science of logic-第26章

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representation　as　the　real　in　contrast　to　what　is　thought；　to　the　Notion；　is　a　view；　the
abandonment　of　which　is　not　only　a　condition　of　philosophising　but　is　already　presupposed　by
religion；　for　how　can　there　be　any　need　for　religion；　how　can　religion　have　any　meaning；　if　the
fleeting　and　superficial　phenomena　of　the　world　of　sensuous　particulars　are　still　regarded　as　the
truth？　But　philosophy　gives　a　reasoned　insight　into　the　true　state　of　the　case　with　regard　to　the
reality　of　sensuous　being；　it　assumes　the　stages　of　feeling　and　intuition　as　precedent　to　the
understanding　in　so　far　as　they　are　conditions　of　its　genesis；　but　only　in　the　sense　that　it　is
conditioned　by　their　reality。　Abstract　thinking；　therefore；　is　not　to　be　regarded　as　a　mere　setting
aside　of　the　sensuous　material；　the　reality　of　which　is　not　thereby　impaired；　rather　is　it　the　sublating
and　reduction　of　that　material　as　mere　phenomenal　appearance　to　the　essential；　which　is
manifested　only　in　the　Notion。　


Of　course；　if　what　is　taken　up　into　the　Notion　from　the　concrete　phenomenon　is　to　serve　only　as　a
mark　or　sign；　it　certainly　may　be　any　mere　random　sensuous　particular　determination　of　the
object；　selected　from　the　others　on　the　basis　of　any　random　external　interest　and　of　a　similar　kind
and　nature　as　the　rest。　

A　capital　misunderstanding　which　prevails　on　this　point　is　that　the　natural　principle　or　the
beginning　which　forms　the　starting　point　in　the　natural　evolution　or　in　the　history　of　the
developing　individual；　is　regarded　as　the　truth；　and　the　first　in　the　Notion。　Now　in　the　order　of
nature；　intuition　or　being　are　undoubtedly　first；　or　are　the　condition　for　the　Notion；　but　they　are　not
on　that　account　the　absolutely　unconditioned；　on　the　contrary；　their　reality　is　sublated　in　the　Notion
and　with　it；　too；　the　illusory　show　they　possessed　of　being　the　conditioning　reality。　When　it　is　a
question；　not　of　truth　but　merely　of　history；　as　in　pictorial　and　phenomenal　thinking；　we　need　not
of　course　go　beyond　merely　narrating　that　we　start　with　feelings　and　intuitions　and　that　from　the
manifold　of　these　the　understanding　extracts　a　universality　or　an　abstraction　and　naturally　requires
for　this　purpose　the　said　substrate　of　feelings　and　intuitions　which；　in　this　process　of　abstraction；
remains　for　representation　in　the　same　complete　reality　with　which　it　first　presented　itself。　But
philosophy　is　not　meant　to　be　a　narration　of　happenings　but　a　cognition　of　what　is　true　in　them；
and　further；　on　the　basis　of　this　cognition；　to　comprehend　that　which；　in　the　narrative；　appears　as　a
mere　happening。

If　the　superficial　conception　of　what　the　Notion　is；　leaves　all　manifoldness　outside　the　Notion　and
attributes　to　the　latter　only　the　form　of　abstract　universality　or　the　empty　identity　of　reflection；　we
can　at　once　appeal　to　the　fact　that　quite　apart　from　the　view　here　propounded；　the　statement　or
definition　of　a　notion　expressly　includes　not　only　the　genus；　which　itself　is；　properly　speaking；　more
than　a　purely　abstract　universality；　but　also　the　specific　determinateness。　If　one　would　but　reflect
attentively　on　the　meaning　of　this　fact；　one　would　see　that　differentiation　must　be　regarded　as　an
equally　essential　moment　of　the　Notion。　Kant　has　introduced　this　consideration　by　the　extremely
important　thought　that　there　are　synthetic　judgements　a　priori。　This　original　synthesis　of
apperception　is　one　of　the　most　profound　principles　for　speculative　development；　it　contains　the
beginning　of　a　true　apprehension　of　the　nature　of　the　Notion　and　is　completely　opposed　to　that
empty　identity　or　abstract　universality　which　is　not　within　itself　a　synthesis。　The　further
development；　however；　does　not　fulfil　the　promise　of　the　beginning。　The　very　expression　synthesis
easily　recalls　the　conception　of　an　external　unity　and　a　mere　combination　of　entities　that　are
intrinsically　separate。　Then；　again；　the　Kantian　philosophy　has　not　got　beyond　the　psychological
reflex　of　the　Notion　and　has　reverted　once　more　to　the　assertion　that　the　Notion　is　permanently
conditioned　by　a　manifold　of　intuition。　It　has　declared　intellectual　cognition　and　experience　to　be　a
phenomenal　content；　not　because　the　categories　themselves　are　only　finite　but；　on　the　ground　of　a
psychological　idealism；　because　they　are　merely　determinations　originating　in　self…consciousness。　It
is　in　keeping　with　this　standpoint；　too；　that　the　Notion　without　the　manifold　of　intuition　is　again
declared　to　be　empty　and　devoid　of　content　despite　the　fact　that　it　is　a　synthesis　a　priori；　as
such；　it　surely　does　contain　determinateness　and　difference　within　itself。　Moreover；　since　the
determinateness　is　that　of　the　Notion　and　therefore　absolute　determinateness；　individuality；　the
Notion　is　the　ground　and　source　of　all　finite　determinateness　and　manifoldness。

