science of logic-第47章

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Since　the　predicates　immediately　yielded　by　spirit's　phenomenal　aspect　in　the　first　instance　still
belong　to　empirical　Psychology；　there　only　remain；　strictly　speaking；　for　the　metaphysical
consideration；　the　wholly　inadequate　determinations　of　reflection。　Kant；　in　his　criticism　of　rational
psychology　adheres　to　this　metaphysics；　insisting　that；　in　so　far　as　rational　psychology　purports　to
be　a　rational　science；　the　smallest　addition　from　observation　to　the　general　idea　of
selfconsciousness　would　transform　that　science　into　an　empirical　one　and　mar　its　rational　purity
and　its　independence　of　all　experience。　Consequently；　on　this　view；　nothing　is　left　but　the　simple
representation；　'I'；　a　representation　devoid　of　any　content　of　its　own；　of　which　we　cannot　even　say
that　it　is　a　notion　but　a　mere　consciousness　that　accompanies　every　notion。　Now　according　to
the　further　Kantian　conclusions；　by　this　'I'；　or　if　you　like；　it　（the　thing）　that　thinks；　nothing　further　is
represented　than　a　transcendental　subject　of　thoughts　=　x；　which　is　cognised　only　through　the
thoughts　which　are　its　predicates；　and　of　which；　taken　in　its　isolation；　we　can　never　have　the　least
conception。　In　this　context；　the　'I'　has　the　inconvenience；　to　use　Kant's　own　expression　that　we
must　already　make　use　of　it　whenever　we　want　make　any　judgement　about　it；　for　it　is　not　so
much　a　single　representation　by　which　a　particular　object　is　distinguished；　but　rather　a　form　of
representation　in　general　in　so　far　as　this　is　to　be　called　cognition。　Now　the　paralogism　committed
by　rational　psychology；　says　Kant；　consists　in　this；　that　modes　of　self…consciousness　in　thinking　are
converted　into　notions　of　the　understanding　as　applied　to　an　object；　that　the　'I　think'　is　taken　as
a　thinking　being；　a　thing…in…itself；　and　that　in　this　way；　from　the　fact　that　I　always　occur　in
consciousness　as　a　subject；　and　that　too　as　a　singular　subject；　identical　in　all　the　multiplicity　of
representation；　and　distinguishing　myself　from　the　latter　as　from　something　external　to　me；　the
unjustified　inference　is　drawn　that　the　'I'　is　a　substance；　and　further　a　qualitatively　simple　being；
and　a　one；　and　something　that　has　a　real　existence　independently　of　the　things　of　time　and　space。　

I　have　drawn　out　this　exposition　in　some　detail；　because　it　shows　clearly　the　nature　of　the　previous
metaphysics　of　the　soul　and　especially；　too；　the　nature　of　the　criticism　by　which　it　was　made
obsolete。　The　former　aimed　at　determining　the　abstract　essence　of　the　soul；　in　doing　so；　it　started
originally　from　observation　and　converted　the　empirical　universality　of　observation　and　the　wholly
external　reflective　determination　attaching　to　the　individuality　of　the　actual；　into　the　form　of　the
above…mentioned　determinations　of　essence。　Kant　in　his　criticism　had　generally　in　mind　only　the
state　of　the　metaphysics　of　his　time；　which　in　the　main　adhered　to　these　abstract；　one…sided
determinations　wholly　devoid　of　dialectic；　the　genuinely　speculative　ideas　of　older　philosophers　on
the　notion　of　spirit　he　neither　heeded　nor　examined。　In　his　criticism　then　of　those　determinations；　he
followed　quite　simply　Hume's　style　of　scepticism；　that　is　to　say；　he　holds　fast　to　the　'I'　as　it　appears
in　self…consciousness；　from　which；　however；　since　it　is　its　essence　…　the　thing…in…itself　…　that　we　are
to　cognise；　…　everything　empirical　must　be　omitted；　nothing　then　is　left　but　this　phenomenon　of　the
'I　think'　that　accompanies　every　representation　…　of　which　'I　think'　we　have　not　the　slightest
conception。　

