seven discourses on art-第17章

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We　will　allow　a　poet　to　express　his　meaning；　when　his　meaning　is　not　well　known　to　himself；　with　a　certain　degree　of　obscurity；　as　it　is　one　source　of　the　sublime。　　But　when；　in　plain　prose；　we　gravely　talk　of　courting　the　muse　in　shady　bowers；　waiting　the　call　and　inspiration　of　genius；　finding　out　where　he　inhabits；　and　where　he　is　to　be　invoked　with　the　greatest　success；　of　attending　to　times　and　seasons　when　the　imagination　shoots　with　the　greatest　vigour；　whether　at　the　summer　solstice　or　the　equinox；　sagaciously　observing　how　much　the　wild　freedom　and　liberty　of　imagination　is　cramped　by　attention　to　established　rules；　and　how　this　same　imagination　begins　to　grow　dim　in　advanced　age；　smothered　and　deadened　by　too　much　judgment。　　When　we　talk　such　language；　or　entertain　such　sentiments　as　these；　we　generally　rest　contented　with　mere　words；　or　at　best　entertain　notions　not　only　groundless；　but　pernicious。

If　all　this　means　what　it　is　very　possible　was　originally　intended　only　to　be　meant；　that　in　order　to　cultivate　an　art；　a　man　secludes　himself　from　the　commerce　of　the　world；　and　retires　into　the　country　at　particular　seasons；　or　that　at　one　time　of　the　year　his　body　is　in　better　health；　and　consequently　his　mind　fitter　for　the　business　of　hard　thinking　than　at　another　time；　or　that　the　mind　may　be　fatigued　and　grow　confused　by　long　and　unremitted　application；　this　I　can　understand。　　I　can　likewise　believe　that　a　man　eminent　when　young　for　possessing　poetical　imagination；　may；　from　having　taken　another　road；　so　neglect　its　cultivation　as　to　show　less　of　its　powers　in　his　latter　life。　　But　I　am　persuaded　that　scarce　a　poet　is　to　be　found；　from　Homer　down　to　Dryden；　who　preserved　a　sound　mind　in　a　sound　body；　and　continued　practising　his　profession　to　the　very　last；　whose　later　works　are　not　as　replete　with　the　fire　of　imagination　as　those　which　were　produced　in　his　more　youthful　days。

To　understand　literally　these　metaphors　or　ideas　expressed　in　poetical　language；　seems　to　be　equally　absurd　as　to　conclude　that　because　painters　sometimes　represent　poets　writing　from　the　dictates　of　a　little　winged　boy　or　genius；　that　this　same　genius　did　really　inform　him　in　a　whisper　what　he　was　to　write；　and　that　he　is　himself　but　a　mere　machine；　unconscious　of　the　operations　of　his　own　mind。

Opinions　generally　received　and　floating　in　the　world；　whether　true　or　false；　we　naturally　adopt　and　make　our　own；　they　may　be　considered　as　a　kind　of　inheritance　to　which　we　succeed　and　are　tenants　for　life；　and　which　we　leave　to　our　posterity　very　near　in　the　condition　in　which　we　received　it；　not　much　being　in　any　one　man's　power　either　to　impair　or　improve　it。

The　greatest　part　of　these　opinions；　like　current　coin　in　its　circulation；　we　are　obliged　to　take　without　weighing　or　examining；　but　by　this　inevitable　inattention；　many　adulterated　pieces　are　received；　which；　when　we　seriously　estimate　our　wealth；　we　must　throw　away。　　So　the　collector　of　popular　opinions；　when　he　embodies　his　knowledge；　and　forms　a　system；　must　separate　those　which　are　true　from　those　which　are　only　plausible。　　But　it　becomes　more　peculiarly　a　duty　to　the　professors　of　art　not　to　let　any　opinions　relating　to　that　art　pass　unexamined。　　The　caution　and　circumspection　required　in　such　examination　we　shall　presently　have　an　opportunity　of　explaining。

Genius　and　taste；　in　their　common　acceptation；　appear　to　be　very　nearly　related；　the　difference　lies　only　in　this；　that　genius　has　superadded　to　it　a　habit　or　power　of　execution。　　Or　we　may　say；　that　taste；　when　this　power　is　added；　changes　its　name；　and　is　called　genius。　　They　both；　in　the　popular　opinion；　pretend　to　an　entire　exemption　from　the　restraint　of　rules。　　It　is　supposed　that　their　powers　are　intuitive；　that　under　the　name　of　genius　great　works　are　produced；　and　under　the　name　of　taste　an　exact　judgment　is　given；　without　our　knowing　why；　and　without　being　under　the　least　obligation　to　reason；　precept；　or　experience。

