phenomenology of mind-第69章

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evil　from　someone　and　bringing　him　good。　To　do　this　we　have　to　distinguish　what　the　evil　is；　what
is　the　appropriate　good　to　meet　this　evil；　and　what　in　general　his　well…being　consists　in；　i。e。　we
have　to　love　him　intelligently。　Unintelligent　love　will　do　him　harm　perhaps　more　than　hatred。

Intelligent；　veritable　（wesentlich）　well…doing　is；　however；　in　its　richest　and　most　important　form　the
intelligent　universal　action　of　the　state　—　an　action　compared　with　which　the　action　of　a　particular
individual　as　such　is　something　altogether　so　trifling　that　it　is　hardly　worth　talking　about。　The　action
of　the　state　is　in　this　connexion　of　such　great　weight　and　strength　that　if　the　action　of　the　individual
were　to　oppose　it；　and　either　sought　to　be　straightway　and　deliberately　（für　sich）　criminal；　or　out
of　love　for　another　wanted　to　cheat　the　universal　out　of　the　right　and　claim　which　it　has　upon　him；
such　action　would　be　useless　and　would　inevitably　be　annihilated。　Hence　all　that　well…doing；　which
lies　in　sentiment　and　feeling；　can　mean　is　an　action　wholly　and　solely　particular；　a　help　at　need；
which　is　as　contingent　as　it　is　momentary。　Chance　determines　not　merely　its　occasion；　but　also
whether　it　is　a　〃work〃　at　all；　whether　it　is　not　at　once　dissipated　again；　and　whether　it　does　not
itself　really　turn　to　evil。　Thus　this　sort　of　action　for　the　good　of　others；　which　is　given　out　as
necessary；　is　so　constituted　that　it　may　just　as　likely　not　exist　as　exist；　is　such　that　if　the　occasion
by　chance　arises；　it　may　possibly　be　a　〃work〃；　may　possibly　be　good；　but　just　as　likely　may　not。
This　law；　therefore；　has　as　little　of　a　universal　content　as　the　first　above　considered；　and　fails　to
express　anything　substantial；　something　objectively　real　per　se　（an　und　für　sich）；　which　it　should
do　if　it　is　to　be　an　absolute　ethical　law。　In　other　words；　such　laws　never　get　further　than　the　〃ought
to　be〃；　they　have　no　actual　reality；　they　are　not　laws；　but　merely　commands。

It　is；　however；　in　point　of　fact；　clear　from　the　very　nature　of　the　case　that　we　must　renounce　all
claim　to　an　absolute　universal　content。　For　every　specific　determination　which　the　simple　substance
（and　its　very　nature　consists　in　being　simple）　might　obtain　is　inadequate　to　its　nature。　The　command
itself　in　its　simple　absoluteness　expresses　immediate　ethical　existence；　the　distinction　appearing　in　it
is　a　specific　determinate　element；　and　thus　a　content　standing　under　the　absolute　universality　of　this
simple　existence。　Since；　then；　an　absolute　content　must　thus　be　renounced；　formal　universality　is
the　only　kind　that　is　possible　and　suitable；　and　this　means　merely　that　it　is　not　to　contradict　itself。
For　universality　devoid　of　content　is　formal；　and　an　absolute　content　amounts　to　a　distinction　which
is　no　distinction；　i。e。　means　absence　of　content。（2）

In　default　of　all　content　there　is　thus　nothing　left　with　which　to　make　a　law　but　the　bare　form　of
universality；　in　fact；　the　mere　tautology　of　consciousness；　a　tautology　which　stands　over　against　the
content；　and　consists　in　a　knowledge；　not　of　the　content　actually　existing；　the　content　proper；　but
of　its　ultimate　essence　only；　a　knowledge　of　its　self…identity。

The　ethical　inner　essence　is　consequently　not　itself　ipso　facto　a　content；　but　only　a　standard　for
deciding　whether　a　content　is　capable　of　being　a　law　or　not；　i。e。　whether　the　content　does　not
contradict　itself。　Reason　as　law…giver　is　reduced　to　being　reason　as　criterion；　instead　of　laying
down　laws　reason　now　only　tests　what　is　laid　down。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　



