phenomenology of mind-第47章

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and　the　attitude　of　mere　observation　has　in　any　case　to　confine　itself　merely　to　their　actual
existence。　Organic　reality　necessarily　has　within　it　such　an　opposition　as　its　notion　expresses；　and
which　can　be　determined　as　irritability　and　sensibility；　as　these　again　both　appear　distinct　from
reproduction。　The　aspect　in　which　the　moments　of　the　notion　of　organism　are　here　considered；
their　Externality；　is　the　proper　and　peculiar　immediate　externality　of　the　inner；　not　the　outer　which
is　the　outer　embodied　form　of　the　whole　organism；　the　inner　is　to　be　considered　in　relation　to　this
later　on。　

If；　however；　the　opposition　of　the　moments　is　apprehended　as　it　is　found　in　actual　existence；　then
sensibility；　irritability；　reproduction　sink　to　the　level　of　common　properties；　which　are　universals
just　as　indifferent　towards　one　another　as　specific　weight；　colour；　hardness；　etc。　In　this　sense　it
may　doubtless　be　observed　that　one　organic　being　is　more　sensitive；　or　more　irritable；　or　has　a
greater　reproductive　capacity　than　another：　just　as　we　may　observe　that　the　sensibility；　etc。；　of　one
is　in　kind　different　from　that　of　another；　that　one　responds　differently　from　another　to　a　given
simulus；　e。g。　a　horse　behaves　differently　towards　oats　from　what　it　does　towards　hay；　and　a　dog
again　differently　towards　both；　and　so　on。　These　differences　can　as　readily　be　observed　as　that
one　body　is　harder　than　another；　and　so　on。　

But　these　sense　properties；　hardness；　colour；　etc。；　as　also　the　phenomena　of　responding　to　the
stimulus　of　oats；　of　irritability　under　certain　kinds　of　load；　or　of　producing　the　number　and　kind　of
youngall　such　properties　and　phenomena；　when　related　to　one　another　and　compared　inter　se；
essentially　defy　the　attempt　to　reduce　them　to　law。　For　the　characteristic　of　their　being　sensuous
facts　consists　just　in　their　existing　in　complete　indifference　to　one　another；　and　in　manifesting　the
freedom　of　nature　emancipated　from　the　control　of　the　notion；　rather　than　the　unity　of　a　relationin
exhibiting　nature's　irrational　way　of　playing　up　and　down　the　scale　of　contingent　quantity　between
the　moments　of　the　notion；　rather　than　in　these　forth　these　moments　themselves。　

It　is　the　other　aspect；　in　which　tile　simple　moments　of　the　notion　of　organism　are　compared　with
the　moments　of　the　actual　embodiment；　that　would　first　furnish　the　law　proper　for　expressing　the
true　outer　as　the　copy　of　the　inner。　

Now　because　those　simple　moments　are　properties　that　permeate　and　pervade　the　whole；　they　do
not　find　such　a　detached　real　expression　in　the　organic　thing　as　to　form　what　we　call　an　individual
system　with　a　definite　structure　（Gestalt）。　Or；　again；　if　the　abstract　idea　of　organism　is　truly
expressed　in　those　three　moments　merely　because　they　are　nothing　stable；　but　moments　of　the
notion　and　its　process；　the　organism；　on　the　other　hand；　qua　a　definite　embodiment；　is　not
exhaustively　expressed　in　those　three　determinate　systems　in　the　way　anatomy　analyses　and
describes　them。　So　far　as　such　systems　are　to　be　found　in　their　actual　reality　and　rendered
legitimate　by　being　so　found；　we　must　also　bear　in　mind　that　anatomy　not　only　puts　before　us　three
systems　of　that　sort；　but　a　good　many　others　as　well。　

