the commonwealth of oceana-第6章

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t　the　full　perfection　of　government。　But　to　return。　　　　　By　what　has　been　shown　in　reason　and　experience；　it　may　appear；　that　though　commonwealths　in　general　be　governments　of　the　senate　proposing；　the　people　resolving；　and　the　magistracy　executing；　yet　some　are　not　so　good　at　these　orders　as　others；　through　some　impediment　or　defect　in　the　frame；　balance；　or　capacity　of　them；　according　to　which　they　are　of　divers　kinds。　　　　　The　first　division　of　them　is　into　such　as　are　single；　as　Israel；　Athens；　Lacedaemon；　etc。；　and　such　as　are　by　leagues；　as　those　of　the　Achaeans；　AEtolians；　Lycians；　Switz；　and　Hollanders。　　　　　The　second　（being　Machiavel's）　is　into　such　as　are　for　preservation；　as　Lacedaemon　and　Venice；　and　such　as　are　for　increase；　as　Athens　and　Rome；　in　which　I　can　see　no　more　than　that　the　former　takes　in　no　more　citizens　than　are　necessary　for　defence；　and　the　latter　so　many　as　are　capable　of　increase。　　　　　The　third　division　（unseen　hitherto）　is　into　equal　and　Unequal；　and　this　is　the　main　point；　especially　as　to　domestic　peace　and　tranquillity；　for　to　make　a　commonwealth　unequal；　is　to　divide　it　into　parties；　which　sets　them　at　perpetual　variance；　the　one　party　endeavoring　to　preserve　their　eminence　and　inequality　and　the　other　to　attain　to　equality；　whence　the　people　of　Rome　derived　their　perpetual　strife　with　the　nobility　and　Senate。　But　in　an　equal　commonwealth　there　can　be　no　more　strife　than　there　can　be　overbalance　in　equal　weights；　wherefore　the　Commonwealth　of　Venice；　being　that　which　of　all　others　is　the　most　equal　in　the　constitution；　is　that　wherein　there　never　happened　any　strife　between　the　Senate　and　the　people。　　　　　An　equal　commonwealth　is　such　a　one　as　is　equal　both　in　the　balance　or　foundation；　and　in　the　superstructure；　that　is　to　say；　in　her　agrarian　law　and　in　her　rotation。　　　　　An　equal　agrarian　is　a　perpetual　law；　establishing　and　preserving　the　balance　of　dominion　by　such　a　distribution；　that　no　one　man　or　number　of　men；　within　the　compass　of　the　few　or　aristocracy；　can　come　to　overpower　the　whole　people　by　their　possessions　in　lands。　　　　　As　the　agrarian　answers　to　the　foundation；　so　does　rotation　to　the　superstructures。　　　　　Equal　rotation　is　equal　vicissitude　in　government；　or　succession　to　magistracy　conferred　for　such　convenient　terms；　enjoying　equal　vacations；　as　take　in　the　whole　body　by　parts；　succeeding　others；　through　the　free　election　or　suffrage　of　the　people。　　　　　The　contrary；　whereunto　is　prolongation　of　magistracy；　which；　trashing　the　wheel　of　rotation；　destroys　the　life　or　natural　motion　of　a　commonwealth。　　　　　The　election　or　suffrage　of　the　people　is　most　free；　where　it　is　made　or　given　in　such　a　manner　that　it　can　neither　oblige　nor　disoblige　another；　nor　through　fear　of　an　enemy；　or　bashfulness　toward　a　friend；　impair　a　man's　liberty。　　　　　Wherefore；　says　Cicero；　the　tablet　or　ballot　of　the　people　of　Rome　（who　gave　their　votes　by　throwing　tablets　or　little　pieces　of　wood　secretly　into　urns　marked　for　the　negative　or　affirmative）　was　a　welcome　constitution　to　the　people；　as　that　which；　not　impairing　the　assurance　of　their　brows；　increased　the　freedom　of　their　judgment。　I　have　not　stood　upon　a　more　particular　description　of　this　ballot；　because　that　of　Venice　exemplified　in　the　model　is　of　all　others　the　most　perfect。　　　　　An　equal　commonwealth　（by　that　which　has　been　said）　is　a　government　established　upon　an　equal　agrarian；　arising　into　the　superstructures　or　three　orders；　the　Senate　debating　and　proposing；　the　people　resolving；　and　the　magistracy　executing；　by　an　equal　rotation　through　the　suffrage　of　the　people　given　by　the　ballot。　