science of logic-第42章

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determined　by　the　Notion；　and　in　the　first　instance　as　means。

B。　The　Means　

The　first　immediate　positing　in　end　is　at　one　and　the　same　time　the　positing　of　an　internality；　that
is；　of　something　determined　as　posited；　and　the　presupposing　of　an　objective　world　which　is
indifferent　to　the　determination　of　end。　But　the　subjectivity　of　end　is　absolute　negative　unity：　its
second　determining　is；　therefore；　the　sublating　of　this　presupposition　altogether；　this　sublating　is　the
return…into…self　in　so　far　as　by　it　is　sublated　that　moment　of　the　first　negative；　the　positing　of　the
negative　as　against　the　subject；　the　external　object。　But　as　against　the　presupposition　or　the
immediacy　of　the　determining；　as　against　the　objective　world；　it　is　as　yet　only　the　first　negation；
itself　immediate　and　therefore　external。　This　positing　is　therefore　not　yet　the　realised　end　itself；　but
only　the　initial　step　towards　it。　The　object　thus　determined　is　so　far　only　the　means。

The　end　unites　itself　through　a　means　with　objectivity；　and　in　objectivity　with　itself。　The　means　is
the　middle　term　of　the　syllogism。　The　end；　because　it　is　finite；　requires　a　means　for　its　realisation…a
means；　that　is　a　middle　term；　that　at　the　same　time　has　the　shape　of　an　external　existence
indifferent　to　the　end　itself　and　its　realisation。　The　absolute　Notion　possesses　mediation　within　itself
in　such　a　manner　that　its　first　positing　is　not　a　presupposing　whose　object　would　have　indifferent
externality　for　its　fundamental　determination；　on　the　contrary；　the　world　as　a　creation　has　only　the
form　of　such　externality；　but　its　fundamental　determination　is　really　constituted　by　its　negativity　and
positedness。　The　finitude　of　end　consists　accordingly　in　this；　that　its　determining　is　altogether
external　to　itself；　and　so　its　first　determining；　as　we　have　seen；　divides　itself　into　a　positing　and　a
presupposing；　therefore　the　negation　of　this　determining；　too；　is　so　far　only　in　one　aspect　already
a　reflection…into…self；　in　the　other；　it　is　in　fact　merely　a　first　negation；　in　other　words　the　very
reflection…into…self　is　also　external　to　itself　and　a　reflection　outwards。

The　means　is　therefore　the　formal　middle　term　of　a　formal　syllogism；　it　is　external　as　against　the
extreme　of　the　subjective　end；　and　therefore　also　to　the　extreme　of　the　objective　end；　just　as
particularity　in　the　formal　syllogism　is　an　indifferent　medius　terminus　that　can　be　replaced　by
others。　Further；　just　as　this　particularity　is　middle　term　only　by　being　determinateness　in　relation　to
one　extreme　and　a　universal　in　relation　to　the　other；　and　therefore　owes　its　mediating　determination
to　its　relation　to　other　terms；　so　the　means；　too；　is　only　the　mediating　middle　term；　first　because　it　is
an　immediate　object；　secondly　because　it　is　a　means　by　virtue　of　the　relation　it　possesses
externally　to　the　extreme　of　the　end…a　relation　that　is　for　it　a　form　to　which　it　is　indifferent。

