a discourse on method-第4章

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t　with　absolute　perfection；　at　least　with　the　greatest　attainable　by　me：　besides；　I　was　conscious　that　by　its　use　my　mind　was　becoming　gradually　habituated　to　clearer　and　more　distinct　conceptions　of　its　objects；　and　I　hoped　also；　from　not　having　restricted　this　method　to　any　particular　matter；　to　apply　it　to　the　difficulties　of　the　other　sciences；　with　not　less　success　than　to　those　of　algebra。　　I　should　not；　however；　on　this　account　have　ventured　at　once　on　the　examination　of　all　the　difficulties　of　the　sciences　which　presented　themselves　to　me；　for　this　would　have　been　contrary　to　the　order　prescribed　in　the　method；　but　observing　that　the　knowledge　of　such　is　dependent　on　principles　borrowed　from　philosophy；　in　which　I　found　nothing　certain；　I　thought　it　necessary　first　of　all　to　endeavor　to　establish　its　principles。　　。And　because　I　observed；　besides；　that　an　inquiry　of　this　kind　was　of　all　others　of　the　greatest　moment；　and　one　in　which　precipitancy　and　anticipation　in　judgment　were　most　to　be　dreaded；　I　thought　that　I　ought　not　to　approach　it　till　I　had　reached　a　more　mature　age　（being　at　that　time　but　twenty…three）；　and　had　first　of　all　employed　much　of　my　time　in　preparation　for　the　work；　as　well　by　eradicating　from　my　mind　all　the　erroneous　opinions　I　had　up　to　that　moment　accepted；　as　by　amassing　variety　of　experience　to　afford　materials　for　my　reasonings；　and　by　continually　exercising　myself　in　my　chosen　method　with　a　view　to　increased　skill　in　its　application。



PART　III

And　finally；　as　it　is　not　enough；　before　commencing　to　rebuild　the　house　in　which　we　live；　that　it　be　pulled　down；　and　materials　and　builders　provided；　or　that　we　engage　in　the　work　ourselves；　according　to　a　plan　which　we　have　beforehand　carefully　drawn　out；　but　as　it　is　likewise　necessary　that　we　be　furnished　with　some　other　house　in　which　we　may　live　commodiously　during　the　operations；　so　that　I　might　not　remain　irresolute　in　my　actions；　while　my　reason　compelled　me　to　suspend　my　judgement；　and　that　I　might　not　be　prevented　from　living　thenceforward　in　the　greatest　possible　felicity；　I　formed　a　provisory　code　of　morals；　composed　of　three　or　four　maxims；　with　which　I　am　desirous　to　make　you　acquainted。

The　first　was　to　obey　the　laws　and　customs　of　my　country；　adhering　firmly　to　the　faith　in　which；　by　the　grace　of　God；　I　had　been　educated　from　my　childhood　and　regulating　my　conduct　in　every　other　matter　according　to　the　most　moderate　opinions；　and　the　farthest　removed　from　extremes；　which　should　happen　to　be　adopted　in　practice　with　general　consent　of　the　most　judicious　of　those　among　whom　I　might　be　living。　　For　as　I　had　from　that　time　begun　to　hold　my　own　opinions　for　nought　because　I　wished　to　subject　them　all　to　examination；　I　was　convinced　that　I　could　not　do　better　than　follow　in　the　meantime　the　opinions　of　the　most　judicious；　and　although　there　are　some　perhaps　among　the　Persians　and　Chinese　as　judicious　as　among　ourselves；　expediency　seemed　to　dictate　that　I　should　regulate　my　practice　conformably　to　the　opinions　of　those　with　whom　I　should　have　to　live；　and　it　appeared　to　me　that；　in　order　to　ascertain　the　real　opinions　of　such；　I　ought　rather　to　take　cognizance　of　what　they　practised　than　of　what　they　said；　not　only　because；　in　the　corruption　of　our　manners；　there　are　few　disposed　to　speak　exactly　as　they　believe；　but　also　because　very　many　are　not　aware　of　what　it　is　that　they　really　believe；　for；　as　the　act　of　mind　by　which　a　thing　is　believed　is　different　from　that　by　which　we　know　that　we　believe　it；　the　one　act　is　often　found　without　the　other。　Also；　amid　many　opinions　held　in　equal　repute；　I　chose　always　the　most　moderate；　as　much　for　the　reason　that　these　are　always　the　most　convenient　for　practice；　and　probably　the　best　（for　all　excess　is　generally　vicious）；　as　that；　in　the　event　of　my　falling　into　error；　I　might　be　at　less　distance　from　the　truth　than　if；　having　chosen　one　of　the　extremes；　it　should　turn　out　to　be　the　other　which　I　ought　to　have　adopted。　　And　I　placed　in　the　class　of　extremes　especially　all　promises　by　which　somewhat　of　our　freedom　is　abridged；　not　that　I　disapproved　of　the　laws　which；　to　provide　against　the　instability　of　men　of　feeble　resolution；　when　what　is　sought　to　be　accomplished　is　some　good；　permit　engagements　by　vows　and　contracts　binding　the　parties　to　persevere　in　it；　or　even；　for　the　security　of　commerce；　sanction　similar　engagements　where　the　purpose　sought　to　be　realized　is　indifferent：　　but　because　I　did　not　find　anything　on　earth　which　was　wholly　superior　to　change；　and　because；　for　myself　in　particular；　I　hoped　gradually　to　perfect　my　judgments；　and　not　to　suffer　them　to　deteriorate；　I　would　have　deemed　it　a　grave　sin　against　good　sense；　if；　for　the　reason　that　I　approved　of　something　at　a　particular　time；　I　therefore　bound　myself　to　hold　it　for　good　at　a　subsequent　time；　when　perhaps　it　had　ceased　to　be　so；　or　I　had　ceased　to　esteem　it　such。

