abraham lincoln and the union-第12章

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strangest　thing　in　our　history。　　Virtually；　Seward　intrigued　against　Lincoln　for　control　of　the　Administration。　　The　events　of　the　next　five　weeks　have　an　importance　out　of　all　proportion　to　the　brevity　of　the　time。　　This　was　Lincoln's　period　of　final　probation。　　The　psychological　intensity　of　this　episode　grew　from　the　consciousness　in　every　mind　that　now；　irretrievably；　destiny　was　to　be　determined。　　War　or　peace；　happiness　or　adversity；　one　nation　or　twoall　these　were　in　the　balance。　　Lincoln　entered　the　episode　a　doubtful　quantity；　not　with　certainty　the　master　even　in　his　own　Cabinet。　　He　emerged　dominating　the　situation；　but　committed　to　the　terrible　course　of　war。

One　cannot　enter　upon　this　great　episode；　truly　the　turning　point　in　American　history；　without　pausing　for　a　glance　at　the　character　of　Seward。　　The　subject　is　elusive。　　His　ablest　biographer*　plainly　is　so　constantly　on　guard　not　to　appear　an　apologist　that　he　ends　by　reducing　his　portrait　to　a　mere　outline；　wavering　across　a　background　of　political　details。　　The　most　recent　study　of　Seward**　surely　reveals　between　the　lines　the　doubtfulness　of　the　author　about　pushing　his　points　home。　The　different　sides　of　the　man　are　hard　to　reconcile。　　Now　he　seemed　frank　and　honest；　again　subtle　and　insincere。　　As　an　active　politician　in　the　narrow　sense；　he　should　have　been　sagacious　and　astute；　yet　he　displayed　at　the　crisis　of　his　life　the　most　absolute　fatuity。　　At　times　he　had　a　buoyant　and　puerile　way　of　disregarding　fact　and　enveloping　himself　in　a　world　of　his　own　imagining。　　He　could　bluster；　when　he　wished；　like　any　demagogue；　and　yet　he　could　be　persuasive；　agreeable；　and　even　personally　charming。

*Frederic　Bancroft；　〃Life　of　William　H。　Seward〃。　**　Gamaliel　Bradford；　〃Union　Portraits〃。


But　of　one　thing　with　regard　to　Seward；　in　the　first　week　of　March；　1861；　there　can　be　no　doubt：　he　thought　himself　a　great　statesman　and　he　thought　Lincoln　〃a　Simple　Susan。〃　　He　conceived　his　role　in　the　new　administration　to　involve　a　subtle　and　patient　manipulation　of　his　childlike　superior。　　That　Lincoln　would　gradually　yield　to　his　spell　and　insensibly　become　his　figurehead；　that　he；　Seward；　could　save　the　country　and　would　go　down　to　history　a　statesman　above　compare；　he　took　for　granted。　　Nor　can　he　fairly　be　called　conceited；　either；　that　is　part　of　his　singularity。

Lincoln's　Cabinet　was；　as　Seward　said；　a　compound　body。　　With　a　view　to　strengthening　his　position；　Lincoln　had　appointed　to　cabinet　positions　all　his　former　rivals　for　the　Republican　nomination。　　Besides　Seward；　there　was　Chase　as　Secretary　of　the　Treasury；　Simon　Cameron　of　Pennsylvania　as　Secretary　of　War；　Edward　Bates　of　Missouri　as　Attorney…General。　　The　appointment　of　Montgomery　Blair　of　Maryland　as　Postmaster…General　was　intended　to　placate　the　border　Slave　States。　　The　same　motive　dictated　the　later　inclusion　of　James　Speed　of　Kentucky　in　the　Cabinet。　　The　Black…Stanton　wing　of　the　Democrats　was　represented　in　the　Navy　Department　by　Gideon　Welles；　and　in　course　of　time　in　the　War　Department　also；　when　Cameron　resigned　and　Stanton　succeeded　him。　The　West　of　that　day　was　represented　by　Caleb　B。　Smith　of　Indiana。

Seward　disapproved　of　the　composition　of　the　Cabinet　so　much　that；　almost　at　the　last　moment；　he　withdrew　his　acceptance　of　the　State　Department。　　It　was　Lincoln's　gentleness　of　argument　which　overcame　his　reluctance　to　serve。　　We　may　be　sure；　however；　that　Seward　failed　to　observe　that　Lincoln's　tactlessness　in　social　matters　did　not　extend　to　his　management　of　men　in　politics；　we　may　feel　sure　that　what　remained　in　his　mind　was　Lincoln's　unwillingness　to　enter　office　without　William　Henry　Seward　as　Secretary　of　State。