Certainly；　it　must　be　conceded　that　we　have　not　the　least　conception　the　'I'；　or　of　anything
whatever；　not　even　of　the　Notion　itself；　so　long　as　we　do　not　really　think；　but　stop　short　at　the
simple；　fixed　general　idea　and　the　name。　It　is　an　odd　thought　…　if　it　can　be　called　a　thought　at　all　…
that　I　must　already　make　use　of　the　'I'　in　order　to　judge　of　the　'l'；　the　'I'　that　makes　use　of
selfconsciousness　as　a　means　in　order　to　judge；　this　is　indeed　an　x　of　which；　as　well　as　of　the
relationship　of　such　'making　use'；　we　cannot　have　the　slightest　conception。　But　surely　it　is　ridiculous
to　call　this　nature　of　self…consciousness；　namely；　that　the　'I'　thinks　itself；　that　the　'I'　cannot　be
thought　without　its　being　the　'I'　that　thinks；　an　inconvenience　and；　as　though　there　was　a　fallacy　in
it；　a　circle。　It　is　this　relationship　through　which；　in　immediate　self…consciousness；　the　absolute；
eternal　nature　of　self…consciousness　and　the　Notion　itself　manifests　itself；　and　manifests　itself　for
this　reason；　that　selfconsciousness　is　just　the　existent　pure　Notion；　and　therefore　empirically
perceptible；　the　absolute　relation…to…self　that；　as　a　separating　judgement；　makes　itself　its　own
object　and　is　solely　this　process　whereby　it　makes　itself　a　circle。　

A　stone　does　not　have　this　inconvenience；　when　it　is　to　be　thought　or　judged　it　does　not　stand　in
its　own　way。　It　is　relieved　from　the　burden　of　making　use　of　itself　for　this　task；　it　is　something　else
outside　it　that　must　give　itself　this　trouble。　

Kant's　Critique　of　Rational　Psychology

A　The　Idea　of　the　True

The　subjective　Idea　is　in　the　first　instance　an　urge。　For　it　is　the　contradiction　of　the　Notion　to　have
itself　for　object　and　to　be　its　own　reality；　yet　without　the　object　being　an　other；　that　is；
self…subsistent　over　against　it；　or　without　the　difference　of　the　Notion　from　itself　possessing　at　the
same　time　the　essential　determination　of　diversity　and　indifferent　existence。　The　specific　nature　of
this　urge　is　therefore　to　sublate　its　own　subjectivity；　to　make　its　first；　abstract　reality　into　a　concrete
one　and　to　fill　it　with　the　content　of　the　world　presupposed　by　its　subjectivity。　

From　the　other　side；　this　urge　is　determined　in　the　following　manner：　the　Notion　is；　it　is　true；　the
absolute　certainty　of　itself；　but　its　being…for…self　is　confronted　by　its　presupposition　of　a　world
having　the　form　of　implicit　being；　but　a　world　whose　indifferent　otherness　has　for　the
self…certainty　of　the　Notion　the　value　merely　of　an　unessentiality；　it　is　thus　the　urge　to　sublate　this
otherness　and　to　intuit　in　the　object　its　identity　with　itself。　This　reflection…into　self　is　the　sublated
opposition；　and　the　individuality　which　initially　appears　as　the　presupposed　implicit　being　of　a
world　is　now　posited　as　individuality　and　made　actual　for　the　subject；　accordingly　the
reflection…into…self　is　the　self…identity　of　the　form　restored　out　of　the　opposition　…　an　identity　that　is
therefore　determined　as　indifferent　to　the　form　in　its　distinctiveness　and　is　content。　

This　urge　is　therefore　the　urge　to　truth　in　so　far　as　truth　is　in　cognition；　accordingly　to　truth　in　its
proper　sense　as　theoretical　Idea。　Objective　truth　is　no　doubt　the　Idea　itself　as　the　reality　that
corresponds　to　the　Notion；　and　to　this　extent　an　object　may　or　may　not　possess　truth；　but；　on　the
other　hand；　the　more　precise　meaning　of　truth　is　that　it　is　truth　for　or　in　the　subjective　Notion；　in
knowing。　It　is　the　relation　of　the　Notion　judgement　which　showed　itself　to　be　the　formal
judgement　of　truth；　in　it；　namely；　the　predicate　is　not　merely　the　objectivity　of　the　Notion；　but　the
relating　comparison　of　the　Notion　of　the　subject…matter　with　its　actuality。　This　realisation　of　the
Notion　is　theoretical　in　so　far　as　the　Notion；　as　form；　has　still　the　determination　of　subjectivity；　or
has　still　the　determination　for　the　subject　of　being　its　own　determination。　Because　cognition　is　the
Idea　as　end　as　subjective；　the　negation　of　the　world　presupposed　as　an　implicit　being　is　the　first
negation；　therefore　also　the　conclusion　in　which　the　objective　is　posited　in　the　subjective；　has　at
first　only　this　meaning；　that　the　implicit　being　is　only　posited　in　the　form　of　subjectivity；　or　in　the
Notion　determination；　and　for　this　reason　is　not；　in　that　form；　in　and　for　itself。　Thus　the　conclusion
only　attains　to　a　neutral　unity　or　a　synthesis；　that　is；　to　a　unity　of　things　that　are　originally　separate
and　only　are　externally　so　conjoined。　Since　therefore　in　this　cognition　the　Notion　posits　the　object
as　its　own；　the　Idea　in　the　first　instance　only　gives　itself　a　content　whose　basis　is　given；　and　in
which　only　the　form　of　externality　has　been　sublated。　

