intensity　in　connection　with　the　utilitarian；　as　with　any　other　rule　of　morals。　　　There　is；　I　am　aware；　a　disposition　to　believe　that　a　person　who　sees　in　moral　obligation　a　transcendental　fact；　an　objective　reality　belonging　to　the　province　of　〃Things　in　themselves；〃　is　likely　to　be　more　obedient　to　it　than　one　who　believes　it　to　be　entirely　subjective；　having　its　seat　in　human　consciousness　only。　But　whatever　a　person's　opinion　may　be　on　this　point　of　Ontology；　the　force　he　is　really　urged　by　is　his　own　subjective　feeling；　and　is　exactly　measured　by　its　strength。　No　one's　belief　that　duty　is　an　objective　reality　is　stronger　than　the　belief　that　God　is　so；　yet　the　belief　in　God；　apart　from　the　expectation　of　actual　reward　and　punishment；　only　operates　on　conduct　through；　and　in　proportion　to；　the　subjective　religious　feeling。　The　sanction；　so　far　as　it　is　disinterested；　is　always　in　the　mind　itself；　and　the　notion　therefore　of　the　transcendental　moralists　must　be；　that　this　sanction　will　not　exist　in　the　mind　unless　it　is　believed　to　have　its　root　out　of　the　mind；　and　that　if　a　person　is　able　to　say　to　himself；　This　which　is　restraining　me；　and　which　is　called　my　conscience；　is　only　a　feeling　in　my　own　mind；　he　may　possibly　draw　the　conclusion　that　when　the　feeling　ceases　the　obligation　ceases；　and　that　if　he　find　the　feeling　inconvenient；　he　may　disregard　it；　and　endeavour　to　get　rid　of　it。　But　is　this　danger　confined　to　the　utilitarian　morality？　Does　the　belief　that　moral　obligation　has　its　seat　outside　the　mind　make　the　feeling　of　it　too　strong　to　be　got　rid　of？　The　fact　is　so　far　otherwise；　that　all　moralists　admit　and　lament　the　ease　with　which；　in　the　generality　of　minds；　conscience　can　be　silenced　or　stifled。　The　question；　Need　I　obey　my　conscience？　is　quite　as　often　put　to　themselves　by　persons　who　never　heard　of　the　principle　of　utility；　as　by　its　adherents。　Those　whose　conscientious　feelings　are　so　weak　as　to　allow　of　their　asking　this　question；　if　they　answer　it　affirmatively；　will　not　do　so　because　they　believe　in　the　transcendental　theory；　but　because　of　the　external　sanctions。　　　It　is　not　necessary；　for　the　present　purpose；　to　decide　whether　the　feeling　of　duty　is　innate　or　implanted。　Assuming　it　to　be　innate；　it　is　an　open　question　to　what　objects　it　naturally　attaches　itself；　for　the　philosophic　supporters　of　that　theory　are　now　agreed　that　the　intuitive　perception　is　of　principles　of　morality　and　not　of　the　details。　If　there　be　anything　innate　in　the　matter；　I　see　no　reason　why　the　feeling　which　is　innate　should　not　be　that　of　regard　to　the　pleasures　and　pains　of　others。　If　there　is　any　principle　of　morals　which　is　intuitively　obligatory；　I　should　say　it　must　be　that。　If　so；　the　intuitive　ethics　would　coincide　with　the　utilitarian；　and　there　would　be　no　further　quarrel　between　them。　Even　as　it　is；　the　intuitive　moralists；　though　they　believe　that　there　are　other　intuitive　moral　obligations；　do　already　believe　this　to　one；　for　they　unanimously　hold　that　a　large　portion　of　morality　turns　upon　the　consideration　due　to　the　interests　of　our　fellow…creatures。　Therefore；　if　the　belief　in　the　transcendental　origin　of　moral　obligation　gives　any　additional　efficacy　to　the　internal　sanction；　it　appears　to　me　that　the　utilitarian　principle　has　already　the　benefit　of　it。　　　On　the　other　hand；　if；　as　is　my　own　belief；　the　moral　feelings　are　not　innate；　but　acquired；　they　are　not　for　that　reason　the　less　natural。　It　is　natural　to　man　to　speak；　to　reason；　to　build　cities；　to　cultivate　the　ground；　though　these　are　acquired　faculties。　The　moral　feelings　are　not　indeed　a　part　of　our　nature；　in　the　sense　of　being　in　any　perceptible　degree　present　in　all　of　us；　but　this；　unhappily；　is　a　fact　admitted　by　those　who　believe　the　most　strenuously　in　their　transcendental　origin。　Like　the　other　acquired　capacities　above　referred　to；　the　moral　faculty；　if　not　a　part　of　our　nature；　is　a　natural　outgrowth　from　it；　capable；　like　them；　in　a　certain　small　degree；　of　springing　up　spontaneously；　and　susceptible　of　being　brought　by　cultivation　to　a　high　degree　of　development。　Unhappily　it　is　also　susceptible；　by　a　sufficient　use　of　the　external　sanctions　and　of　the　force　of　early　impressions；　of　being　cultivated　in　almost　any　direction：　so　that　there　is　hardly　anything　so　absurd　or　so　mischievous　that　it　may　not；　by　means　of　these　influences；　be　made　to　act　on　the　human　mind　with　all　the　authority　of　conscience。　To　doubt　that　the　same　potency　might　be　given　by　the　same　means　to　the　principle　of　utility；　even　if　it　had　no　foundation　in　human　nature；　would　be　flying　in　the　face　of　all　experience。　　　