One　can　scarce　state　these　opinions　without　exposing　their　absurdity；　yet　they　are　constantly　in　the　mouths　of　men；　and　particularly　of　artists。　　They　who　have　thought　seriously　on　this　subject；　do　not　carry　the　point　so　far；　yet　I　am　persuaded；　that　even　among　those　few　who　may　be　called　thinkers；　the　prevalent　opinion　gives　less　than　it　ought　to　the　powers　of　reason；　and　considers　the　principles　of　taste；　which　give　all　their　authority　to　the　rules　of　art；　as　more　fluctuating；　and　as　having　less　solid　foundations　than　we　shall　find；　upon　examination；　they　really　have。

The　common　saying；　that　tastes　are　not　to　be　disputed；　owes　its　influence；　and　its　general　reception；　to　the　same　error　which　leads　us　to　imagine　it　of　too　high　original　to　submit　to　the　authority　of　an　earthly　tribunal。　　It　will　likewise　correspond　with　the　notions　of　those　who　consider　it　as　a　mere　phantom　of　the　imagination；　so　devoid　of　substance　as　to　elude　all　criticism。

We　often　appear　to　differ　in　sentiments　from　each　other；　merely　from　the　inaccuracy　of　terms；　as　we　are　not　obliged　to　speak　always　with　critical　exactness。　　Something　of　this　too　may　arise　from　want　of　words　in　the　language　to　express　the　more　nice　discriminations　which　a　deep　investigation　discovers。　　A　great　deal；　however；　of　this　difference　vanishes　when　each　opinion　is　tolerably　explained　and　understood　by　constancy　and　precision　in　the　use　of　terms。

We　apply　the　term　taste　to　that　act　of　the　mind　by　which　we　like　or　dislike；　whatever　be　the　subject。　　Our　judgment　upon　an　airy　nothing；　a　fancy　which　has　no　foundation；　is　called　by　the　same　name　which　we　give　to　our　determination　concerning　those　truths　which　refer　to　the　most　general　and　most　unalterable　principles　of　human　nature；　to　works　which　are　only　to　be　produced　by　the　greatest　efforts　of　the　human　understanding。　　However　inconvenient　this　may　be；　we　are　obliged　to　take　words　as　we　find　them；　all　we　can　do　is　to　distinguish　the　things　to　which　they　are　applied。

We　may　let　pass　those　things　which　are　at　once　subjects　of　taste　and　sense；　and　which　having　as　much　certainty　as　the　senses　themselves；　give　no　occasion　to　inquiry　or　dispute。　　The　natural　appetite　or　taste　of　the　human　mind　is　for　truth；　whether　that　truth　results　from　the　real　agreement　or　equality　of　original　ideas　among　themselves；　from　the　agreement　of　the　representation　of　any　object　with　the　thing　represented；　or　from　the　correspondence　of　the　several　parts　of　any　arrangement　with　each　other。　　It　is　the　very　same　taste　which　relishes　a　demonstration　in　geometry；　that　is　pleased　with　the　resemblance　of　a　picture　to　an　original；　and　touched　with　the　harmony　of　music。

All　these　have　unalterable　and　fixed　foundations　in　nature；　and　are　therefore　equally　investigated　by　reason；　and　known　by　study；　some　with　more；　some　with　less　clearness；　but　all　exactly　in　the　same　way。　　A　picture　that　is　unlike；　is　false。　　Disproportionate　ordinance　of　parts　is　not　right　because　it　cannot　be　true　until　it　ceases　to　be　a　contradiction　to　assert　that　the　parts　have　no　relation　to　the　whole。　　Colouring　is　true　where　it　is　naturally　adapted　to　the　eye；　from　brightness；　from　softness；　from　harmony；　from　resemblance；　because　these　agree　with　their　object；　nature；　and　therefore　are　true：　　as　true　as　mathematical　demonstration；　but　known　to　be　true　only　to　those　who　study　these　things。

