science of logic-第12章

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supposed　to　be　of　no　consequence　in　itself；　and　in　it　nothing　is　gained　for　the　same　reason　that
nothing　is　lost；　because　the　ego；　conception；　spirit；　remains　filled　with　the　same　content　of　finitude。
The　opposition　of　the　form　of　subjectivity　and　objectivity　is　of　course　one　of　the　finitudes；　but　the
content；　as　taken　up　in　sensation；　intuition　or　even　in　the　more　abstract　element　of　conception；　of
thought；　contains　finitudes　in　abundance　and　with　the　exclusion　of　only　one　of　the　modes　of
finitude；　namely；　of　the　said　form　of　subjective　and　objective；　these　finitudes　are　certainly　not
eliminated；　still　less　have　they　spontaneously　fallen　away。

Chapter　3　Being…for…self

In　being…for…self；　qualitative　being　finds　its　consummation；　it　is　infinite　being。　The　being　of　the
beginning　lacks　all　determination。　Determinate　being　is　sublated　but　only　immediately　sublated
being。　It　thus　contains；　to　begin　with；　only　the　first　negation；　which　is　itself　immediate；　it　is　true　that
being；　too；　is　preserved　in　it　and　both　are　united　in　determinate　being　in　a　simple　unity；　but　for　that
very　reason　they　are　in　themselves　still　unequal　to　each　other　and　their　unity　is　not　yet　posited。
Determinate　being　is　therefore　the　sphere　of　difference；　of　dualism；　the　field　of　finitude。
Determinateness　is　determinateness　as　such；　in　which　being　is　only　relatively；　not　absolutely
determined。　In　being…for…self；　the　difference　between　being　and　determinateness　or　negation　is
posited　and　equalised；　quality；　otherness；　limit　…　like　reality；　being…in…itself；　the　ought；　and　so
on…are　the　imperfect　embodiments　of　the　negation　in　being　in　which　the　difference　of　both　still　lies
at　the　base。　Since；　however；　in　finitude　the　negation　has　passed　into　infinity；　into　the　posited
negation　of　negation；　it　is　simple　self…relation　and　consequently　in　its　own　self　the　equalisation　with
being；　absolutely　determined　being。

Being…for…self　is　first；　immediately　a　being…for…self　—　the　One。

Secondly；　the　One　passes　into　a　plurality　of　ones　…　repulsion　—　and　this　otherness　of　the　ones　is
sublated　in　their　ideality　—　attraction。

Thirdly；　we　have　the　alternating　determination　of　repulsion　and　attraction　in　which　they　collapse
into　equilibrium；　and　quality；　which　in　being…for…self　reached　its　climax；　passes　over　into　quantity。

A　Being…for…self　as　Such

　　　　　（a）　Determinate　Being　and　Being…for…self

　　　　　（b）　Being…for…one

Remark：　The　German　Expression；　'What　For　a　Thing'　（Meaning　'What　Kind　of　a　Thing'）

　　　　　（c）　The　One

B　The　One　and　the　Many

　　　　　（a）　The　One　in　its　own　self

　　　　　（b）　The　One　and　the　Void



Remark：　Atomism

　　　　　（c）　Many　Ones　—　Repulsion

Remark：　The　Monad　of　Leibniz

C　Repulsion　and　Attraction

　　　　　（a）　Exclusion　of　the　One

Remark：　The　unity　of　the　One　and　the　Many

　　　　　（b）　The　one　One　of　Attraction

　　　　　（c）　The　Relation　of　Repulsion　and　Attraction

Remark：　The　Kantian　Construction　of　Matter　from　the　Forces　of　Attraction
and　Repulsion

Attraction　and　repulsion；　as　we　know；　are　usually　retarded　as　forces。　This　determination　of　them
and　—　the　relationships　connected　with　it　have　to　be　compared　with　the　Notions　which　have
resulted　from　our　consideration　of　them。　Conceived　as　forces；　they　are　regarded　as　self…subsistent
and　therefore　as　not　connected　with　each　other　through　their　own　nature；　that　is；　they　are
considered　not　as　moments；　each　of　which　is　supposed　to　pass　into　the　other；　but　rather　as　fixed　in
their　opposition　to　each　other。　Further；　they　are　imagined　as　meeting　in　a　third；　in　matter；　but　in
such　a　manner；　that　this　unification　is；　counted；　as　their　truth。；　on　the　contrary；　each　is　regarded
also　as　a　first；　as　being　in　and　for　itself；　and　matter；　or　its　determinations；　are　supposed　to　be
realised　and　produced　by　them。　When　it　is　said　that　matter　has　the　forces　within　itself；　they　are
understood　to　be　so　conjoined　in　this　unity　that　they　are　at　the　same　time　presupposed　as
intrinsically　free　and　independent　of　each　other。