But　moral　associations　which　are　wholly　of　artificial　creation；　when　intellectual　culture　goes　on；　yield　by　degrees　to　the　dissolving　force　of　analysis：　and　if　the　feeling　of　duty；　when　associated　with　utility；　would　appear　equally　arbitrary；　if　there　were　no　leading　department　of　our　nature；　no　powerful　class　of　sentiments；　with　which　that　association　would　harmonise；　which　would　make　us　feel　it　congenial；　and　incline　us　not　only　to　foster　it　in　others　（for　which　we　have　abundant　interested　motives）；　but　also　to　cherish　it　in　ourselves；　if　there　were　not；　in　short；　a　natural　basis　of　sentiment　for　utilitarian　morality；　it　might　well　happen　that　this　association　also；　even　after　it　had　been　implanted　by　education；　might　be　analysed　away。　　　But　there　is　this　basis　of　powerful　natural　sentiment；　and　this　it　is　which；　when　once　the　general　happiness　is　recognised　as　the　ethical　standard；　will　constitute　the　strength　of　the　utilitarian　morality。　This　firm　foundation　is　that　of　the　social　feelings　of　mankind；　the　desire　to　be　in　unity　with　our　fellow　creatures；　which　is　already　a　powerful　principle　in　human　nature；　and　happily　one　of　those　which　tend　to　become　stronger；　even　without　express　inculcation；　from　the　influences　of　advancing　civilisation。　The　social　state　is　at　once　so　natural；　so　necessary；　and　so　habitual　to　man；　that；　except　in　some　unusual　circumstances　or　by　an　effort　of　voluntary　abstraction；　he　never　conceives　himself　otherwise　than　as　a　member　of　a　body；　and　this　association　is　riveted　more　and　more；　as　mankind　are　further　removed　from　the　state　of　savage　independence。　Any　condition；　therefore；　which　is　essential　to　a　state　of　society；　becomes　more　and　more　an　inseparable　part　of　every　person's　conception　of　the　state　of　things　which　he　is　born　into；　and　which　is　the　destiny　of　a　human　being。　　　Now；　society　between　human　beings；　except　in　the　relation　of　master　and　slave；　is　manifestly　impossible　on　any　other　footing　than　that　the　interests　of　all　are　to　be　consulted。　Society　between　equals　can　only　exist　on　the　understanding　that　the　interests　of　all　are　to　be　regarded　equally。　And　since　in　all　states　of　civilisation；　every　person；　except　an　absolute　monarch；　has　equals；　every　one　is　obliged　to　live　on　these　terms　with　somebody；　and　in　every　age　some　advance　is　made　towards　a　state　in　which　it　will　be　impossible　to　live　permanently　on　other　terms　with　anybody。　In　this　way　people　grow　up　unable　to　conceive　as　possible　to　them　a　state　of　total　disregard　of　other　people's　interests。　They　are　under　a　necessity　of　conceiving　themselves　as　at　least　abstaining　from　all　the　grosser　injuries；　and　（if　only　for　their　own　protection）　living　in　a　state　of　constant　protest　against　them。　They　are　also　familiar　with　the　fact　of　co…operating　with　others　and　proposing　to　themselves　a　collective；　not　an　individual　interest　as　the　aim　（at　least　for　the　time　being）　of　their　actions。　So　long　as　they　are　co…operating；　their　ends　are　identified　with　those　of　others；　there　is　at　least　a　temporary　feeling　that　the　interests　of　others　are　their　own　interests。　Not　only　does　all　strengthening　of　social　ties；　and　all　healthy　growth　of　society；　give　to　each　individual　a　stronger　personal　interest　in　practically　consulting　the　welfare　of　others；　it　also　leads　him　to　identify　his　feelings　more　and　more　with　their　good；　or　at　least　with　an　even　greater　degree　of　practical　consideration　for　it。　He　comes；　as　though　instinctively；　to　be　conscious　of　himself　as　a　being　who　of　course　pays　regard　to　others。　The　good　of　others　becomes　to　him　a　thing　naturally　and　necessarily　to　be　attended　to；　like　any　of　the　physical　conditions　of　our　existence。　Now；　whatever　amount　of　this　feeling　a　person　has；　he　is　urged　by　the　strongest　motives　both　of　interest　and　of　sympathy　to　demonstrate　it；　and　to　the　utmost　of　his　power　encourage　it　in　others；　and　even　if　he　has　none　of　it　himself；　he　is　as　greatly　interested　as　any　one　else　that　others　should　have　it。　Consequently　the　smallest　germs　of　the　feeling　are　laid　hold　of　and　nourished　by　the　contagion　of　sympathy　and　the　influences　of　education；　and　a　complete　web　of　corroborative　association　is　woven　round　it；　by　the　powerful　agency　of　the　external　sanctions。　　　This　mode　of　conceiving　ourselves　and　human　life；　as　civilisation　goes　on；　is　felt　to　be　more　and　more　natural。　Every　step　in　political　improvement　renders　it　more　so；　by　removing　the　sources　of　opposition　of　interest；　and　levelling　those　inequalities　of　legal　privilege　between　individuals　or　classes；　owing　to　which　there　are　large　portions　of　mankind　whose　happiness　it　is　still　practicable　to　disregard。　In　an　improving　state　of　the　human　mind；　the　influences　are　constantly　on　the　increase；　which　tend　to　generate　in　each　individual　a　feeling　of　unity　with　all　the　rest；　which；　if　perfect；　would　make　him　never　think　of；　or　desire；　any　beneficial　condition　for　himself；　in　the　benefits　of　which　they　are　not　included。　If　we　now　suppose　this　feeling　of　unity　to　be　taught　as　a　religion；　and　the　whole　force　of　education；　of　institutions；　and　of　opinion；　directed；　as　it　once　was　in　the　case　of　religion；　to　make　every　person　grow　up　from　infancy　surrounded　on　all　sides　both　by　the　profession　and　the　practice　of　it；　I　thin