science of logic-第5章

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before　they　are　employed。　Ignorance　in　this　matter　reaches　incredible　lengths；　it　is　guilty　of；　the
fundamental　misunderstanding；　the　uncouth　and　uneducated　behaviour　of　taking　a　category　which
is　under　consideration　for　something　other　than　the　category　itself。　This　ignorance　is　the　less
justifiable　because　this　'something　other'　consists　of　determinate　thoughts　and　concepts；　and　in　a
system　of　logic　these　other　categories　must　likewise　have　been　assigned　their　own　place　and　must
themselves　have　been　subjected　to　critical　examination　within　the　system。　This　ignorance　is　most
obvious　in　the　great　majority　of　the　objections　and　attacks　on　the　first　Notions　of　logic；　being　and
nothing；　and　becoming　which；　itself　a　simple　determination…the　simplest　analysis　shows　it　to　be
so…contains　the　two　other　determinations　as　moments。　Thoroughness　seems　to　require　that　the
beginning；　as　the　foundation　on　which　everything　is　built；　should　be　examined　before　anything　else；
in　fact　that　we　should　not　go　any　further　until　it　has　been　firmly　established　and　if；　on　the　other
hand；　it　is　not；　that　we　should　reject　all　that　follows。

This　thoroughness　at　the　same　time　has　the　advantage　of　guaranteeing　that　the　labour　of　thinking
shall　be　reduced　to　a　minimum；　it　has　before　it；　enclosed　in　this　germ；　the　entire　development　

This　restriction　to　what　is　simple　gives　scope　for　the　free　play　of　caprice　which　does　not　want　to
remain　simple　…but　brings　in　Its　own　reflections　on　the　subject　matter。　Having　good　right　to　occupy
itself　at　first　only　with　the　principle　and　in　doing　so　not　to　concern　itself　with　what　lies　beyond　it；
this　thoroughness　actually　proceeds　to　do　the　opposite　of　this；　for　it　does　bring　in　what　lies
beyond；　that　is；　categories　other　than　those　which　constitute　the　principle　itself；　other
presuppositions　and　prejudices。　Such　presuppositions　as　that　infinite　is　different　from　finitude；　that
content　is　other　than　form；　that　the　inner　is　other　than　the　outer；　also　that　mediation　is　no
immediacy　（as　if　anyone　did　not　know　such　things）；　are　brought　forward　by　way　of　information
and　narrated　and　asserted　rathe　than　proved。　But　there　is　something　stupid…I　can　find　no　other

word　for　it　—　about　this　didactic　behaviour；　technically　it　is　unjustifiable　simply　to　presuppose　and
straightway　assume　such　propositions；　and；　still　more；　it　reveals　ignorance　of　the　fact　that　it　is　the
requirement　and　the　business　of　logical　thinking　to　enquire　into　just　this；　whether　such　a　finite
without　infinity　is　something　true；　or　whether　such　an　abstract　infinity；　also　a　content　without　form
and　a　form　without　content；　an　inner　by　itself　which　has　no　outer　expression；　an　externality　without
an　inwardness；　whether　any　of　these　is　something；　true　or　something　actual。　But　this　education
and　discipline　of　thinking　by　which　it　acquires　plasticity　and　by　which　the　impatience　of　casual
reflection　is　overcome；　is　procured　solely　by　going　further；　by　study　and　by　carrying　out　to　its
conclusion　the　entire　development。

Anyone　who　labours　at　presenting　anew　an　independent　structure　of　philosophical　science　may；
when　referring　to　the　Platonic　exposition；　be　reminded　of　the　story　that　Plato　revised　his　Republic
seven　times　over。　The　remembrance　of　this；　the　comparison；　so　far　as　such　may　seem　to　be
implied　in　it；　should　only　urge　one　all　the　more　to　wish　that　for　a　work　which；　as　belonging　to　the
modern　world；　is　confronted　by　a　profounder　principle；　a　more　difficult　subject　matter　and　a
material　richer　in　compass；　leisure　had　been　afforded　to　revise　it　seven　and　seventy　times。
However；　the　author；　in　face　of　the　magnitude　of　the　task；　has　had　to　content　himself　with　what　it
was　possible　to　achieve　in　circumstances　of　external　necessity；　of　the　inevitable　distractions　caused
by　the　magnitude　and　many…sidedness　of　contemporary　affairs；　even　under　the　doubt　whether　the
noisy　clamour　of　current　affairs　and　the　deafening　chatter　of　a　conceit　which　prides　itself　on
confining　itself　to　such　matters　leave　any　room　for　participation　in　the　passionless　calm　of　a
knowledge　which　is　in　the　element　of　pure　thought　alone。