The　promptness　with　which　Seward　assumed　the　role　of　prime　minister　bears　out　this　inference。　　The　same　fact　also　reveals　a　puzzling　detail　of　Seward's　character　which　amounted　to　obtusenesshis　forgetfulness　that　appointment　to　cabinet　offices　had　not　transformed　his　old　political　rivals　Chase　and　Cameron；　nor　softened　the　feelings　of　an　inveterate　political　enemy；　Welles；　the　Secretary　of　the　Navy。　　The　impression　which　Seward　made　on　his　colleagues　in　the　first　days　of　the　new　Government　has　been　thus　sharply　recorded　by　Welles：　〃The　Secretary　of　State　was；　of　course；　apprised　of　every　meeting　＇of　ministers＇　and　never　failed　in　his　attendance；　whatever　was　the　subject…matter；　and　though　entirely　out　of　his　official　province。　　He　was　vigilantly　attentive　to　every　measure　and　movement　in　other　Departments；　however　trivialas　much　so　as　to　his　ownwatched　and　scrutinized　every　appointment　that　was　made；　or　proposed　to　be　made；　but　was　not　communicative　in　regard　to　the　transaction　of　the　State　Department。〃　　So　eager　was　Seward　to　keep　all　the　threads　of　affairs　in　his　own　hands　that　he　tried　to　persuade　Lincoln　not　to　hold　cabinet　meetings　but　merely　to　consult　with　particular　ministers；　and　with　the　Secretary　of　State；　as　occasion　might　demand。　　A　combined　protest　from　the　other　Secretaries；　however；　caused　the　regular　holding　of　Cabinet　meetings。

With　regard　to　the　Confederacy；　Seward's　policy　was　one　of　non…resistance。　　For　this　he　had　two　reasons。　　The　first　of　these　was　his　rooted　delusion　that　the　bulk　of　the　Southerners　were　opposed　to　secession　and；　if　let　alone；　would　force　their　leaders　to　reconsider　their　action。　　He　might　have　quoted　the　nursery　rhyme；　〃Let　them　alone　and　they'll　come　home〃；　it　would　have　been　like　him　and　in　tune　with　a　frivolous　side　of　his　nature。　　He　was　quite　as　irresponsible　when　he　complacently　assured　the　North　that　the　trouble　would　all　blow　over　within　ninety　days。　　He　also　believed　that　any　display　of　force　would　convert　these　hypothetical　Unionists　of　the　South　from　friends　to　enemies　and　would　consolidate　opinion　in　the　Confederacy　to　produce　war。　　In　justice　to　Seward　it　must　be　remembered　that　on　this　point　time　justified　his　fears。

His　dealings　with　the　Confederate　commissioners　show　that　he　was　playing　to　gain　time；　not　with　intent　to　deceive　the　Southerners　but　to　acquire　that　domination　over　Lincoln　which　he　felt　was　his　by　natural　right。　　Intending　to　institute　a　peace　policy　the　moment　he　gained　this　ascendency；　he　felt　perfectly　safe　in　making　promises　to　the　commissioners　through　mutual　friends。　　He　virtually　told　them　that　Sumter　would　eventually　be　given　up　and　that　all　they　need　do　was　to　wait。

Seward　brought　to　bear　upon　the　President　the　opinions　of　various　military　men　who　thought　the　time　had　passed　when　any　expedition　for　the　relief　of　Sumter　could　succeed。　　For　some　time　Lincoln　seemed　about　to　consent；　though　reluctantly；　to　Seward's　lead　in　the　matter　of　the　forts。　　He　was　pulled　up　standing；　however；　by　the　threatened　resignation　of　the　Postmaster…General；　Blair。　After　a　conference　with　leading　Republican　politicians　the　President　announced　to　his　Cabinet　that　his　policy　would　include　the　relief　of　Sumter。　　〃Seward；〃　says　Welles；　〃。。。was　evidently　displeased。〃

Seward　now　took　a　new　tack。　　Fort　Pickens；　at　Pensacola；　was　a　problem　similar　to　that　of　Sumter　at　Charleston。　　Both　were　demanded　by　the　Confederates；　and　both　were　in　need　of　supplies。　But　Fort　Pickens　lay　to　one　side；　so　to　speak；　of　the　public　mind；　and　there　was　not　conspicuously　in　the　world's　eye　the　square　issue　over　it　that　there　was　over　Sumter。　　Seward　conceived　the　idea　that；　if　the　President's　attention　were　diverted　from　Sumter　to　Pickens　and　a　relief　expedition　were　sent　to　the　latter　but　none　to　the　former；　his　private　negotiations　with　the　Confederates　might　still　be　kept　going；　Lincoln　might　yet　be　hypnotized；　and　at　last　all　would　be　well。

