phenomenology of mind-第54章

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when　it　is　a　question　of　his　being　qua　being；　and　the　twofold　being　of　bodily　shape　and　act　are
pitted　against　one　another；　each　claiming　to　be　his　true　reality；　the　deed　alone；　is　to　be　affirmed　as
his　genuine　being　—　not　his　figure　or　shape；　which　would　express　what　he　〃means〃　to　convey　by
his　acts；　or　what　any　one　might　〃conjecture〃　he　merely　could　do。　In　the　same　way；　on　the　other
hand；　when　his　performance　and　his　inner　possibility；　capacity；　or　intention　are　opposed；　the
former　alone　is　to　be　regarded　as　his　true　reality；　even　if　he　deceives　himself　on　the　point　and；
after　he　has　turned　from　his　action　into　himself；。　means　to　be　something　else　in　his　〃inner　mind〃　than
what　he　is　in　the　act。　Individuality；　which　commits　itself　to　the　objective　element；　when　it　passes
over　into　a　deed　no　doubt　puts　itself　to　the　risk　of　being　altered　and　perverted。　But　what　settles　the
character　of　the　act　is　just　this　—　whether　the　deed　is　a　real　thing　that　holds　together；　or　whether　it
is　merely　a　pretended　or　〃supposed〃　performance；　which　is　in　itself　null　and　void　and　passes　away。
Objectification　does　not　alter　the　act　itself；　it　merely　shows　what　the　deed　is；　i。e。　whether　it　is　or
whether　it　is　nothing。

The　breaking　up　of　this　real　being　into　intentions；　and　subtleties　of　that　sort；　by　which　the　real　man；
i。e。　his　deed；　is　to　be　reduced　again　to；　and　explained　in　terms　of；　a　〃conjectured〃　being；　as　even
the　individual　himself　may　produce　out　of　himself　particular　intentions　concerning　his　reality　—　all
this　must　be　left　to　idle　〃fancying　and　presuming〃　to　furnish　at　its　leisure。　If　this　idle　thinking　will　set
its　ineffective　wisdom　to　work；　and　will　deny　the　agent　the　character　of　reason；　and　use　him　so
badly　as　to　want　to　declare　his　figure　and　his　lineaments　to　be　his　real　being　instead　of　his　act；　then
it　may　expect　to　get　the　retort　above　spoken　of；　a　retort　which　shows　that　figure　is　not　the　inherent
being；　but　is　on　the　contrary　an　object　sufficiently　on　the　surface　to　be　roughly　handled。

If　we　look　now　at　the　range　of　relations　as　a　whole　in　which　self…conscious　individuality　can　be
observed　standing　towards　its　outer　aspect；　there　will　be　one　left　which　has　still　to　come　before
observation　as　an　object。　In　psychology　it　is　the　external　reality　of　things　which　in　the　life　of　mind　is
to　have　its　counterpart　conscious　of　itself　and　make　the　mind　intelligible。　In　physiognomy；　on　the
other　hand；　mind　or　spirit　is　to　be　known　in　its　own　proper　outer　（physical）　aspect；　a　form　of　being
which　may　be　called　the　language　or　utterance　of　mind　—　the　visible　invisibility　of　its　inner　nature。
There　is　still　left　the　further　character　of　the　aspect　of　reality　—　that　individuality　expresses　its
nature　in　its　immediate　actuality；　an　actuality　that　is　definitely　fixed　and　purely　existent。

This　last　relation　＇of　mind　to　its　reality＇　is　distinguished　from　the　physiognomic　by　the　fact　that　this
is　the　speaking　presence　of　the　individual；　who　in　his　practical　active　outer　expression　brings　to
light　and　manifests　at　the　same　time　the　expression　wherein　he　reflects　himself　into　himself　and
contemplates　himself；　an　expression　which　is　itself　a　movement；　passive　lineaments　which　are
themselves　essentially　a　mediated　form　of　existence。　In　the　character　still　to　be　considered；
however；　the　outer；　element　is　finally　an　entirely　inactive　objectivity；　which　is　not　in　itself　a　speaking
sign；　but　presents　itself　on　its　own　account；　separate　from　the　self…conscious　process；　and　has　the
form　of　a　bare　thing。

In　the　first　place　in　regard　to　the　relation　of　the　inner　to　this　its　outer；　it　is　clear　that　that　relation
seems　bound　to　be　understood　in　the　sense　of　a　causal　connexion；　since　the　relation　of　one
immanent　and　inherent　entity　to　another；　qua　a　necessary　relation；　is　causal　connexion。