Berlin；　November　7；　1831　




Introduction

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　General　Notion　of　Logic

In　no　science　is　the　need　to　begin　with　the　subject　matter　itself；　without　preliminary　reflections；　felt
more　strongly　than　in　the　science　of　logic。　In　every　other　science　the　subject　matter　and　the
scientific　method　are　distinguished　from　each　other；　also　the　content　does　not　make　an　absolute
beginning　but　is　dependent　on　other　concepts　and　is　connected　on　all　sides　with　other　material。
These　other　sciences　are；　therefore；　permitted　to　speak　of　their　ground　and　its　context　and　also　of
their　method；　only　as　premises　taken　for　granted　which；　as　forms　of　definitions　and　such…like
presupposed　as　familiar　and　accepted；　are　to　be　applied　straight…way；　and　also　to　employ　the
usual　kind　of　reasoning　for　the　establishment　of　their　general　concepts　and　fundamental
determinations。

Logic　on　the　contrary；　cannot　presuppose　any　of　these　forms　of　reflection　and　laws　of　thinking；　for
these　constitute　part　of　its　own　content　and　have　first　to　be　established　within　the　science。　But　not
only　the　account　of　scientific　method；　but　even　the　Notion　itself　of　the　science　as　such　belongs　to
its　content；　and　in　fact　constitutes　its　final　result；　what　logic　is　cannot　be　stated　beforehand；　rather
does　this　knowledge　of　what　it　is　first　emerge　as　the　final　outcome　and　consummation　of　the　whole
exposition。　Similarly；　it　is　essentially　within　the　science　that　the　subject　matter　of　logic；　namely；
thinking　or　more　specifically　comprehensive　thinking　is　considered；　the　Notion　of　logic　has　its
genesis　in　the　course　of　exposition　and　cannot　therefore　be　premised。　Consequently；　what　is
premised　in　this　Introduction　is　not　intended；　as　it　were；　to　establish　the　Notion　of　Logic　or　to
justify　its　method　scientifically　in　advance；　but　rather　by　the　aid　of　some　reasoned　and　historical
explanations　and　reflections　to　make　more　accessible　to　ordinary　thinking　the　point　of　view　from
which　this　science　is　to　be　considered。

When　logic　is　taken　as　the　science　of　thinking　in　general；　it　is　understood　that　this　thinking
constitutes　the　mere　form　of　a　cognition　that　logic　abstracts　from　all　content　and　that　the
so…called　second　constituent　belonging　to　cognition；　namely　its　matter；　must　come　from
somewhere　else；　and　that　since　this　matter　is　absolutely　independent　of　logic；　this　latter　can
provide　only　the　formal　conditions　of　genuine　cognition　and　cannot　in　its　own　self　contain　any　real
truth；　not　even　be　the　pathway　to　real　truth　because　just　that　which　is　essential　in　truth；　its　content；
lies　outside　logic。？

But　in　the　first　place；　it　is　quite　inept　to　say　that　logic　abstracts　from　all　content；　that　it　teaches　only
the　rules　of　thinking　without　any　reference　to　what　is　thought　or　without　being　able　to　consider　its
nature。　For　as　thinking　and　the　rules　of　thinking　are　supposed　to　be　the　subject　matter　of　logic；
these　directly　constitute　its　peculiar　content；　in　them；　logic　has　that　second　constituent；　a　matter；
about　the　nature　of　which　it　is　concerned。

But　secondly；　the　conceptions　on　which　the　Notion　of　logic　has　rested　hitherto　have　in　part　already
been　discarded；　and　for　the　rest；　it　is　time　that　they　disappeared　entirely　and　that　this　science　were
grasped　from　a　higher　standpoint　and　received　a　completely　changed　shape。

