an enquiry concerning human understanding-第13章

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is　connected　with　its　effect；　and　is　for　ever　infallible　in
its　operation。　They　acquire；　by　long　habit；　such　a　turn　of
mind；　that；　upon　the　appearance　of　the　cause；　they
immediately　expect　with　assurance　its　usual　attendant；　and
hardly　conceive　it　possible　that　any　other　event　could
result　from　it。　It　is　only　on　the　discovery　of　extraordinary
phaenomena；　such　as　earthquakes；　pestilence；　and　prodigies
of　any　kind；　that　they　find　themselves　at　a　loss　to　assign　a
proper　cause；　and　to　explain　the　manner　in　which　the　effect
is　produced　by　it。　It　is　usual　for　men；　in　such　difficulties
to　have　recourse　to　some　invisible　intelligent　principle＇18＇
as　the　immediate　cause　of　that　event　which　surprises　them；
and　which；　they　think；　cannot　be　accounted　for　from　the
common　powers　of　nature。　But　philosophers；　who　carry　their
scrutiny　a　little　farther；　immediately　perceive　that；　even
in　the　most　familiar　events；　the　energy　of　the　cause　is　as
unintelligible　as　in　the　most　unusual；　and　that　we　only
learn　by　experience　the　frequent　C/ONJUNCTION　of　objects；
without　being　ever　able　to　comprehend　any　thing　like
C/ONNEXION　between　them。　Here；　then；　many　philosophers
think　themselves　obliged　by　reason　to　have　recourse；　on　all
occasions；　to　the　same　principle；　which　the　vulgar　never
appeal　to　but　in　cases　that　appear　miraculous　and
supernatural。　They　acknowledge　mind　and　intelligence　to　be；
not　only　the　ultimate　and　original　cause　of　all　things；　but
the　immediate　and　sole　cause　of　every　event　which　appears　in
nature。　They　pretend　that　those　objects　which　are　commonly
denominated　；　are　in　reality　nothing　but
；　and　that　the　true　and　direct　principle　of　every
effect　is　not　any　power　or　force　in　nature；　but　a　volition
of　the　Supreme　Being；　who　wills　that　such　particular　objects
should　for　ever　be　conjoined　with　each　other。　Instead　of
saying　that　one　billiard…ball　moves　another　by　a　force　which
it　has　derived　from　the　author　of　nature；　it　is　the　Deity
himself；　they　say；　who；　by　a　particular　volition；　moves　the
second　ball；　being　determined　to　this　operation　by　the
impulse　of　the　first　ball；　in　consequence　of　those　general
laws　which　he　has　laid　down　to　himself　in　the　government　of
the　universe。　But　philosophers　advancing　still　in　their
inquiries；　discover　that；　as　we　are　totally　ignorant　of　the
power　on　which　depends　the　mutual　operation　of　bodies；　we
are　no　less　ignorant　of　that　power　on　which　depends　the
operation　of　mind　on　body；　or　of　body　on　mind；　nor　are　we
able；　either　from　our　senses　or　consciousness；　to　assign　the
ultimate　principle　in　one　case　more　than　in　the　other。　The
same　ignorance；　therefore；　reduces　them　to　the　same
conclusion。　They　assert　that　the　Deity　is　the　immediate
cause　of　the　union　between　soul　and　body；　and　that　they　are
not　the　organs　of　sense；　which；　being　agitated　by　external
objects；　produce　sensations　in　the　mind；　but　that　it　is　a
particular　volition　of　our　omnipotent　Maker；　which　excites
such　a　sensation；　in　consequence　of　such　a　motion　in　the
organ。　In　like　manner；　it　is　not　any　energy　in　the　will　that
produces　local　motion　in　our　members：　It　is　God　himself；　who
is　pleased　to　second　our　will；　in　itself　impotent；　and　to
command　that　motion　which　we　erroneously　attribute　to　our
own　power　and　efficacy。　Nor　do　philosophers　stop　at　this
conclusion。　They　sometimes　extend　the　same　inference　to　the
mind　itself；　in　its　internal　operations。　Our　mental　vision
or　conception　of　ideas　is　nothing　but　a　revelation　made　to
us　by　our　Maker。　When　we　voluntarily　turn　our　thoughts　to
any　object；　and　raise　up　its　image　in　the　fancy；　it　is　not
the　will　which　creates　that　idea：　It　is　the　universal
Creator；　who　discovers　it　to　the　mind；　and　renders　it
present　to　us。