The　merely　formal　position　that　the　Notion　holds　as　understanding　is　fully　confirmed　in　the　Kantian
exposition　of　what　reason　is。　In　reason；　the　highest　stage　of　thought；　one　ought　to　have　expected
the　Notion　to　lose　the　conditionedness　in　which　it　still　appears　at　the　stage　of　understanding　and　to
attain　to　perfect　truth。　But　this　expectation　is　disappointed。　For　Kant　defines　the　relation　of　reason
to　the　categories　as　merely　dialectical　and；　indeed；　takes　the　result　of　this　dialectic　to　be　the
infinite　nothing　…　just　that　and　nothing　more。

Consequently；　the　infinite　unity　of　reason；　too；　is　still　deprived　of　the　synthesis；　and　with　it　the
beginning　referred　to　above　of　a　speculative；　truly　infinite　Notion；　reason　becomes　the　familiar；
wholly　formal；　merely　regulative　unity　of　the　systematic　employment　of　the　understanding。　It　is
declared　to　be　an　abuse　when　logic；　which　is　supposed　to　be　merely　a　canon　of　judgment；　is
regarded　as　an　organon　for　the　production　of　objective　insights。　The　notions　of　reason　in　which
we　could　not　but　have　an　intimation　of　a　higher　power　and　a　profounder　significance；　no　longer
possess　a　constitutive　character　as　do　the　categories；　they　are　mere　Ideas；　certainly；　we　are
quite　at　liberty　to　use　them；　but　by　these　intelligible　entities　in　which　all　truth　should　be
completely　revealed；　we　are　to　understand　nothing　more　than　hypotheses；　and　to　ascribe　absolute
truth　to　them　would　be　the　height　of　caprice　and　foolhardiness；　for　they　do　not　occur　in　any
experience。　Would　one　ever　have　thought　that　philosophy　would　deny　truth　to　intelligible　entities
because　they　lack　the　spatial　and　temporal　material　of　the　sensuous　world？　

Directly　connected　with　this　is　the　question　of　the　point　of　view　from　which　the　Notion　and　the
character　of　logic　generally　are　to　be　considered；　a　question　on　which　the　Kantian　philosophy
holds　the　same　view　as　is　commonly　taken：　that　is　to　say；　in　what　relation　do　the　Notion　and　the
science　of　the　Notion　stand　to　truth　itself。　We　have　already　quoted　from　the　Kantian　deduction
of　the　categories　that　according　to　it　the　object；　as　that　in　which　the　manifold　of　intuition　is　unified；
is　this　unity　solely　through　the　unity　of　self…consciousness。　Here；　therefore；　the　objectivity　of
thought　is　specifically　enunciated；　an　identity　of　Notion　and　thing；　which　is　truth。　In　the　same
way；　it　is　also　commonly　admitted　that　when　thinking　appropriates　a　given　object；　this　thereby
suffers　an　alteration　and　is　changed　from　something　sensuous　to　something　thought；　and　yet　that
not　only　is　the　essential　nature　of　the　object　not　affected　by　this　alteration　but　that　it　is　only　in　its
Notion　that　it　is　in　its　truth；　whereas　in　the　immediacy　in　which　it　is　given　it　is　only　appearance　and
a　contingency；　that　the　cognition　that　truly　comprehends　the　object　is　the　cognition　of　it　as　it　is　in
and　for　itself；　and　that　the　Notion　is　its　very　objectivity。　