Kant；　as　we　know；　constructed　matter　from　the　forces　of　attraction　and　repulsion；　or　at　least　he
has；　to　use　his　own　words；　set　up　the　metaphysical　elements　of　this　construction。　It　will　not　be
without　interest　to　examine　this　construction　more　closely。　This　metaphysical　exposition　of　a
subject　matter　which　not　only　itself　but　also　in　its　determinations　seemed　to　belong　only　to
experience　is　noteworthy；　partly　because　as　an　experiment　with　the　Notion　it　at　least　gave　the
impulse　to　the　more　recent　philosophy　of　nature；　to　a　philosophy　which　does　not　make　nature　as
given　in　sense…perception　the　basis　of　science；　but　which　goes　to　the　absolute　Notion　for　its
determinations；　and　partly　because　in　many　cases　no　advance　is　made　beyond　the　Kantian
construction　which　is　held　to　be　a　philosophical　beginning　and　foundation　for　physics。

Now　it　is　true　that　matter　as　it　exists　for　sense　perception　is　no　more　a　subject　matter　of　logic　than
are　space　and　its　determinations。　But　the　forces　of　attraction　and　repulsion；　in　so　far　as　they　are
regarded　as　forces　of　empirical　matter；　are　also　based　on　the　pure　determinations　here　considered
of　the　one　and　the　many　and　their　inter…relationships；　which；　because　these　names　are　most
obvious；　I　have　called　repulsion　and　attraction。

Kant's　method　in　the　deduction　of　matter　from　these　forces；　which　he　calls　a　construction；　when
looked　at　more　closely　does　not　deserve　this　name；　unless　any　exercise　of　reflection；　even
analytical　reflection；　is　to　be　called　a　construction；　and　later　philosophers　of　nature　have　in　fact
given　the　name　of　construction　to　the　shallowest　reasoning　and　the　most　baseless　concoction　of
unbridled　imagination　and　thoughtless　reflection…and　it　is　especially　for　the　so…called　factors　of
attraction　and　repulsion　that　such　philosophers　have　shown　a　predilection。

For　Kant's　method　is　basically　analytical；　not　constructive。　He　presupposes　the　idea　of　matter　and
then　asks　what　forces　are　required　to　maintain　the　determinations　he　has　presupposed。　Thus；　on
the　one　hand；　he　demands　the　force　of　attraction　because；　properly　speaking；　through　repulsion
alone　and　without　attraction　matter　could　not　exist；'　and　on　the　other　hand　he　derives　repulsion；
too；　from　matter　and　gives　as　the　reason　that　we　think　of　matter　as　impenetrable；　since　it　presents
itself　under　this　category　to　the　sense　of　touch　by　which　it　manifests　itself　to　us。　Consequently；　he
proceeds；　repulsion　is　at　once　thought　in　the　concept　of　matter　because　it　is　immediately　given
therein；　whereas　attraction　is　added　to　the　concept　syllogistically。　But　these　syllogisms；　too；　are
based　on　what　has　just　been　said；　namely；　that　matter　which　possessed　repulsive　force　alone；
would　not　exhaust　our　conception　of　matter。　

It　is　evident　that　this　is　the　method　of　a　cognition　which　reflects　on　experience；　which　first
perceives　the　determinations　in　a　phenomenon；　then　makes　these　the　fondation；　and　for　their
so…called　explanation　asumes　correspnding　basic　elements　or　forces　which　are　suppoed　to
produce　those　determinations　of　the　phenomenon。

With　respect　to　this　difference　as　to　the　way　in　which　cognition　finds　the　forces　of　repulsion　and
attraction　in　matter；　Kant　further　remarks　that　the　force　of　attraction　certainly　just　as　much　belongs
to　the　concept　of　matter　'although　it　is　not　contained　in　it'；　this　last　expression　is　italicised　by
Kant。　However；　it　is　hard　to　perceive　what　this　difference　is　supposed　to　be；　for　a　determination
which　belongs　to　the　concept　of　anything　must　be　truly　contained　in　it。

