an enquiry concerning human understanding-第7章

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inseparable　and　inviolable　connexion　between　them。　A　man
must　be　very　sagacious　who　could　discover　by　reasoning　that
crystal　is　the　effect　of　heat；　and　ice　of　cold；　without
being　previously　acquainted　with　the　operation　of　these
qualities。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　II。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　B/UT　we　have　not　yet　attained　any　tolerable
satisfaction　with　regard　to　the　question　first　proposed。
Each　solution　still　gives　rise　to　a　new　question　as
difficult　as　the　foregoing；　and　leads　us　on　to　farther
enquiries。　When　it　is　asked；　　the　proper　answer
seems　to　be；　that　they　are　founded　on　the　relation　of　cause
and　effect。　When　again　it　is　asked；　　it　may　be　replied　in　one　word；　E/XPERIENCE。　But
if　we　still　carry　on　our　sifting　humour；　and　ask；　　this
implies　a　new　question；　which　may　be　of　more　difficult
solution　and　explication。　Philosophers；　that　give　themselves
airs　of　superior　wisdom　and　sufficiency；　have　a　hard　task
when　they　encounter　persons　of　inquisitive　dispositions；　who
push　them　from　every　corner　to　which　they　retreat；　and　who
are　sure　at　last　to　bring　them　to　some　dangerous　dilemma。
The　best　expedient　to　prevent　this　confusion；　is　to　be
modest　in　our　pretensions；　and　even　to　discover　the
difficulty　ourselves　before　it　is　objected　to　us。　By　this
means；　we　may　make　a　kind　of　merit　of　our　very　ignorance。

　　　　　I　shall　content　myself；　in　this　section；　with　an　easy
task；　and　shall　pretend　only　to　give　a　negative　answer　to
the　question　here　proposed。　I　say　then；　that；　even　after　we
have　experience　of　the　operations　of　cause　and　effect；　our
conclusions　from　that　experience　are　not　founded　on
reasoning；　or　any　process　of　the　understanding。　This　answer
we　must　endeavour　both　to　explain　and　to　defend。

　　　　　It　must　certainly　be　allowed；　that　nature　has　kept　us
at　a　great　distance　from　all　her　secrets；　and　has　afforded
us　only　the　knowledge　of　a　few　superficial　qualities　of
objects；　while　she　conceals　from　us　those　powers　and
principles　on　which　the　influence　of　those　objects　entirely
depends。　Our　senses　inform　us　of　the　colour；　weight；　and
consistence　of　bread；　but　neither　sense　nor　reason　can　ever
inform　us　of　those　qualities　which　fit　it　for　the
nourishment　and　support　of　a　human　body。　Sight　or　feeling
conveys　an　idea　of　the　actual　motion　of　bodies；　but　as　to
that　wonderful　force　or　power；　which　would　carry　on　a　moving
body　for　ever　in　a　continued　change　of　place；　and　which
bodies　never　lose　but　by　communicating　it　to　others；　of　this
we　cannot　form　the　most　distant　conception。　But
notwithstanding　this　ignorance　of　natural　powers＇11＇　and
principles；　we　always　presume；　when　we　see　like　sensible
qualities；　that　they　have　like　secret　powers；　and　expect
that　effects；　similar　to　those　which　we　have　experienced；
will　follow　from　them。　If　a　body　of　like　colour　and
consistence　with　that　bread；　which　we　have　formerly　eat；　be
presented　to　us；　we　make　no　scruple　of　repeating　the
experiment；　and　foresee；　with　certainty；　like　nourishment
and　support。　Now　this　is　a　process　of　the　mind　or　thought；
of　which　I　would　willingly　know　the　foundation。　It　is
allowed　on　all　hands　that　there　is　no　known　connexion
between　the　sensible　qualities　and　the　secret　powers；　and
consequently；　that　the　mind　is　not　led　to　form　such　a
conclusion　concerning　their　constant　and　regular
conjunction；　by　any　thing　which　it　knows　of　their　nature。　As
to　past　；　it　can　be　allowed　to　give　　and
　information　of　those　precise　objects　only；　and
that　precise　period　of　time；　which　fell　under　its
cognizance：　But　why　this　experience　should　be　extended　to
future　times；　and　to　other　objects；　which　for　aught　we　know；
may　be　only　in　appearance　similar；　this　is　the　main　question
on　which　I　would　insist。　The　bread；　which　I　formerly　eat；
nourished　me；　that　is；　a　body　of　such　sensible　qualities
was；　at　that　time；　endued　with　such　secret　powers：　But　does
it　follow；　that　other　bread　must　also　nourish　me　at　another
time；　and　that　like　sensible　qualities　must　always　be
attended　with　like　secret　powers？　The　consequence　seems
nowise　necessary。　At　least；　it　must　be　acknowledged　that
there　is　here　a　consequence　drawn　by　the　mind；　that　there　is
a　certain　step　taken；　a　process　of　thought；　and　an
inference；　which　wants　to　be　explained。　These　two
propositions　are　far　from　being　the　same；　；　and　。
I　shall　allow；　if　you　please；　that　the　one　proposition　may
justly　be　inferred　from　the　other：　I　know；　in　fact；　that　it
always　is　inferred。　But　if　you　insist　that　the　inference　is
made　by　a　chain　of　reasoning；　I　desire　you　to　produce　that
reasoning。　The　connexion　between　these　propositions　is　not
intuitive。　There　is　required　a　medium；　which　may　enable　the
mind　to　draw　such　an　inference；　if　indeed　it　be　drawn　by
reasoning　and　argument。　What　that　medium　is；　I　must　confess；
passes　my　comprehension；　and　it　is　incumbent　on　those　to
produce　it；　who　assert　that　it　really　exists；　and　is　the
origin　of　all　our　conclusions　concerning　matter　of　fact。

