phenomenology of mind-第105章

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acknowledge　each　other　as　acting　conscientiously　—　this　general　equality　breaks　up　into　the
inequality　of　each　individual　existing　for　himself；　each　consciousness　is　just　as　much　reflected　out　of
its　universality　absolutely　into　itself　as　it　is　universal。　By　this　means　there　necessarily　comes　about
the　opposition　of　individuality　to　other　individuals　and　to　the　universal。　And　this　relation　and　its
process　we　have　to　consider。

Or；　again；　this　universality　and　duty　have　the　absolutely　opposite　significance；　they　signify
determinate　individuality；　exempting　itself　from　what　is　universal；　individuality　which　looks　on　pure
duty　as　universality　that　has　appeared　merely　on　the　surface　and　is　turned　outwards：　〃duty　is
merely　a　matter　of　words〃；　and　passes　for　that　whose　being　is　for　something　else。　Conscience；
which　in　the　first　instance　takes　up　merely　a　negative　attitude　towards　duty；　qua　a　given
determinate　duty；　knows　itself　detached　from　it。　But　since　conscience　fills　empty　duty　with　a
determinate　content　drawn　from　its　own　self；　it　is　positively　aware　of　the　fact　that　it；　qua　this
particular　self；　makes　its　own　content。　Its　pure　self；　as　it　is　empty　knowledge；　is　without　content
and　without　definiteness。　The　content　which　it　supplies　to　that　knowledge　is　drawn　from　its　own
self；　qua　this　determinate　self；　is　drawn　from　itself　as　a　natural　individuality。　In　affirming　the
conscientiousness　of　its　action；　it　is　doubtless　aware　of　its　pure　self；　but　in　the　purpose　of　its　action
—　a　purpose　which　brings　in　a　concrete　content　—　it　is　conscious　of　itself　as　this　particular
individual；　and　is　conscious　of　the　opposition　between　what　it　is　for　itself　and　what　it　is　for　others；
of　the　opposition　of　universality　or　duty　and　its　state　of　being　reflected　into　self　away　from　the
universal。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（3）　Evil　and　Forgiveness

While　in　this　way　the　opposition；　into　which　conscience　passes　when　it　acts；　finds　expression　in　its
inner　life；　the　opposition　is　at　the　same　time　disparity　on　its　outer　side；　in　the　sphere　of　existence　—
the　lack　of　correspondence　of　its　particular　individuality　with　reference　to　another　individual。　Its
special　peculiarity　consists　in　the　fact　that　the　two　elements　constituting　its　consciousness　—　viz。　the
self　and　the　inherent　nature　（Ansich）　—　are　unequal　in　value　and　significance　within　it；　an　inequality
in　which　they　are　so　determined　that　certainty　of　self　is　the　essential　fact　as　against　the　inherent
nature；　or　the　universal；　which　is　taken　to　be　merely　a　moment。　Over　against　this　internal
determination　there　thus　stands　the　element　of　existence；　the　universal　consciousness；　for　this　latter
it　is　rather　universality；　duty；　that　is　the　essential　fact；　while　individuality；　which　exists　for　itself　and
is　opposed　to　the　universal；　has　merely　the　value　of　a　superseded　moment。　The　first　consciousness
is　held　to　be　Evil　by　the　consciousness　which　thus　stands　by　the　fact　of　duty；　because　of　the　lack
of　correspondence　of　its　internal　subjective　life　with　the　universal；　and　since　at　the　same　time　the
first　consciousness　declares　its　act　to　be　congruency　with　itself；　to　be　duty　and　conscientiousness　it
is　held　by　that　universal　consciousness　to　be　Hypocrisy。