My　second　maxim　was　to　be　as　firm　and　resolute　in　my　actions　as　I　was　able；　and　not　to　adhere　less　steadfastly　to　the　most　doubtful　opinions；　when　once　adopted；　than　if　they　had　been　highly　certain；　imitating　in　this　the　example　of　travelers　who；　when　they　have　lost　their　way　in　a　forest；　ought　not　to　wander　from　side　to　side；　far　less　remain　in　one　place；　but　proceed　constantly　towards　the　same　side　in　as　straight　a　line　as　possible；　without　changing　their　direction　for　slight　reasons；　although　perhaps　it　might　be　chance　alone　which　at　first　determined　the　selection；　for　in　this　way；　if　they　do　not　exactly　reach　the　point　they　desire；　they　will　come　at　least　in　the　end　to　some　place　that　will　probably　be　preferable　to　the　middle　of　a　forest。　　In　the　same　way；　since　in　action　it　frequently　happens　that　no　delay　is　permissible；　it　is　very　certain　that；　when　it　is　not　in　our　power　to　determine　what　is　true；　we　ought　to　act　according　to　what　is　most　probable；　and　even　although　we　should　not　remark　a　greater　probability　in　one　opinion　than　in　another；　we　ought　notwithstanding　to　choose　one　or　the　other；　and　afterwards　consider　it；　in　so　far　as　it　relates　to　practice；　as　no　longer　dubious；　but　manifestly　true　and　certain；　　since　the　reason　by　which　our　choice　has　been　determined　　is　itself　possessed　of　these　qualities。　　This　principle　was　sufficient　thenceforward　to　rid　me　of　all　those　repentings　and　pangs　of　remorse　that　usually　disturb　the　consciences　of　such　feeble　and　uncertain　minds　as；　destitute　of　any　clear　and　determinate　principle　of　choice；　allow　themselves　one　day　to　adopt　a　course　of　action　as　the　best；　which　they　abandon　the　next；　as　the　opposite。