But；　on　the　other　hand；　it　is　equally　maintained　that　we　cannot　after　all；　know　things　as　they
truly　are　in　themselves　and　that　truth　is　inaccessible　to　the　cognitive　powers　of　reason；　that
the　aforesaid　truth　which　consists　in　the　unity　of　the　object　and　the　Notion　is；　after　all；　only
Appearance；　and　this　time；　again　on　the　ground　that　the　content　is　only　the　manifold　of　intuition。
On　this　point　we　have　already　remarked　that；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　precisely　in　the　Notion　that　this
manifoldness；　in　so　far　as　it　pertains　to　intuition　in　contrast　to　the　Notion；　is　sublated　and　that
through　the　Notion　the　object　is　reduced　to　its　non…contingent　essential　nature。　The　latter　enters
into　the　sphere　of　Appearance　and　for　that　very　reason　the　Appearance　is　not　devoid　of　essential
being；　but　is　a　manifestation　of　essence。　But　the　completely　liberated　manifestation　of　essence　is
the　Notion　

These　propositions　of　which　we　here　remind　the　reader　are　not　dogmatic　assertions；　for　the　reason
that　they　are　results　that　have　issued　from　the　entire　immanent　development　of　essence。　The
present　standpoint　to　which　this　development　has　led　is　that　the　form　of　the　absolute　which　is
higher　than　being　and　essence　is　the　Notion。　Regarded　from　this　aspect；　the　Notion　has
subjugated　being　and　essence；　which　from　other　starting　points　include　also　feeling　and　intuition
and　representation；　and　which　appeared　as　its　antecedent　conditions；　and　has　proved　itself　to　be
their　unconditioned　ground。　There　now　remains　the　second　aspect；　to　the　treatment　of　which　this
Third　Book　of　the　Logic　is　devoted；　namely　the　exposition　of　how　the　Notion　builds　up　in　and
from　itself　the　reality　that　has　vanished　in　it。　It　has　therefore　been　freely　admitted　that　the　cognition
that　stops　short　at　the　Notion　purely　as　such；　is　still　incomplete　and　has　only　as　yet　arrived　at
abstract　truth。　But　its　incompleteness　does　not　lie　in　its　lack　of　that　presumptive　reality　given　in
feeling　and　intuition　but　rather　in　the　fact　that　the　Notion　has　not　yet　given　itself　a　reality　of　its　own；
a　reality　produced　from　its　own　resources。　The　demonstrated　absoluteness　of　the　Notion　relatively
to　the　material　of　experience　and；　more　exactly；　to　the　categories　and　concepts　of　reflection；
consists　in　this；　that　this　material　as　it　appears　apart　from　and　prior　to　the　Notion　has　no　truth；
this　it　has　solely　in　its　ideality　or　its　identity　with　the　Notion。　The　derivation　of　the　real　from　it　if
we　want　to　call　it　derivation；　consists　in　the　first　place　essentially　in　this；　that　the　Notion　in　its
formal　abstraction　reveals　itself　as　incomplete　and　through　its　own　immanent　dialectic　passes　over
into　reality；　but　it　does　not　fall　back　again　onto　a　ready…made　reality　confronting　it　and　take　refuge
in　something　which　has　shown　itself　to　be　the　unessential　element　of　Appearance　because；　having
looked　around　for　something　better；　it　has　failed　to　find　it；　on　the　contrary；　it　produces　the　reality
from　its　own　resources。　It　will　always　stand　out　as　a　marvel　how　the　Kantian　philosophy
recognised　the　relation　of　thought　to　sensuous　reality；　beyond　which　it　did　not　advance；　as　only　a
relative　relation　of　mere　Appearance；　and　perfectly　well　recognised　and　enunciated　a　higher　unity
of　both　in　the　Idea　in　general　and；　for　example；　in　the　Idea　of　an　intuitive　understanding；　and　yet
stopped　short　at　this　relative　relation　and　the　assertion　that　the　Notion　is　and　remains　utterly
separate　from　realit