Notion　and　objectivity　are　therefore　only　externally　combined　in　the　means；　which　is　accordingly　a
merely　mechanical　object。　The　relation　of　the　object　to　the　end　is　a　premise；　or　the　immediate
relation　which　with　regard　to　the　end　has　been　shown　to　be　reflection　into　itself；　the　means；　is　an
inhering　predicate；　its　objectivity　is　subsumed　under　the　determination　of　end　which　on　account　of
its　concretion　is　universality。　By　virtue　of　this　determination　of　end　present　in　the　means；　the　latter
is　now　also　subsumptive　in　relation　to　the　other　extreme　of　the　initially　still　indeterminate
objectivity。　Conversely；　in　contrast　to　the　subjective　end；　the　means；　as　immediate　objectivity；
has　a　universality　of　existence　that　the　subjective　individuality　of　the　end　still　lacks。　The　end
being　thus　in　the　first　instance　only　an　external　determinateness　in　the　means；　it　is　itself；　as　a
negative　unity；　outside　it；　just　as　the　means　is　a　mechanical　object　that　possesses　the　end　only　as　a
determinateness；　not　as　simple　concretion　of　the　totality。　As　the　unifying　element；　however；　the
middle　term　must　itself　be　the　totality　of　the　end。　It　has　been　seen　that　the　determination　of　end　in
the　means　is　at　the　same　time　reflection…into…self；　it　is　in　so　far　formal　self…relation；　since　the
determinateness；　as　real　indifference；　is　posited　as　the　objectivity　of　the　means。　But　for　this
very　reason；　this；　in　one　respect；　pure　subjectivity；　is　at　the　same　time　also　activity。　In　the
subjective　end　the　negative　relation…to…self　is　still　identical　with　determinateness　as　such；　with
content　and　externality。　But　in　the　incipient　objectification　of　the　end；　in　the　becoming…other　of　the
simple　Notion；　these　moments　separate　themselves；　or　conversely；　it　is　in　such　separation　that　this
becoming…other　or　externality　consists。

Consequently；　this　whole　middle　term　is　itself　the　totality　of　the　syllogism；　in　which　the　abstract
activity　and　the　external　means　constitute　the　extremes；　and　their　middle　term　is　constituted　by　that
determinateness　of　the　object　by　the　end；　which　makes　it　a　means。　But　further；　universality　is　the
relation　of　the　activity　of　the　end　and　the　means。　The　means　is　an　object；　in　itself　the　totality　of
the　Notion；　it　has　no　power　of　resistance　against　the　end；　as　it　has　in　the　first　instance　against
another　immediate　object。　To　the　end；　therefore；　which　is　the　posited　Notion；　it　is　absolutely
penetrable；　and　receptive　of　this　communication；　because　it　is　in　itself　identical　with　the　end。　But
now　it　is　also　posited　as　penetrable　by　the　Notion；　for　in　centrality　it　is　an　object　striving　towards
the　negative　unity；　similarly　in　chemism；　it　is　as　a　neutral　and　also　as　a　different　object；　no　longer
self…subsistent。　Its　lack　of　self…subsistence　consists　precisely　in　its　being　only　in　itself　the　totality　of
the　Notion；　but　the　latter　is　a　being…for…self。　Consequently　the　object　has　the　character　of　being
powerless　against　the　end　and　of　serving　it；　the　end　is　the　object's　subjectivity　or　soul；　that　has　in
the　object　its　external　side。

The　object；　being　in　this　manner　immediately　subjected　to　the　end；　is　not　an　extreme　of　the
syllogism；　but　this　relation　constitutes　one　of　its　premises。　But　the　means　has　also　a　side　from
which　it　still　has　self…subsistence　as　against　the　end。　The　objectivity　that　is　connected　with　the　end
in　the　means　is　still　external　to　it；　because　it　is　only　immediately　so　connected；　and　therefore　the
presupposition　still　persists。　The　activity　of　the　end　through　the　means　is　for　that　reason　still
directed　against　this　presupposition；　and　the　end　is　activity　and　no　longer　merely　an　urge　and　a
striving；　precisely　because　the　moment　of　objectivity　is　posited　in　the　means　in　its　determinateness
as　something　external；　and　the　simple　unity　of　the　Notion　now　has　this　objectivity　as　such　in　itself。

C。　The　Realised　End

1。　The　end　in　its　relation　to　the　means　is　already　reflected　into　itself；　but　its　objective　return　into
itself　is　not　yet　posited。　The　activity　of　the　end　through　its　means　is　still　directed　against　objectivity
as　an　original　presupposition；　the　nature　of　this　activity　is　precisely　this；　to　be　indifferent　to　the
determinateness。　Were　the　activity　again　to　consist　in　merely　determining　the　immediate　objectivity；
the　product　would　again　be　merely　a　means；　and　so　on　to　infinity；　the　outcome　would　be　only　a
means　suitable　to　the　end；　but　not　the　objectivity　of　the　end　itself。　Therefore　the　end　which　is　active
in　its　means；　in　determining　the　immediate　object　must　not　do　so　as　a　determinant　external　to　it；
and　consequently　the　object　must　spontaneously　conform　to　the　unity　of　the　Notion；　in　other
words；　the　former　external　activity　of　the　end　through　its　means　must　determine　itself　as　mediation
and　sublate　its　own　self。