　　　　　Thus；　according　to　these　philosophers；　every　thing　is
full　of　God。　Not　content　with　the　principle；　that　nothing
exists　but　by　his　will；　that　nothing　possesses　any　power　but
by　his　concession：　They　rob　nature；　and　all　created　beings；
of　every　power；　in　order　to　render　their　dependence　on　the
Deity　still　more　sensible　and　immediate。　They　consider　not
that；　by　this　theory；　they　diminish；　instead　of　magnifying；
the　grandeur　of　those　attributes；　which　they　affect　so　much
to　celebrate。　It　argues　surely　more　power　in　the　Deity　to
delegate　a　certain　degree　of　power　to　inferior　creatures
than　to　produce　every　thing　by　his　own　immediate　volition。
It　argues　more　wisdom　to　contrive　at　first　the　fabric　of　the
world　with　such　perfect　foresight　that；　of　itself；　and　by
its　proper　operation；　it　may　serve　all　the　purposes　of
providence；　than　if　the　great　Creator　were　obliged　every
moment　to　adjust　its　parts；　and　animate　by　his　breath　all
the　wheels　of　that　stupendous　machine。

　　　　　But　if　we　would　have　a　more　philosophical　confutation
of　this　theory；　perhaps　the　two　following　reflections　may
suffice：

　　　　　；　it　seems　to　me　that　this　theory　of　the
universal　energy　and　operation　of　the　Supreme　Being　is　too
bold　ever　to　carry　conviction　with　it　to　a　man；　sufficiently
apprized　of　the　weakness　of　human　reason；　and　the　narrow
limits　to　which　it　is　confined　in　all　its　operations。　Though
the　chain　of　arguments　which　conduct　to　it　were　ever　so
logical；　there　must　arise　a　strong　suspicion；　if　not　an
absolute　assurance；　that　it　has　carried　us　quite　beyond　the
reach　of　our　faculties；　when　it　leads　to　conclusions　so
extraordinary；　and　so　remote　from　common　life　and
experience。　We　are　got　into　fairy　land；　long　ere　we　have
reached　the　last　steps　of　our　theory；　and　there　we　have　no
reason　to　trust　our　common　methods　of　argument；　or　to　think
that　our　usual　analogies　and　probabilities　have　any
authority。　Our　line　is　too　short　to　fathom　such　immense
abysses。　And　however　we　may　flatter　ourselves　that　we　are
guided；　in　every　step　which　we　take；　by　a　kind　of
verisimilitude　and　experience；　we　may　be　assured　that　this
fancied　experience　has　no　authority　when　we　thus　apply　it　to
subjects　that　lie　entirely　out　of　the　sphere　of　experience。
But　on　this　we　shall　have　occasion　to　touch　afterwards。＇19＇

　　　　　；　I　cannot　perceive　any　force　in　the
arguments　on　which　this　theory　is　founded。　We　are　ignorant；
it　is　true；　of　the　manner　in　which　bodies　operate　on　each
other：　Their　force　or　energy　is　entirely　incomprehensible：
But　are　we　not　equally　ignorant　of　the　manner　or　force　by
which　a　mind；　even　the　supreme　mind；　operates　either　on
itself　or　on　body？　Whence；　I　beseech　you；　do　we　acquire　any
idea　of　it？　We　have　no　sentiment　or　consciousness　of　this
power　in　ourselves。　We　have　no　idea　of　the　Supreme　Being　but
what　we　learn　from　reflection　on　our　own　faculties。　Were　our
ignorance；　therefore；　a　good　reason　for　rejecting　any　thing；
we　should　be　led　into　that　principle　of　denying　all　energy
in　the　Supreme　Being　as　much　as　in　the　grossest　matter。　We
surely　comprehend　as　little　the　operations　of　one　as　of　the
other。　Is　it　more　difficult　to　conceive　that　motion　may
arise　from　impulse　than　that　it　may　arise　from　volition？　All
we　know　is　our　profound　ignorance　in　both　cases。＇20＇
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　II。