1。　Cp。　Kant；　Groundwork　of　the　Metaphysic　of　Morals：　Sect。　1　Critique　of　Practical　Reason：
Analytic　c。　3。

2。　The　above　criticism　applies　to　Kant's　〃categorical　imperative〃。　




c
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Reason　as　Testing　Laws

A　DIFFERENCE　within　the　bare　and　simple　ethical　substance　is　for　it　an　accident；　which；　in　the
case　of　determinate　commands；　as　we　saw；　appeared　as　contingency　in　the　knowledge　of　the
circumstances　and　contingency　in　action。　The　comparison　of　that　simple　existence　with　the
determinateness　which　was　inadequate　to　its　nature　took　place　in　us；　and　the　simple　substance　was
then　seen　to　be　formal　universality　or　pure　consciousness　which　holds　itself　free　from　and　in
opposition　to　the　content；　and　is　a　knowledge　of　that　content　as　something　determinate。　The
universality　in　this　way　remains　the　same　as　what　the　objectified　intent　was。　But　in　consciousness
this　universality　is　something　different；　it　is　no　longer　the　genus；　inert　and　void　of　thought；　but　is
related　to　the　particular　and　valid　as　its　force　and　truth。

This　consciousness　at　first　seems　the　same　process　of　testing　which　formerly　we　carried　on；　and　its
action　seems　unable　to　be　anything　else　than　has　already　taken　place　—　a　comparison　of　the
universal　with　the　determinate　particular　which　would　yield　as　formerly　their　mutual　incongruity。
But　the　relation　of　content　to　universal　is　different　here；　since　this　universal　has　got　another
significance。　It　is　formal　universality；　of　which　the　specific　consent　is　capable；　for　in　that
universality　the　content　is　considered　merely　in　relation　to　itself。　When　we　were　applying　the　test；
the　universal　solid　substance　stood　over　against　that　specificity；　which　proved　to　be　a　contingent
element　of　the　consciousness　into　which　the　substance　entered。　Here　one　term　of　the　comparison
has　vanished；　the　universal　is　no　longer　the　existing　substance　with　a　value　all　its　own；　is　no　longer
substantive　right　per　se；　but　simple　knowledge　or　form；　which　compares　a　content　merely　with
itself；　and　looks　at　it　to　see　if　it　is　a　tautology。　Laws　are　no　longer　given；　but　examined　and　tested；
and　for　that　consciousness　which　applies　the　test　the　laws　are　already　given。　It　picks　up　their
content　as　simply　there；　without　going　into　the　consideration　（as　was　done　before）　of　the
particularity　and　contingency　attaching　to　its　reality；　instead　of　this　it　takes　its　stand　by　the
command　as　command；　and　takes　up　an　attitude　towards　this　command　just　as　direct　and　simple
as　＇the　fact　of＇　its　being　a　standard　and　criterion　for　criticizing　it。

For　that　reason；　however；　this　process　of　testing　does　not　get　very　far。　Just　because　the　standard
is　a　tautology　and　indifferent　to　the　content；　it　accepts　one　content　just　as　readily　as　the　opposite。
Suppose　the　question　is：　—　ought　it　to　be　a　law　without　qualification　（an　und　für　sich）　that　there
should　be　property？　Without　qualification；　and　not　because　of　utility　for　other　ends：　—　the　essential
ethical　truth　consists　just　in　the　fact　that　the　law　should　be　merely　a　self…consistent　whole　（sich
selbst　gleiche）；　and　through　being　identical　with　itself　have　its　ground　in　its　own　essential　nature；
and　not　be　something　conditioned。　Property　per　se　does　not　contradict　itself。　It　is　a　specifically
determinate　isolated　element；　or　merely　self…identical　（sich　selbst　gleich）。　Absence　of　property；
absence　of　ownership　of　things；　or　again；　community　of　goods；　contradicts　itself　just　as　little。　That
something　belong　to　nobody　at　all；　or　to　the　first　best　man　who　puts　himself　in　possession；　or；
again；　to　all　together；　and　to　each　according　to　his　need　or　in　equal　portions　—　that　is　a　simple
characteristic；　a　formal　thought；　like　its　opposite；　property。

