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phenomenology of mind-及67嫗

弌傍�� phenomenology of mind 忖方�� 耽匈3500忖

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the same time�察�as we find self´consciousness here�察�it is a consciousness of its substance which has
just arisen�察�and hence is immediate�察�and this is the specific way in which we find spirit at the
present stage�此�it has not yet reached its truly real substance。 The objectified intent takes in this
immediate consciousness the form of bare and simple essence ��einfachen Wesen���察�which being
universal�察�contains all its various moments in itself and belongs to them�察�but�察�again�察�is also
indifferent towards them taken as specific moments�察�and is independent by itself �察�and�察�as this free
and objective simple abstract ;fact;�察�passes for the essentially real ��Wesen��。 The various moments
of the original determinateness�察�the moments of the ;fact; of this particular individual�察�his purpose��
means�察�action�察�and actual reality�察�are�察�on the one hand�察�particular moments for this consciousness��
which it can abandon and give up for the objectified intent�察�on the other hand�察�however�察�they all
have this object as their essential nature�察�but only in such a way that it�察�being their abstract
universal�察�can find itself in each of these different moments and be their predicate。 The objectified
intent is not yet subject�察�but those moments stand for subject�察�because they belong to the aspect of
individualness�察�while the object in mind is only at this stage bare universality。 It is the genus which
finds itself in all these moments as species of itself�察�and is equally independent of them。

Consciousness is called ;honest;�察�when it has on the one hand attained this idealization
��Idealismus���察�which objectified intent expresses�察�and on the other possesses the truth in it qua this
formal universality。 Consciousness when so characterized is solely concerned with intended
object�察�and hence occupies itself with its various moments or species。 And when it does not reach
this fact in one of these moments�察�does not find the real intent in one meaning�察�it just on that
account lays hold of the fact in another�察�and consequently always really secures that satisfaction
which should belong to this mode of consciousness by its very nature ��seinem Begriffe nach��。
However things turn out�察�it achieves and secures the objectified intent�察�for the latter�察�being this
universal genus of those moments�察�is the predicate of all。

Should it not bring a purpose into reality�察�it has at least willed the purpose�察�i。e。 turns purpose qua
purpose�察�mere doing which does nothing�察�into the real intent�察�and can therefore maintain and feel
consoled that at least there has always been something attempted�察�something done。 Since the
universal contains within it even the negative or the transitoriness�察�this too�察�the self´annihilation of
the work�察�is itself its doing。 It has stimulated others towards this�察�and still finds satisfaction in the
disappearance of its reality�察�just as bad boys enjoy a personal pleasure in getting their ears boxed
because they are the cause of its being done。 Or�察�again�察�suppose it has not so much as tried to
carry out the real intent and done nothing at all�察�then it has not cared�察�the objectified intent is for it
just the unity of its decision with reality�察�it asserts that the reality would be nothing else than its own
wish in the matter ��sein M��gen��。 Finally�察�suppose something of interest has come its way entirely
without its help�察�then for it this reality is the real intent just by the interest which it finds therein��
although that reality has not been produced by its doing。 If it is a piece of good luck�察�which has
befallen the individual personally�察�he reckons it his own act and his own desert�察�if it is�察�on the other
hand�察�a mere event in the world�察�which does not concern him further�察�he makes it likewise his own��
and an interest�察�where he has done nothing�察�is held as a party interest which he has taken up and
defended or maintained�察�for or against。

                  3。 Mutual Deception and Spiritual Substance

The ;Honesty;�察�or ;Honourableness;�察�of this mode of consciousness�察�as well as the satisfaction
which it meets with at every point�察�really consists�察�as the above makes clear�察�in this�察�that it does not
bring together its ideas regarding the objectified intent。 Its own affair ��seine Sache���察�no work at all��
or mere action and bare purpose�察�or again a reality involving no action at all ! all and every one of
these are equally the real intent�此�it makes one meaning after another the subject of this predicate��
and forgets one after the other。 By its having merely willed or�察�again�察�in not having cared�察�the real
intent has now the meaning of empty purpose�察�and of the merely ideal thought´unity of willing and
performance。 The consolation for the annihilation of the purpose which was at all events willed or
at all events simply done�察�as well as the satisfaction of having given others something to do�察�makes
simple doing�察�or entirely bad work�察�the essential reality�察�for that must be called a bad work which
is no work at all。 Finally�察�in the case of finding through good luck the reality at hand�察�this existence
without any act becomes the real intent。

