the commonwealth of oceana-第34章

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ans；　and　are　carried　by　a　natural　instinct　to　the　desire　of　such　herbs　as　are　their　proper　cure；　but　the　people；　for　the　greater　part；　are　beneath　the　beasts　in　the　use　of　them。　Thus　the　people　of　Rome；　though　in　their　misery　they　had　recourse　by　instinct；　as　it　were；　to　the　two　main　fundamentals　of　a　commonwealth；　participation　of　magistracy　and　the　agrarian；　did　but　taste　and　spit　at　them；　not　（which　is　necessary　in　physic）　drink　down　the　potion；　and　in　that　their　healths。　For　when　they　had　obtained　participation　of　magistracy　it　was　but　lamely；　not　to　a　full　and　equal　rotation　in　all　elections；　nor　did　they　greatly　regard　it　in　what　they　had　got。　And　when　they　had　attained　to　the　agrarian；　they　neglected　it　so　far　as　to　suffer　the　law　to　grow　obsolete；　but　if　you　do　not　take　the　due　dose　of　your　medicines　（as　there　be　slight　tastes　which　a　man　may　have　of　philosophy　that　incline　to　atheism）　it　may　chance　to　be　poison；　there　being　a　like　taste　of　the　politics　that　inclines　to　confusion；　as　appears　in　the　institution　of　the　Roman　tribunes；　by　which　magistracy　and　no　more　the　people　were　so　far　from　attaining　to　peace；　that　they　in　getting　but　so　much；　got　but　heads　for　an　eternal　feud；　whereas　if　they　had　attained　in　perfection　either　to　the　agrarian；　they　had　introduced　the　equality　and　calm　of　Lacedaemon；　or　to　rotation；　and　they　had　introduced　that　of　Venice：　and　so　there　could　have　been　no　more　enmity　between　the　Senate　and　the　people　of　Rome　than　there　was　between　those　orders　in　Lacedaemon；　or　is　now　in　Venice。　Wherefore　Machiavel　seems　to　me；　in　attributing　the　peace　of　Venice　more　to　her　luck　than　her　prudence；　of　the　whole　stable　to　have　saddled　the　wrong　horse；　for　though　Rome　in　her　military　part　could　beat　it　better；　beyond　all　comparison；　upon　the　sounding　hoof；　Venice　for　the　civil　part　has　plainly　had　the　wings　of　Pegasus。　　　　　〃The　whole　question　then　will　come　upon　this　point；　whether　the　people　of　Rome　could　have　obtained　these　orders？　And　first；　to　say　that　they　could　not　have　obtained　them　without　altering　the　commonwealth；　is　no　argument；　seeing　neither　could　they；　without　altering　the　commonwealth；　have　obtained　their　tribunes；　which　nevertheless　were　obtained。　And　if　a　man　considers　the　posture　that　the　people　were　in　when　they　obtained　their　tribunes；　they　might　as　well；　and　with　as　great　ease　（forasmuch　as　the　reason　why　the　nobility　yielded　to　the　tribunes　was　no　other　than　that　there　was　no　remedy）　have　obtained　anything　else。　And　for　experience；　it　was　in　the　like　case　that　the　Lacedaemonians　did　set　up　their　ephors；and　the　Athenians；after　the　battle　of　Plataea；　bowed　the　Senate　（so　hard　a　thing　it　is　for　a　commonwealth　that　was　born　crooked　to　become　straight）　as　much　the　other　way。　Nor；　if　it　be　objected　that　this　must　have　ruined　the　nobility　（and　in　that　deprived　the　commonwealth　of　the　greatness　which　she　acquired　by　them）；　is　this　opinion　holding；　but　confuted　by　the　sequel　of　the　story；　showing　plainly　that　the　nobility；　through　the　defect　of　such　orders　（that　is　to　say；　of　rotation　and　the　agrarian）；　came　to　eat　up　the　people；　and　battening　themselves　in　luxury；　to　be；　as　Sallust　speaks　of　them；　'a　most　sluggish　and　lazy　nobility；　in　whom；　besides　the　name；　there　was　no　more　than　in　a　statue；'　and　to　bring　so　mighty　a　commonwealth；　and　of　so　huge　a　glory；　to　so　deplorable　an　end。　Wherefore　means　might　have　been　found　to　remove　the　enmity　that　was　between　the　Senate　and　the　people　of　Rome。　　　　　〃My　lords；　if　I　have　argued　well；　I　have　given　you　the　comfort　and　assurance　that；　notwithstanding　the　judgment　of　Machiavel；　your　commonwealth　is　both　safe　and　sound；　but　if　I　have　not　argued　well；　then　take　the　comfort　and　assurance　which　he　gives　you　while　he　is　firm；　that　a　legislator　is　to　lay　aside　all　other　examples；　and　follow　that　of　Rome　only；　conniving　and　temporizing　with　the　enmity　between　the　Senate　and　the　people　as　a　necessary　step　to　the　Roman　greatness。　