Now；　for　spiritual　individuality　to　have　an　effect　on　the　body　it　must　qua　cause　be　itself　corporeal。
The　corporeal　element；　however；　wherein　it　acts　as　a　cause；　is　the　organ；　not　the　organ　of　action
on　external　reality；　but　of　the　action　of　the　self…conscious　being　within　itself；　operating　outward
only　on　its　own　body。　It　is　at　the　same　time　not　easy　to　see　what　these　organs　can　be。　If　we　merely
think　of　organs　in　general；　the　general　organ　for　work　would　at　once　occur　to　us；　so；　too；　the
organ　of　sex；　and　so　on。　But　organs　of　that　sort　are　to　be　considered　as　intruments　or　parts；　which
mind；　qua　one　extreme；　possesses　as　a　means　for　dealing　with　the　other　extreme；　which　is　an
outer　object。　In　the　present　case；　however；　an　organ　is　to　be　understood　to　be　one　wherein　the
self…conscious　individual；　as　an　extreme；　maintains　himself　on　his　own　account　and　for　himself
against　his　own　proper　actuality　which　is　opposed　to　him；　the　individual　not　being　at　the　same　time
turned　upon　the　outer　world；　but　reflected　in　his　own　action；　and　where；　further；　his　aspect　of
existence　is　not　an　existence　objective　for　some　other　individual。　In　the　case　of　physiognomy；　too；
the　organ　is　no　doubt　considered　as　an　existence　reflected　into　self　and　criticizing　the　action。　But　in
this　case　the　existence　is　objective　in　character；　and　the　outcome　of　the　physiognomical
observation　is　that　self…consciousness　treats　precisely　this　its　reality　as　something　indifferent。　This
indifference　disappears　in　the　fact　that　this　very　state　of　being　reflected　into　self　is　itself　active　upon
the　other：　thereby　that　existence　occupies　and　maintains　a　necessary　relation　to　self…consciousness。
But　to　operate　effectually　on　that　existence　it　must　itself　have　a　being；　though　not　properly
speaking　an　objective　being；　and　it　must　be　set　forth　as　being　this　organ。

In　ordinary　life；　anger；　e。g。　as　an　internal　action　of　that　sort；　is　located　in　the　liver。　Plato　（7）　even
assigns　the　liver　something　still　higher；　something　which　to　many　is　even　the　highest　function　of　all；
viz。　prophesying；　or　the　gift　of　uttering　in　an　irrational　manner　things　sacred　and　eternal。　But　the
process　which　the　individual　has　in　his　liver；　heart；　and　so　on；　cannot　be　regarded　as　one　wholly
internal　to　the　individual；　wholly　reflected　into　his　self；　rather　his　process　is　there　（viz。　in　the　liver；
etc。）　as　something　which　has　already　become　bodily　and　assumes　a　physical　animal　existence；
reacting　on　and　towards　external　reality。

The　nervous　system；　on　the　other　hand；　is　the　immediate　stability　of　the　organism　in　its　process　of
movement。　The　nerves　themselves；　no　doubt；　are　again　organs　of　that　consciousness　which　from
the　first　is　immersed　in　its　outward　impulses。　Brain　and　spinal　cord；　however；　may　be　looked　at　as
the　immediate　presence　of　self…consciousness；　a　presence　self…contained；　not　an　object　and　also
not　transient。　In　so　far　as　the　moment　of　being；　which　this　organ　has；　is　a　being　for　another；　is　an
objective　existence；　it　is　a　being　that　is　dead；　and　is　no　longer　the　presence　of　self…consciousness。
This　self…contained　existence；　however；　is　by　its　very　nature　a　fluent　stream；　wherein　the　circles
that　are　made　in　it　immediately　break　up　and　dissolve；　and　where　no　distinction　is　expressed　as
permanent　or　real。　Meanwhile；　as　mind　itself　is　not　an　abstractly　simple　entity；　but　a　system　of
processes；　wherein　it　distinguishes　itself　into　moments；　but　in　the　very　act　of　distinguishing　remains
free　and　detached；　and　as　mind　articulates　its　body　as　a　whole　into　a　variety　of　functions；　and
designates　one　particular　part　of　the　body　for　only　one　function：　—　so　too　one　can　represent　to
oneself　the　fluent　state　of　its　internal　existence　＇its　existence　within　itself＇　as　something　that　is
articulated　into　parts。　Moreover；　it　seems　bound　to　be　thought　of　in　this　way；　because　the
self…reflected　being　of　mind　in　the　brain　itself　is　again　merely　a　middle　term　between　its　pure
essential　nature　and　its　bodily　articulation；　an　intermediate　link；　which　consequently　must　partake
of　the　nature　of　both；　and　thus　in　respect　of　the　latter　must　also　again　have　in　it　actual　articulation。

