an enquiry concerning human understanding-第3章

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importance。

　　　　　But　as；　after　all；　the　abstractedness　of　these
speculations　is　no　recommendation；　but　rather　a　disadvantage
to　them；　and　as　this　difficulty　may　perhaps　be　surmounted　by
care　and　art；　and　the　avoiding　of　all　unnecessary　detail；　we
have；　in　the　following　enquiry；　attempted　to　throw　some
light　upon　subjects；　from　which　uncertainty　has　hitherto
deterred　the　wise；　and　obscurity　the　ignorant。　Happy；　if　we
can　unite　the　boundaries　of　the　different　species　of
philosophy；　by　reconciling　profound　enquiry　with　clearness；
and　truth　with　novelty！　And　still　more　happy；　if；　reasoning
in　this　easy　manner；　we　can　undermine　the　foundations　of　an
abstruse　philosophy；　which　seems　to　have　hitherto　served
only　as　a　shelter　to　superstition；　and　a　cover　to　absurdity
and　error！

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　II。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Origin　of　Ideas。

　　　　　E/VERY　one　will　readily　allow；　that　there　is　a
considerable　difference　between　the　perceptions　of　the　mind；
when　a　man　feels　the　pain　of　excessive　heat；　or　the　pleasure
of　moderate　warmth；　and　when　he　afterwards　recalls　to　his
memory　this　sensation；　or　anticipates　it　by　his　imagination。
These　faculties　may　mimic　or　copy　the　perceptions　of　the
senses；　but　they　never　can　entirely　reach　the　force　and
vivacity　of　the　original　sentiment。　The　utmost　we　say　of
them；　even　when　they　operate　with　greatest　vigour；　is；　that
they　represent　their　object　in　so　lively　a　manner；　that　we
could　　say　we　feel　or　see　it：　But；　except　the　mind
be　disordered　by　disease　or　madness；　they　never　can　arrive
at　such　a　pitch　of　vivacity；　as　to　render　these　perceptions
altogether　undistinguishable。　All　the　colours　of　poetry；
however　splendid；　can　never　paint　natural　objects　in　such　a
manner　as　to　make　the　description　be　taken　for　a　real
landskip。　The　most　lively　thought　is　still　inferior　to　the
dullest　sensation。

　　　　　We　may　observe　a　like　distinction　to　run　through　all
the　other　perceptions　of　the　mind。　A　man　in　a　fit　of　anger；
is　actuated　in　a　very　different　manner　from　one　who　only
thinks　of　that　emotion。　If　you　tell　me；　that　any　person　is
in　love；　I　easily　understand　your　meaning；　and　from　a　just
conception　of　his　situation；　but　never　can　mistake　that
conception　for　the　real　disorders　and　agitations　of　the
passion。　When　we　reflect　on　our　past　sentiments　and
affections；　our　thought　is　a　faithful　mirror；　and　copies　its
objects　truly；　but　the　colours　which　it　employs　are　faint
and　dull；　in　comparison　of　those　in　which　our　original
perceptions　were　clothed。　It　requires　no　nice　discernment　or
metaphysical　head　to　mark　the　distinction　between　them。

　　　　　Here　therefore　we　may　divide　all　the　perceptions　of　the
mind　into　two　classes　or　species；　which　are　distinguished　by
their　different　degrees　of　force　and　vivacity。　The　less
forcible　and　lively　are　commonly　denominated　T/HOUGHTS　or
I/DEAS。　The　other　species　want　a　name　in　our　language；　and
in　most　others；　I　suppose；　because　it　was　not　requisite　for
any；　but　philosophical　purposes；　to　rank　them　under　a
general　term　or　appellation。　Let　us；　therefore；　use　a　little
freedom；　and　call　them　I/MPRESSIONS；　employing　that　word　in
a　sense　somewhat　different　from　the　usual。　By　the　term
；　then；　I　mean　all　our　more　lively　perceptions；
when　we　hear；　or　see；　or　feel；　or　love；　or　hate；　or　desire；
or　will。　And　impressions　are　distinguished　from　ideas；　which
are　the　less　lively　perceptions；　of　which　we　are　conscious；
when　we　reflect　on　any　of　those　sensations　or　movements
above　mentioned。