Whence　it　follows　that　your　commonwealth；　at　the　worst；　is　that　which　he　has　given　you　his　word　is　the　best。　　　　　〃I　have　held　your　lordships　long；　but　upon　an　account　of　no　small　importance；　which　I　can　now　sum　up　in　these　few　words：　where　there　is　a　liquorishness　in　a　popular　assembly　to　debate；　it　proceeds　not　from　the　constitution　of　the　people；　but　of　the　commonwealth。　Now　that　your　commonwealth　is　of　such　a　constitution　as　is　naturally　free　from　this　kind　of　intemperance；　is　that　which；　to　make　good；　I　must　divide　the　remainder　of　my　discourse　into　two　parts：　　　　　〃The　first；　showing　the　several　constitutions　of　the　assemblies　of　the　people　in　other　commonwealths；　　　　　〃The　second；　comparing　our　assembly　of　the　people　with　theirs；　and　showing　how　it　excludes　the　inconveniences　and　embraces　the　conveniences　of　them　all。　　　　　〃In　the　beginning　of　the　first　part　I　must　take　notice；　that　among　the　popular　errors　of　our　days　it　is　no　small　one　that　men　imagine　the　ancient　governments　of　this　kind　to　have　consisted　for　the　most　part　of　one　city　that　is；　of　one　town；　whereas　by　what　we　have　learned　of　my　'lords　that　owned　them；　it　appears　that　there　was　not　any　considerable　one　of　such　a　Constitution　but　Carthage；　till　this　in　our　days　of　Venice。　　　　　〃For　to　begin　with　Israel；　it　consisted　of　the　twelve　tribes；　locally　spread　or　quartered　throughout　the　whole　territory；　and　these　being　called　together　by　trumpets；　constituted　the　Church　or　assembly　of　the　people。　The　vastness　of　this　weight；　as　also　the　slowness　thence　unavoidable；　became　a　great　cause　（as　has　been　shown　at　large　by　my　Lord　Phosphorus）　of　the　breaking　that　commonwealth；　notwithstanding　that　the　Temple；　and　those　religious　ceremonies　for　which　the　people　were　at　least　annually　obliged　to　repair　thither；　were　no　small　ligament　of　the　tribes；　otherwise　but　slightly　tacked　together。　　　　　〃Athens　consisted　of　four　tribes；　taking　in　the　whole　people；　both　of　the　city　and　of　the　territory；　not　so　gathered　by　Theseus　into　one　town；　as　to　exclude　the　country；　but　to　the　end　that　there　might　be　some　capital　of　the　commonwealth：　though　true　it　be；　that　the　congregation；　consisting　of　the　inhabitants　within　the　walls；　was　sufficient　to　all　intents　and　purposes；　without　those　of　the　country。　These　also　being　exceeding　numerous；　became　burdensome　to　themselves　and　dangerous　to　the　commonwealth；　the　more　for　their　ill…education；　as　is　observed　by　Xenophon　and　Polybius；　who　compare　them　to　mariners　that　in　a　calm　are　perpetually　disputing　and　swaggering　one　with　another；　and　never　lay　their　hands　to　the　common　tackling　or　safety　till　they　be　all　endangered　by　some　storm。　Which　caused　Thucydides；　when　he　saw　this　people　through　the　purchase　of　their　misery　become　so　much　wiser　as　to　reduce　their　Comitia　or　assemblies　to　5；000；　to　say　in　his　eighth　book：　'And　now；　at　least　in　my　time；　the　Athenians　seem　to　have　ordered　their　State　aright；　consisting　of　a　moderate　tempor　both　of　the　few　（by　which　he　means　the　Senate　of　the　Bean）　and　of　the　many；'　or　the　5；000。　And　he　does　not　only　give　you　his　judgment；　but　the　best　proof　of　it；　for　'this；'　says　he；　'was　the　first　thing　that；　after　so　many　misfortunes　past；　made　the　city　again　to　raise　her　head。'　The　place　I　would　desire　your　lordships　to　note；　as　the　first　example　that　I　find；　or　think　is　to　be　found；　of　a　popular　assembly　by　way　of　representative。　　　　　〃Lacedaemon　consisted　of　30；000　citizens　dispersed　throughout　Laconia；　one　of　the　greatest　provinces　in　all　Greece；　and　divided；　as　by　some　authors　is　probable；　into　six　tribes。　