science of logic-第44章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


the　immediate。　In　this　way；　the　negativity　returns　into　it　self　in　such　a　manner　that　it　is　equally　a
restoration　of　the　objectivity　but　of　an　objectivity　identical　with　it；　and　in　this　it　is　as　at　the　same
time　also　a　positing　of　the　objectivity　as　an　external　objectivity　determined　only　by　the　end。
Through　the　latter　circumstance　this　product　remains　as　before　also　a　means；　through　the　former　it
is　objectivity　that　is　identical　with　the　Notion；　the　realised　end；　in　which　the　side　of　being　a　means
is　the　reality　of　the　end　itself。　In　the　realised　end　the　means　vanishes；　for　it　would　be　the　objectivity
that　is　as　yet　only　immediately　subsumed　under　the　end；　and　in　the　realised　end　objectivity　is
present　as　the　return　of　the　end　into　itself；　further；　with　it　there　also　vanishes　the　mediation　itself　as
a　relation　of　something　external；　on　the　one　side；　into　the　concrete　identity　of　the　objective　end；
and　on　the　other；　into　the　same　identity　as　abstract　identity　and　immediacy　of　existence。

Herein　is　also　contained　the　mediation　that　was　demanded　for　the　first　premise；　the　immediate
relation　of　the　end　to　the　object。　The　realised　end　is　also　means；　and　conversely　the　truth　of　the
means　is　just　this；　to　be　itself　a　real　end；　and　the　first　sublating　of　objectivity　is　already　also　the
second；　just　as　the　second　proved　to　contain　the　first；　as　well。　That　is　to　say；　the　Notion
determines　itself；　its　determinateness　is　external　indifference；　which　is　immediately　determined　in
the　resolution　＇Entschluss＇　as　sublated；　namely　as　internal；　subjective　indifference；　and　at　the
same　time　as　a　presupposed　object。　Its　further　passage　out　from　itself　which　appeared；　namely；
as　an　immediate　communication　and　subsumption　of　the　presupposed　object　under　it；　is　at　the
same　time　a　sublating　of　the　former　determinateness　of　externality　that　was　internal　and　enclosed
within　the　Notion；　that　is；　posited　as　sublated；　and　at　the　same　time　a　sublating　of　the
presupposition　of　an　object；　consequently；　this　apparently　first　sublating　of　the　indifferent
objectivity　is　already　the　second　as　well；　a　reflection…into…self　that　has　passed　through　mediation；
and　the　realised　end。

Since　the　Notion　here　in　the　sphere　of　objectivity；　where　its　determinateness　has　the　form　of
indifferent　externality；　is　in　reciprocal　action　with　itself；　the　exposition　of　its　movement　here
becomes　doubly　difficult　and　involved；　because　this　movement　is　itself　double　and　a　first　is　always
a　second　also。　In　the　Notion　taken　by　itself；　that　is　in　its　subjectivity；　its　difference　from　itself
appears　as　an　immediate　identical　totality　on　its　own　account；　but　since　its　determinateness　here　is
indifferent　externality；　its　identity　with　itself　in　this　externality　is　also　immediately　again
self…repulsion；　so　that　what　is　determined　as　external　and　indifferent　to　the　identity　is　the　identity
itself；　and　the　identity　as　identity；　as　reflected　into　itself；　is　rather　its　other。　Only　by　keeping　this
firmly　in　mind　can　we　grasp　the　objective　return　of　the　Notion　into　itself；　that　is；　the　true
objectification　of　the　Notion…grasp　that　each　of　the　single　moments　through　which　this　mediation
runs　its　course　is　itself　the　entire　syllogism　of　those　moments。