Accordingly；　this　cognition　still　retains　its　finitude　in　its　realised　end；　in　its　realised　end　it　has　at　the
same　time　not　attained　its　end；　and　in　its　truth　has　not　yet　arrived　at　truth。　For　in　so　far　as　in　the
result　the　content　still　has　the　character　of　a　datum；　the　presupposed　implicit　being　confronting
the　Notion　is　not　sublated；　equally　therefore　the　unity　of　Notion　and　reality；　truth；　is　also　not
contained　in　it。　Oddly　enough；　it　is　his　side　of　finitude　that　latterly　has　been　clung　to；　and　accepted
as　the　absolute　relation　of　cognition　…　as　though　the　finite　as　such　was　supposed　to　be　the
absolute！　At　this　standpoint；　the　object　is　credited　with　being　an　unknown　thing…in…itself　behind
cognition；　and　this　character　of　the　object；　and　with　it　truth　too　is　regarded　as　an　absolute　beyond
for　cognition。　In　this　view　of　cognition；　thought　determinations　in　general；　the　categories；　reflective
determinations；　as　well　as　the　for　Notion　and　its　moments　are　assigned　the　position　of　being　finite
determinations　not　in　and　for　themselves；　but　finite　in　the　sense　that　they　are　subjective　in　rely　on　to
this　empty　thing…in…itself；　the　fallacy　of　taking　this　untrue　relation　of　cognition　as　the　true　relation
has　become　the　universal　opinion　of　modern　times。　

From　this　determination　of　finite　cognition　it　is　immediately　evident　that　it　is　a　contradiction　that
sublates　itself　…　the　contradiction　of　a　truth　that　at　the　same　time　is　supposed　not　to　be　truth　…　of　a
cognition　of　what　is；　which　at　the　same　time　does　not　cognise　the　thing…in…itself。　In　the　collapse　of
this　contradiction；　its　content；　subjective　cognition　and　the　thing…in…itself；　collapses；　that　is；　proves
itself　an　untruth。　But　cognition　must；　in　the　course　of　its　own　movement；　resolve　its　finitude　and
with　it　its　contradiction；　this　examination　of　it　made　by　us　is　an　external　reflection；　but　cognition　is
itself　the　Notion；　the　Notion　that　is　its　own　end　and　therefore　through　its　realisation　fulfils　itself；　and
in　this　very　fulfilment　sublates　its　subjectivity　and　the　presupposed　implicit　being。　We　have
therefore　to　consider　cognition　in　its　own　self　in　its　positive　activity。　Since　this　Idea　is；　as　we　have
seen；　the　urge　of　the　Notion　to　realise　itself　for　itself；　its　activity　consists　in　determining　the　object；
and　by　this　determining　to　relate　itself　in　the　object　identically　to　itself。　The　object　is　in　general
something　simply　determinable；　and　in　the　Idea　it　has　this　essential　side　of　not　being　in　and　for　itself
opposed　to　the　Notion。　Because　cognition　is　still　finite；　not　speculative；　cognition；　the　presupposed
objectivity　has　not　as　yet　for　it　the　shape　of　something　that　is　in　its　own　self　simply　and　solely　the
Notion　and　that　contains　nothing　with　a　particularity　of　its　own　as　against　the　latter。　

But　the　fact　that　it　counts　as　an　implicit　beyond；　necessarily　implies　that　its　determinability　by　the
Notion　is　a　determination　it　possesses　essentially；　fo