　　　　　B/UT　to　hasten　to　a　conclusion　of　this　argument；　which
is　already　drawn　out　to　too　great　a　length：　We　have　sought
in　vain　for　an　idea　of　power　or　necessary　connexion　in　all
the　sources　from　which　we　could　suppose　it　to　be　derived。　It
appears　that；　in　single　instances　of　the　operation　of
bodies；　we　never　can；　by　our　utmost　scrutiny；　discover　any
thing　but　one　event　following　another；　without　being　able　to
comprehend　any　force　or　power　by　which　the　cause　operates；
or　any　connexion　between　it　and　its　supposed　effect。　The
same　difficulty　occurs　in　contemplating　the　operations　of
mind　on　body　　where　we　observe　the　motion　of　the　latter　to
follow　upon　the　volition　of　the　former；　but　are　not　able　to
observe　or　conceive　the　tie　which　binds　together　the　motion
and　volition；　or　the　energy　by　which　the　mind　produces　this
effect。　The　authority　of　the　will　over　its　own　faculties　and
ideas　is　not　a　whit　more　comprehensible：　So　that；　upon　the
whole；　there　appears　not；　throughout　all　nature；　any　one
instance　of　connexion　which　is　conceivable　by　us。　All　events
seem　entirely　loose　and　separate。　One　event　follows　another；
but　we　never　can　observe　any　tie　between　them。　They　seem
；　but　never　。　And　as　we　can　have　no
idea　of　any　thing　which　never　appeared　to　our　outward　sense
or　inward　sentiment；　the　necessary　conclusion　seems　to　be
that　we　have　no　idea　of　connexion　or　power　at　all；　and　that
these　words　are　absolutely；　without　any　meaning；　when
employed　either　in　philosophical　reasonings　or　common　life。

　　　　　But　there　still　remains　one　method　of　avoiding　this
conclusion；　and　one　source　which　we　have　not　yet　examined。
When　any　natural　object　or　event　is　presented；　it　is
impossible　for　us；　by　any　sagacity　or　penetration；　to
discover；　or　even　conjecture；　without　experience；　what　event
will　result　from　it；　or　to　carry　our　foresight　beyond　that
object　which　is　immediately　present　to　the　memory　and
senses。　Even　after　one　instance　or　experiment　where　we　have
observed　a　particular　event　to　follow　upon　another；　we　are
not　entitled　to　form　a　general　rule；　or　foretell　what　will
happen　in　like　cases；　it　being　justly　esteemed　an
unpardonable　temerity　to　judge　of　the　whole　course　of　nature
from　one　single　experiment；　however　accurate　or　certain。　But
when　one　particular　species　of　event　has　always；　in　all
instances；　been　conjoined　with　another；　we　make　no　longer
any　scruple　of　foretelling　one　upon　the　appearance　of　the
other；　and　of　employing　that　reasoning；　which　can　alone
assure　us　of　any　matter　of　fact　or　existence。　We　then　call
the　one　object；　；　the　other；　。　We　suppose
that　there　is　some　connexion　between　them；　some　power　in　the
one；　by　which　it　infallibly　produces　the　other；　and　operates
with　the　greatest　certainty　and　strongest　necessity。

　　　　　It　appears；　then；　that　this　idea　of　a　necessary
connexion　among　events　arises　from　a　number　of　similar
instances　which　occur　of　the　constant　conjunction　of　these
events；　nor　can　that　idea　ever　be　suggested　by　any　one　of
these　instances；　surveyed　in　all　possible　lights　and
positions。　But　there　is　nothing　in　a　number　of　instances；
different　from　every　single　instance；　which　is　supposed　to
be　exactly　similar；　except　only；　that　after　a　repetition　of
similar　instances；　the　mind　is　carried　by　habit；　upon　the
appearance　of　one　event；　to　expect　its　usual　attendant；　and
to　believe　that　it　will　exist。　This　connexion；　therefore；
which　we　　in　the　mind；　this　customary　transition　of
the　imagination　from　one　object　to　its　usual　attendant；　is
the　sentiment　or　impression　from　which　we　form　the　idea　of
power　or　necessary　connexion。　Nothing　farther　is　in　the
case。　Contemplate　the　subject　on　all　sides；　you　will　never
find　any　other　origin　of　that　idea。　This　is　the　sole
difference　between　one　instance；　from　which　we　can　never
receive　the　idea　of　connexion；　and　a　number　of　similar
instances；　by　which　it　is　suggested。　The　first　time　a　man
saw　the　communication　of　motion　by　impulse；　as　by　t