the crisis in russia(俄国危机)-第2章
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sort of divine punishment for revolution； or indeed to describe them at all
without emphasizing the fact that the crisis in Russia is part of the crisis in
Europe； and has been in the main brought about like the revolution itself；
by the same forces that have caused； for example； the crisis in Germany or
the crisis in Austria。
No country in Europe is capable of complete economic independence。
In spite of her huge variety of natural resources； the Russian organism
seemed in 1914 to have been built up on the generous assumption that
with Europe at least the country was to be permanently at peace； or at the
lost to engage in military squabbles which could be reckoned in months；
and would keep up the prestige of the autocracy without seriously
hampering imports and exports。 Almost every country in Europe； with the
exception of England； was better fitted to stand alone； was less completely
specialized in a single branch of production。 England； fortunately for
herself； was not isolated during the war； and will not become isolated
unless the development of the crisis abroad deprives her of her markets。
England produces practically no food； but great quantities of coal； steel
and manufactured goods。 Isolate her absolutely； and she will not only
starve； but will stop producing manufactured goods； steel and coal；
because those who usually produce these things will be getting nothing for
their labor except money which they will be unable to use to buy dinners；
because there will be no dinners to buy。 That supposititious case is a
precise parallel to what has happened in Russia。 Russia produced
practically no manufactured goods （70 per cent。 of her machinery she
received from abroad）； but great quantities of food。 The blockade
isolated her。 By the blockade I do not mean merely the childish stupidity
committed by ourselves； but the blockade； steadily increasing in strictness；
which began in August； 1914； and has been unnecessarily prolonged by
our stupidity。 The war； even while for Russia it was not nominally a
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blockade； was so actually。 The use of tonnage was perforce restricted to
the transport of the necessaries of war； and these were narrowly defined as
shells； guns and so on； things which do not tend to improve a country
economically； but rather the reverse。 The imports from Sweden through
Finland were no sort of make…weight for the loss of Poland and Germany。
The war meant that Russia's ordinary imports practically ceased。 It
meant a strain on Russia； comparable to that which would have been put
on England if the German submarine campaign had succeeded in putting
an end to our imports of food from the Americas。 From the moment of
the Declaration of War； Russia was in the position of one 〃holding out；〃 of
a city standing a siege without a water supply； for her imports were so
necessary to her economy that they may justly be considered as essential
irrigation。 There could be no question for her of improvement； of
strengthening。 She was faced with the fact until the war should end she
had to do with what she had； and that the things she had formerly
counted on importing would be replaced by guns and shells； to be used； as
it turned out； in battering Russian property that happened to be in enemy
hands。 She even learned that she had to develop gun…making and shell…
making at home； at the expense of those other industries which to some
small extent might have helped her to keep going。 And； just as in
England such a state of affairs would lead to a cessation of the output of
iron and coal in which England is rich； so in Russia； in spite of her corn
lands； it led to a shortage of food。
The Russian peasant formerly produced food； for which he was paid
in money。 With that money； formerly； he was able to clothe himself； to
buy the tools of his labor； and further； though no doubt he never observed
the fact； to pay for the engines and wagons that took his food to market。
A huge percentage of the clothes and the tools and the engines and the
wagons and the rails came from abroad； and even those factories in Russia
which were capable of producing such things were； in many essentials；
themselves dependent upon imports。 Russian towns began to be hungry
in 1915。 In October of that year the Empress reported to the Emperor
that the shrewd Rasputin had seen in a vision that it was necessary to bring
wagons with flour； butter and sugar from Siberia； and proposed that for
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three days nothing else should be done。 Then there would be no strikes。
〃He blesses you for the arrangement of these trains。〃 In 1916 the
peasants were burying their bread instead of bringing it to market。 In the
autumn of 1916 I remember telling certain most incredulous members of
the English Government that there would be a most serious food shortage
in Russia in the near future。 In 1917 came the upheaval of the revolution；
in
1918 peace； but for Russia； civil war and the continuance of the
blockade。 By July； 1919； the rarity of manufactured goods was such that
it was possible two hundred miles south of Moscow to obtain ten eggs for
a box of matches； and the rarity of goods requiring distant transport
became such that in November； 1919； in Western Russia； the peasants
would sell me nothing for money； whereas my neighbor in the train bought
all he wanted in exchange for small quantities of salt。
It was not even as if； in vital matters； Russia started the war in a
satisfactory condition。 The most vital of all questions in a country of
huge distances must necessarily be that of transport。 It is no
exaggerationto say that only by fantastic efforts was Russian transport able
to save its face and cover its worst deficiencies even before the war began。
The extra strain put upon it by the transport of troops and the maintenance
of the armies exposed its weakness； and with each succeeding week of war；
although in 19l6 and 1917 Russia did receive 775 locomotives from
abroad； Russian transport went from bad to worse； making inevitable a
creeping paralysis of Russian economic life； during the latter already acute
stages of which the revolutionaries succeeded to the disease that had
crippled their precursors。
In 1914 Russia had in all 20；057 locomotives； of which 15；047 burnt
coal； 4；072 burnt oil and 938 wood。 But that figure of twenty thousand
was more impressive for a Government official； who had his own reasons
for desiring to be impressed； than for a practical railway engineer； since of
that number over five thousand engines were more than twenty years old；
over two thousand were more than thirty years old； fifteen hundred were
more than forty years old； and 147 patriarchs had passed their fiftieth
birthday。 Of the whole twenty thousand only 7；108 were under ten years
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of age。 That was six years ago。 In the meantime Russia has been able
to make in quantities decreasing during the last five years by 40 and 50 per
cent。 annually； 2；990 new locomotives。 In 1914 of the locomotives then
in Russia about 17；000 were in working condition。 In 1915 there were；
in spite of 800 new ones； only 16；500。 In 1916 the number of healthy
locomotives was slightly higher； owing partly to the manufacture of 903 at
home in the preceding year and partly to the arrival of 400 from abroad。
In 1917 in
spite of the arrival of a further small contingent the number sank to
between 15；000 and 16；000。 Early in 1918 the Germans in the Ukraine
and elsewhere captured 3；000。 Others were lost in the early stages of the
civil war。 The number of locomotives fell from 14；519 in January to 8；457
in April； after which the artificially instigated revolt of the Czecho…
Slovaks made possible the fostering of civil war on a large scale； and the
number fell swiftly to 4；679 in December。 In 1919 the numbers varied
less markedly； but the decline continued； and in December last year
4；141 engines were in working order。 In January this year the number
was 3；969； rising slightly in February； when the number was 4；019。 A
calculation was made before the war that in the best possible conditions
the maximum Russian output of engines could be not more than1；800
annually。 At this rate in ten years the Russians could restore their
collection of engines to something like adequate numbers。 Today； thirty
years would be an inadequate estimate； for some factories； like the
Votkinsky； have been purposely ruined by the Whites； in others the lathes
and other machinery for building and repairing locomotives are worn out；
many of the skilled engineers were killed in the war with Germany； many
others in defending the revolution； and it will be long before it will be
possible to restore to the workmen or to the factories the favorable
material conditions of 1912…13。 Thus the main fact in the present crisis is
that Russia possesses one…fifth of the number of locomotives which in
1914 was just sufficient to maintain her railway system in a state of
efficiency which to English observers at that time was a joke。 For six
years sh
