meditations on first philosophy-第2章

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learning　to　subscribe　to　your　judgment；　and　your　authority　will　cause　the　atheists；　who　are　usually　more　arrogant　than　learned　or　judicious；　to　rid　themselves　of　their　spirit　of　contradiction　or　lead　them　possibly　themselves　to　defend　the　reasonings　which　they　find　being　received　as　demonstrations　by　all　persons　of　consideration；　lest　they　appear　not　to　understand　them。　　And；　finally；　all　others　will　easily　yield　to　such　a　mass　of　evidence；　and　there　will　be　none　who　dares　to　doubt　the　existence　of　God　and　the　real　and　true　distinction　between　the　human　soul　and　the　body。　　It　is　for　you　now　in　your　singular　wisdom　to　judge　of　the　importance　of　the　establishment　of　such　beliefs　＇you　who　see　the　disorders　produced　by　the　doubt　of　them＇5　。　　But　it　would　not　become　me　to　say　more　in　consideration　of　the　cause　of　God　and　religion　to　those　who　have　always　been　the　most　worthy　supports　of　the　Catholic　Church。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Preface　to　the　Reader　　　　　　　　　　　　I　have　already　slightly　touched　on　these　two　questions　of　God　and　the　human　soul　in　the　Discourse　on　the　Method　of　rightly　conducting　the　Reason　and　seeking　truth　in　the　Sciences；　published　in　French　in　the　year　1637。　　Not　that　I　had　the　design　of　treating　these　with　any　thoroughness；　but　only　so　to　speak　in　passing；　and　in　order　to　ascertain　by　the　judgment　of　the　readers　how　I　should　treat　them　later　on。　　For　these　questions　have　always　appeared　to　me　to　be　of　such　importance　that　I　judged　it　suitable　to　speak　of　them　more　than　once；　and　the　road　which　I　follow　in　the　explanation　of　them　is　so　little　trodden；　and　so　far　removed　from　the　ordinary　path；　that　I　did　not　judge　it　to　be　expedient　to　set　it　forth　at　length　in　French　and　in　a　Discourse　which　might　be　read　by　everyone；　in　case　the　feebler　minds　should　believe　that　it　was　permitted　to　them　to　attempt　to　follow　the　same　path。　　　　　　But；　having　in　this　Discourse　on　Method　begged　all　those　who　have　found　in　my　writings　somewhat　deserving　of　censure　to　do　me　the　favour　of　acquainting　me　with　the　grounds　of　it；　nothing　worthy　of　remark　has　been　objected　to　in　them　beyond　two　matters：　　to　these　two　I　wish　here　to　reply　in　a　few　words　before　undertaking　their　more　detailed　discussion。　　　　　　The　first　objection　is　that　it　does　not　follow　from　the　fact　that　the　human　mind　reflecting　on　itself　does　not　perceive　itself　to　be　other　than　a　thing　that　thinks；　that　its　nature　or　its　essence　consists　only　in　its　being　a　thing　that　thinks；　in　the　sense　that　this　word　only　excludes　all　other　things　which　might　also　be　supposed　to　pertain　to　the　nature　of　the　soul。　　To　this　objection　I　reply　that　it　was　not　my　intention　in　that　place　to　exclude　these　in　accordance　with　the　order　that　looks　to　the　truth　of　the　matter　（as　to　which　I　was　not　then　dealing）；　but　only　in　accordance　with　the　order　of　my　thought　＇perception＇；　thus　my　meaning　was　that　so　far　as　I　was　aware；　I　knew　nothing　clearly　as　belonging　to　my　essence；　excepting　that　I　was　a　thing　that　thinks；　or　a　thing　that　has　in　itself　the　faculty　of　thinking。　　But　I　shall　show　hereafter　how　from　the　fact　that　I　know　no　other　thing　which　pertains　to　my　essence；　it　follows　that　there　is　no　other　thing　which　really　does　belong　to　it。　　　　　　The　second　objection　is　that　it　does　not　follow　from　the　fact　that　I　have　in　myself　the　idea　of　something　more　perfect　than　I　am；　that　this　idea　is　more　perfect　than　I；　and　much　less　that　what　is　represented　by　this　idea　exists。　　But　I　reply　that　in　this　term　idea　there　is　here　something　equivocal；　for　it　may　either　be　taken　materially；　as　an　act　of　my　understanding；　and　in　this　sense　it　cannot　be　said　that　it　is　more　perfect　than　I；　or　it　may　be　taken　objectively；　as　the　thing　which　is　represented　by　this　act；　which；　although　we　do　not　suppose　it　to　exist　outside　of　my　understanding；　may；　none　the　less；　be　more　perfect　than　I；　because　of　its　essence。　　