But　besides　real；　there　is　also　apparent　truth；　or　opinion；　or　prejudice。　　With　regard　to　real　truth；　when　it　is　known；　the　taste　which　conforms　to　it　is；　and　must　be；　uniform。　　With　regard　to　the　second　sort　of　truth；　which　may　be　called　truth　upon　sufferance；　or　truth　by　courtesy；　it　is　not　fixed；　but　variable。　　However；　whilst　these　opinions　and　prejudices　on　which　it　is　founded　continue；　they　operate　as　truth；　and　the　art；　whose　office　it　is　to　please　the　mind；　as　well　as　instruct　it；　must　direct　itself　according　to　opinion；　or　it　will　not　attain　its　end。

In　proportion　as　these　prejudices　are　known　to　be　generally　diffused；　or　long　received；　the　taste　which　conforms　to　them　approaches　nearer　to　certainty；　and　to　a　sort　of　resemblance　to　real　science；　even　where　opinions　are　found　to　be　no　better　than　prejudices。　　And　since　they　deserve；　on　account　of　their　duration　and　extent；　to　be　considered　as　really　true；　they　become　capable　of　no　small　decree　of　stability　and　determination　by　their　permanent　and　uniform　nature。

As　these　prejudices　become　more　narrow；　more　local；　more　transitory；　this　secondary　taste　becomes　more　and　more　fantastical；　recedes　from　real　science；　is　less　to　be　approved　by　reason；　and　less　followed　in　practice；　though　in　no　case　perhaps　to　be　wholly　neglected；　where　it　does　not　stand；　as　it　sometimes　does；　in　direct　defiance　of　the　most　respectable　opinions　received　amongst　mankind。

Having　laid　down　these　positions；　I　shall　proceed　with　less　method；　because　less　will　serve；　to　explain　and　apply　them。

We　will　take　it　for　granted　that　reason　is　something　invariable　and　fixed　in　the　nature　of　things；　and　without　endeavouring　to　go　back　to　an　account　of　first　principles；　which　for　ever　will　elude　our　search；　we　will　conclude　that　whatever　goes　under　the　name　of　taste；　which　we　can　fairly　bring　under　the　dominion　of　reason；　must　be　considered　as　equally　exempt　from　change。　　If　therefore；　in　the　course　of　this　inquiry；　we　can　show　that　there　are　rules　for　the　conduct　of　the　artist　which　are　fixed　and　invariable；　it　implies；　of　course；　that　the　art　of　the　connoisseur；　or；　in　other　words；　taste；　has　likewise　invariable　principles。

Of　the　judgment　which　we　make　on　the　works　of　art；　and　the　preference　that　we　give　to　one　class　of　art　over　another；　if　a　reason　be　demanded；　the　question　is　perhaps　evaded　by　answering；　〃I　judge　from　my　taste〃；　but　it　does　not　follow　that　a　better　answer　cannot　be　given；　though　for　common　gazers　this　may　be　sufficient。　Every　man　is　not　obliged　to　investigate　the　causes　of　his　approbation　or　dislike。

The　arts　would　lie　open　for　ever　to　caprice　and　casualty；　if　those　who　are　to　judge　of　their　excellences　had　no　settled　principles　by　which　they　are　to　regulate　their　decisions；　and　the　merit　or　defect　of　performances　were　to　be　determined　by　unguided　fancy。　　And　indeed　we　may　venture　to　assert　that　whatever　speculative　knowledge　is　necessary　to　the　artist；　is　equally　and　indispensably　necessary　to　the　connoisseur。

The　first　idea　that　occurs　in　the　consideration　of　what　is　fixed　in　art；　or　in　taste；　is　that　presiding　principle　of　which　I　have　so　frequently　spoken　in　former　discourses；　the　general　idea　of　nature。　The　beginning；　the　middle；　and　the　end　of　everything　that　is　valuable　in　taste；　is　comprised　in　the　knowledge　of　what　is　truly　nature；　for　whatever　ideas　are　not　conformable　to　those　of　nature；　or　universal　opinion；　must　be　considered　as　more　or　less　capricious。

The　idea　of　nature　comprehending　not　only　the　forms　which　nature　produces；　but　also　the　nature　and　internal　fabric　and　organisation；　as　I　may　call　it；　of　the　human　mind　and　imagination：　　general　ideas；　beauty；　or　nature；　are　but　different　ways　of　expressing　the　same　thing；　whether　we　apply　these　terms　to　statues；　poetry；　or　picture。　　Deformity　is　not　nature；　but　an　accidental　deviation　from　her　accustomed　practice。　　This　general　idea　therefore　o