on liberty-第4章

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temporal　authority　（which　placed　the　direction　of　men's　consciences　in



other　hands　than　those　which　controlled　their　worldly　affairs）；



prevented　so　great　an　interference　by　law　in　the　details　of　private



life；　but　the　engines　of　moral　repression　have　been　wielded　more



strenuously　against　divergence　from　the　reigning　opinion　in



self…regarding；　than　even　in　social　matters；　religion；　the　most



powerful　of　the　elements　which　have　entered　into　the　formation　of



moral　feeling；　having　almost　always　been　governed　either　by　the



ambition　of　a　hierarchy；　seeking　control　over　every　department　of



human　conduct；　or　by　the　spirit　of　Puritanism。　And　some　of　those



modern　reformers　who　have　placed　themselves　in　strongest　opposition　to



the　religions　of　the　past；　have　been　noway　behind　either　churches　or



sects　in　their　assertion　of　the　right　of　spiritual　domination：　M。



Comte；　in　particular；　whose　social　system；　as　unfolded　in　his



Systeme　de　Politique　Positive；　aims　at　establishing　（though　by　moral



more　than　by　legal　appliances）　a　despotism　of　society　over　the



individual；　surpassing　anything　contemplated　in　the　political　ideal　of



the　most　rigid　disciplinarian　among　the　ancient　philosophers。



　　Apart　from　the　peculiar　tenets　of　individual　thinkers；　there　is　also



in　the　world　at　large　an　increasing　inclination　to　stretch　unduly



the　powers　of　society　over　the　individual；　both　by　the　force　of



opinion　and　even　by　that　of　legislation；　and　as　the　tendency　of　all



the　changes　taking　place　in　the　world　is　to　strengthen　society；　and



diminish　the　power　of　the　individual；　this　encroachment　is　not　one



of　the　evils　which　tend　spontaneously　to　disappear；　but；　on　the



contrary；　to　grow　more　and　more　formidable。　The　disposition　of



mankind；　whether　as　rulers　or　as　fellow…citizens；　to　impose　their



own　opinions　and　inclinations　as　a　rule　of　conduct　on　others；　is　so



energetically　supported　by　some　of　the　best　and　by　some　of　the　worst



feelings　incident　to　human　nature；　that　it　is　hardly　ever　kept　under



restraint　by　anything　but　want　of　power；　and　as　the　power　is　not



declining；　but　growing；　unless　a　strong　barrier　of　moral　conviction



can　be　raised　against　the　mischief；　we　must　expect；　in　the　present



circumstances　of　the　world；　to　see　it　increase。



　　It　will　be　convenient　for　the　argument；　if；　instead　of　at　once



entering　upon　the　general　thesis；　we　confine　ourselves　in　the　first



instance　to　a　single　branch　of　it；　on　which　the　principle　here



stated　is；　if　not　fully；　yet　to　a　certain　point；　recognised　by　the



current　opinions。　This　one　branch　is　the　Liberty　of　Thought：　from



which　it　is　impossible　to　separate　the　cognate　liberty　of　speaking　and



of　writing。　Although　these　liberties；　to　some　considerable　amount；



form　part　of　the　political　morality　of　all　countries　which　profess



religious　toleration　and　free　institutions；　the　grounds；　both



philosophical　and　practical；　on　which　they　rest；　are　perhaps　not　so



familiar　to　the　general　mind；　nor　so　thoroughly　appreciated　by　many



even　of　the　leaders　of　opinion；　as　might　have　been　expected。　Those



grounds；　when　rightly　understood；　are　of　much　wider　application　than



to　only　one　division　of　the　subject；　and　a　thorough　consideration　of



this　part　of　the　question　will　be　found　the　best　introduction　to　the



remainder。　Those　to　whom　nothing　which　I　am　about　to　say　will　be



new；　may　therefore；　I　hope；　excuse　me；　if　on　a　subject　which　for　now



three　centuries　has　been　so　often　discussed；　I　venture　on　one



discussion　more。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　2。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Liberty　of　Thought　and　Discussion。