Thus　the　original　inner　externality　of　the　Notion　through　which　it　is　self…repellent　unity；　the　end　and
the　striving　of　the　end　towards　objectification；　is　the　immediate　positing　or　presupposition　of　an
external　object；　the　_self…determination　is　also　the　determination　of　an　external　object　not
determined　by　the　Notion；　and　conversely；　the　latter　determination　is　self…determination；　that　is；
externality　sublated　and　posited　as　internal…or　the　certainty　of　the　unessentiality　of　the　external
object。　Of　the　second　relation；　the　determination　of　the　object　as　means；　it　has　just　been　shown
how　it　is　within　itself　the　mediation　of　the　end　in　the　object　with　itself。　Similarly；　the　third　relation；
mechanism；　which　proceeds　under　the　dominance　of　the　end　and　sublates　the　object　by　the
object；　is　on　the　one　hand　a　sublating　of　the　means；　of　the　object　already　posited　as　sublated　and
is　therefore　a　second　sublating　and　a　reflection…into…self；　while　on　the　other　hand　it　is　a　first
determining　of　the　external　object。　The　latter；　as　has　been　remarked；　is　the　production　again　in　the
realised　end　only　of　a　means；　the　subjectivity　of　the　finite　Notion；　contemptuously　rejecting　the
means；　has　attained　to）　nothing　better　in　its　goal。　But　this　reflection　that　the　end　is　reached　in　the
means；　and　that　in　the　fulfilled　end；　means　and　mediation　are　preserved；　is　the　last　result　of　the
external　end…relation；　a　result　in　which　that　relation　has　sublated　itself；　and　which　it　has　exhibited
as　its　truth。　The　third　syllogism　that　was　considered　last　is　distinguished　by　the　fact　that　it　is；　in　the
first　place；　the　subjective　purposive　activity　of　the　preceding　syllogisms；　but　is　also　the
spontaneous　sublation　of　external　objectivity；　and　therewith　of　externality　in　general；　and　hence　is
the　totality　in　its　positedness。

First　we　saw　subjectivity；　the　Notion's　being…for…self；　pass　over；　into　its　in…itself；　objectivity；　to
be　followed　by　the　reappearance　in　the　latter　of　the　negativity　of　the　Notion's　being…for…self；　in　that
negativity　the　Notion　has　determined　itself　in　such　a　manner　that　its　particularity　is　an　external
objectivity；　or　it　has　determined　itself　as　a　simple　concrete　unity　whose　externality　is　its
self…determination。　The　movement　of　the　end　has　now　reached　the　stage　where　the　moment　of
externality　is　not　merely　posited　in　the　Notion；　where　the　end　is　not　merely　an　ought…to…be　and　a
striving　to　realise　itself；　but　as　a　concrete　totality　is　identical　with　the；　immediate　objectivity。　This
identity　is　on　the　one　hand　the　simple　Notion　and　the　equally　immediate　objectivity；　but　on　the
other　hand；　it　is　just　as　essentially　a　mediation；　and　only　through　the　latter　as　a　self…sublating
mediation　is　it　that　simple　immediacy；　the　Notion　is　therefore　essentially　this：　to　be　distinct　as　an
explicit　identity　from　its　implicit　objectivity；　and　thereby　to　possess　externality；　yet　in　this　external
totality　to　be　the　totality's　self…determining　identity。　As　such；　the　Notion　is　now　the　Idea。　




BOOK　III：　The　Doctrine　of　the　Notion
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Section　Three：　The　Idea

　　　　　　　　　　　　　Life　…　Cognition　…　The　Absolute　Idea

The　Idea　is　the　adequate　Notion；　that　which　is　objectively　true；　or　the　true　as　such。　When
anything　whatever　possesses　truth；　it　possesses　it　through　its　Idea；　or；　something　possesses　truth
only　in　so　far　as　it　is　Idea。　The　expression　'idea'　has　often　been　employed　in　philosophy　as　in
ordinary　life　for　'notion'；　indeed；　even　for　a　mere　ordinary　conception：　'I　have　no　idea　yet　of　this
lawsuit；　building；　neighbourhood'；　means　nothing　more　than　the　ordinary　conception。　Kant　has
reclaimed　the　expression　Idea　for　the　notion　of　reason。　Now　according　to　Kant；　the　notion　of
reason　is　supposed　to　be　the　notion　of　the　unconditioned；　but　a　notion　transcendent　in　regard　to
phenomena；　that　is；　no　empirical　use　can　be　made　of　such　notion　that　is　adequate　to　it。　The
notions　of　reason　are　to　serve　for　the　comprehension　of　perceptions；　the　notions　of　the
understanding　for　understanding　them。　But　in　fact；　if　the　latter　really　are　Notions；　then　they　are
Notions　…　they　enable　one　to　comprehend　；　and　an　understanding　of　perceptions　by　means　of
notions　of　the　understanding　will　be　a　comprehension　of　them。　