On　All…Fools'　Day；　1861；　in　the　midst　of　a　press　of　business；　he　obtained　Lincoln's　signature　to　some　dispatches；　which　Lincoln；　it　seems；　discussed　with　him　hurriedly　and　without　detailed　consideration。　　There　were　now　in　preparation　two　relief　expeditions；　one　to　carry　supplies　to　Pensacola；　the　other　to　Charleston。　　Neither　was　to　fight　if　it　was　not　molested。　　Both　were　to　be　strong　enough　to　fight　if　their　commanders　deemed　it　necessary。　　As　flagship　of　the　Charleston　expedition；　Welles　had　detailed　the　powerful　warship　Powhatan；　which　was　rapidly　being　made　ready　at　the　Brooklyn　Navy　Yard。　　Such　was　the　situation　as　Welles　understood　it　when　he　was　thinking　of　bed　late　on　the　night　of　the　6th　of　April。　　Until　then　he　had　not　suspected　that　there　was　doubt　and　bewilderment　about　the　Powhatan　at　Brooklyn。　One　of　those　dispatches　which　Lincoln　had　so　hastily　signed　provided　for　detaching　the　Powhatan　from　the　Charleston　expedition　and　sending　it　safe　out　of　harm's　way　to　Pensacola。　　The　commander　of　the　ship　had　before　him　the　conflicting　orders；　one　from　the　President；　one　from　the　Secretary　of　the　Navy。　　He　was　about　to　sail　under　the　President's　orders　for　Pensacola；　but　wishing　to　make　sure　of　his　authority；　he　had　telegraphed　to　Washington。　Gideon　Welles　was　a　pugnacious　man。　　His　dislike　for　Seward　was　deepseated。　　Imagine　his　state　of　mind　when　it　was　accidently　revealed　to　him　that　Seward　had　gone　behind　his　back　and　had　issued　to　naval　officers　orders　which　were　contradictory　to　his　own！　　The　immediate　result　was　an　interview　that　same　night　between　Seward　and　Welles　in　which；　as　Welles　coldly　admitted　in　after　days；　the　Secretary　of　the　Navy　showed　〃some　excitement。〃　Together　they　went；　about　midnight；　to　the　White　House。　　Lincoln　had　some　difficulty　recalling　the　incident　of　the　dispatch　on　the　1st　of　April；　but　when　he　did　remember；　he　took　the　responsibility　entirely　upon　himself；　saying　he　had　had　no　purpose　but　to　strengthen　the　Pickens　expedition；　and　no　thought　of　weakening　the　expedition　to　Charleston。　　He　directed　Seward　to　telegraph　immediately　cancelling　the　order　detaching　the　Powhatan。　Seward　made　a　desperate　attempt　to　put　him　off；　protesting；　it　was　too　late　to　send　a　telegram　that　night。　　〃But　the　President　was　imperative；〃　writes　Secretary　Welles；　in　describing　the　incident；　and　a　dispatch　was　sent。

Seward　then；　doubtless　in　his　agitation；　did　a　strange　thing。　Instead　of　telegraphing　in　the　President's　name；　the　dispatch　which　he　sent　read　merely；　〃Give　up　the　Powhatan。。。Seward。〃　　When　this　dispatch　was　received　at　Brooklyn；　the　Powhatan　was　already　under　way　and　had　to　be　overtaken　by　a　fast　tug。　　In　the　eyes　of　her　commander；　however；　a　personal　telegram　from　the　Secretary　of　State　appeared　as　of　no　weight　against　the　official　orders　of　the　President；　and　he　continued　his　voyage　to　Pensacola。

The　mercurial　temper　of　Seward　comes　out　even　in　the　caustic　narrative　written　afterwards　by　Welles。　　Evidently　Seward　was　deeply　mortified　and　depressed　by　the　incident。　　He　remarked；　says　Welles；　that　old　as　he　was　he　had　learned　a　lesson；　and　that　was　that　he　had　better　attend　to　his　own　business。　　〃To　this；〃　commented　his　enemy；　〃I　cordially　assented。〃

Nevertheless　Seward's　loss　of　faith　in　himself　was　only　momentary。　A　night's　sleep　was　sufficient　to　restore　it。　　His　next　communication　to　the　commissioners　shows　that　he　was　himself　again；　sure　that　destiny　owed　him　the　control　of　the　situation。　　On　the　following　day　the　commissioners　had　got　wind　of　the　relief　expedition　and　pressed　him　for　information；　recalling　his　assurance　that　nothing　would　be　done　to　their