The　psycho…organic　being　has　at　the　same　time　the　necessary　aspect　of　a　stable　subsistent
existence。　The　former　must　retire；　qua　extreme　of　self…existence；　and　have　this　latter　as　the　other
extreme　over　against　it；　an　extreme　which　is　then　the　object　on　which　the　former　acts　as　a　cause。　If
now　brain　and　spinal　cord　are　that　bodily　self…existence　of　mind；　the　skull　and　vertebral　column
form　the　other　extreme　separated　off；　viz。　the　solid　fixed　stable　thing。

When；　however；　any　one　thinks　of　the　proper　place　where　mind　exists；　it　is　not　the　back　that
occurs　to　him；　but　merely　the　head。　Since　this　is　so；　we　can；　in　examining　a　form　of　knowledge　like
what　we　are　at　present　dealing　with；　content　ourselves　with　this　reason　—　not　a　very　bad　one　in　the
present　case　—　in　order　to　confine　the　existence　of　mind　to　the　skull。　Should　it　strike　any　one　to
take　the　vertebral　column　for　the　seat　of　mind；　in　so　far　as　by　it　too　knowledge　and　action
doubtless　are　sometimes　partly　induced　and　partly　educed；　this　would　prove　nothing　in　defence　of
the　view　that　the　spinal　cord　must　be　taken　as　well　for　the　indwelling　seat　of　mind；　and　the
vertebral　column　for　the　existential　counterpart；　because　this　proves　too　much。　For　we　may　bear　in
mind　that　there　are　also　other　approved　external　ways　for　getting　at　the　activity　of　mind　in　order　to
stimulate　or　inhibit　its　activity。

The　vertebral　column；　then；　if　we　like；　drops　rightly　out　of　account；　and　it　is　as　well　made　out　as
many　another　doctrine　of　the　philosophy　of　nature　that　the　skull　alone　does　not　indeed　contain　the
〃organs〃　of　mind　（but　its　existent　embodiment）。　For　this　was　previously　excluded　from　the
conception　of　this　relation；　and　on　that　account　the　skull　was　taken　for　the　aspect　of　existence；　or；
if　we　may　not　be　allowed　to　recall　the　conception　involved；　then　experience　unquestionably
teaches　that；　as　we　see　with　the　eye　qua　organ；　so　it　is　not　with　the　skull　that　we　commit　murder；
steal；　write　poetry；　etc。

We　must　on　that　account　refrain　from　using　the　expression　〃organ〃　also　when　speaking　of　that
significance　of　the　skull　which　we　have　still　to　mention。　For　although　it　is　a　common　thing　to　hear
people　say；　that　to　reasonable　men　it　is　not　words　but　facts　that　really　matter；　yet　that　does　not
give　us　permission　to　describe　a　thing　in　terms　not　appropriate　to　it。　For　this　is　at　once　stupidity
and　deceit；　pretending　merely　not　to　have　the　right　〃word〃；　and　biding　from　itself　that　in　reality　it
has　not　got　hold　of　the　fact　itself；　the　notion。　If　the　latter　were　there；　it　would　soon　find　the　right
word。

What　has　been　here　determined　is；　in　the　first　instance；　merely　that　just　as　the　brain　is　the　caput
vivum；　the　skull　is　the　caput　mortuum。

It　is　in　this　ens　mortuum；　then；　that　the　mental　processes　and　specific　functions　of　the　brain　would
have　to　find　their　external　reality　manifested；　a　reality　which　is　none　the　less　in　the　individual
himself。　For　the　relation　of　those　processes　and　functions　to　what；　being　an　ens　mortuum；　does
not　contain　mind　indwelling　within　it；　there　is　offered；　in　the　first　instance；　the　external　and
mechanical　relation　defined　above；　so　that　the　organs　proper　—　and　these　are　in　the　brain　—　here
pre