For　though　rotation　may　be　without　the　ballot；　and　the　ballot　without　rotation；　yet　the　ballot　not　only　as　to　the　ensuing　model　includes　both；　but　is　by　far　the　most　equal　way；　for　which　cause　under　the　name　of　the　ballot　I　shall　hereafter　understand　both　that　and　rotation　too。　　　　　Now　having　reasoned　the　principles　of　an　equal　commonwealth；　I　should　come　to　give　an　instance　of　such　a　one　in　experience；　if　I　could　find　it；　but　if　this　work　be　of　any　value；　it　lies　in　that　it　is　the　first　example　of　a　commonwealth　that　is　perfectly　equal。　For　Venice；　though　it　comes　the　nearest；　yet　is　a　commonwealth　for　preservation；　and　such　a　one；　considering　the　paucity　of　citizens　taken　in；　and　the　number　not　taken　in；　is　externally　unequal；　and　though　every　commonwealth　that　holds　provinces　must　in　that　regard　be　such；　yet　not　to　that　degree。　Nevertheless；　Venice　internally；　and　for　her　capacity；　is　by　far　the　most　equal；　though　it　has　not；　in　my　judgment；　arrived　at　the　full　perfection　of　equality；　both　because　her　laws　supplying　the　defect　of　an　agrarian　are　not　so　clear　nor　effectual　at　the　foundation；　nor　her　superstructures；　by　the　virtue　of　her　ballot　or　rotation；　exactly　librated；　in　regard　that　through　the　paucity　of　her　citizens　her　greater　magistracies　are　continually　wheeled　through　a　few　hands；　as　is　confessed　by　Janotti；　where　he　says；　that　if　a　gentleman　comes　once　to　be　Savio　di　terra　ferma；　it　seldom　happens　that　he　fails　from　thenceforward　to　be　adorned　with　some　one　of　the　greater　magistracies；　as　Savi　di　mare；　Savi　di　terra　ferma；　Savi　Grandi；　counsellors；　those　of　the　decemvirate　or　dictatorian　council；　the　aurogatori；　or　censors；　which　require　no　vacation　or　interval。　Wherefore　if　this　in　Venice；　or　that　in　Lacedaemon；　where　the　kings　were　hereditary；　and　the　Senators　（though　elected　by　the　people）　for　life；　cause　no　inequality　（which　is　hard　to　be　conceived）　in　a　commonwealth　for　preservation；　or　such　a　one　as　consists　of　a　few　citizens；　yet　is　it　manifest　that　it　would　cause　a　very　great　one　in　a　commonwealth　for　increase；　or　consisting　of　the　many；　which；　by　engrossing　the　magistracies　in　a　few　hands；　would　be　obstructed　in　their　rotation。　　　　　But　there　be　who　say　（and　think　it　a　strong　objection）　that；　let　a　commonwealth　be　as　equal　as　you　can　imagine；　two　or　three　men　when　all　is　done　will　govern　it；　and　there　is　that　in　it　which；　notwithstanding　the　pretended　sufficiency　of　a　popular　State；　amounts　to　a　plain　confession　of　the　imbecility　of　that　policy；　and　of　the　prerogative　of　monarchy；　forasmuch　as　popular　governments　in　difficult　cases　have　had　recourse　to　dictatorian　power；　as　in　Rome。　　　　　To　which　I　answer；　that　as　truth　is　a　spark　to　which　objections　are　like　bellows；　so　in　this　respect　our　commonwealth　shines；　for　the　eminence　acquired　by　suffrage　of　the　people　in　a　commonwealth；　especially　if　it　be　popular　and　equal；　can　be　ascended　by　no　other　steps　than　the　universal　acknowledgment　of　virtue：　and　where　men　excel　in　virtue；　the　commonwealth　is　stupid　and　unjust；　if　accordingly　they　do　not　excel　in　authority。　Wherefore　this　is　both　the　advantage　of　virtue；　which　has　her　due　encouragement；　and　of　the　commonwealth；　which　has　her　due　services。　These　are　the　philosophers　which　Plato　would　have　to　be　princes；　the　princes　which　Solomon　would　have　to　be　mounted；　and　their　steeds　are　those　of　authority；　not　empire；　or；　if　they　be　buckled　to　the　chariot　of　empire；　as　that　of　the　dictatorian　power；　like　the　chariot　of　the　sun；　it　is　glorious　for　terms　and　vacations　or　intervals。　And　as　a　commonwealth　is　a　government　of　laws　and　not　of　men；　so　is　this　the　principality　of　virtue；　and　not　of　man；　if　that　fail　or　set　in　one；　it　rises　in　another　who　is　created　his　immediate　successor。　And　this　takes　away　that　vanity　from　under　the　sun；　which　is　an　error　proceeding　more　or　less　from　all　other　rulers　under　heaven　but　an　equal　commonwealth。　　　　　