And　in　following　out　this　Treatise　I　shall　show　more　fully　how；　from　the　sole　fact　that　I　have　in　myself　the　idea　of　a　thing　more　perfect　than　myself；　it　follows　that　this　thing　truly　exists。　　　　　　In　addition　to　these　two　objections　I　have　also　seen　two　fairly　lengthy　works　on　this　subject；　which；　however；　did　not　so　much　impugn　my　reasonings　as　my　conclusions；　and　this　by　arguments　drawn　from　the　ordinary　atheistic　sources。　　But；　because　such　arguments　cannot　make　any　impression　on　the　minds　of　those　who　really　understand　my　reasonings；　and　as　the　judgments　of　many　are　so　feeble　and　irrational　that　they　very　often　allow　themselves　to　be　persuaded　by　the　opinions　which　they　have　first　formed；　however　false　and　far　removed　from　reason　they　may　be；　rather　than　by　a　true　and　solid　but　subsequently　received　refutation　of　these　opinions；　I　do　not　desire　to　reply　here　to　their　criticisms　in　case　of　being　first　of　all　obliged　to　state　them。　　I　shall　only　say　in　general　that　all　that　is　said　by　the　atheist　against　the　existence　of　God；　always　depends　either　on　the　fact　that　we　ascribe　to　God　affections　which　are　human；　or　that　we　attribute　so　much　strength　and　wisdom　to　our　minds　that　we　even　have　the　presumption　to　desire　to　determine　and　understand　that　which　God　can　and　ought　to　do。　　In　this　way　all　that　they　allege　will　cause　us　no　difficulty；　provided　only　we　remember　that　we　must　consider　our　minds　as　things　which　are　finite　and　limited；　and　God　as　a　Being　who　is　incomprehensible　and　infinite。　　　　　　Now　that　I　have　once　for　all　recognised　and　acknowledged　the　opinions　of　men；　I　at　once　begin　to　treat　of　God　and　the　Human　soul；　and　at　the　same　time　to　treat　of　the　whole　of　the　First　Philosophy；　without　however　expecting　any　praise　from　the　vulgar　and　without　the　hope　that　my　book　will　have　many　readers。　　On　the　contrary；　I　should　never　advise　anyone　to　read　it　excepting　those　who　desire　to　meditate　seriously　with　me；　and　who　can　detach　their　minds　from　affairs　of　sense；　and　deliver　themselves　entirely　from　every　sort　of　prejudice。　　I　know　too　well　that　such　men　exist　in　a　very　small　number。　　But　for　those　who；　without　caring　to　comprehend　the　order　and　connections　of　my　reasonings；　form　their　criticisms　on　detached　portions　arbitrarily　selected；　as　is　the　custom　with　many；　these；　I　say；　will　not　obtain　much　profit　from　reading　this　Treatise。　　And　although　they　perhaps　in　several　parts　find　occasion　of　cavilling；　they　can　for　all　their　pains　make　no　objection　which　is　urgent　or　deserving　of　reply。　　　　　　And　inasmuch　as　I　make　no　promise　to　others　to　satisfy　them　at　once；　and　as　I　do　not　presume　so　much　on　my　own　powers　as　to　believe　myself　capable　of　foreseeing　all　that　can　cause　difficulty　to　anyone；　I　shall　first　of　all　set　forth　in　these　Meditations　the　very　considerations　by　which　I　persuade　myself　that　I　have　reached　a　certain　and　evident　knowledge　of　the　truth；　in　order　to　see　if；　by　the　same　reasons　which　persuaded　me；　I　can　also　persuade　others。　　And；　after　that；　I　shall　reply　to　the　objections　which　have　been　made　to　me　by　persons　of　genius　and　learning　to　whom　I　have　sent　my　Meditations　for　examination；　before　submitting　them　to　the　press。　　For　they　have　made　so　many　objections　and　these　so　different；　that　I　venture　to　promise　that　it　will　be　difficult　for　anyone　to　bring　to　mind　criticisms　of　any　consequence　which　have　not　been　already　touched　upon。　　This　is　why　I　beg　those　who　read　these　Meditations　to　form　no　judgment　upon　them　unless　they　have　given　themselves　the　trouble　to　read　all　the　objections　as　well　as　the　replies　which　I　have　made　to　them。6