The　course　taken　by　this　opposition　is；　in　the　first　instance；　the　formal　establishment　of
correspondence　between　what　the　evil　consciousness　is　in　its　own　nature　and　what　it　expressly
says。　It　has　to　be　made　manifest　that　it　is　evil；　and　its　objective　existence　thus　made　congruent　with
its　real　nature；　the　hypocrisy　must　be　unmasked。　This　return　of　the　discordance；　present　in
hypocrisy；　into　the　state　of　correspondence　is　not　at　once　brought　to　pass　by　the　mere　fact　that；　as
people　usually　say；　hypocrisy　just　proves　its　reverence　for　duty　and　virtue　through　assuming　the
appearance　of　them；　and　using　this　as　a　mask　to　hide　itself　from　its　own　consciousness　no　less　than
from　another　—　as　if；　in　this　acknowledgment　and　recognition　in　itself　of　its　opposite；　eo　ipso
congruency　and　agreement　were　implied　and　contained。　Yet　even　then　it　is　just　as　truly　done　with
this　recognition　in　words　and　is　reflected　into　self；　and　in　the　very　fact　of　its　using　the　inherent　and
essential　reality　merely　as　something　which　has　a　significance　for　another　consciousness；　there　is
really　implied　its　own　contempt　for　that　inherent　principle；　and　the　demonstration　of　the
worthlessness　of　that　reality　for　all。　For　what　lets　itself　be　used　as　an　external　instrument　shows
itself　to　be　a　thing；　which　has　within　it　no　proper　weight　and　worth　of　its　own。

Moreover；　this　correspondence　is　not　brought　about　either　by　the　evil　consciousness　persisting
onesidedly　in　its　own　state；　or　by　the　judgment　of　the　universal　consciousness。　If　the　former　denies
itself　as　against　the　consciousness　of　duty；　and　maintains　that　what　the　latter　pronounces　to　be
baseness；　to　be　absolute　discordance　with　universality；　is　an　action　according　to　inner　law　and
conscience；　then；　in　this　onesided　assurance　of　identity　and　concord；　there　still　remains　its
discordance　with　the　other；　since　this　other　universal　consciousness　certainly　does　not　believe　the
assurance　and　does　not　acknowledge　it。　In　other　words；　since　onesided　insistence　on　one　extreme
destroys　itself；　evil　would　indeed　thereby　confess　to　being　evil；　but　in　so　doing　would　at　once
cancel　itself　and　cease　to　be　hypocrisy；　and　so　would　not　qua　hypocrisy　be　unmasked。　It
confesses　itself；　in　fact；　to　be　evil　by　asserting　that；　while　opposing　what　is　recognized　as　universal；
it　acts　according　to　its　own　inner　law　and　conscience。　For　were　this　law　and　conscience　not　the
law　of　its　individuality　and　caprice；　it　would　not　be　something　inward；　something　private；　but　what
is　universally　accepted　and　acknowledged。　When；　therefore；　any　one　says　he　acts　towards　others
from　a　law　and　conscience　of　his　own；　he　is　saying；　in　point　of　fact；　that　he　is　abusing　and
wronging　them。　But　actual　conscience　is　not　this　insistence　on　a　knowledge　and　a　will　which　are
opposed　to　what　is　universal；　the　universal　is　the　element　of　its　existence；　and　its　very　language
pronounces　its　action　to　be　recognized　duty。

Just　as　little；　when　the　universal　consciousness　persists　in　its　own　judgment；　does　this　unmask　and
dissipate　hypocrisy。　When　that　universal　consciousness　stigmatizes　hypocrisy　as　bad；　base；　and　so
on；　it　appeals；　in　passing　such　a　judgment；　to　its　own　law；　just　as　the　evil　consciousness　appeals　to
its　law。　For　the　former　law　makes　its　appearance　in　opposition　to　the　latter；　and　thereby　as　a
particular　law。　It　has；　therefore；　no　antecedent　claim　over　the　other　law；　rather　it　legitimizes　this
other　law。　Hence　the　universal　consciousness；　by　its　zeal　in　abusing　hypocrisy；　does　precisely　the
opposite　of　what　it　means　to　do：　for　it　shows　that　its　so…called　〃true　duty〃；　which　ought　to　be
universally　acknowledged；　is　something　not　acknowledged　and　recognized；　and　consequently　it
grants　other　an　equal　right　of　independently　existing　on　its　own　account。