These　things　considered；　it　will　be　convenient　in　this　place　to　speak　a　word　to　such　as　go　about　to　insinuate　to　the　nobility　or　gentry　a　fear　of　the　people；　or　to　the　people　a　fear　of　the　nobility　or　gentry；　as　if　their　interests　were　destructive　to　each　other。　When　indeed　an　army　may　as　well　consist　of　soldiers　without　officers；　or　of　officers　without　soldiers；　as　a　commonwealth；　especially　such　a　one　as　is　capable　of　greatness；　of　a　people　without　a　gentry；　or　of　a　gentry　without　a　people。　Wherefore　this；　though　not　always　so　intended；　as　may　appear　by　Machiavel；　who　else　would　be　guilty；　is　a　pernicious　error。　There　is　something　first　in　the　making　of　a　commonwealth；　then　in　the　governing　of　it；　and　last　of　all　in　the　leading　of　its　armies；　which；　though　there　be　great　divines；　great　lawyers；　great　men　in　all　professions；　seems　to　be　peculiar　only　to　the　genius　of　a　gentleman。　　　　　For　so　it　is　in　the　universal　series　of　story；　that　if　any　man　has　founded　a　commonwealth；　he　was　first　a　gentleman。　Moses　had　his　education　by　the　daughter　of　Pharaoh；　Theseus　and　Solon；　of　noble　birth；　were　held　by　the　Athenians　worthy　to　be　kings；　Lycurgus　was　of　the　royal　blood；　Romulus　and　Numa　princes；　Brutus　and　Publicola　patricians；　the　Gracchi；　that　lost　their　lives　for　the　people　of　Rome　and　the　restitution　of　that　commonwealth；　were　the　sons　of　a　father　adored　with　two　triumphs；　and　of　Cornelia　the　daughter　of　Scipio；　who　being　demanded　in　marriage　by　King　Ptolemy；　disdained　to　become　the　Queen　of　Egypt。　And　the　most　renowned　Olphaus　Megaletor；　sole　legislator；　as　you　will　see　anon；　of　the　Commonwealth　of　Oceana；　was　derived　from　a　noble　family；　nor　will　it　be　any　occasion　of　scruple　in　this　case；　that　Leviathan　affirms　the　politics　to　be　no　ancienter　than　his　book　〃De　Cive。〃　Such　also　as　have　got　any　fame　in　the　civil　government　of　a　commonwealth；　or　by　the　leading　of　its　armies；　have　been　gentlemen；　for　so　in　all　other　respects　were　those　plebeian　magistrates　elected　by　the　people　of　Rome；　being　of　known　descents　and　of　equal　virtues；　except　only　that　they　were　excluded　from　the　name　by　the　usurpation　of　the　patricians。　Holland；　through　this　defect　at　home；　has　borrowed　princes　for　generals；　and　gentlemen　of　divers　nations　for　commanders：　and　the　Switzers；　if　they　have　any　defect　in　this　kind；　rather　lend　their　people　to　the　colors　of　other　princes；　than　make　that　noble　use　of　them　at　home　which　should　assert　the　liberty　of　mankind。　For　where　there　is　not　a　nobility　to　hearten　the　people；　they　are　slothful；　regardless　of　the　world；　and　of　the　public　interest　of　liberty；　as　even　those　of　Rome　had　been　without　their　gentry：　wherefore　let　the　people　embrace　the　gentry　in　peace；　as　the　light　of　their　eyes；　and　in　war；　as　the　trophy　of　their　arms；　and　if　Cornelia　disdained　to　be　Queen　of　Egypt；　if　a　Roman　consul　looked　down　from　his　tribunal　upon　the　greatest　king；　let　the　nobility　love　and　cherish　the　people　that　afford　them　a　throne　so　much　higher　in　a　commonwealth；　in　the　acknowledgment　of　their　virtue；　than　the　crowns　of　monarchs。　　　　　But　if　the　equality　of　a　commonwealth　consist　in　the　equality　first　of　the　agrarian；　and　next　of　the　rotation；　then　the　inequality　of　a　commonwealth　must　consist　in　the　absence　or　inequality　of　the　agrarian；　or　of　the　rotation；　or　of　both。　　　　　Israel　and　Lacedaemon；　which　commonwealths　（as　the　people　of　this；　in　Josephus；　claims　kindred　of　that）　have　great　resemblance；　were　each　of　them　equal　in　their　agrarian；　and　unequal　in　their　rotation；　especially　Israel；　where　the　Sanhedrim；　or　Senate；　first　elected　by　the　people；　as　appears　by　the　words　of　Moses；　took　upon　them　ever　after；　without　any　precept　of　God；　to　substitute　their　successors　by　ordination；　which　having　been　there　of　civil　use；　as　excommunicat