　　　　　　　　　　Synopsis　of　the　Six　Following　Meditations。　　　　　　　　　　　　In　the　first　Meditation　I　set　forth　the　reasons　for　which　we　may；　generally　speaking；　doubt　about　all　things　and　especially　about　material　things；　at　least　so　long　as　we　have　no　other　foundations　for　the　sciences　than　those　which　we　have　hitherto　possessed。　　But　although　the　utility　of　a　Doubt　which　is　so　general　does　not　at　first　appear；　it　is　at　the　same　time　very　great；　inasmuch　as　it　delivers　us　from　every　kind　of　prejudice；　and　sets　out　for　us　a　very　simple　way　by　which　the　mind　may　detach　itself　from　the　senses；　and　finally　it　makes　it　impossible　for　us　ever　to　doubt　those　things　which　we　have　once　discovered　to　be　true。　　　　　　In　the　second　Meditation；　mind；　which　making　use　of　the　liberty　which　pertains　to　it；　takes　for　granted　that　all　those　things　of　whose　existence　it　has　the　least　doubt；　are　non…　existent；　recognises　that　it　is　however　absolutely　impossible　that　it　does　not　itself　exist。　　This　point　is　likewise　of　the　greatest　moment；　inasmuch　as　by　this　means　a　distinction　is　easily　drawn　between　the　things　which　pertain　to　mind　that　is　to　say　to　the　intellectual　nature　and　those　which　pertain　to　body。　　　　　　But　because　it　may　be　that　some　expect　from　me　in　this　place　a　statement　of　the　reasons　establishing　the　immortality　of　the　soul；　I　feel　that　I　should　here　make　known　to　them　that　having　aimed　at　writing　nothing　in　all　this　Treatise　of　which　I　do　not　possess　very　exact　demonstrations；　I　am　obliged　to　follow　a　similar　order　to　that　made　use　of　by　the　geometers；　which　is　to　begin　by　putting　forward　as　premises　all　those　things　upon　which　the　proposition　that　we　seek　depends；　before　coming　to　any　conclusion　regarding　it。　　Now　the　first　and　principal　matter　which　is　requisite　for　thoroughly　understanding　the　immortality　of　the　soul　is　to　form　the　clearest　possible　conception　of　it；　and　one　which　will　be　entirely　distinct　from　all　the　conceptions　which　we　may　have　of　body；　and　in　this　Meditation　this　has　been　done。　　In　addition　to　this　it　is　requisite　that　we　may　be　assured　that　all　the　things　which　we　conceive　clearly　and　distinctly　are　true　in　the　very　way　in　which　we　think　them；　and　this　could　not　be　proved　previously　to　the　Fourth　Mediation。　　Further　we　must　have　a　distinct　conception　of　corporeal　nature；　which　is　given　partly　in　this　Second；　and　partly　in　the　Fifth　and　Sixth　Meditations。　　And　finally　we　should　conclude　from　all　this；　that　those　things　which　we　conceive　clearly　and　distinctly　as　being　diverse　substances；　as　we　regard　mind　and　body　to　be；　are　really　substances　essentially　distinct　one　from　the　other；　and　this　is　the　conclusion　of　the　Sixth　Meditation。　　This　is　further　confirmed　in　this　same　Meditation　by　the　fact　that　we　cannot　conceive　of　body　excepting　in　so　far　as　it　is　divisible；　while　the　mind　cannot　be　conceived　of　excepting　as　indivisible。　　For　we　are　not　able　to　conceive　of　the　half　of　a　mind　as　we　can　do　of　the　smallest　of　all　bodies；　so　that　we　see　that　not　only　are　their　natures　different　but　even　in　some　respects　contrary　to　one　another。　　I　have　not　however　dealt　further　with　this　matter　in　this　treatise；　both　because　what　I　have　said　is　sufficient　to　show　clearly　enough　that　the　extinction　of　the　mind　does　not　follow　from　the　corruption　of　the　body；　and　also　to　give　men　the　hope　of　another　life　after　death；　as　also　because　the　premises　from　which　the　immortality　of　the　soul　may　be　deduced　depend　on　an　elucidation　of　a　complete　system　of　Physics。　　This　would　mean　to　establish　in　the　first　place　that　all　substances　generally　that　is　to　say　all　things　which　cannot　exist　without　being　created　by　God￥are　in　their　nature　incorruptible；　and　that　they　can　never　cease　to　exist　unless　God；　in　denying　to　them　his　concurrence；　reduce　them　to　nought；　and　secondly　that　body；