Hitherto；　the　Notion　of　logic　has　rested　on　the　separation；　presupposed　once　and　for　all　in　the
ordinary　consciousness；　of　the　content　of　cognition　and　its　form；　or　of　truth　and　certainty。　First；
it　is　assumed　that　the　material　of　knowing　is　present　on　its　own　account　as　a　ready…made　world
apart　from　thought；　that　thinking　on　its　own　is　empty　and　comes　as　an　external　form　to　the　said
material；　fills　itself　with　it　and　only　thus　acquires　a　content　and　so　becomes　real　knowing。

Further；　these　two　constituents　—　for　they　are　supposed　to　be　related　to　each　other　as
constituents；　and　cognition　is　compounded　from　them　in　a　mechanical　or　at　best　chemical　fashion
—　are　appraised　as　follows：　the　object　is　regarded　as　something　complete　and　finished　on　its　own
account；　something　which　can　entirely　dispense　with　thought　for　its　actuality；　while　thought　on　the
other　hand　is　regarded　as　defective　because　it　has　to　complete　itself　with　a　material　and　moreover；
as　a　pliable　indeterminate　form；　has　to　adapt　itself　to　its　material。　Truth　is　the　agreement　of　thought
with　the　object；　and　in　order　to　bring　about　this　agreement　—　for　it　does　not　exist　on　its　own
account　—　thinking　is　supposed　to　adapt　and　accommodate　itself　to　the　object。

Thirdly；　when　the　difference　of　matter　and　form；　of　object　and　thought　is　not　left　in　that　nebulous
indeterminateness　but　is　taken　more　definitely；　then　each　is　regarded　as　a　sphere　divorced　from　the
other。　Thinking　therefore　in　its　reception　and　formation　of　material　does　not　go　outside　itself；　its
reception　of　the　material　and　the　conforming　of　itself　to　it　remains　a　modification　of　its　own　self；　it
does　not　result　in　thought　becoming　the　other　of　itself；　and　self…conscious　determining　moreover
belongs　only　to　thinking。　In　its　relation　to　the　object；　therefore；　thinking　does　I　not　go　out　of　itself
to　the　object；　this；　as　a　thing…in…itself；　remains　a　sheer　beyond　of　thought。

These　views　on　the　relation　of　subject　and　object　to　each　other　express　the　determinations　which
constitute　the　nature　of　our　ordinary；　phenomenal　consciousness；　but　when　these　prejudices　are
carried　out　into　the　sphere　of　reason　as　if　the　same　relation　obtained　there；　as　if　this　relation　were
something　true　in　its　own　self；　then　they　are　errors　the　—　refutation　of　which　throughout　every　part
of　the　spiritual　and　natural　universe　is　philosophy；　or　rather；　as　they　bar　the　entrance　to
philosophy；　must　be　discarded　at　its　portals。

Ancient　metaphysics　had　in　this　respect　a　higher　conception　of　thinking　than　is　current　today。　For　it
based　itself　on　the　fact　that　the　knowledge　of　things　obtained　through　thinking　is　alone　what　is
really　true　in　them；　that　is；　things　not　in　their　immediacy　but　as　first　raised　into　the　form　of　thought；
as　things　thought。　Thus　this　metaphysics　believed　that　thinking　（and　its　determinations）　is　not
anything　alien　to　the　object；　but　rather　is　its　essential　nature；　or　that　things　and　the　thinking　of　them
—　our　language　too　expresses　their　kinship　—　are　explicitly　in　full　agreement；　thinking　in　its
immanent　determinations　and　the　true　nature　of　things　forming　one　and　the　same　content。

But　reflective　understanding　took　possession　of　philosophy。　We　must　know　exactly　what　is　meant
by　this　expression　which　moreover　is　often　used　as　a　slogan；　in　general　it　stands　for　the
understanding　as　abstracting；　and　hence　as　separating　and　remaining　fixed　in　its　separations。
Directed　against　reason；　it　behaves　as　ordinary　common　sense　and　imposes　its　view　that　truth　rests
on　sensuous　reality；　that　thoughts　are　only　thoughts；　meaning　that　it　is　sense　perception　which　first
gives　them　filling　and　reality　and　that　reason　left　to　its　own　resources　engenders　only　figments　of
the　brain。　In