But　if　understanding　is　only　a　determining　of　perceptions　by　such　categories　as　for　example　whole
and　parts；　force；　cause；　and　the　like；　it　signifies　only　a　determining　by　reflection；　and　similarly；　by
understanding　can　be　meant　only　the　specific　representation　of　a　completely　determined　sensuous
content；　thus　when　someone；　having　been　directed　that　at　the　end　of　the　wood　he　must　turn　left；
replies　'I　understand'；　understanding　means　nothing　more　than　the　grasping　of　something　in
pictorial　thought　and　in　memory。　'Notion　of　reason'；　too；　is　a　somewhat　clumsy　expression；　for
the　Notion　is　something　altogether　rational；　and　in　so　far　as　reason　is　distinguished　from
understanding　and　the　Notion　as　such；　it　is　the　totality　of　the　Notion　and　of　objectivity。　In　this
sense　the　Idea　is　the　rational；　it　is　the　unconditioned；　because　only　that　has　conditions　which
essentially　relates　itself　to　an　objectivity；　but　an　objectivity　that　it　has　not　itself　determined　but
which　still　confronts　it　in　the　form　of　indifference　and　externality；　just　as　the　external　end　still　had
conditions。　

Reserving　then　the　expression　'Idea'　for　the　objective　or　real　Notion　and　distinguishing　it　from　the
Notion　itself　and　still　more　from　mere　pictorial　thought；　we　must　also　reject　even　more　vigorously
that　estimate　of　the　Idea　according　to　which　it　is　not　anything　actual；　and　true　thoughts　are　said　to
be　only　ideas。　If　thoughts　are　merely　subjective　and　contingent；　they　certainly　have　no　further
value；　but　in　this　respect　they　are　not　inferior　to　temporal　and　contingent　actualities　which　likewise
have　no　further　value　than　that　of　contingencies　and　phenomena。　On　the　other　hand　if；　conversely；
the　Idea　is　not　to　have　the　value　of　truth；　because　in　regard　to　phenomena　it　is　transcendent；　and
no　congruent　object　can　be　assigned　to　it　in　the　world　of　sense；　this　is　an　odd　misunderstanding
that　would　deny　objective　validity　to　the　Idea　because　it　lacks　that　which　constitutes　Appearance；
namely；　the　untrue　being　of　the　objective　world。　In　regard　to　practical　Ideas；　Kant　recognises
that　'nothing　can　be　more　harmful　and　unworthy　of　a　philosopher　than　the　vulgar　appeal　to　an
experience　that　allegedly　conflicts　with　the　Idea。　This　very　experience　would　not　even　exist　if；　for
example；　political　institutions　had　been　established　at　the　proper　time　in　conformity　with　Ideas；　and
if　crude　conceptions；　crude　just　because　they　had　been　drawn　from　experience；　had　not　taken　the
place　of　Ideas　and　so　nullified　every　good　intention。'　Kant　regards　the　Idea　as　a　necessity　and　as
the　goal　which；　as　the　archetype；　it　must　be　our　endeavour　to　set　up　for　a　maximum　and　to　which
we　must　strive　to　bring　the　condition　of　the　actual　world　ever　nearer。　

But　having　reached　the　result　that　the　Idea　is　the　unity　of　the　Notion　and　objectivity；　is　the　true；　it
must　not　be　regarded　merely　as　a　goal　to　which　we　have　to　approximate　but　which　itself　always
remains　a　kind　of　beyond；　on　the　contrary；　we　must　recognise　that　everything　actual　is　only　in　so
far　as　it　possesses　the　Idea　and　expresses　it。　It　is　not　merely　that　the　object；　the　objective　and
subjective　world　in　general；　ought　to　be　congruous　with　the　Idea；　but　they　are　themselves　the
congruence　of　Notion　and　reality；　the　reality　that　does　not　correspond　to　the　Notion　is　mere
Appearance；　the　subjective；　contingent；　capricious　element　that　is　not　the　truth。　

When　it　is　said　that　no　object　is　to　be　found　in　experience　that　is　perfectly　congruous　with　the
Idea；　one　is　opposing　the　Idea　as　a　subjective　standard　to　the　actual；　but　what　anything　actual　is
supposed　in　truth　to　be；　if　its　Notion　is　not　in　it　and　if　its　objectivity　docs　not　correspond　to　its
Notion　at　all；　it　is　impossible　to　say；