The true meaning of this ;Honesty;�察�however�察�lies in not being so honest as it seems。 For it cannot
be so unintelligent as to let these various moments fall apart in that way�察�it must have an immediate
consciousness regarding their opposition�察�because they are absolutely related to one another。 Bare
action is essentially action of this individual�察�and this action is likewise essentially an actuality or a
;fact;。 Conversely�察�actuality essentially is only as his own action�察�and as action in general as well��
and just as his own action is action in general�察�so it is only reality in general。 While�察�then�察�he thinks
he has only to do with the objectified intent as abstract reality�察�there is also present this idea that he
has to do with it as his own doing。 But precisely so far as it is only a matter of being busy about
doing something�察�he is not really in earnest in the matter�察�but rather is dealing with a ;fact;�察�and with
fact as his own。 Since�察�finally�察�he seems to will merely his own ;fact; and his own action�察�it is again
a matter of dealing with ;fact; in general or actuality substantial and abiding ��an und f┨r sich
bleibende��。

Just as the real intent and its moments appear at this stage as content�察�they are likewise necessary
also as forms in consciousness。 They come forward as content merely to pass away again�察�each
making room for the other。 They have therefore to be present in the character of cancelled and
sublated forms�此�so taken�察�however�察�they are aspects of consciousness itself。 The real intent is
present as the inherent nature or reflexion of consciousness into self�察�the ousting of the moments by
each other there finds expression�察�however�察�in their being established in consciousness�察�not per se��
but only for another consciousness。 One of the moments of the content is exposed by it to the
light�察�and presented as an object for others。 Consciousness�察�however�察�is at the same time reflected
therefrom back upon itself�察�and the opposite is thus equally present within it�察�is retained for itself as
its own。 There is�察�too�察�not one of them which could be merely and solely put outside�察�and another
merely retained within�察�rather�察�consciousness operates alternately with them�察�for it has to make
one as well as another essential for itself and for others。 The whole is the moving process of
permeating individuality with the universal。 In that this consciousness finds this whole�察�however�察�to
be merely the simple ultimate nature ��Wesen�� and thus the abstraction of the real intent�察�the
moments of this whole appear as distinct outside that object and outside one another。 As a single
whole it is only exhaustively exhibited by the process of alternately exposing its elements to view
and keeping them within itself。 Since in this alternation consciousness has in its process of reflexion
one moment for itself and keeps it as essential�察�while another is merely externally implied or is for
others�察�there thus enters a play of individualities with one another�察�where they both deceive and
find deceived themselves and one another reciprocally。

An individuality�察�then�察�sets to work to carry out something�察�by so doing it seems to have made
something into an ;actual fact;。 It acts�察�by so doing it comes out before others�察�and seems to be
concerned to secure the reality of something。 Others�察�therefore�察�take its action to be an interest in
the ;fact; as such�察�and take the end of the act to be the carrying out of the ;fact; per se�察�regardless
of whether this is done by the former individuality or by them。 When on this account they point out
that this ;fact; has been already brought about by themselves�察�or�察�if not�察�offer and actually furnish
their assistance�察�then they see that consciousness has rather left the position where they think it to
be�察�it is its own action and effort�察�which arouses its interest in the ;fact;�察�and when they come to
know that this was the real intent�察�the fact of the matter�察�they feel themselves deceived。 In reality��
however�察�their haste to render assistance was itself nothing else than their desire to see and
manifest their own action and not the objectified intent�察�i。e。 they wanted to deceive the other
individual just in the way they complain of having been deceived。 Since there has now been
brought to light that its own action and effort�察�the play of its powers�察�is taken for the real intent��
consciousness seems to be occupied in its own way on its own account and not on that of others��
and only to be troubled about action qua its own action�察�and not about action qua an action of
others�察�and hence seems to let the others in their turn keep to their own ;fact; But they go wrong
again�察�that consciousness has already left the point where they thought it was。 It is not concerned
with the matter in hand as ;fact; in the sense of this its own particular fact�察�but as fact qua fact��
qua something universal�察�which is for all。 Hence it interferes in the action and work of others�察�and
if consciousness can no longer take their work out of their hands�察�it is at least interested in the
matter�察�and shows this by its concern to pass judgment。 When it stamps the result with the mark of
its approval and praise�察�this is meant to imply that in the work it does not merely praise the work
itself�察�but at the same time its own generosity and moderation in not having destroyed the work as
work nor spoiled it by finding fault。 Since it shows an interest in the work�察�it enjoys its own self
therein�察�and in the same way the work which it found fault with is welcomed for just this enjoyment
of its own action which is thereby procured。 Those�察�however�察�who regard themselves as�察�or
profess to be�察�deceived by this interference from others wanted really themselves to deceive in the
same way。 They give out their efforts and doings as something only for themselves�察�in which they
merely have themselves and their own nature in view。 But since they do something�察�and thus
express their nature�察�bring themselves to the light of day�察�they directly contradict by their deed the
pretence of wanting to exclude the daylight�察�i。e。 to exclude the publicity of universal consciousness��
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