My　third　maxim　was　to　endeavor　always　to　conquer　myself　rather　than　fortune；　and　change　my　desires　rather　than　the　order　of　the　world；　and　in　general；　accustom　　myself　to　the　persuasion　that；　except　our　own　thoughts；　there　is　nothing　absolutely　in　our　power；　so　that　when　we　have　done　our　best　in　things　external　to　us；　all　wherein　we　fail　of　success　is　to　be　held；　as　regards　us；　absolutely　impossible：　　and　this　single　principle　seemed　to　me　sufficient　to　prevent　me　from　desiring　for　the　future　anything　which　I　could　not　obtain；　and　thus　render　me　contented；　for　since　our　will　naturally　seeks　those　objects　alone　which　the　understanding　represents　as　in　some　way　possible　of　attainment；　it　is　plain；　that　if　we　consider　all　external　goods　as　equally　beyond　our　power；　we　shall　no　more　regret　the　absence　of　such　goods　as　seem　due　to　our　birth；　when　deprived　of　them　without　any　fault　of　ours；　　than　our　not　possessing　the　kingdoms　of　China　or　Mexico；　and　thus　making；　so　to　speak；　a　virtue　of　necessity；　we　shall　no　more　desire　health　in　disease；　or　freedom　in　imprisonment；　than　we　now　do　bodies　incorruptible　as　diamonds；　or　the　wings　of　birds　to　fly　with。　　But　I　confess　there　is　need　of　prolonged　discipline　and　frequently　repeated　meditation　to　accustom　the　mind　to　view　all　objects　in　this　light；　and　I　believe　that　in　this　chiefly　consisted　the　secret　of　the　power　of　such　philosophers　as　in　former　times　were　enabled　to　rise　superior　to　the　influence　of　fortune；　and；　amid　suffering　and　poverty；　enjoy　a　happiness　which　their　gods　might　have　envied。　　For；　occupied　incessantly　with　the　consideration　of　the　limits　prescribed　to　their　power　by　nature；　they　became　so　entirely　convinced　that　nothing　was　at　their　disposal　except　their　own　thoughts；　that　this　conviction　was　of　itself　sufficient　to　prevent　their　entertaining　any　desire　of　other　objects；　and　over　their　thoughts　they　acquired　a　sway　so　absolute；　that　they　had　some　ground　on　this　account　for　esteeming　themselves　more　rich　and　more　powerful；　more　free　and　more　happy；　than　other　men　who；　whatever　be　the　favors　heaped　on　them　by　nature　and　fortune；　if　destitute　of　this　philosophy；　can　never　command　the　realization　of　all　their　desires。

In　fine；　to　conclude　this　code　of　morals；　I　thought　of　reviewing　the　different　occupations　of　men　in　this　life；　with　the　view　of　making　choice　of　the　best。　　And；　without　wishing　to　offer　any　remarks　on　the　employments　of　others；　I　may　state　that　it　was　my　conviction　that　I　could　not　do　better　than　continue　in　that　in　which　I　was　engaged；　viz。；　in　devoting　my　whole　life　to　the　culture　of　my　reason；　and　in　making　the　greatest　progress　I　was　able　in　the　knowledge　of　truth；　on　the　principles　of　the　method　which　I　had　prescribed　to　myself。　　This　method；　from　the　time　I　had　begun　to　apply　it；　had　been　to　me　the　source　of　satisfaction　so　intense　as　to　lead　me　to；　believe　that　more　perfect　or　more　innocent　could　not　be　enjoyed　in　this　life；　and　as　by　its　means　I　daily　discovered　truths　that　appeared　to　me　of　some　importance；　and　of　which　other　men　were　generally　ignorant；　the　gratification　thence　arising　so　occupied　my　mind　that　I　was　wholly　indifferent　to　every　other　object。　　Besides；　the　three　preceding　maxims　were　founded　singly　on　the　design　of　continuing　the　work　of　self…　instruction。　　For　since　God　has　endowed　each　of　us　with　some　light　of　reason　by　which　to　distinguish　truth　from　error；　I　could　not　have　believed　that　I　ought　for　a　single　moment　to　rest　satisfied　with　the　opinions　of　another；　unless　I　had　resolved　to　exercise　my　own　judgment　in　examining　these　whenever　I　should　be　duly　qualified　for　the　task。　　Nor　could　I　have　proceeded　on　such　opinions　without　scruple；　had　I　supposed　that　I　should　thereby　forfeit　any　advantage　for　attaining　still　more　accurate；　should　such　exist。　　And；　in　fine；　I　could　not　have　restrained　my　desires；　nor　remained　satisfied　had　I　not　followed　a　path　in　which　I　thought　myself　certain　of　attaining　all　the　knowledge　to　the　acquisition　of　which　I　was　competent；　as　well　as　the　largest　amount　of　what　is　truly　good　which　I　could　ever　hope　to　secure　Inasmuch　as　we　neither　seek　nor　shun　any　object　except　in　so　far　as　our　understanding　represents　it　as　good　or　bad；　all　that　is　necessary　to　right　action　is　right　judgment；　and　to　the　best　action　the　most　correct　judgment；　that　is；　to　the　acquisition　of　all　the　virtues　with　all　else　that　is　truly　valuable　and　within　our　reach；　and　the　assurance　of　such　an　acquisition　cannot　fail　to　render　us　contented。

Having　thus　provided　myself　with　these　maxims；　and　having　placed　them　in　reserve　along　with　the　truths　of　　faith；　which　have　ever　occupied　the　first　place　in　my　　b