　　THE　TIME；　it　is　to　be　hoped；　is　gone　by；　when　any　defence　would　be



necessary　of　the　〃liberty　of　the　press〃　as　one　of　the　securities



against　corrupt　or　tyrannical　government。　No　argument；　we　may　suppose；



can　now　be　needed；　against　permitting　a　legislature　or　an　executive；



not　identified　in　interest　with　the　people；　to　prescribe　opinions　to



them；　and　determine　what　doctrines　or　what　arguments　they　shall　be



allowed　to　hear。　This　aspect　of　the　question；　besides；　has　been　so



of　and　so　triumphantly　enforced　by　preceding　writers；　that　it　needs



not　be　specially　insisted　on　in　this　place。　Though　the　law　of　England；



on　the　subject　of　the　press；　is　as　servile　to　this　day　as　it　was　in



the　time　of　the　Tudors；　there　is　little　danger　of　its　being　actually



put　in　force　against　political　discussion；　except　during　some



temporary　panic；　when　fear　of　insurrection　drives　ministers　and　judges



from　their　propriety；*　and；　speaking　generally；　it　is　not；　in



constitutional　countries；　to　be　apprehended；　that　the　government；



whether　completely　responsible　to　the　people　or　not；　will　often



attempt　to　control　the　expression　of　opinion；　except　when　in　doing



so　it　makes　itself　the　organ　of　the　general　intolerance　of　the　public。



Let　us　suppose；　therefore；　that　the　government　is　entirely　at　one　with



the　people；　and　never　thinks　of　exerting　any　power　of　coercion



unless　in　agreement　with　what　it　conceives　to　be　their　voice。　But　I



deny　the　right　of　the　people　to　exercise　such　coercion；　either　by



themselves　or　by　their　government。　The　power　itself　is　illegitimate。



The　best　government　has　no　more　title　to　it　than　the　worst。　It　is　as



noxious；　or　more　noxious；　when　exerted　in　accordance　with　public



opinion；　than　when　in　opposition　to　it。　If　all　mankind　minus　one



were　of　one　opinion；　and　only　one　person　were　of　the　contrary　opinion；



mankind　would　be　no　more　justified　in　silencing　that　one　person；



than　he；　if　he　had　the　power；　would　be　justified　in　silencing　mankind。



Were　an　opinion　a　personal　possession　of　no　value　except　to　the　owner；



if　to　be　obstructed　in　the　enjoyment　of　it　were　simply　a　private



injury；　it　would　make　some　difference　whether　the　injury　was　inflicted



only　on　a　few　persons　or　on　many。　But　the　peculiar　evil　of　silencing



the　expression　of　an　opinion　is；　that　it　is　robbing　the　human　race；



posterity　as　well　as　the　existing　generation；　those　who　dissent　from



the　opinion；　still　more　than　those　who　hold　it。　If　the　opinion　is



right；　they　are　deprived　of　the　opportunity　of　exchanging　error　for



truth：　if　wrong；　they　lose；　what　is　almost　as　great　a　benefit；　the



clearer　perception　and　livelier　impression　of　truth；　produced　by　its



collision　with　error。







　　*　These　words　had　scarcely　been　written；　when；　as　if　to　give　them



an　emphatic　contradiction；　occurred　the　Government　Press



Prosecutions　of　1858。　That　ill…judged　interference　with　the　liberty　of



public　discussion　has　not；　however；　induced　me　to　alter　a　single



word　in　the　text；　nor　has　it　at　all　weakened　my　conviction　that；



moments　of　panic　excepted；　the　era　of　pains　and　penalties　for



political　discussion　has；　in　our　own　country；　passed　away。　For；　in　the



first　place；　the　prosecutions　were　not　persisted　in；　and；　in　the



second；　they　were　never；　properly　speaking；　political　prosecutions。



The　offence　charged　was　not　that　of　criticising　institutions；　or　the



acts　or　persons　of　rulers；　but　of　circulating　what　was　deemed　an



immoral　doctrine；　the　lawfulness　of　Tyrannicide。



　　If　the　arguments　of　the　present　chapter　are　of　any　validity；　there