This　judgment　＇of　universal　consciousness＇；　however；　has；　at　the　same　time；　another　side　to　it；
from　which　it　leads　the　way　to　the　dissolution　of　the　opposition　in　question。　Consciousness　of　the
universal　does　not　proceed；　qua　real　and　qua　acting；　to　deal　with　the　evil　consciousness；　for　this
latter；　rather；　is　the　real。　In　opposing　the　latter；　it　is　a　consciousness　which　is　not　entangled　in　the
opposition　of　individual　and　universal　involved　in　action。　It　stays　within　the　universality　of　thought；
takes　up　the　attitude　of　an　apprehending　intelligence；　and　its　first　act　is　merely　that　of　judgment。
Through　this　judgment　it　now　places　itself；　as　was　just　observed；　alongside　the　first　consciousness；
and　the　latter　through　this　likeness　between　them；　comes　to　see　itself　in　this　other　consciousness。
For　the　consciousness　of　duty　maintains　the　passive　attitude　of　apprehension。　Thereby　it　is　in
contradiction　with　itself　as　the　absolute　will　of　duty；　as　the　self　that　determines　absolutely　from
itself。　It　may　well　preserve　itself　in　its　purity；　for　it　does　not　act；　it　is　hypocrisy；　which　wants　to　see
the　fact　of　judging　taken　for　the　actual　deed；　and　instead　of　proving　its　uprightness　and　honesty　by
acts　does　so　by　expressing　fine　sentiments。　It　is　thus　constituted　entirely　in　the　same　way　as　that
against　which。　the　reproach　is　made　of　putting　its　phrases　in　place　of　duty。　In　both　alike　the　aspect
of　reality　is　distinct　from　the　express　statements　—　in　the　one　owing　to　the　selfish　purpose　of　the
action；　in　the　other　through　failure　to　act　at　all；　although　the　necessity　of　acting　is　involved　in　the
very　speaking　of　duty；　for　duty　without　deeds　is　altogether　meaningless。

The　act　of　judging；　however；　has　also　to　be　looked　at　as　a　positive　act　of　thought　and　has　a
positive　content：　this　aspect　makes　the　contradiction　present　in　the　apprehending　consciousness；
and　its　identity　with　the　first　consciousness；　still　more　complete。　The　active　consciousness　declares
its　specific　deed　to　be　its　duty；　and　the　consciousness　that　passes　judgment　cannot　deny　this；　for
duty　as　such　is　form　void　of　all　content　and　capable　of　any。　In　other　words；　concrete　action；
inherently　implying　diversity　in　its　manysidedness；　involves　the　universal　aspect；　which　is　that　which
is　taken　as　duty；　just　as　much　as　the　particular；　which　constitutes　the　share　and　interest　the
individual　has　in　the　act。　Now　the　judging　consciousness　does　not　stop　at　the　former　aspect　of
duty　and　rest　content　with　the　knowledge　which　the　active　agent　has　of　this；　viz。　that　this　is　his
duty；　the　condition　and　the　status　of　his　reality。　It　holds　on　to　the　other　aspect；　diverts　the　act　into
the　inner　realm；　and　explains　the　act　from　selfish　motives　and　from　its　inner　intention；　an　intention
different　from　the　act　itself。　As　every　act　is　capable　of　treatment　in　respect　of　its　dutifulness；　so；
too；　each　can　be　considered　from　this　other　point　of　view　of　particularity；　for　as　an　act　it　is　the
reality　of　an　individual。

This　process　of　judging；　then；　takes　the　act　out　of　the　sphere　of　its　objective　existence；　and　turns　it
back　into　the　inner　subjective　sphere；　into　the　form　of　private　or　individual　particularity。　If　the　act
carries　glory　with　it；　then　the　inner　sphere　is　judged　as　love　of　fame。　If　it　is　altogether　conformity
with　the　position　of　the　individual；　without　going　beyond　this　position；　and　is　so　constituted　that　the
individuality　in　question　does　not　have　the　position　attached　to　it　as　an　external　feature；　but　through
itself　supplies　concrete　filling　to　this　universality；　and　by　that　very　process　shows　itself　to　be
capable　of　a　higher　station…then　the　inner　nature　of　the　act　is　judged　as　ambition；　and　so　on。　Since；
in　the　act　in　general；　the　individual　who　acts　comes　to　see　himself　in　objective　form；　or　gets　the
feeling　of　his　own　being　in　his　objective　existence　and　thus　attains　enjoyment；　the　judgment　on　the
act　finds　the　inner　nature　of　it　to　be　an　impulse　towards　personal　happiness；　even　though　this
happiness　were　to　consist　merely　in　inner　moral　vanity；　the　enjoyment　of　a　sense　of　personal
excellence；　and　in　the　foretaste　and　hope　of　a　happiness　to　come。

No　act　can　es