　　　　　This　negative　argument　must　certainly；　in　process　of
time；　become　altogether　convincing；　if　many　penetrating　and
able　philosophers　shall　turn　their　enquiries　this　way　and　no
one　be　ever　able　to　discover　any　connecting　proposition　or
intermediate　step；　which　supports　the　understanding　in　this
conclusion。　But　as　the　question　is　yet　new；　every　reader　may
not　trust　so　far　to　his　own　penetration；　as　to　conclude；
because　an　argument　escapes　his　enquiry；　that　therefore　it
does　not　really　exist。　For　this　reason　it　may　be　requisite
to　venture　upon　a　more　difficult　task；　and　enumerating　all
the　branches　of　human　knowledge；　endeavour　to　show　that　none
of　them　can　afford　such　an　argument。

　　　　　All　reasonings　may　be　divided　into　two　kinds；　namely；
demonstrative　reasoning；　or　that　concerning　relations　of
ideas；　and　moral　reasoning；　or　that　concerning　matter　of
fact　and　existence。　That　there　are　no　demonstrative
arguments　in　the　case　seems　evident；　since　it　implies　no
contradiction　that　the　course　of　nature　may　change；　and　that
an　object；　seemingly　like　those　which　we　have　experienced；
may　be　attended　with　different　or　contrary　effects。　May　I
not　clearly　and　distinctly　conceive　that　a　body；　falling
from　the　clouds；　and　which；　in　all　other　respects；　resembles
snow；　has　yet　the　taste　of　salt　or　feeling　of　fire？　Is　there
any　more　intelligible　proposition　than　to　affirm；　that　all
the　trees　will　flourish　in　D/ECEMBER　and　J/ANUARY；　and
decay　in　M/AY　and　J/UNE？　Now　whatever　is　intelligible；　and
can　be　distinctly　conceived；　implies　no　contradiction；　and
can　never　be　proved　false　by　any　demonstrative　argument　or
abstract　reasoning　。