Further；　apart　from　this；　the　sensitive　system　as　a　whole　must　mean　something　quite　different　from
what　is　called　a　nervous　system；　the　irritable　system　something　different　from　the　muscular　system；
the　reproductive　from　the　intestinal　mechanism　of　reproduction。　In　the　systems　constituting　an
embodied　form　（Gestalt）　the　organism　is　apprehended　from　the　abstract　side　of　lifeless　physical
existence：　so　taken；　its　moments　are　elements　of　a　corpse　and　fall　to　be　dealt　with　by　anatomy；
they　do　not　appertain　to　knowledge　and　to　the　living　organism。　Qua　parts　of　that　sort　they　have
really　ceased　to　be；　for　they　cease　to　be　processes。　Since　the　being　of　an　organism　consists
essentially　in　universality；　or　reflexion　into　self；　the　being　of　its　totality；　like　its　moments；　cannot
consist　in　an　anatomical　system。　The　actual　expression　of　the　whole；　and　the　externalization　of　its
moments；　are　really　found　only　as　a　process　and　a　movement；　running　throughout　the　various　parts
of　the　embodied　organism；　and　in　this　process　what　is　extracted　as　an　individual　system　and
fixated　so；　appears　essentially　as　a　fluid　moment。　So　that　the　reality　which　anatomy　finds　cannot　be
taken　for　its　real　being；　but　only　that　reality　as　a　process；　a　process　in　which　alone　even　the
anatomical　parts　have　a　significance。　

We　see；　then；　that　the　moments　of　the　〃inner〃　being　of　the　organism　taken　separately　by
themselves　are　not　capable　of　furnishing　aspects　of　a　law　of　being；　since　in　a　law　of　that　sort　they
are　predicated　of　an　objective　existence；　are　distinguished　from　one　another；　and　thus　each　aspect
would　not　be　able　to　be　equally　named　in　place　of　the　other。　Further；　we　see　that；　when　placed　on
one　side；　they　do　not　find　in　the　other　aspect　their　realization　in　a　fixed　system；　for　this　fixed　system
is　as　little　something　that　could　convey　truly　the　general　nature　of　organic　existence；　as　it　is　the
expression　of　those　moments　of　the　inner　life　of　the　organism。　The　essential　nature　of　what　is
organic；　since　this　is　inherently　something　universal；　lies　altogether　rather　in　having　its　moments
equally　universal　in　concrete　reality；　i。e。　in　having　them　as　permeating　processes；　and　not　in　giving　a
copy　of　the　universal　in　an　isolated　thing。　

In　this　manner　the　idea　of　a　law　in　the　case　of　organic　existence　slips　altogether　from　our　grasp。
The　law　wants　to　grasp　and　express　the　opposition　as　static　aspects；　and　to　attach　as　predicates
of　them　the　characteristic　which　is　really　their　relation　to　one　another。　The　inner；　to　which　falls　the
universality　appearing　in　the　process；　and　the　outer；　to　which　belong　the　parts　of　the　static
structure　of　the　organism；　were　to　constitute　the　corresponding　sides　of　the　law；　but　they　lose；　in
being　kept　asunder　in　this　way；　their　organic　significance。　And　at　the　bottom　of　the　idea　of　law　lies
just　this；　that　its　two　aspects　should　have　a　subsistence　each　on　its　own　account　indifferent　to　the
other；　and　the　relation　of　the　two　sides　should　be　shared　between　them；　thus　appearing　as　a
twofold　characteristic　corresponding　to　that　relation。　But　really　each　aspect　of　the　organism
consists　inherently　in　being　simple　universality；　wherein　all　determinations　are　dissolved；　and　in
being　the　process　of　this　resolution。　

If　we　quite　see　the　difference　between　this　way　of　framing　laws　and　previous　forms；　it　will　clear　up
its　nature　completely。　Turning　back　to　the　process　of　perceiving　and　that　of　understanding
（intelligence）；　which　reflects　itself　into　itself；　and　by　so　doing　determines　its　object；　we　see　that
understanding　does　not　there　have　before　itself　in　its　object　the　relation　of　these　abstract
determinations；　universal　and　individual；　essential　and　external；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　itself　the　actual
transition；　the　relational　process；　and　to　itself　this　transition　does　not　become　objective。　Here；　on
the　other　hand；　the　organic　unity；　i。e。　just　the　relation　of　those　opposites；　is　itself　the　object；　and
this　relation　is　a　pure　process　of　transition。　This　process　in　its　simplicity　is　directly　universality；　and
in　that　universality　opens　out　into　different　factors；　whose　relation　it　is　the　purpose　of　the　law　to
express；　the　moments　of　the　process　take　the　form　of　being　universal　objects　of　this　mode　of
consciousness；　and　the　law　runs；　〃the　outer　is　an　expression　of　the　inner〃。　Understanding　has　here
grasped　the　thought　of　the　law　itself；　whereas　formerly　it　merely　looked　for　laws　in　a　general　way；
and　their　moments　appeared　before　it　in　the　shape　of　a　definite　and　specific　content；　and　not　in　the
form　of　thoughts　of　laws。　