　　　　　Nothing；　at　first　view；　may　seem　more　unbounded　than
the　thought　of　man；　which　not　only　escapes　all　human　power
and　authority；　but　is　not　even　restrained　within　the　limits
of　nature　and　reality。　To　form　monsters；　and　join
incongruous　shapes　and　appearances；　costs　the　imagination　no
more　trouble　than　to　conceive　the　most　natural　and　familiar
objects。　And　while　the　body　is　confined　to　one　planet；　along
which　it　creeps　with　pain　and　difficulty；　the　thought　can　in
an　instant　transport　us　into　the　most　distant　regions　of　the
universe；　or　even　beyond　the　universe；　into　the　unbounded
chaos；　where　nature　is　supposed　to　lie　in　total　confusion。
What　never　was　seen；　or　heard　of；　may　yet　be　conceived；　nor
is　any　thing　beyond　the　power　of　thought；　except　what
implies　an　absolute　contradiction。

　　　　　But　though　our　thought　seems　to　possess　this　unbounded
liberty；　we　shall　find；　upon　a　nearer　examination；　that　it
is　really　confined　within　very　narrow　limits；　and　that　all
this　creative　power　of　the　mind　amounts　to　no　more　than　the
faculty　of　compounding；　transposing；　augmenting；　or
diminishing　the　materials　afforded　us　by　the　senses　and
experience。　When　we　think　of　a　golden　mountain；　we　only　join
two　consistent　ideas；　；　and　；　with　which　we
were　formerly　acquainted。　A　virtuous　horse　we　can　conceive；
because；　from　our　own　feeling；　we　can　conceive　virtue；　and
this　we　may　unite　to　the　figure　and　shape　of　a　horse；　which
is　an　animal　familiar　to　us。　In　short；　all　the　materials　of
thinking　are　derived　either　from　our　outward　or　inward
sentiment：　The　mixture　and　composition　of　these　belongs
alone　to　the　mind　and　will。　Or；　to　express　myself　in
philosophical　language；　all　our　ideas　or　more　feeble
perceptions　are　copies　of　our　impressions　or　more　lively
ones。

　　　　　To　prove　this；　the　two　following　arguments　will；　I
hope；　be　sufficient。　First；　when　we　analyze　our　thoughts　or
ideas；　however　compounded　or　sublime；　we　always　find　that
they　resolve　themselves　into　such　simple　ideas　as　were
copied　from　a　precedent　feeling　or　sentiment。　Even　those
ideas；　which；　at　first　view；　seem　the　most　wide　of　this
origin；　are　found；　upon　a　nearer　scrutiny；　to　be　derived
from　it。　The　idea　of　God；　as　meaning　an　infinitely
intelligent；　wise；　and　good　Being；　arises　from　reflecting　on
the　operations　of　our　own　mind；　and　augmenting；　without
limit；　those　qualities　of　goodness　and　wisdom。　We　may
prosecute　this　enquiry　to　what　length　we　please；　where　we
shall　always　find；　that　every　idea　which　we　examine　is
copied　from　a　similar　impression。　Those　who　would　assert
that　this　position　is　not　universally　true　nor　without
exception；　have　only　one；　and　that　an　easy　method　of
refuting　it；　by　producing　that　idea；　which；　in　their
opinion；　is　not　derived　from　this　source。　It　will　then　be
incumbent　on　us；　if　we　would　maintain　our　doctrine；　to
produce　the　impression；　or　lively　perception；　which
corresponds　to　it。

　　　　　Secondly。　If　it　happen；　from　a　defect　of　the　organ；
that　a　man　is　not　susceptible　of　any　species　of　sensation；
we　always　find　that　he　is　as　little　susceptible　of　the
correspondent　ideas。　A　blind　man　can　form　no　notion　of
colours；　a　deaf　man　of　sounds。　Restore　either　of　them　that
sense　in　which　he　is　deficient；　by　opening　this　new　inlet
for　his　sensations；　you　also　open　an　inlet　for　the　ideas；
and　he　finds　no　difficulty　in　conceiving　these　objects。　The
case　is　the　same；　if　the　object；　proper　for　exciting　any
sensation；　has　never　been　applied　to　the　organ。　A
L/APLANDER　or　N/EGROE　has　no　notion　of　the　relish　of　wine。
And　though　there　are　few　or　no　instances　of　a　like
deficiency　in　the　mind；　where　a　person　has　never　felt　or　is
wholly　incapable　of　a　sentiment　or　passion　that　belongs　to
his　species；　yet　we　find　the　same　observation　to　take　place
in　a　less　degree。　A　man　of　mild　manners　can　form　no　idea　of
inveterate　revenge　or　cruelty；　nor　can　a　selfish　heart
easily　conceive　the　heights　of　friendship　and　generosity。　It
is　readily　allowed；　that　other　beings　may　possess　many
senses　of　which　we　can　have　no　conception；　because　the　ideas
of　them　have　never　been　introduced　to　us　in　the　only　manner
by　which　an　idea　can　have　access　to　the　mind；　to　wit；　by　the
actual　feeling　and　sensation。