What　causes　the　difficulty　and　gives　rise　to　this　vain　subterfuge；　is　that　Kant　from　the　start
one…sidedly　attributes　to　the　concept　of　matter　only　the　determination　of　impenetrability；　which　we
are　supposed　to　perceive　by　the　sense　of　touch；　for　which　reason　the　force　of　repulsion　as　the
holding　off　of　an　other　from　itself　is　immediately　given。　But　if；　further；　the　existence　of　matter　is
supposed　to　be　impossible　without　attraction；　then　this　assertion　is　based　on　a　conception　of
matter　taken　from　sense　perception；　consequently；　the　determination　of　attraction；　too；　must　come
within　the　range　of　sense　perception。　It　is　indeed　easy　to　perceive　that　matter；　besides　its
being…for…self；　which　sublates　the　being…for…other　（offers　resistance）；　has　also　a　relation　between
its　self…determined　parts；　a　spatial　extension　and　cohesion；　and　in　rigidity　and　solidity　the
cohesion　is　very　firm。　Physics　explains　that　the　tearing　apart；　etc。；　of　a　body　requires　a　force　which
shall　be　stronger　than　the　mutual　attraction　of　the　parts　of　the　body。　From　this　observation
reflection　can　just　as　directly　derive　the　force　of　attraction　or　assume　it　as　given；　as　it　did　with　the
force　of　repulsion。　In　point　of　fact；　if　we　consider　Kant's　arguments　from　which　the　force　of
attraction　is　supposed　to　be　deduced　（the　proof　of　the　proposition　that　the　possibility　of　matter
requires　a　force　of　attraction　as　a　second　fundamental　force；　loc。　cit。）；　it　is　apparent　that　their　sole
content　is　this；　that　through　repulsion　alone　matter　would　not　be　spatial　Matter　being　presupposed
as　filling　space；　it　is　credited　with　continuity；　the　ground　of　which　is　assumed　to　be　the　force　of
attraction。

Now　if　the　merit　of　such　a　construction　of　matter　were　at　most　that　of　an　analysis　（though　a　merit
diminished　by　the　faulty　exposition）；　still　the　fundamental　thought；　namely；　the　derivation　of　matter
from　these　two　opposite　determinations　as　its　fundamental　forces；　must　always　be　highly
esteemed。　Kant　is　chiefly　concerned　to　banish　the　vulgar　mechanistic　way　of　thinking　which　stops
short　at　the　one　determination　of　impenetrability；　of　self…determined　and　self…subsistent　puncticity；
and　converts　into　something　external　the　opposite　determination；　the　relation　of　matter　within
itself　or　the　relation　of　a　plurality　of　matters；　which　in　turn　are　regarded　as　particular　ones…a　way　of
thinking　which；　as　Kant　says；　will　admit　no　motive　forces　except　pressure　and　thrust；　that　is；　only
action　from　without。　This　external　manner　of　thinking　always　presupposes　motion　as　already
externally　present　in　matter；　and　it　does　not　occur　to　it　to　regard　motion　as　something　immanent
and　to　comprehend　motion　itself　in　matter；　which　latter　is　thus　assumed　as；　on　its　own　account；
motionless　and　inert。　This　stand…point　has　before　it　only　ordinary　mechanics；　not　immanent　and
free　motion。　It　is　true　that　Kant　sublates　this　externality　in　so　far　as　he　makes　attraction　（the
relation　of　matters　to　one　another　in　so　far　as　these　are　assumed　as　separated　from　one　another；
or　matter　generally　in　its　self…externality）　a　force　of　matter　itself；　still；　on　the　other　hand；　his　two
fundamental　forces　within　matter　remain　external　to　and　completely　independent　of　each　other。

The　fixed　difference　of　these　two　forces　attributed　to　them　from　that　external　standpoint　is　no　less
null　than　any　other　distinction　must　show　itself　to　be　which；　in　respect　of　its　specific　content；　is
made　into　something　supposedly　fixed；　because　these　forces　are　only　moments　which　pass　over
into　each　other；　as　we　saw　above　when　they　were　considered　in　their　truth。　I　go　on　to　consider
these　other　distinctions