The　relation　of　the　activity　of　the　end　through　the　means　to　the　external　object　is　in　the　first　instance
the　second　premise　of　the　syllogism　—　an　immediate　relation　of　the　middle　term　to　the　other
extreme。　It　is　immediate　because　the　middle　term　has　an　external　object　in　it　and　the　other
extreme　is　another　such　object。　The　means　is　effective　and　potent　against　the　latter　because　its
own　object　is　connected　with　the　self…determining　activity；　while　for　the　other　object　the　immediate
determinateness　that　it　possesses　is　an　indifferent　one。　Their　process　in　this　relation　is　none　other
than　the　mechanical　or　chemical　one；　in　this　objective　externality　the　previous　relationships　emerge
but　under　the　dominance　of　the　end。　These　processes；　however；　as　they　themselves　showed；
spontaneously　return　into　the　end。　if；　therefore；　in　the　first　instance；　the　relation　of　the　means　to　the
external　object　it　has　to　work　upon　is　an　immediate　one；　it　has　already　at　an　earlier　stage　exhibited
itself　as　a　syllogism；　the　end　having　proved　itself　to　be　their　true　middle　term　and　unity。　As；
therefore；　the　means　is　the　object　that　stands　on　the　side　of　the　end　and　has　within　it　the　activity　of
the　end；　the　mechanism　that　is　found　here　is　at　the　same　time　the　return　of　objectivity　into　itself；
into　the　Notion；　which　however　is　already　presupposed　as　the　end；　the　negative　attitude　of
purposive　activity　towards　the　object　is　thus　not　an　external　attitude；　but　the　alteration　and
transition　of　objectivity　in　its　own　self　into　the　end。

That　the　end　relates　itself　immediately　to　an　object　and　makes　it　a　means；　as　also　that　through　this
means　it　determines　another　object；　may　be　regarded　as　violence　＇Gewalt＇　in　so　far　as　the　end
appears　to　be　of　quite　another　nature　than　the　object；　and　the　two　objects　similarly　are　mutually
independent　totalities。　But　that　the　end　posits　itself　in　a　mediate　relation　with　the　object　and
interposes　another　object　between　itself　and　it；　may　be　regarded　as　the　cunning　of　reason。　The
finitude　of　rationality　has；　as　remarked；　this　side；　that　the　end　enters　into　relationship　with　the
presupposition；　that　is；　with　the　externality　of　the　object。　In　the　immediate　relation　to　the　object；
it　would　itself　enter　into　the　sphere　of　mechanism　or　chemism　and　thereby　be　subject　to
contingency　and　the　loss　of　its　determination　as　the　Notion　that　is　in　and　for　itself。　But　as　it　is；　it
puts　forward　an　object　as　means；　allows　it　to　wear　itself　out　in　its　stead；　exposes　it　to　attrition　and
shields　itself　behind　it　from　mechanical　violence。

Further；　since　the　end　is　finite　it　has　a　finite　content；　accordingly　it　is　not　an　absolute；　nor　simply
something　that　in　its　own　nature　is　rational。　But　the　means　is　the　external　middle　term　of　the
syllogism　which　is　the　realisation　of　the　end；　in　the　means；　therefore；　the　rationality　in　it　manifests
itself　as　such　by　maintaining　itself　in　this　external　other；　and　precisely　through　this　externality。　To
this　extent　the　means　is　superior　to　the　finite　ends　of　external　purposiveness：　the　plough　is　more
honourable　than　are　immediately　the　enjoyments　procured　by　it　and　which　are　ends。　The　tool
lasts；　while　the　immediate　enjoyments　pass　away　and　are　forgotten。　In　his　tools　man　possesses
power　over　external　nature；　even　though　in　respect　of　his　ends　he　is；　on　the　contrary；　subject　to　it。

But　the　end　does　not　merely　keep　outside　the　mechanical　process；　rather　it　maintains　itself　in　it　and
is　its　determinat