As　regards　content；　therefore；　such　laws　ought　not　to　have　place　in　this　connexion　which　merely
passively　accept　and　put　into　the　form　of　universality　purely　existential　distinctions；　but　such　laws
as　directly　maintain　in　these　distinctions　the　restless　activity　of　the　notion　as　well；　and　consequently
possess　at　the　same　time　necessity　in　the　relation　of　the　two　sides。　Yet；　precisely　because　that
object；　organic　unity；　directly　combines　the　endless　superseding；　or　the　absolute　negation　of；
existence　with　inactive　passive　existence；　and　because　the　moments　are　essentially　pure
transitionthere　are　thus　not　to　be　found　any　such　merely　existent　aspects　as　are　required　for　the
law。　

To　get　such　aspects；　intelligence　must　take　its　stand　on　the　other　moment　of　the　organic　relation；
viz。　on　the　fact　that　organic　existence　is　reflected　into　itself。　But　this　mode　of　being　is　so　completely
reflected　into　self　that　it　has　no　specific　character；　no　determinateness　of　its　own　as　against
something　else；　left　over。　The　immediate　sensuous　being　is　directly　one　with　the　determinate　quality
as　such；　and　hence　inherently　expresses　a　qualitative　distinction；　e。g。　blue　against　red；　acid　against
alkaloid；　etc。　But　the　organic　being　that　has　returned　into　itself　is　completely　indifferent　towards　an
other；　its　existence　is　simple　universality；　and　refuses　to　offer　observation　any　permanent　sense
distinctions；　or；　what　is　the　same　thing；　shows　its　essential　characteristic　to　be　merely　the　changing
flux　of　whatever　determinate　qualities　there　are。　Hence；　the　way　distinction　qua　actually　existing
expresses　itself　is　just　this；　that　it　is　an　indifferent　distinction；　i。e。　a　distinction　in　the　form　of
quantity。　In　this；　however；　the　notion　is　extinguished　and　necessity　disappears。　If　the　content；
however；　and　filling　of　this　indifferent　existence；　the　flux　and　interchange　of　sense　determinations
are　gathered　into　the　simplicity　of　an　organic　determination；　then　this　expresses　at　the　same　time
the　fact　that　the　content　does　not　have　that　determinateness　（the　determinateness　of　the　immediate
property　and　the　qualitative　feature　falls　solely　within　the　aspect　of　quantity；　as　we　saw　above。　

Although　the　objective　element；　apprehended　in　the　form　of　a　determinate　character　of　organic
existence；　has　thus　the　notion　inherent　in　it；　and　thereby　is　distinguished　from　the　object　offered　to
understanding；　which　in　apprehending　the　content　of　its　laws　proceeds　in　a　purely　perceptive
manner；　yet　apprehension　in　the　former　case　falls　back　entirely　into　the　principle　and　manner　of
mere　percipient　understanding；　for　the　reason　that　the　object　apprehended　is　used　to　constitute
moments　of　a　law。　For　by　this　means　what　is　apprehended　receives　and　keeps　the　character　of　a
fixed　determinate　quality；　the　form　of　an　immediate　property　or　a　passive　phenomenon；　it　is；
further；　subsumed　under　the　aspect　of　quantity；　and　the　nature　of　the　notion　is　suppressed。　

The　exchange　of　a　merely　perceived　object　for　one　reflected　into　itself；　of　a　mere　sense　character
for　an　organic；　thus　loses　once　more　its　value；　and　does　so　by　the　fact　that　understanding　has　not
yet　cancelled　the　process　of　framing　laws。　

If　we　compare　what　we　find　as　regards　this　exchange　in　the　case　of　a　few　examples；　we　see；　it
may　be；　something　that　perception　takes　for　an　animal　with　strong　muscles　characterized　as