If　indeed　no　one　is　master　of　a　thing　and　it　is　looked　at　as　a　necessary　object　for　human
requirement；　then　it　is　necessary　that　it　should　become　the　possession　of　some　particular　individual；
and　the　contradiction　would　rather　lie　in　making　a　law　out　of　the　freedom　of　the　thing。　By　the　thing
being　without　an　owner　is　meant；　however；　not　absolute　freedom　from　ownership；　but　that　it　shall
come　into　someone's　possession　according　to　the　need　of　the　individual；　and；　moreover；　not　in
order　to　be　kept　but　directly　to　be　used。　But　to　make　provision　for　need　in　such　an　entirely
haphazard　manner　is　contradictory　to　the　nature　of　the　conscious　being；　with　whom　alone　we　have
here　to　do。　For　such　a　being　has　to　think　of　his　need　in　a　universal　way；　to　look　to　his　existence　in
its　entirety；　and　procure　himself　a　permanent　lasting　good。　This　being　so；　the　idea　that　a　thing　is　to
become　by　chance　the　possession　of　the　first　self…conscious　individual　（Leben）　who　happens　to
need　it；　is　inconsistent　with　itself。

In　a　communistic　society；　where　provision　would　be　made　in　a　way　which　is　universal　and
permanent；　either　each　comes　to　have　as　much　as　he　requires…in　which　case　there　is　a
contradiction　between　this　inequality　and　the　essential　nature　—　of　consciousness；　whose　principle
is　the　equality　of　individuals…or；　acting　on　this　last　principle；　there　is　an　equal　division　of　goods；　and
in　this　case　the　share　each　gets　has　no　relation　to　his　needs；　and　yet　this　is　solely　what　〃share〃；　i。e。
fair　share；　really　means。

But　if　when　taken　in　this　way　absence　of　property　seems　contradictory；　this　is　only　because　it　has
not　been　left　in　the　form　of　a　simple　determinate　characteristic。　The　same　result　is　found　in　the　case
of　property　if　this　is　resolved　into　separate　moments。　The　particular　thing　which　is　my　property　has
by　being　so　the　value　of　something　universal；　established；　and　permanent。　This；　how。　ever；
contradicts　its　nature；　which　consists　in　its　being　used　and　passing　away。　At　the　same　time　its
value　lies　in　being　mine；　which　all　others　acknowledge　and　keep　themselves　away　from。　But　just　in
my　being　acknow…　ledged　lies　rather　my　equality；　my　identify；　with　every　one　—　the　opposite　of
exclusion。

Again；　what　I　possess　is　a　thing；　i。e。　an　existence；　which　is　there　for　others　in　general；　quite
universally　and　without　any　condition　that　it　is　for　me　alone。　That　I　possess　it　contradicts　the
general　nature　of　its　thinghood。　Property　therefore　contradicts　itself　on　all　hands　just　as　much　as
absence　of　property；　each　has　within　it　both　these　opposite　and　self…contradictory　moments；
universality　and　particularity。

But　each　of　these　determinate　characteristics；　presented　simply　as　property　or　absence　of
property　without　further　developing　its　implications；　is　as　simple　as　the　other；　i。e。　is　not
self…contradictory。　The　standard　of　law　which　reason　has　within　itself　therefore　fits　every　case　in
the　same　way；　and　is　in　point　of　fact　no　standard　at　all。　It　would；　too；　turn　out　rather　strange；　if
tautology；　the　principle　of　contradiction；　which　is　allowed　to　be　merely　a　formal　criterion　for
knowledge　of　theoretical　truth；　i。e。　something　which　is　quite　indifferent　to　truth　and　untruth　alike；
were　to　be　more　than　this　for　knowledge　of　practical　truth。

In　both　the　above　moments　of　what　fills　up　the　previous　emptiness　of　spiritual　reality　（geistigen
Wesen）　the　attempt　to　establish　immediate　determinate　characteristics　within　the　substance　of　the
ethical　life；　and　then　to　know　whether　these　determinations　are　laws；　has　cancelled　itself。　The
outcome；　then；　seems　to　be　that　neither　determinate　laws　nor　a　knowledge　of　these　can　be
obtained。　But　the　substance　in　question　is　the　consciousness　of　itself　as　absolute　essentiality
（Wesenheit）；　a　consciousness　therefore　which　can　give　up　neither　the　difference　falling　within　that
substance；　nor　the　knowledge　of