　　　　　If　we　be；　therefore；　engaged　by　arguments　to　put　trust
in　past　experience；　and　make　it　the　standard　of　our　future
judgment；　these　arguments　must　be　probable　only；　or　such　as
regard　matter　of　fact　and　real　existence　according　to　the
division　above　mentioned。　But　that　there　is　no　argument　of
this　kind；　must　appear；　if　our　explication　of　that　species
of　reasoning　be　admitted　as　solid　and　satisfactory。　We　have
said　that　all　arguments　concerning　existence　are　founded　on
the　relation　of　cause　and　effect；　that　our　knowledge　of　that
relation　is　derived　entirely　from　experience；　and　that　all
our　experimental　conclusions　proceed　upon　the　supposition
that　the　future　will　be　conformable　to　the　past。　To
endeavour；　therefore；　the　proof　of　this　last　supposition　by
probable　arguments；　or　arguments　regarding　existence；　must
be　evidently　going　in　a　circle；　and　taking　that　for　granted；
which　is　the　very　point　in　question。

　　　　　In　reality；　all　arguments　from　experience　are　founded
on　the　similarity　which　we　discover　among　natural　objects；
and　by　which　we　are　induced　to　expect　effects　similar　to
those　which　we　have　found　to　follow　from　such　objects。　And
though　none　but　a　fool　or　madman　will　ever　pretend　to
dispute　the　authority　of　experience；　or　to　reject　that　great
guide　of　human　life；　it　may　surely　be　allowed　a　philosopher
to　have　so　much　curiosity　at　least　as　to　examine　the
principle　of　human　nature；　which　gives　this　mighty　authority
to　experience；　and　makes　us　draw　advantage　from　that
similarity　which　nature　has　placed　among　different　objects。
From　causes　which；　appear　；　we　expect　similar
effects。　This　is　the　sum　of　all　our　experimental
conclusions。　Now　it　seems　evident　that；　if　this　conclusion
were　formed　by　reason；　it　would　be　as　perfect　at　first；　and
upon　one　instance；　as　after　ever　so　long　a　course　of
experience。　But　the　case　is　far　otherwise。　Nothing　so　like
as　eggs；　yet　no　one；　on　account　of　this　appearing
similarity；　expects　the　same　taste　and　relish　in　all　of
them。　It　is　only　after　a　long　course　of　uniform　experiments
in　any　kind；　that　we　attain　a　firm　reliance　and　security
with　regard　to　a　particular　event。　Now　where　is　that　process
of　reasoning　which；　from　one　instance；　draws　a　conclusion；
so　different　from　that　which　it　infers　from　a　hundred
instances　that　are　nowise　different　from　that　single　one？
This　question　I　propose　as　much　for　the　sake　of　information；
as　with　an　intention　of　raising　difficulties。　I　cannot　find；
I　cannot　imagine　any　such　reasoning。　But　I　keep　my　mind
still　open　to　instruction；　if　any　one　will　vouchsafe　to
bestow　it　on　me。

　　　　　Should　it　be　said　that；　from　a　number　of　uniform
experiments；　we　　a　connexion　between　the　sensible
qualities　and　the　secret　powers；　this；　I　must　confess；　seems
the　same　difficulty；　couched　in　different　terms。　The
question　still　recurs；　on　what　process　of　argument　this
　is　founded？　Where　is　the　medium；　the　interposing
ideas；　which　join　propositions　so　very　wide　of　each　other？
It　is　confessed　that　the　colour；　consistence；　and　other
sensible　qualities　of　bread　appear　not；　of　themselves；　to
have　any　connexion　with　the　secret　powers　of　nourishment　and
support。　For　otherwise　we　could　infer　these　secret　powers
from　the　first　appearance　of　these　sensible　qualities；
without　the　aid　of　experience；　contrary　to　the　sentiment　of
all　philosophers；　and　contrary　to　plain　matter　of　fact。
Here；　then；　is　our　natural　state　of　ignorance　with　regard　to
the　powers　and　influence　of　all　objects。　How　is　this
remedied　by　experience？　It　only　shows　us　a　number　of　uniform
effects；　resulting　from　certain　objects；　and　teaches　us　that
those　particular　objects；　at　that　particular　time；　were
endowed　with　such　powers　and　forces。　When　a　new　object；
endowed　with　similar　sensible　qualities；　is　produced；　we
expect　similar　powers　and　forces；　and　look　for　a　like
effect。　From　a　body　of　like　colour　and　consistence　with
bread　we　expect　like　nourishment　and　support。　But　this
surely　is　a　step　or　progress　of　the　mind；　which　wants　to　be
explain