Of　the　whole　body　of　these；　being　gathered；　consisted　the　great　Church　or　assembly；　which　had　the　legislative　power；　the　little　church；　gathered　sometimes　for　matters　of　concern　within　the　city；　consisted　of　the　Spartans　only。　These　happened；　like　that　of　Venice；　to　be　good　constitutions　of　a　congregation；　but　from　an　ill…cause　the　infirmity　of　a　commonwealth；　which　through　her　paucity　was　oligarchical。　　　　　'Wherefore；　go　which　way　you　will；　it　should　seem　that　without　a　representative　of　the　people；　your　commonwealth；　consisting　of　a　whole　nation；　can　never　avoid　falling　either　into　oligarchy　or　confusion。　　　　　〃This　was　seen　by　the　Romans；　whose　rustic　tribes；　extending　themselves　from　the　river　Arno　to　the　Vulturnus；　that　is；　from　Fesulae　or　Florence　to　Capua；　invented　a　way　of　representative　by　lots：　the　tribe　upon　which　the　first　fell　being　the　prerogative；　and　some　two　or　three　more　that　had　the　rest；　the　jure　vocatoe。　These　gave　the　suffrage　of　the　commonwealth　in　two　meetings；　the　prerogative　at　the　first　assembly；　and　the　jure　vocatoe　at　a　second。　　　　　〃Now　to　make　the　parallel：　all　the　inconveniences　that　you　have　observed　in　these　assemblies　are　shut　out；　and　all　the　conveniences　taken　into　your　prerogative。　For　first；　it　is　that　for　which　Athens；　shaking　off　the　blame　of　Xenophon　and　Polybius；　came　to　deserve　the　praise　of　Thucydides；　a　representative。　　And；　secondly；　not；　as　I　suspect　in　that　of　Athens；　and　is　past　suspicion　in　this　of　Rome；　by　lot；　but　by　suffrage；　as　was　also　the　late　House　of　Commons；　by　which　means　in　your　prerogatives　all　the　tribes　of　Oceana　are　jure　vocatoe；　and　if　a　man　shall　except　against　the　paucity　of　the　standing　number；　it　is　a　wheel；　which　in　the　revolution　of　a　few　years　turns　every　hand　that　is　fit；　or　fits　every　hand　that　it　turns　to　the　public　work。　Moreover；　I　am　deceived　if；　upon　due　consideration；　it　does　not　fetch　your　tribes；　with　greater　equality　and　ease　to　themselves　and　to　the　government；　from　the　frontiers　of　Marpesia；　than　Rome　ever　brought　any　one　of　hers　out　of　her　pomoeria；　or　the　nearest　parts　of　her　adjoining　territories。　To　this　you　may　add；　that　whereas　a　commonwealth；　which　in　regard　of　the　people　is　not　of　facility　in　execution；　were　sure　enough　in　this　nation　to　be　cast　off　through　impatience；　your　musters　and　galaxies　are　given　to　the　people；　as　milk　to　babes；　whereby　when　they　are　brought　up　through　four　days'　election　in　a　whole　year　（one　at　the　parish；　one　at　the　hundred；　and　two　at　the　tribe）　to　their　strongest　meat；　it　is　of　no　harder　digestion　than　to　give　their　negative　or　affirmative　as　they　see　cause。　There　be　gallant　men　among　us　that　laugh　at　such　an　appeal　or　umpire；　but　I　refer　it　whether　you　be　more　inclining　to　pardon　them　or　me；　who　I　confess　have　been　this　day　laughing　at　a　sober　man；　but　without　meaning　him　any　harm；　and　that　is　Petrus　Cunaeus；　where　speaking　of　the　nature　of　the　people；　he　says；　'that　taking　them　apart；　they　are　very　simple；　but　yet　in　their　assemblies　they　see　and　know　something：；　and　so　runs　away　without　troubling　himself　with　what　that　something　is。　Whereas　the　people；　taken　apart；　are　but　so　many　private　interests；　but　if　you　take　them　together；　they　are　the　public　interest。　　　　　〃The　public　interest　of　a　commonwealth；　as　has　been　shown；　is　nearest　that　of　mankind；　and　that　of　mankind　is　right　reason；　but　with　aristocracy　（whose　reason　or　interest；　when　they　are　all　together；　as　appeared　by　the　patricians；　is　but　that　of　a　party）　it　is　quite　contrary：　for　as；　taken　apart；　they　are　far　wiser　than　the　people　considered　in　that　manner；　so；　being　put　together；　they　are　such　fools；　who　by　deposing　the　people；　as　did　those　of　Rome；　will　saw　off　the　branch　whereupon　they　sit；　or　rather　destroy　the　root　of　their　own　greatness。　Wherefore　Machi