ought　to　exist　the　fullest　liberty　of　professing　and　discussing；　as



a　matter　of　ethical　conviction；　any　doctrine；　however　immoral　it　may



be　considered。　It　would；　therefore；　be　irrelevant　and　out　of　place



to　examine　here；　whether　the　doctrine　of　Tyrannicide　deserves　that



title。　I　shall　content　myself　with　saying　that　the　subject　has　been　at



all　times　one　of　the　open　questions　of　morals；　that　the　act　of　a



private　citizen　in　striking　down　a　criminal；　who；　by　raising　himself



above　the　law；　has　placed　himself　beyond　the　reach　of　legal　punishment



or　control；　has　been　accounted　by　whole　nations；　and　by　some　of　the



best　and　wisest　of　men；　not　a　crime；　but　an　act　of　exalted　virtue；　and



that；　right　or　wrong；　it　is　not　of　the　nature　of　assassination；　but　of



civil　war。　As　such；　I　hold　that　the　instigation　to　it；　in　a　specific



case；　may　be　a　proper　subject　of　punishment；　but　only　if　an　overt



act　has　followed；　and　at　least　a　probable　connection　can　be



established　between　the　act　and　the　instigation。　Even　then；　it　is



not　a　foreign　government；　but　the　very　government　assailed；　which



alone；　in　the　exercise　of　self…defence；　can　legitimately　punish



attacks　directed　against　its　own　existence。







　　It　is　necessary　to　consider　separately　these　two　hypotheses；　each　of



which　has　a　distinct　branch　of　the　argument　corresponding　to　it。　We



can　never　be　sure　that　the　opinion　we　are　endeavouring　to　stifle　is



a　false　opinion；　and　if　we　were　sure；　stifling　it　would　be　an　evil



still。







　　First：　the　opinion　which　it　is　attempted　to　suppress　by　authority



may　possibly　be　true。　Those　who　desire　to　suppress　it；　of　course



deny　its　truth；　but　they　are　not　infallible。　They　have　no　authority　to



decide　the　question　for　all　mankind；　and　exclude　every　other　person



from　the　means　of　judging。　To　refuse　a　hearing　to　an　opinion；



because　they　are　sure　that　it　is　false；　is　to　assume　that　their



certainty　is　the　same　thing　as　absolute　certainty。　All　silencing　of



discussion　is　an　assumption　of　infallibility。　Its　condemnation　may



be　allowed　to　rest　on　this　common　argument；　not　the　worse　for　being



common。



　　Unfortunately　for　the　good　sense　of　mankind；　the　fact　of　their



fallibility　is　far　from　carrying　the　weight　in　their　practical



judgment　which　is　always　allowed　to　it　in　theory；　for　while　every



one　well　knows　himself　to　be　fallible；　few　think　it　necessary　to



take　any　precautions　against　their　own　fallibility；　or　admit　the



supposition　that　any　opinion；　of　which　they　feel　very　certain；　may



be　one　of　the　examples　of　the　error　to　which　they　acknowledge



themselves　to　be　liable。　Absolute　princes；　or　others　who　are



accustomed　to　unlimited　deference；　usually　feel　this　complete



confidence　in　their　own　opinions　on　nearly　all　subjects。　People　more



happily　situated；　who　sometimes　hear　their　opinions　disputed；　and



are　not　wholly　unused　to　be　set　right　when　they　are　wrong；　place　the



same　unbounded　reliance　only　on　such　of　their　opinions　as　are　shared



by　all　who　surround　them；　or　to　whom　they　habitually　defer；　for　in



proportion　to　a　man's　want　of　confidence　in　his　own　solitary　judgment；



does　he　usually　repose；　with　implicit　trust；　on　the　infallibility　of



〃the　world〃　in　general。　And　the　world；　to　each　individual；　means　the



part　of　it　with　which　he　comes　in　contact；　his　party；　his　sect；　his



church；　his　class　of　society；　the　man　may　be　called；　by　comparison；



almost　liberal　and　large…minded　to　whom　it　means　anything　so



comprehensive　as　his　own　country　or　his　own　age。　Nor　is　his　faith　i