the prince(王子)-第6章
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distrusted by him who has been raised to power。
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CHAPTER IV
WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS； CONQUERED BY
ALEXANDER； DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS
OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH
Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly
acquired state； some might wonder how； seeing that Alexander the Great
became the master of Asia in a few years； and died whilst it was scarcely
settled （whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would
have rebelled）； nevertheless his successors maintained themselves； and
had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves
from their own ambitions。
I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be
governed in two different ways； either by a prince； with a body of servants；
who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour and
permission； or by a prince and barons； who hold that dignity by antiquity
of blood and not by the grace of the prince。 Such barons have states and
their own subjects； who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural
affection。 Those states that are governed by a prince and his servants hold
their prince in more consideration； because in all the country there is no
one who is recognized as superior to him； and if they yield obedience to
another they do it as to a minister and official； and they do not bear him
any particular affection。
The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and
the King of France。 The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one
lord； the others are his servants； and； dividing his kingdom into sanjaks； he
sends there different administrators； and shifts and changes them as he
chooses。 But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body
of lords； acknowledged by their own subjects； and beloved by them； they
have their own prerogatives； nor can the king take these away except at his
peril。 Therefore； he who considers both of these states will recognize great
difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk； but； once it is conquered； great
ease in holding it。 The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of
the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the
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kingdom； nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of
those whom the lord has around him。 This arises from the reasons given
above； for his ministers； being all slaves and bondmen； can only be
corrupted with great difficulty； and one can expect little advantage from
them when they have been corrupted； as they cannot carry the people with
them； for the reasons assigned。 Hence； he who attacks the Turk must bear
in mind that he will find him united； and he will have to rely more on his
own strength than on the revolt of others； but； if once the Turk has been
conquered； and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his
armies； there is nothing to fear but the family of this prince； and； this being
exterminated； there remains no one to fear； the others having no credit
with the people； and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his
victory； so he ought not to fear them after it。
The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France；
because one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the
kingdom； for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change。
Such men； for the reasons given； can open the way into the state and
render the victory easy； but if you wish to hold it afterwards； you meet
with infinite difficulties； both from those who have assisted you and from
those you have crushed。 Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the
family of the prince； because the lords that remain make themselves the
heads of fresh movements against you； and as you are unable either to
satisfy or exterminate them； that state is lost whenever time brings the
opportunity。
Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of
Darius； you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk； and therefore it
was only necessary for Alexander； first to overthrow him in the field； and
then to take the country from him。 After which victory； Darius being killed；
the state remained secure to Alexander； for the above reasons。 And if his
successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and at
their ease； for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except those
they provoked themselves。
But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted like
that of France。 Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the Romans
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in Spain； France； and Greece； owing to the many principalities there were
in these states； of which； as long as the memory of them endured； the
Romans always held an insecure possession； but with the power and long
continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away； and the
Romans then became secure possessors。 And when fighting afterwards
amongst themselves； each one was able to attach to himself his own parts
of the country； according to the authority he had assumed there； and the
family of the former lord being exterminated； none other than the Romans
were acknowledged。
When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with
which Alexander held the Empire of Asia； or at the difficulties which
others have had to keep an acquisition； such as Pyrrhus and many more；
this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror；
but by the want of uniformity in the subject state。
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CHAPTER V
CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR
PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS
BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED
Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been
accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom； there are three
courses for those who wish to hold them： the first is to ruin them； the next
is to reside there in person； the third is to permit them to live under their
own laws； drawing a tribute； and establishing within it an oligarchy which
will keep it friendly to you。 Because such a government； being created by
the prince； knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest；
and does it utmost to support him； and therefore he who would keep a city
accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own
citizens than in any other way。
There are； for example； the Spartans and the Romans。 The Spartans
held Athens and Thebes； establishing there an oligarchy； nevertheless they
lost them。 The Romans； in order to hold Capua； Carthage； and Numantia；
dismantled them； and did not lose them。 They wished to hold Greece as
the Spartans held it； making it free and permitting its laws； and did not
succeed。 So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the
country； for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than by
ruining them。 And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to
freedom and does not destroy it； may expect to be destroyed by it； for in
rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancient privileges
as a rallying point； which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to
forget。 And whatever you may do or provide against； they never forget that
name or their privileges unless they are disunited or dispersed； but at every
chance they immediately rally to them； as Pisa after the hundred years she
had been held in bondage by the Florentines。
But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince； and
his family is exterminated； they； being on the one hand accustomed to
obey and on the other hand not having the old prince； cannot agree in
making one from amongst themselves； and they do not know how to
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govern themselves。 For this reason they are very slow to take up arms； and
a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily。 But
in republics there is more vitality； greater hatred； and more desire for
vengeance； which will never permit them to allow the memory of their
former liberty to rest； so that the safest way is to destroy them or to reside
there。
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CHAPTER VI
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE
ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY
Let no one be surprised if； in speaking of entirely new principalities as
I shall do； I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state；
because men； walking almost always in paths beaten by others； and
following by imitation their deeds； are yet unable to keep entirely to the
ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate。 A wise man
ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men； and to imitate those
who have been supreme； so that if his ability does not equal theirs； at least
it will savour of it。 Let him act like the clever archers who； designing to hit
the mark which yet appears too far distant； and knowing the limits to
which the strength of their bow attains； take aim much higher than the
mark； not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height； but to be
able with th