　　　　　There　is；　however；　one　contradictory　phenomenon；　which
may　prove　that　it　is　not　absolutely　impossible　for　ideas　to
arise；　independent　of　their　correspondent　impressions。　I
believe　it　will　readily　be　allowed；　that　the　several
distinct　ideas　of　colour；　which　enter　by　the　eye；　or　those
of　sound；　which　are　conveyed　by　the　ear；　are　really
different　from　each　other；　though；　at　the　same　time；
resembling。　Now　if　this　be　true　of　different　colours；　it
must　be　no　less　so　of　the　different　shades　of　the　same
colour；　and　each　shade　produces　a　distinct　idea；　independent
of　the　rest。　For　if　this　should　be　denied；　it　is　possible；
by　the　continual　gradation　of　shades；　to　run　a　colour
insensibly　into　what　is　most　remote　from　it；　and　if　you　will
not　allow　any　of　the　means　to　be　different；　you　cannot；
without　absurdity；　deny　the　extremes　to　be　the　same。
Suppose；　therefore；　a　person　to　have　enjoyed　his　sight　for
thirty　years；　and　to　have　become　perfectly　acquainted　with
colours　of　all　kinds　except　one　particular　shade　of　blue；
for　instance；　which　it　never　has　been　his　fortune　to　meet
with。　Let　all　the　different　shades　of　that　colour；　except
that　single　one；　be　placed　before　him；　descending　gradually
from　the　deepest　to　the　lightest；　it　is　plain　that　he　will
perceive　a　blank；　where　that　shade　is　wanting；　and　will　be
sensible　that　there　is　a　greater　distance　in　that　place
between　the　contiguous　colour　than　in　any　other。　Now　I　ask；
whether　it　be　possible　for　him；　from　his　own　imagination；　to
supply　this　deficiency；　and　raise　up　to　himself　the　idea　of
that　particular　shade；　though　it　had　never　been　conveyed　to
him　by　his　senses？　I　believe　there　are　few　but　will　be　of
opinion　that　he　can：　And　this　may　serve　as　a　proof　that　the
simple　ideas　are　not　always；　in　every　instance；　derived　from
the　correspondent　impressions；　though　this　instance　is　so
singular；　that　it　is　scarcely　worth　our　observing；　and　does
not　merit　that　for　it　alone　we　should　alter　our　general
maxim。

　　　　　Here；　therefore；　is　a　proposition；　which　not　only
seems；　in　itself；　simple　and　intelligible；　but；　if　a　proper
use　were　made　of　it；　might　render　every　dispute　equally
intelligible；　and　banish　all　that　jargon；　which　has　so　long
taken　possession　of　metaphysical　reasonings；　and　drawn
disgrace　upon　them。　All　ideas；　especially　abstract　ones；　are
naturally　faint　and　obscure：　The　mind　has　but　a　slender　hold
of　them：　They　are　apt　to　be　confounded　with　other　resembling
ideas；　and　when　we　have　often　employed　any　term；　though
without　a　distinct　meaning；　we　are　apt　to　imagine　it　has　a
determinate　idea　annexed　to　it。　On　the　contrary；　all
impressions；　that　is；　all　sensations；　either　outward　or
inward；　are　strong　and　vivid：　The　limits　between　them　are
more　exactly　determined：　Nor　is　it　easy　to　fall　into　any
error　or　mistake　with　regard　to　them。　When　we　entertain；
therefore；　any　suspicion　that　a　philosophical　term　is
employed　without　any　meaning　or　idea　（as　is　but　too
frequent）；　we　need　but　enquire；　？　And　if　it　be　impossible　to
assign　any；　this　will　serve　to　confirm　our　suspicion。　By
bringing　ideas　into　so　clear　a　light　we　may　reasonably　hope
to　remove　all　dispute；　which　may　arise；　concerning　their
nature　and　reality。＇4＇

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　III。